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Abstract 
 
Successful innovation is vital for firm survival and success (Dougherty, 2004). 
Leaders of established companies acknowledge that radical innovation, in 
particular, is critical to their growth and renewal (Leifer et al, 2000). This is 
especially true for the research and development sector (Eisenbeiß and 
Boerner, 2010). New product development, while not the only form of 
innovation, remains the most advanced, the most widely studied, and the most 
significant type of firm-level innovation (Garcia and Cantalone, 2002). Despite 
an increase in research on innovation, the identification of specific ways to 
improve firms’ innovation performance, specifically with regard to radical 
innovation, remains a significant challenge for researchers of innovation 
(Bessant et al., 2010). 
 
The context for this study is a revelatory case study of two competing R&D 
teams in a global, high-tech, research-intensive organisation. The teams had a 
mandate to develop radical innovations, though were characterised by 
differences in approach and leadership styles. A thematic analysis explores 
the processes through which each team generated, incubated and, ultimately, 
implemented new commercial ideas. Four themes emerge from the case 
study: structure, process, networks and leadership. The analysis suggests that 
variation in these four elements may explain the variation in the teams’ 
outcomes in terms of radical and incremental innovation.  
 
This study contributes to our understanding of how to organise for innovation, 
and specifically, how team leadership and networks relate to innovation 
outcomes.  Specifically, it suggests that the three phases of the Innovation 
Value Chain (Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007) have differential potency in their 
likelihood of delivering radical innovation; with a focus on the first phase more 
likely to produce radical innovation. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Organising for Radical Innovation 
This study focuses on new product development within an R&D department of 
a large, global, pharmaceutical corporation. New Product Development (NPD) 
is an issue that is widely accepted as critical for both individual firms and the 
economy as a whole. Ahmed and Shepherd (2010) note that the potential 
benefits accruing from innovation make it possibly the single most important 
activity for organisations.  Specifically, product innovation or new product 
development (NPD) is widely recognised as an important priority for 
companies (e.g. Hill and Utterback, 1980; Lundvall, 1985; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1987; Rommel, 1991; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Dougherty, 
1996; Utterback, 1996).  
 
The literature on innovation is diverse and complex, and overlaps with many 
different topics and research fields (Antonelli, 2009). This complexity makes it 
challenging for practitioners and scholars to understand and explain the wide-
ranging organisational factors that can influence a firm’s innovation capability 
and performance. Several decades of research into innovation management 
have failed to provide clear and consistent findings or coherent advice for 
managers (Tidd, 2001).  Indeed, managing innovation has been recognised as 
2 
 
a long-standing and intractable problem (Salaman and Storey, 2002) mainly, 
according to Igartua et al., (2010) because the concept comprises so many, 
diverse component parts that guidelines inevitably become fragmented.  
 
There is, however, agreement in the literature that proficiency at new product 
development is a key priority for managers (Van de Ven, 1986) and for their 
organisations (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1994; Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1999; 
Liker et al., 1999; Sethi et al., 2001; Bonner et al., 2002; Filippini et al., 2004; 
Szymanski et al., 2006). Arguably, Tushman and Nadler’s assertion about the 
prevailing mood about innovation, therefore, still holds relevance:  
 
In today’s business environment, there is no executive task more vital 
and demanding than the sustained management of innovation and 
change…to compete in a new environment, companies must create 
new products, services and processes…they must adopt innovation as 
a way of corporate life (Tushman and Nadler, 1986: 74) 
 
However, despite this scholarly interest in NPD structures, the question of how 
firms should implement an effective new NPD process design for decreased 
cycle time and increased innovation productivity remains largely unanswered. 
Precise knowledge of the organisational factors that lead to radical innovation, 
in particular,  is underdeveloped to the extent that success is often attributed to 
serendipity (Bessant et al, 2004). Wolfe asserted that; ‘Our understanding of 
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innovative behaviour in organisations remains relatively under-developed’ 
(1994: 405).   
 
Key questions remain in the literature and in the field about just how radical 
innovation, in particular, emerges within large organisatons (Leifer et al, 2000). 
This includes specific details like: how R&D teams organise for innovation; 
how they generate new commercial ideas; how they develop, rank, incubate 
and prioritise their ideas; how they convert raw ideas into testable concepts; 
how they research them; how and why teams prioritise and champion certain 
ideas and abandon others; how teams get ideas implemented and adopted by 
the organisation as a whole; and how such teams are and ought to be led.  
These qestions form the key focus of this study. 
 
Companies constantly search for proven, effective methods to innovate.  But 
the quest for organisational factors that are proven to be successful in the 
innovation process is a significant challenge for many reasons. By its very 
nature, innovation is largely unpredictable and requires flexibility, opportunism, 
and adaptability; it’s a delicate balancing act (Kanter, 1989).  Similarly, there is 
agreement that due to the complexities associated with innovation research, 
there will never be just one true theory or best practice of innovation (Tidd, 
2001; Thamain, 1990; Harmancioglu et al., 2007).  It is these continuing gaps 
in knowledge about what really happens inside firms which leads to successful 
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innovation outcomes, combined with the fact that this potential to achieve more 
with innovation remains largely unexploited by management practitioners that 
provides the motivation underpinning this thesis. 
 
In the research on innovation, what is clear is that different theories apply in 
various contexts within an organisation or even within individual projects, such 
as: the stage of development of the innovation (Damanpour and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2001); the type, scope or ambition of innovation pursued 
(Christensen, 1997; Leifer et al., 2000); the life-cycle stage of the organisation 
(Koberg et al., 1996; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000); the level of customer 
involvement in the process of co-evolution of innovation (Von Hippel, 1986, 
1988; Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2003); the type of leadership assigned to 
the project group or innovation team (Buijs, 2007); the phase of the innovation 
value chain (IVC) in which the project is situated (O’Connor and Ayers, 2004; 
Hansen and Birkenshaw, 2007; Roper et al., 2008); particular characteristics of 
public service innovation (Damanpour and Schneider, 2009) the corporate 
priority assigned to the brands or assets involved (Birkinshaw and Robbins, 
2010); whether it is a product or service innovation and the role of design 
(Bessant and Maher, 2009);  and the wider environment that the organisation 
operates within (Koberg et al., 1996; Brennan and Dooley, 2005).  
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This contingency approach to describing new product and service 
development within firms is common in innovation research (e.g. Wolfe, 1994; 
Damanpour, 1996), but what is also important is the role of the relationships 
between the factors that influence an organisation’s ability to manage 
innovation. The relationships between factors will be influenced by 
organisational context such as organisational size, age, resources and 
competitive elements and the external environment. The culture in the 
organisation; the work climate for creativity and the team climate for 
innovation; the use of cross functional teams; the engagement with external 
network partners; the management support for innovation and, crucially, the 
leadership of the innovation teams will also influence innovation efforts 
(Phillips et al, 2006; Amabile et al, 1996, 2006; Anderson and West, 1998; 
Balsano et al, 2008; Barczak and Wilemon, 2003; Caldwell and O’Reilly, 2003; 
Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Cooper, 2009; Edmondson and Nembhard, 2009; 
Goffin et al, 2010; Keller, 2006; Kratzer et al, 2006; Mumford et al, 2007) . 
 
The problem of how to manage innovation, however difficult, is not new and 
the sources of the problem have been investigated at many levels and from 
diverse perspectives. Most of the studies exploring innovation adopt a 
positivist perspective (Biemans et al, 2010).  That is, they treat innovation as 
the dependent variable and try to establish, identify and, ultimately, measure 
the influence of a series of independent variables.  In this way, they seek to 
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explain the scope, pattern and degree of innovation within organisations 
(Salaman and Storey, 2005).   This study takes a different approach as it 
explores variation in innovation outputs and links them directly to the 
processes employed. 
 
Researchers often either focus on how the process of innovation is organised 
in firms (innovation modes) or, alternatively, on the results of the innovation 
processes and their characteristics (innovation outcomes). In the literature on 
innovation management these two aspects are treated in a somehow separate 
way (Isari and Pontiggia, 2010).   
 
R&D is often the starting point for innovation and new product development. 
The R&D team in any firm, which is responsible for most of the organisation’s 
product innovation, plays, probably, the crucial role in firm survival (Huang and 
Lin 2006). R&D projects are generally complex, time-pressured and uncertain. 
R&D is risky: vast amounts of money can be lost in attempts to innovate 
(Stevens, 1996) and critics of innovation often suggest that stock markets 
respond negatively to innovations which have a longer lead time (Sood and 
Tellis, 2009). Thamhain (2003) argues that, as with innovation generally, no 
single, blueprint exists that guarantees success in R&D.  However, the R&D 
innovation process is necessarily purposeful. Therefore, the quest for more 
meaningful insight that might help guide managerial action to more effective 
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performance is important. In this context, Goffin et al (2011), assert that the 
ability of organisations to learn from prior experience is essential if they are to 
improve their performance at innovation: ‘Sustained improvements in R&D 
depend on the capacity of an organisation to learn’ (p. 301).  But although, 
such learning has been noted as a requirement for the successful 
development of innovation (Drejer and Riis, 1999; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990); 
the NPD process has proved a difficult learning environment for R&D 
organisations (Michael and Palandjian, 2004).  Arguably, this is because the 
new product development process is highly complex, involves cross functional 
integration with many individuals involved and this gives rise to numerous 
uncertainties (Brettel et al, 2011).  Also, research into creativity in R&D has not 
been extensive and hence understanding of the area is arguably 
underdeveloped (Eisenbeiß and Boerner, 2010; Kurtzberg and Amabile, 
2001;West, 2002; Anderson et al, 2004). 
 
A flexible organisation, with high levels of freedom and risk taking, is 
commonly proposed as the ideal springboard for innovation (Phillips et al, 
2006; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). However, extant evidence suggests that it is 
difficult to achieve projects that run efficiently but that still leave room for 
exploration and the creation of new knowledge (Smith et al., 2008).  
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In this context, it is also important to make a distinction between two types of 
R&D that firms undertake: exploration and exploitation (Schumpeter, 1934; 
March, 1991; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Firms undertake exploration in 
R&D to create new products and deploy new technologies. Exploration or 
exploratory research (including exploration alliances) is characterised by long 
time horizons and unpredictable, high variance returns (Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2009). On the other hand, firms undertake exploitation in R&D to 
improve product lines within markets that they are currently serving (Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2010; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). This distinction has 
parallels in the classification of types of innovation with exploration correlated 
to radical innovation and exploitation more likely to yield incremental 
innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Leifer et al., 
2000). There is increasing evidence that firms are favouring radical innovation 
because, when successful, it offers superior return on investment (Bessant et 
al., 2010).  Therefore, any insights or guidelines that could enhance firms’ 
capacity to successfully deliver radical innovation will have considerable 
managerial relevance. 
 
Any NPD process requires a high level of creative performance. In innovation, 
creative performance is generally mediated through a team or working group 
rather than an individual. According to Leenders et al, (2007), creative 
performance is of paramount importance in NPD projects and most NPD 
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projects are managed through an NPD or innovation team as the 
organisational nucleus for innovation. The value of teams in new product 
development is well established. Both the complexity of the work; the blend of 
skills and expertise required and extant best practice suggest that when 
professionals from different functions work together on development projects 
they create the most successful product in the shortest possible time 
(Edmondson and Nembhardt, 2009). As creative and innovative work, within 
the R&D setting, is complex, it demands the collaborative efforts of creative 
people with different areas of expertise (Mumford et al., 2002). Such 
complexity makes successful performance of innovation activities especially 
difficult and puts additional strain on leaders of innovation teams.  
 
Research surveys have been conducted to determine the organisational 
factors in firms that are most predictive of success in NPD initiatives (Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt, 1999; Cooper et al., 2008; Cooper, 2009; Cooper and 
Edgett, 2010; Barczac et al., 2008). For instance, the Product Development 
and Management Association (PDMA) recognises the importance of new 
products to organisations and has undertaken three major studies on ‘‘best 
practices’’ in NPD (Barczak et al, 2003; Griffin, 1997; Page, 1993). Overall, 
these, and other (Adams, 2004), large scale studies focus on the number and 
types of activities conducted by organisations during the NPD process and the 
relationships between the proficiency in executing these activities and new 
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product performance. Such surveys generally identify issues like having an 
explicit innovation strategy; having an effective innovation process (Adams, 
2004; Griffin, 1997); having cross functional teams managing the process; they 
often refer to the quality of the people on the innovation team and usually 
specify that the best companies ensure that there is senior management 
responsibility for the results of the innovation programme.  Bringing the voice 
of the consumer (or customer) into the NPD process has generally been a 
feature of best practice in NPD.  However other issues such as, the selection 
of team leader; the leader’s characteristics, experience; management style; 
their networks both inside and outside the company; their skills; their technical 
knowledge and their level within the organisation have rarely featured in these 
frameworks. 
 
Strong team leadership, for innovation and R&D teams, includes the ability to 
direct and coordinate the activities of other team members, assess team 
performance, assign tasks, develop team knowledge, skills and abilities, 
motivate team members, plan and organise, and establish a positive 
atmosphere (Tannenbaum et al., 1998; Eisenbeiss et al., 2008; Messinger, 
2009; Zheng et al., 2010).  As boundaries between the team and the 
stakeholders will be porous, strong team leadership requires being clear about 
which are the unhelpful information flows across team boundaries during 
creative phases (pressure, delivery dates, high expectations and threats) and 
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which are the helpful flows (information, contacts, experience and alternative 
solutions). Cooper and Edgett (2008) argue that leadership in an innovative 
context will require vision and keeping situations open; being flexible, 
experimental and positively disposed to creativity rather than focussing on the 
solution and shutting situations down. Kolb et al, suggest that an effective 
leader for innovation will manage team boundaries with the external world and 
let their teams concentrate on their objectives (1993). However, academic 
examination of leadership influence on R&D team innovation has been, at 
best, inadequate and often controversial (Bass, 1999; Keller, 1999 and 2004; 
Nippa, 2006; Stoker et al., 2001).  
 
That leadership is important in managing innovation teams is established 
(Senge, 2006; Van Buijs, 2007; Sarin and O’Connor, 2009).  Similarly, there is 
evidence that innovation projects, in getting from raw idea to its eventual 
introduction or implementation, follow a journey with very distinct stages, 
namely:  Idea Generation, Idea Conversion and Idea Diffusion. (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1997; O’Connor and Ayers, 2004; Hansen and Birkinshaw, 
2007; Roper et al., 2008).  It is arguable that different types of team leadership 
will have differential potency in an innovation project depending on the stage of 
progress of the individual project.  
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In summary, innovation and, specifically, proficiency at new product 
development is a vital element of most firms’ ability to survive and compete.  
The majority of firms who are innovation-active rely on cross function teams as 
the organizing unit through which innovation is delivered.   
 
Radical innovation is associated with organisations with the capacity for 
continuous learning (Bessant and Francis, 1997; McLaughlin et al, 2008) and 
teams, ‘rather than individuals, are the fundamental learning unit in most 
organisations’ (Senge, 2006; p.10).  
 
R&D is the start point for most innovation projects, in large firms, and R&D 
shoulders the burden for delivering the majority of companies’ innovation 
output.  But, the operating context for innovation is characterised by risk and 
most projects fail (Christensen, 1997; Foster and Kaplan, 2001).  This study 
seeks to identify some of the important factors, which both encourage and 
frustrate the successful development of new product and service ideas within 
innovation teams.  It examines the structure, processes, networks and 
leadership of an innovation project in a large organisation to determine their 
impact on the outcomes.  Such an understanding is not only critical for 
organisations but also aligns with Ireland’s national ambitions of competing on 
the basis of creativity and innovation. 
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1.2 The Importance of Innovation in the Irish Context  
Recent reports from the Irish Government repeatedly assert that innovation 
and creativity are key determinants of success for Ireland. In particular, a 
number of recent government reports allude to a vision of creating Ireland’s 
‘smart economy’. The basic idea, as expressed in five reports reports – the 
‘Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation 2006-2013’ (2006); ‘Building 
Ireland’s Smart Economy’ published in 2008; ‘Sharing our Future: Ireland 
2025’ (2009); ‘Trading and Investing in a Smart Economy; Action Plan to 2015’ 
(2010) and the ‘Report of the Innovation Taskforce’ (2010) – is to focus public 
investment on a set of targeted priority areas in science, engineering and 
technology. The intention is to create a research, innovation and 
commercialisation environment that will translate knowledge creation into 
economic activity and ultimately generate highly paid and sustainable jobs in 
Ireland.  
 
Innovation is currently the central theme in the Irish Government’s plans for 
economic recovery. The first formal declaration of this national focus on 
innovation, ‘Building Ireland’s Smart Economy’ was published by the 
Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in 2008. Intended as a blueprint 
for sustainable development, this programme outlined the Government’s 
commitment to a set of actions to reorganise the economy over the period 
2008-2013 in order to secure the economic future for Ireland. 
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The Smart Economy combines the successful elements of the enterprise 
economy and the innovation or ‘ideas’ economy. 
 
A key feature of this approach is building the innovation or ‘ideas’ 
component of the economy through the utilisation of human capital - the 
knowledge, skills and creativity of people - and its ability and 
effectiveness in translating ideas into valuable processes, products and 
services. (Building Ireland’s Smart Economy: A Framework for 
Sustainable Economic Renewal, 2008; p. 7). 
 
A number of subsequent Government Reports have also put innovation at the 
top of the Irish Government’s business and economic agenda. Forfas 
(Ireland’s state agency responsible for developing industrial policy) report 
‘Sharing Our Future’ (2009) stated: 
 
Innovation in all its dimensions will continue as the central driver of 
wealth creation, economic progress and prosperity in the coming 
decades. Innovation will no longer be about technological innovation but 
will include organisation and business model innovation, workplace 
innovation, creativity and design. (Forfás: Sharing our Future: Ireland 
2025; 2009; p. 6. Emphasis added). 
 
In order to frame specific policies to facilitate Ireland’s transition to a smart 
economy, an Innovation Taskforce was appointed by the Government in July, 
2009.  This group, which included some private sector representation, was 
mainly comprised of state agencies.  It included the heads of the state 
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development agencies, the Industrial Development Authority and Enterprise 
Ireland as well as the heads of Ireland’s two largest universities (Trinity 
College and UCD).  In 2010, the Report of the Innovation Taskforce states: 
 
What we need to do now is to place innovation at the heart of enterprise 
policy. Our future economic success depends on increasing levels of 
innovation across all aspects of Irish enterprise – from large Irish-owned 
multinationals to foreign multinationals located here to established Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in services and manufacturing, as well 
as start-ups and existing companies with high growth potential. (Report of 
the Innovation Taskforce, 2010; p. 2) 
 
Within this report, the Government unveiled its ambition to create ‘an 
Innovation Island’ and to make Ireland an innovation hub for Europe: 
 
The key objective of this Action Area is to make Ireland an innovation 
and commercialisation hub of Europe – a country that combines the 
features of an attractive home for innovative multinationals while also 
being a highly-attractive incubation environment for the best 
entrepreneurs from Ireland and overseas.  (Building Ireland’s Smart 
Economy: A Framework for Sustainable Economic Renewal, 2008; p. 
13) 
 
That specific policy intervention, to help Ireland succeed with innovation, is 
warranted has been repeatedly demonstrated by Ireland’s performance in the 
EU Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) has been conducted a total of six times; 1992, 1996, 2001, 2002-4, 
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2004-6 and 2006-8. The CIS defines a firm as being innovative, or innovation-
active, if it introduces at least one product, service or process that is new to the 
firm itself within the period under review (Arundel et al, 2007).  
 
The Irish Community Innovation Survey for 2008-2010 collected information 
about product and process innovation as well as organisational innovations 
and other key variables.  Most questions covered new or significantly improved 
goods or services or the implementation of new or significantly improved 
processes, logistics or distribution methods.  Compared to other EU member 
states, Ireland continues to be seen as a ‘follower’ in innovation. The CIS 
reports a general trend suggesting that the larger the firm, the more likely it is 
that it will be engaged in some mode of innovation.  It notes that Irish firms are 
generally less innovative than their foreign-owned counterparts.  Another 
finding is that when smaller firms innovate, they are much less likely than 
larger firms to engage in any collaboration with external partners. 
 
In examining barriers to innovation, the survey asks why companies are not 
engaging more (or, in some cases, at all) with innovation. They conclude that 
the principal barrier is funding.  Companies see innovation as expensive and 
have difficulty in getting the funds to innovate. Second only to access to funds 
to innovate is the issue of qualified personnel; this is followed by lack of 
information on technology. Firms report that they do not have the expertise or 
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specialist personnel they would wish to have in order to voyage into the area of 
new product and service development. This suggests that there is a lack of 
process know-how within Irish firms about how innovation really unfolds in 
organisations and what might constitute best practice in the area. 
 
What can be concluded from the Irish innovation context is that innovation 
(new product, service, and business development) is high on the 
Government’s agenda and that it is likely to remain a high national priority. 
Innovation is a top priority for business and therefore any practical insights that 
may offer a better framework for enhancing innovation performance will be a 
welcome addition to both policy and practice.  An objective of this thesis is to 
investigate how innovation really happens in firms and what sort of practices 
organisations should embed in order to lead to successful new product and 
service development. Hence, this thesis is conceptually relevant both for 
practitioners and policymakers. 
 
1.3 The Case Research 
This thesis is based on a ‘revelatory’ case study of what could be described as 
an organisational experiment in innovation in a large R&D intensive firm. The 
case study is based on two teams that ‘competed’ to develop ‘radical, game-
changing’ new product ideas for the firm. This case study represents an 
interesting context for several reasons. First, the firm, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), 
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was the world’s second largest pharmaceutical company with large R&D 
expenditure (GSK was one of the world’s top ten spenders on R&D in 2009). 
Second, as part of an effort to develop ‘bigger and better’ ideas to fill its new 
product development pipeline GSK created a project called Innovation Sans 
Frontiers (ISF). This project involved two ‘Innovation Teams’ working to the 
same brief but in competition with each other; it was time bound, a nine-month 
project to end in the summer of 2007; and the outcomes were ‘judged’ by 
senior management, with one team ‘winning the contest’. Third, a priori, the 
project was designed to be ‘different’ from existing approaches to innovation 
within GSK. For example, the project was designed to provide additional 
management autonomy for the participants; the teams were encouraged to 
explore areas in which they had a strong personal interest, including 
opportunities outside the existing sectors and therapy areas in which the firm 
operates; and the team leaders were not required to account for their time or 
expenditures. Fourth, the two teams were comprised of roughly 12 members  
and were ‘created equal’ insofar as was possible with their collective 
experience, expertise and seniority balanced across the two teams.  Finally, 
the two teams were based in different geographic contexts (the UK and the 
US).   
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The study will show how one team produced innovation ideas and concepts 
(outcomes), which could be classified as radical while the other team’s 
outcomes were described as less original and more incremental in nature.  In 
this study I was given the type of access to the people and data surrounding 
this project which is rarely forthcoming from global organisations.  As such, the 
study provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the managerial practices 
currently deployed with the objective of identifying the elements of those 
practices which should be encouraged and those whose value is more 
equivocal.  Thus, it offers an opportunity to respond to the questions in the 
innovation literature. 
 
1.4 The Research Objective & Research Question 
In doing this study my objective was to undertake an in-depth and longitudinal 
examination of an innovation project or programme within a large, global, R&D 
intensive organisation (GSK) to gain a deep, rich understanding about the 
innovation process, which may have relevance for developing and advancing 
the practice of new product development and innovation management more 
generally. Specifically, I sought to review the outputs of the innovation contest 
and to assess the influence of various antecedent factors in arriving at the 
outputs. 
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This study explores how innovation unfolds within teams, who themselves 
operate within organisations.  It focuses on how radical innovation can be 
encouraged within large organisatons. It explores issues like: how teams 
actually create and develop new ideas; how they sift, rank, incubate and 
prioritise them; how they convert raw ideas into testable concepts; how and 
why teams or individuals champion certain ideas and abandon others; how 
teams get ideas implemented and adopted by the organisation as a whole; 
how they find sponsors in senior management to facilitate the assimilation of 
their ideas into the company’s pipeline.  It also examines how such teams are 
and ought to be led.   This latter element, leadership of R&D teams, is 
important to this study as the case facilitated an analysis of the type of 
leadership most appropriate for each phase of the innovation process, value 
chain or ‘journey’.   
 
1.5 The Research Methodology 
1.5.1  What was done? 
This study is based on a single, revalatory case-study.  The approach is 
inductive. The study was constructed in a series of three consecutive phases 
to provide increasing focus to the investigation.  
 
The three phases are illustrated in Figure 1.1 (below).  The first phase involved 
interviewing senior management in GSK’s worldwide HQ (Generally at 
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functional ‘President’ or ‘Vice President’ level) to identify the most appropriate 
case within GSK’s extensive, global R&D operations to study.   The factors 
that led to the selection of the ISF programme included a desire to examine a 
dedicated, discrete, time-bound programme in order to be able to elicit some 
meaningful insights about the management of innovation in future initiatives of 
this type.  A further consideration was that this project was explicitly mandated 
to search for radical ideas.  The first phase of the fieldwork involved interviews 
with the global heads of Innovation, R&D, Organisational Development, 
Marketing Excellence and Global Brand Marketing.  Through these interviews, 
the ISF project was selected and agreed at a high level within the organisation 
as a suitable case study. 
 
The second phase constitutes the principal part of the study.  It involved a 
series of in depth, semi-structured, mainly (but not exclusively) telephone 
interviews with the participants on the ISF programme.  These interviews took 
place over a period of two years.  Interviews were carried out with everyone 
who was a member of either team in the initiative, over the two sites in the UK 
and US with the exceptions of a couple of individuals who had left the 
organisation either during or fairly soon after the conclusion of the project.  
Along with the interviews, there was additional material ranging from briefing 
slides, project plans (US only), the two teams’ PowerPoint slides and videos 
for the final presentation of their outputs in New Jersey, internal close-out 
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reports on the project along with considerable consumer research data and 
video material. 
 
The third phase involved interviews with the judging panel for the innovation 
competition.  Members of this group sit on GSK’s Senior Leadership Team 
(SLT) within R&D and are responsible for the number, scope and progress of 
initiatives that are undertaken by R&D.  They allocate the budgets and 
resources and manage the innovation process from the R&D side and they 
determine the portfolio of projects that are supported, making decisions on the 
balance between radical and incremental projects. This group are the most 
influential gatekeepers within the innovation process in R&D.   
 
The three-phased approach allowed for a chronological analysis of the case.  
The preliminary interviews showed why such an experimental approach was 
deemed appropriate by the SLT for this project.  The participant interviews 
revealed which were the elements of the project design and management that 
encouraged innovation and which ones frustrated it.  Finally, the interviews 
with the SLT gave a much richer insight into how senior management 
expected the initiative to be run; how they ranked the ideas; which ones have 
survived and are still being worked on in the organisation.  These interviews 
also revealed some differences of opinion within SLT as to which group should 
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have won the contest as it transpired that the ‘declared winner’ was not the 
universal choice. 
 
1.5.2 How it was done? 
 
Figure 1.1: The Research Process for this Study 
 
Source:  Case Study Records 
 
1.6 Findings 
This study’s analysis identified (i) the factors that encouraged or inhibited the 
participants from creating and developing ideas for new products, and (ii) the 
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influence of internal and external networks on the type and novelty of the ideas 
and (iii) the effect of team leadership on the innovation process.  
The factors that enabled or inhibited participants to develop ideas reflect many 
existing themes in the literature. Specifically, the study suggests four key areas 
in developing a firm or project-level infrastructure conducive to innovation: 
structures, processes, networks and leadership.   
 
This study has successfully identified a number of team or project-level factors, 
which seem to enhance organisations innovation performance. High among 
these is the issue of leadership for innovation teams; for innovation projects 
and, specifically, for the phases of individual innovation projects. Additional 
considerations which are predictive of positive NPD outcomes surround the 
initiating structures of innovation teams (the time allocated for innovation and, 
specifically, time devoted to each section of the innovation value chain; 
creative spaces for innovation; squaring off line managers; the size of the team 
itself) and the processes (integrating the voice of the consumer; converting raw 
ideas into testable concepts and effectively screening the ideas; and finding a 
way to prioritise ideas which is genuinely objective) they use. A further critical 
consideration is the use of internal and external networks. 
 
In terms of team leadership, the case study revealed that the leaders of the 
two teams adopted very different approaches to the task. In summary, the UK 
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team leader abandoned any formal team processes and allowed team 
members to work on their own. Additionally, the UK team leader was a 
scientist, of some repute in his field, and he brokered some important 
introductions to other specialists and networks outside the organisation.  
 
The US team, in contrast, was led by a former project manager, who adopted 
a structured approach to the work of the team. During the project he 
‘sensitised’ senior management to the nature and types of ideas on which his 
team was working. At the end of the competition the US team was declared 
the winner, although follow-on discussions with senior management suggests 
that many of the (losing) UK team’s ideas may have a longer lasting impact on 
the development of new products and services at GSK.  Moreover, the majority 
of the judging panel considered the ideas and concepts from the UK to have 
been far more imaginative and radical than those of the US team. 
 
The approaches adopted by the two team leaders in managing their teams 
have been classified in terms of transformational and transactional leaders 
(Bass, 1985). The team leader from the UK could be described as a 
transformational leader, while the US counterpart was more transactional, 
adopting a structured approach to the task.  
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Activities across the project covered a spectrum of ‘exploration’ and 
‘exploitation’ and the case study suggests that different forms of leadership 
have a differential impact depending on the stage of the innovation process. It 
was further identified that the UK team delivered a far higher number of ideas 
which were classified as potentially radical ideas for the organisation while the 
ideas put forward by the US company, while well-researched, were seen as 
largely incremental.  
 
The study suggests that transformational leadership is more appropriate for 
teams at the ‘R’ stage. In contrast we find the ‘D’ stage, where the focus has 
shifted to exploitation, transactional leadership is more appropriate. As such 
we argue that neither leadership approach alone represents an ‘ideal’ 
approach to spanning the full spectrum of the innovation process (Hansen and 
Brkinshaw, 2007) from creativity to implementation.  
 
1.7  Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured around an in-depth case study from within GSK.  
There are nine chapters in the thesis for which the titles and objectives are 
described below. Chapter one sets the context for the study by identifying 
innovation as a key priority for industry and for policymakers.  It notes the 
concern of the Irish government that many Irish businesses are not performing 
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well in terms of their innovation outputs.  It also describes the research 
objectives, the research methodology and design of the study. 
 
Chapter two contains a review of the literature around innovation and new 
product development.  It establishes the theoretical framework for the study of 
innovation management.  It provides a definition of key terms; a description of 
frameworks and identifies how innovation has been generally measured and 
researched in academic studies.  This section identifies some gaps in the 
literature around what is known about how the innovation process happens in 
large complex organisations. 
 
Chapter three outlines the research philosophy underpinning this study.  It 
describes, in detail, the research design and the research process. 
 
Chapter four, by way of general context, provides an overview of the pharma 
sector in 2007 (the year in which the case is set). It describes key global trends 
in the industry and reviews their implications for some of the leading pharma 
companies.  Specifically, it concentrates on GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and 
examines its Consumer Healthcare (GSK CH) business division. The chapter 
describes GSK’s approach to new product development and situates the 
Innovation Sans Frontiers (ISF) project within the organisation’s overall 
innovation programme within R&D. 
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Chapter five describes the background and objectives for the ISF project.  This 
chapter contains the fieldwork for the study and it tells the story of the ISF 
initative from the perspective of the participants.  It contains chronoligical,  
verbatim reports of the team members as they describe their experiences with 
the teams.  It charts the progress of both teams and concludes with interview 
excerpts from the R&D Senior Leadership Team (SLT) who acted as the 
judging panel for the teams’s outputs. 
 
Chapter six presents a thematic analysis of the field data.  It identifies, through 
axial coding,  the issues that emerged as the most significant from the 
fieldwork and categorises these into key operational and managerial issues 
that are likely to either encourage or inhibit innovation. 
 
Chapter seven looks beyond the participant experiences to provide a theory-
based context for this study.  It analyses the case looking at the project 
outcomes rather than the team or individuals as the unit of analysis.  It also 
attempts to map the project across the innovation value chain.  In its review of 
the project outcomes, this section draws conclusions about the number, type 
and quality of the ideas or concepts developed by each team, specifically, 
classifying the outputs on a spectrum of incremental to radical.   
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Chapter eight reviews the relevant literature to situate the key elements of the 
case study in a discussion with the appropriate theory.  Within this chapter, a 
theoretical model is developed which fuses the practice-based insights, 
generated by the case, with the relevant theory.  The objective of the model is 
to improve future guidelines for managing innovation projects in GSK and, 
possibly, elsewhere. 
 
Chapter Nine makes clear the overall contribution this study makes to extant 
literature in this area and it positions this research in terms of its relevance and 
import to policy and practice.  It concludes by making recommendations for 
future research. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The focus of this inductive study was to examine how innovation happens in 
large organisations.  Specifically, access was negotiated to a novel 
organisational experiment within the case firm.  The nature of the innovation 
project was that the organisation was seeking to develop radical innovation 
through two separate and competing R&D teams.  Prior to engaging with the 
case, a review of existing literature relating to the core aspects of firm and 
team level innovation was conducted.  This review is organised around the 
following three questions: How do firms innovate? Why does managing the 
innovation process pose such a formidable challenge for organisations?  And, 
what is the role of teams within the innovation process?  
 
The general management literature often prescribes that organisations need to 
enhance their organisational innovativeness to remain competitive (Porter, 
1990; Lengnick-Hall, 1992; Roberts, 1998), but, as Smith et al. (2008) note, 
the literature often neglects to address exactly how organisations can impact 
on their ability to manage innovation. Similarly, Grönlund et al. (2010; p. 106) 
note that the academic debate has now moved from ‘why to innovate to how to 
innovate’.   As Goffin and Mitchell put it: ‘Innovation: yes, but how?’ (2010, p1).   
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Research on the innovation process has become both more prevalent and 
more important as organisations search for new and more creative ways to 
remain competitive in their respective markets (Pearce and Ensley, 2004; 
Janssen et al, 2004). The centrality of innovation to the success of any firm is 
generally accepted (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992).  But, despite the scholarly 
investigation and interest in New Product Development structures and 
processes (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1994; Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1999; 
Liker and Collins 1999; Bonner et al., 2002; Filippini et al., 2004; Troy et al., 
2001) many questions about how innovation actually takes place; between 
people within teams that are themselves, within organisations, remain 
unanswered.  Van de Ven and Poole (1990) were asking similar questions 20 
years ago when they noted that managers of innovation projects ‘need a "road 
map" that indicates how and why the innovation journey unfolds, and what 
paths are likely to lead to success or failure.’ Arguably, no single, unifying 
guideline exists that guarantees success in R&D (Tidd, 2001; Thamain, 2003; 
Harmancioglu et al., 2007). Therefore, the quest for more meaningful insight 
that might help guide managerial action to more effective performance is 
important.   Innovation, to succeed, requires a complex social interaction 
between both internal and external players (Kuandykov and Sokolov, 2010) 
and is highly context dependent (Hansen and Wakonen, 1997). 
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Considerable debate surrounds the definition and boundaries of the term 
'innovation' (Adams et al, 2006, 2011; Trott, 2005; Tidd et al, 1997).  In its 
broadest sense, this phrase refers to the invention and implementation of a 
novel idea, relative to a social context, with the purpose of delivering benefit. 
Tidd et al. (1997) offer a definition that summarises this breadth:  
 
...innovation is often confused with invention but the latter is only the first 
step in a long process of bringing a good idea to widespread and 
effective use (p. 24).  
 
Drucker saw innovation and entrepreneurship as inextricably linked (1986): 
 
Entrepreneurs innovate.  Innovation is the specific instrument of 
entrepreneurship.  It is the act that endows resources with a new 
capacity to create wealth. (p.30) 
 
In this study, the Tidd and Bessant (2009) definition is adopted which 
describes innovation as ‘the process of turning opportunity into new ideas and 
of putting these into widely used practice’ (p16).  Although all types of 
innovation are important for companies, the case studied in this thesis is 
focused on product innovation or new product development (NPD). Many 
researchers have identified new product development as the most important 
form of innovation (e.g., Rommel, 1991; Dougherty, 1992; Janz et al., 2001; 
Hauser et al, 2006). Sandberg (1992) states that Schumpeter's "view of 
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innovation is consistent with the current focus on product innovation".  Similarly 
Pleschak et al. (1994) say "product innovation is the most important element " 
and Pleschak and Sabisch (1996) point out that product innovation is one of 
the most important sources of profit for firms. 
 
Despite increased academic research, the processes by which innovative 
ideas are generated, incubated and implemented within large, R&D intensive 
companies, are still ‘unclear’ (Sundstrom and Zika-Viktorrson, 2009).   Many 
articles and surveys address innovation at the level of the country (Pianta et 
al., 2008; Puga et al., 2010) or region but innovation, in the form of developing 
new products and services, actually happens at the level of the (R&D) team or 
the project within the firm. Despite this, the amount of research dealing with 
R&D team innovation is rather small (Kurtzberg & Amabile, 2001; West, 2002; 
Anderson et al, 2004). As Anderson and West (1998) noted,  
 
Comparatively few studies have focused at the level-of-analysis of the 
work group. This is a notable shortcoming because it is often the case 
that an innovation is originated and subsequently developed by a team 
into routinised practice within organisations. (p. 239). 
 
Studies looking at firm-level innovation identify a range of factors likely to 
contribute to success in the new product or service development.  These 
generally include having a specific strategy; having robust processes; using a 
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cross functional team; having both technical knowledge and marketing insight 
(Barczak et al., 2008); but one factor that invariably emerges as significant, 
specifically in the field of innovation within R&D, is the quality of team 
leadership.  Yet, despite it being identified as a critical component (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1995), many authors argue that this facet of new product 
development has either not been adequately investigated (Mumford et al., 
2002) or such investigation has been inadequate and controversial (Bass 
1999; Keller 2006; Nippa 2006; Stoker et al., 2001; Yukl 1989).  Nippa (2006), 
in relation to team leadership for innovation projects, suggests:  
 
Not surprisingly, findings, insights, and recommendations remain 
ambiguous and appear to be a patchwork of loosely coupled insights 
rather than the product of a progressive research agenda. (p. 1)   
 
Buijs (2007) argues that: ‘The issues of staffing the innovation team and 
selecting the people who are going to lead the innovation process have hardly 
been discussed in the innovation literature.’ (p. 203) 
 
However, in this review, it is argued that Nippa’s (2006) assessment and Buijs’ 
(2007) contention are not entirely complete as there is, indeed, a literature that 
explores R&D leadership.  While R&D and innovation are not fully 
synonymous; R&D is the central engine, core activity and starting point for 
innovation in many large firms (Kratzer et al., 2006); a fact which makes R&D 
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and innovation, at a minimum, overlapping.  Hence research into successful 
R&D team leaders has considerable relevance when looking at leadership in 
innovation teams.   
 
As the research methodology was inductive and longitudinal, the majority of 
the reading and synthesis occurred during the research activities themselves, 
thus some literature will also be introduced in later chapters (Chapter Eight) 
along with the appropriate results and discussion.  This chapter will conclude 
with some current debates in the literature, focusing on the key questions 
related to this study.  It will use the literature to develop more substantive 
questions related to the central issue. 
 
2.2 How Firms Innovate? 
2.2.1 Models of Innovation 
When looking at innovation at the level of the firm, ‘there are two dominant 
theories or perspectives on innovation and new product development’ 
(Conway and Stewart, 2009, p. 65). They are broad and abstract in nature but 
play a key role in helping the conceptualisation of the contextual relationships 
inherent in innovation projects; between the organisation, the marketplace and 
the project itself.  This section introduces these two broad models and 
discusses them as a prelude to evaluating the featured ISF case study from 
the perspective of both.  These two perspectives, a linear perspective (Pinch 
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and Bijker, 1989; Akrich et al, 2002; McCarthy et al, 2006) and a network 
perspective (Tsai, 2001; Akrich et al., 2002; Ritter, 2003; Leenders and Van 
Engelen, 2003; Chesbrough, 2003; Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005), offer two 
very different accounts of how innovation happens in organisations and how 
innovation activities should be managed. 
 
2.2.2   The Linear Perspective on Innovation 
The linear perspective on management of innovation assumes a project-
management method and process that delivers appropriate outputs at 
specified junctures and within predetermined cost limits.  The linear 
perspective characterises innovation as a series of individual, discrete and 
sequential steps that can be managed by senior managers using analytical 
techniques.  Gate models (Griffin, 1997) are the most widely used frameworks 
to manage innovation processes.  Each phase involves a specific activity and 
concludes with a decision point (Johnson and Jones, 1957) with managers 
making informed choices based on codified knowledge of the projects; their 
appeal to customers, their requirements for technology, their position within a 
competitor framework and their likely value to the overall company portfolio.   
 
Rothwell (1983) distinguishes two principal types of linear innovation 
processes.  Both the ‘technology push’ and ‘demand-pull’ models (See Figure 
2.1) conceptualise innovation as a linear, sequential process.  The assumption 
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underlying the technology push model is that innovation will emerge from a 
focus on technological developments and that technology and science will 
dictate the direction and pace of innovation.  Rothwell refers to technology 
push as a ‘first generation’ model as it is representative of practice in the 
1950’s (1983). He describes this as a period of rapid economic growth and 
expansion which saw the emergence of new sectors such as the emergence of 
semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals and composite materials driven by 
technological advances.  Ahmed and Shepherd (2010) suggests that under 
this approach, firms believed that simply doing more R&D would result in more 
successful products and services and that insufficient attention was paid to the 
role of the marketplace. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Linear Models of Innovation – The ‘Science-Push’ Model (Top) 
and the ‘’Demand-Pull’ Model (Bottom) 
 
Adapted from Rothwell, 1983 
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Research in the 1960’s and 1970’s suggested that most new products 
(between two thirds and three quarters) could be described as demand-led 
(Utterback, 1971; Rothwell et al., 1974).  The increasing importance of users in 
the innovation process led to the description of “democratization of innovation” 
(Von Hippel 2005). Rothwell (1983) refers to the demand or market pull 
models as ‘second generation’ models which favoured the demand rather than 
the supply side of the equation.  As the descriptor implies, demand-led 
indicates that the impetus for the new product or service came from the 
customer as opposed to the technology.  He characterises this period as one 
which saw the dominance of marketing, the intensification of competition and 
the exploitation of technology with greater emphasis on consumer insight and 
gaining market share.  Ahmed and Shepherd (2010) note that this customer 
centric model was evolved to overcome technology push blindness to the 
customer requirements of the marketplace.  In this demand-led model, the 
customer is the primary source of the ideas that then drive the R&D 
programmes.  Although, they warn that there are dangers inherent in this 
approach too: 
 
One of the primary dangers of following this model is that it produces a 
tendency to neglect long-term R&D programmes.  Thus companies can 
easily become locked into a regime of technological incrementalism. 
(p.169) 
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Figure 2.2. shows an idealised version which merges these two models and is 
described by Rothwell (1992) as the ‘coupling’ or ‘interactive’ model which 
represents a move away from the definitive linearity of either the push or the 
pull model.  It represents a fusion of customer or market led innovation with the 
technology push approach.  It is still, at heart, a linear model with feedback 
loops. 
 
Figure 2.2:  The ‘Interactive’ or ‘Coupling’ Model of Innovation 
 
Adapted from Rothwell, 1983. 
 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1984) note that the linkages between the marketplace, 
technology and science are complex and multidirectional and the dominant 
element of the equation (the technology or the customer) can vary over time 
and between industries.  Nevertheless, researchers now agree that both 
demand and supply factors play an important role in innovation and the life 
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cycles of technology (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989; Walsh 1989; Scherer et 
al, 2000; Lucas 1967; Ben- Zion and Ruttan 1978; Ruttan 1997, 2001). 
 
2.2.3   Design-led Innovation 
In more recent literature, a third approach to innovation has been developed 
which reflects the design-led practices adopted by successful Italian 
manufacturers (Verganti, 2008, 2009). Design thinking as an approach to 
innovation argues that not all innovation can be classified as either technology-
push or market-pull.  This newer perspective on the innovation process that is 
gaining popularity is based on design-thinking (Martin, 2009).  Design-thinking 
innovation is an approach to innovation that elevates the intrinsic socio-cultural 
meaning within the products and services.  Nominally, based upon the original 
Latin origin of the word design; ‘designare’ to give meaning to or to assign 
meaning; the principle is that the qualities of the new product or service extend 
considerably beyond merely functional characteristics to also provide 
enhanced design cues that reinforce their socio-cultural meaning.  Dell’era and 
Verganti (2009) argue that the principles of design thinking are not merely 
considerations around physical product design and styling: 
 
A product can bring messages to the market in several ways and styling 
is just one of them; while the functionalities of a product aim to satisfy 
the operative needs of the customer, its product meanings aim to satisfy 
the emotional and socio-cultural needs of the customer. (p 39) 
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Dell’era and Verganti (2009) cite examples like Allessi and Archimedes (well 
known Italian lifestyle brands) who use design thinking to add attractive 
additional dimensions to their innovation ideas and outputs.  This approach is 
also favoured by innovation consultancies such as IDEO (Brown, 2008).  
Implicit in the design thinking approach to innovation is a reliance on 
ethnographic research to ensure the ideas are authentically user-centred.  
Rapid prototyping and customer immersion and involvement in the co-creation 
of the product or service is also a feature of this approach. 
 
Brown (2008) defines design thinking as a discipline that uses the designer’s 
sensibility and practices to match people’s needs with what is technologically 
feasible and what, through a viable business strategy, can be converted into a 
valuable market opportunity.  Brown (2008) notes that historically designers 
would have played merely a supporting. ‘downstream’ role in the innovation 
process; ‘merely to put a beautiful wrapper on the idea’ (p. 86).  Now, however, 
the role, the thinking and the methods of designers are being elevated from the 
merely tactical to be strategic and central to the innovation process. 
 
2.2.4   Structuring the Innovation Process in Stages 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010) argue that organisations today are only 
marginally more prepared for the challenges of innovation than they were fifty 
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years ago. While most companies, they say, have no shortage of creativity or 
technology, what they lack are the managerial skills to convert ideas into 
reality.  They liken innovation to an ascent of a formidable mountain peak. In 
their metaphor, most climbers focus their energy and enthusiasm on getting to 
the top, leaving very few resources for the less glamorous but often more 
dangerous part of the expedition—getting back down safely. Similarly, they 
say, companies devote their energies only to reaching the innovation summit—
that is, identifying, developing, and committing to a sparkling and promising 
idea. In short, they argue, there is too much emphasis on ideas and not nearly 
enough on execution. 
 
Reflecting the priority of the implementation side of the innovation process and 
in order to bring more control, structure and standardisation to it, many 
companies employ a process of milestones or gates.  Each gate marks a 
formal review of predesignated metrics around the project itself.  This 
approach represents ‘the overlay of linear thinking on the innovation process’ 
(Tollin and Caru, 2008; p. 75).  The gate approach reputedly originated from 
the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) in the USA.  Their 
phased project planning (PPP) approach was a planning tool to manage the 
complex co-operations between NASA, its contractors and suppliers (Cooper, 
1990; Eppinger, 2001).  The PPP divided projects into activities with review 
points ensuring a high level of control and measurement.  It focussed on the 
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technical, design side of projects and did not include issues like customers or 
marketing.  The modern gate approach assumes not only a review of a specific 
project but it envisages a review of a portfolio of projects, thus ideally choosing 
the most promising projects to proceed with; the ones which fit best with the 
overall company strategy (Cooper, 1994, 2001; Christiansen and Varnes, 
2007). 
 
The stage-gate approach attempts to control and manage innovation using 
distinct mechanisms.  First, by making resource decisions gradually as more 
information becomes available, it reduces the risk connected with projects 
(Christiansen and Varnes, 2007).  This implies that projects will be either 
progressed or abandoned depending on the likelihood of their commercial 
success.  Hurdles (which generally include a number of pre-agreed project 
performance criteria) are adopted by the company and only if the project 
meets these criteria is it allowed to proceed.  This method also assumes that 
the outcome of any specific, individual innovation programme is continually in 
doubt and further work is only sanctioned incrementally as each piece of new 
information is processed by the decision making team on the project.  Also, 
this approach has the effect of making certain activities mandatory within every 
project.  Conforming to defined stages, activities and hurdles means that all 
projects must meet a common standard and provides the safeguard that 
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individual projects cannot get green-lighted or progressed without meeting the 
corporate criteria. 
 
Cooper (1988) coined the term Stage-Gate to describe this process. The 
Stage-Gate process consists of a series of stages where essential activities 
are carried out. The stages are activities that culminate at gates where interim 
achievements are evaluated. It is the stages that entail the actual development 
work. The specific activities performed depend on which stage the project is in. 
As Figure 2.3 indicates, in the early stages, activities generally focus on 
discovering opportunities and generating ideas, while the later stages 
concentrate on concept development, testing, and commercialisation. Stages 
are typically cross-functional and each activity is undertaken in parallel with 
others so as to enhance speed to market. Each stage typically requires more 
investment than the preceding one, resulting in increased commitments but 
also in a reduced number of unknowns and uncertainties so that risk is 
effectively managed (Cooper, 1988, 1994, 2008). 
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Figure 2.3:  The Stage Gate Model of Innovation 
 
 
The model above describes the phases in a generic stage-gate model.  
However, companies tend to customise these models to suit the specifics of 
their own business and versions with up to ten stages have been reported 
(Philips et al., 1999). 
 
The five phases (depicted above) span the entire innovation spectrum from 
ideation (idea-generation) to launch activities and subsequent post-launch 
evaluation.  This structured, linear model for managing innovation has become 
widespread in nearly every industry with the possible exception of services. 
After surveying NPD best practices, Griffin (1997) noted that 60% of 
responding NPD functions were using some form of Stage-Gate methodology.  
Previous research shows about half (48.6%) of respondents said their 
companies used a traditional Stage-Gates process, 20% said they had no 
formal or an informal stage-gate process, and nearly 30% of respondents said 
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they used a modified Stage-Gates process (Adams and Boike, 2004; Griffin, 
1997).  In the latest Product Development Management Association (PDMA) 
survey Barczak et al. (2008) finds that stage gate systems are the norm in 
innovation projects. 
 
The stage-gate model has attracted some criticism.  Trott (2008, pp. 409-410) 
lists five limitations: 
 
1. The process is sequential and can be slow. 
2. The process is focussed on the gates and not on the customer so the 
project teams may find a way of satisfying the internal NPD hurdles 
without necessarily developing a product or service that is appealing to 
customers. 
3. Product ideas or concepts can be halted too early if the right information 
is not readily available. 
4. The high level of uncertainty that is the hallmark of radical innovation 
makes this process unsuitable for these types of ideas.  Stage-gate 
processes favour incremental projects. 
5. At each stage of the project, a low level of knowledge by the gatekeeper 
can lead to poor judgments being made on the project. 
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As noted previously, many companies tailor the stage-gate process to suit the 
unique or specific intricacies of their business. In their review of the literature, 
Hauser et al., (2005) suggests that companies practicing design-process 
management often modify the stage-gate process. Companies configure the 
model to suit their business by having some stages overlap, some activities 
run in parallel and even dropping certain phases and gates altogether.  
Breakthrough projects were more likely to be managed using the dynamic, 
overlapping model whereas low-risk, incremental technology projects used the 
sequential approach or the conventional stage-gate process regime. Canner 
and Mass (2005) also note another shortcoming of the stage-gate philosophy. 
 
While the portfolio model has brought some discipline to the often-
undisciplined world of new product development research, the approach has 
failed to optimise R&D and spark innovation. There may be several reasons for 
this. Aggressive goals that underpin potential major innovations frequently look 
"impossible" at project outset, and therefore don't fit neatly into the typical 
stage-gate review process. The ‘organisation invariably shifts attention from 
the quality of projects to the quantity.’ (Canner and Mass, 2005; p. 18) 
 
Stage gate processes, while in widespread use, have been argued, at some 
level, to be a constraint on creativity (Storey and Salamander, 2005) and can 
militate against a company pursuing radical ideas.  Its overriding focus on 
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process structure, reliability, and control has tended to overlook factors that 
govern the creativity and flexibility required to innovate (Badaracco, 1991; 
Moenaert et al., 2000). Stage-gate approaches to innovation have led to a 
mechanistic interpretation and focus on process efficiency, which is disposed 
to downplay how process factors such as flexibility, informality, feedback, and 
autonomy might influence innovation (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Dougherty, 
1992; Griffin, 1997a). 
 
Goffin and Mitchell (2010) report a cyclical appeal for stage gate processes.  
Such processes are; ‘put in place, often following a bad experience with 
projects running out of control’ (p. 254).  In these circumstances, they note, 
that the introduction of the process is initially welcomed.  However, over the 
course of time, as more is learnt from using the process; more and more gates 
or hurdles are introduced, resulting in the process itself becoming overly formal 
and cumbersome.  This is compounded by the fact that the organisation is 
getting better at innovation throughout the process and so managers start to 
question whether the all the detail and formality is actually worthwhile.  
 
Eventually the process falls into disuse.  Then another crisis occurs and 
it is reinstated, usually in simpler form. (p. 254) 
 
It is therefore not surprising that recent research on the innovation process has 
acknowledged the need for alternative approaches. Researchers also 
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challenged the assumption that NPD activities could exclusively be 
represented as an ordered, predictable and sequential system of discrete 
stages (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Leonard-Barton, 1988; Schroeder et al., 
1989). Rothwell (1992) argued that the study of NPD as an automatic, 
dependable, and routine decision-making process did not explain how radical 
(Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Leifer et al., 2000) innovations emerge.   
 
Reflecting these arguments, researchers have expanded the characterisation 
of the innovation process as not simply a linear model.  Cunha and Gomes 
(2003) introduce five different product development processes ranging from a 
linear, sequential model to what they refer to as an improvisation model; one, 
which has constantly shifting and fluid conditions.  They believe that the focus 
should not be on organisation but on organising.  Consistent with this, 
McCarthy et al (2006) acknowledge that NPD progresses through a series of 
stages, but with overlaps, feedback loops, and resulting behaviours that resist 
reductionism and linear analysis.  Quinn (1985) was among the first to refer to 
innovation as a form of controlled chaos. 
 
In summary, stage-gates bring structure to what is, by necessity, a chaotic 
process. However, the structure alone is insufficient.  Strong ideas, that are 
ideally the fusion of leading technology with compelling customer insights are 
at the heart of the innovation effort.  Any process, to be useful, needs to be 
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able to nurture and bring these ideas to the market.  The process must always 
be secondary to the organisational strategy and the innovation imperative for 
that context.  The stage-gate process should never become an end in itself 
and this is a real danger because it provides solid framework for organisations 
and many firms prefer to deal with certainty.   As Loewe and Chen (2007) 
cautioned, while there is enormous benefit in managing innovation like a 
process with schedules, milestones etc. 
But sometimes, an overly eager project manager intent on making sure 
that everything gets done on schedule will let the calendar take 
precedence over the content and the quality of the outputs. (Loewe and 
Chen, 2007, p. 24). 
 
2.2.5  The Network Perspective 
An alternative perspective on innovation examines the role of networks in the 
process.  Studies of the innovation process, partly prompted by the remarkable 
performance of Japanese companies in world markets, started looking at an 
interactive, networked perspective for managing innovation (Ahmed and 
Shepherd, 2010). Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) investigated NPD within a 
number of successful companies and reported that the dominant model was 
not one with linear, sequential phases but one with overlapping ones.  Using a 
sporting metaphor, they communicated the fluidity of the process and the need 
for different hard and soft skills to facilitate it: ‘Stop the relay race.  Take up 
Rugby’ (p. 137)  
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This indicates that a team working on innovation must find its own way through 
the process.  Rather than passing the baton at the end of each discrete 
section, the new paradigm suggested that players constantly pass the lead 
back and forth.   
 
This perspective sees innovation as a complex adaptive system (CAS). 
Complex adaptive systems dynamically try to adapt to the environmental 
circumstances in which they find themselves. Such systems are found in rich 
abundance in natural sciences and examples are often drawn from such things 
as viruses or ant-colonies.  Thus, in a way that many organisations would 
envy, they are able to undertake short-term exploitation activities as required 
and to invest in longer-term exploration as needed.  The foundation of the CAS 
framework is based on an understanding that NPD processes are systems 
whose elements, here called agents, are partially connected and have the 
capacity for autonomous decision-making and social action, known as agency. 
The decision rules, interactions, and outcomes of agents create three mutually 
dependent characteristics that define CAS: nonlinearity, self-organisation, and 
emergence.  Carlisle and McMillan (2006) suggest that what innovation should 
learn from the CAS approach is:  
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The message here for organizations is not to take too rigid a stance in 
approaches to innovation, but to respond flexibly as internal and 
external environments demand.  (p. 4)  
 
In common with all living systems, complex adaptive systems are either 
connected or in perpetual pursuit of connection. Lewin (1993) underscores the 
importance of connectedness in evolution and notes that in living systems, 
ossification occurs without it. Similarly, firms need to ensure that they connect 
both externally and internally or they may be susceptible to the corporate 
equivalent of ossification; irrelevance.  
 
Recent studies have demonstrated that innovation mostly emerges through 
unpredictable, often chaotic processes involving multiple actors and could be 
better described as a social progress rather than a technical one (Eisenhart in 
Hargadon, 2003, p. viii).  The process of moving from ideation to 
implementation or launch of an idea is constructed by establishing networks, 
alliances between human and non-human actors (Christiansen and Varnes, 
2007; Kidder, 1981; Kreineer, 2002; Kreiner and Tryggestad, 2002; Callon, 
1986; Van de Ven et al., 1999; Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986). 
 
Hargadon (2003) found that innovation often lies in bringing new knowledge 
from one area to another by what he refers to as ‘technology brokering’.  
Technology brokering is used to exploit the networked nature of the innovation 
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process.  Rather than attempting to pioneer a technological breakthrough in a 
specific area, technology brokering facilitates the bringing together of people, 
ideas and combining technologies and objects in a way that sparks new 
thinking.  An example of this type of networked innovation is Thomas Edison, 
inventor of the incandescent light bulb and the phonograph.  Often described 
as an inventor (Hargadon, 2001) asserts that Edison was, in fact, a technology 
broker and network builder.  He depended heavily on the close collaboration of 
about 15 people in his R&D lab.  Hargadon (2001) asserts that the importance 
of this collective, creative network can best be judged by the fact that Edison’s 
genius evaporated as soon as the lab ceased to exist.  Not only do dedicated 
R&D labs work this way, but leading consultancy practitioners in the area of 
innovation also adopt this approach (Hargadon, 2003; p. 200) including the 
leading innovation company IDEO (www.ideo.com). 
 
New ideas are constantly in search of allies or champions.  If nobody adopts a 
new idea; if nobody advocates it, develops a network to promote and develop 
it or creates channels for its diffusion, it simply won’t succeed.  This process 
includes the involvement of a number of actors in an ever expanding or 
reducing network.  As Tollin and Caru argue: ‘Innovation is the relations in the 
network constructed in a dialogue, a constant iteration between human and 
non-human actors.’ (2008, p. 83).  The network expands or collapses 
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depending on the input of the various actors connected with the idea and 
depending on the idea’s phase of development. 
 
One key difference between the network perspective and the stage-gate 
process surrounds the decision making process involved.  There are no set, 
standard points where Go/No-go decisions are mandated. Instead there are a 
number of heterogeneous, non-sequential, micro decisions that span the 
network and facilitate the progress of the project.  The outcome of the project 
is contingent on the strength of support it has engaged and the power of the 
network that has been established during the process.  Success is dependent 
on the number of allies that the project has garnered through the vision it 
promises and the value the network ascribe to it. 
 
The network process also implies that a team leader will have been able to 
articulate a compelling vision for the project and that such a vision will attract 
talented people with relevant skill sets to become involved.  One important 
feature that can drive team or individual motivation is the ambition to do 
something that has not been done before.  However, an idea can travel in 
many different directions through the network approach and it can be modified, 
moulded, adapted and altered depending on the relationships that emerge.  
These relationships are created by a process of ‘interessement’ where the 
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leader identifies other relevant and useful actors and engages their interest in 
the problem to be solved/ the innovation project (Akrich et al, 2002). 
 
The idea of extended and networked enterprises (i.e. organisations with many 
external linkages) has long been the subject of general management research. 
Networking with other organisations, regardless of the duration of the 
collaboration, can result in an organisation’s attitude to and competence at 
innovation changing (Hadjimanolis, 2000; Kandampully, 2002; Pavitt, 2002; 
Flor and Oltra, 2004; Jaskyte and de Riobo, 2004; Medina et al., 2005; Mudrak 
et al., 2005). This is because the organisation becomes open to new ways of 
thinking and doing, and learns from the experiences of other organisations or 
external bodies. 
 
These networks are both theoretically and actually important.  It has been 
noted that the locus of power in innovation projects can transfer from within the 
original organisation and be found within the network (Powell, 1998). Conway 
and Steward (2009, p70) note that networks do not have convenient natural 
boundaries and stretch beyond the confines of an organisation, an industry, a 
country or even a sector.  They distinguish between two types of networks; 
‘social networks’ between individuals and ‘organisational networks’ between 
organisations.  They provide an example of an organisational network from the 
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electronics industry which shows the diversity and size of an innovation 
network as well as demonstrating its geographic spread (Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4:  Innovation Networks 
 
Source:   The Focal Network of Philips and Siemens (Contractor and 
Lorange, 2002) 
 
2.2.6 Open Innovation 
The network perspective on innovation reflects an Open Innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2003) paradigm.  In the past, the innovation process was seen 
as an internal, integrated model carried out by large firms. Innovations were 
discovered, developed and delivered or launched internally described in the 
so-called ‘Chandlerian’ model (Chandler, 1977 and 1990). This model has 
been recently labeled as “closed innovation model” (Chesbrough, 2003). The 
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‘Chandlerian firm’ that rose to prominence in the 20th century has several 
defining characteristics among which is its self-reliance and expansion into the 
upstream and downstream activities that more modern firms might tend to 
outsource. Termed ‘giant enterprise’, the ‘Chandlerian’ firm has had significant 
impact on large sectors of advanced economies and has created an image of 
what an economic organisation is and ought to be (Robertson and Verona, 
2006).  By contrast, Open Innovation (OI) considers the boundary between the 
company and the surrounding ecosystem as porous. Perkins (2008) defines 
open innovation as the leverage of capabilities and expertise of others to 
deliver differentiated and meaningful innovation.  The open innovation 
philosophy stems from a recognition that issues such as the speed of 
advances in technology, combined with global mobility in workforces, in ideas 
and in venture capital has made it more difficult for conventional R&D teams to 
be able to contain their knowledge.  Moreover, significant innovations are 
increasingly occurring in small firms, in research labs and institutes or global 
innovation clusters.   
 
Bessant and Tidd (2011) show that OECD countries are spending over $750bn 
on research every year through which they are creating a ‘sea of knowledge’ 
(p.348) which would be impossible for any single organisation to match – or 
even stay abreast of. They further point out that such knowledge is no longer 
merely being created in the advanced industrial nations but that many of the 
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rapid advances are taking place in the developing economies like China and 
India. They note that without external networks, organisations, however large 
will inevitably miss out on some key development in their industry. 
 
One of the commercial executives often associated with bringing open 
innovation into more widespread practice is AG Lafley, then CEO of Proctor 
and Gamble (P&G) who believed that although P&G had 12,000 scientists and 
engineers working in R&D when he took over in 2000; he acknowledged that 
there were many people with great ideas who didn’t work for P&G.  He set 
about the purposeful planning of an open innovation culture in P&G which 
included the rebranding of the existing R&D department to the new name of 
C&D (for ‘connect and develop’) thus signalling that P&G was open for 
business and was actively seeking external partners to develop their ideas 
(Huston and Sakkab, 2006). 
 
Concurrent with the adoption of innovation networks in business practice, there 
has been a parallel and distinct body of literature focused on ‘‘open innovation’’ 
(Chesbrough, 2003). This literature concentrates on inter-firm co-operation and 
the development of an ecosystem of firms, sharing technologies and trading 
intellectual property, within a given industry or sector (West et al., 2006). One 
of the key ways that organisations can increase their external linkages is 
through their employees having contact with external bodies such as 
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universities and professional institutions (Smith et al., 2008).  Open Innovation 
includes both outside-in (buying) and inside-out (selling) flows of technologies, 
knowledge and ideas. This model assumes that competitive advantage is 
inextricably linked to the management of inter organisational relationships with 
numerous actors external to the firm (customers, universities, competitors, 
suppliers, research institutions) with the objective of exchanging knowledge, 
expertise and technological know-how. 
 
2.2.7 The Innovation Value Chain 
The two broad, approaches to innovation (linear and networked) describe 
ways to conceptualise the process; while the innovation value chain outlines 
the specific phases that are highly likely to occur within every innovation 
project regardless whether that project has been originated via a development 
in technology or through a new customer insight, or through a fusion of both.  
The steps or phases described in the value chain would occur regardless of 
the overall approach taken.   
 
To improve their firm’s innovation performance, managers are advised to view 
the process of transforming ideas into tangible innovation assets as an 
integrated flow.  For any organisation, to be successful with their innovation 
activities, its leadership must first, formally define the innovation system and 
process which is to be followed or used and then apply appropriate quality and 
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innovation metrics and principles; just as was done in the development of 
quality management, safety management and even finance management in 
previous decades (Hansen and Birkenshaw, 2007; Barczak et al., 2008).  
While there is no universal guarantee of success at innovation (Thamain, 
2008), companies can stack the odds in their favour by having structures and 
processes and by using some formal process to manage their innovation 
activities (Schmidt et al., 2009). Based on this formulation, O’Reilly and Flatt 
(1989) concluded that innovation results from two component processes:  
 
(a)  creativity or the generation of a new idea, and  
(b)  implementation or the actual introduction of the change.  
 
This suggests that the enhancement of innovation in organisations requires 
mechanisms for both stimulating new ideas as well as methods for putting the 
ideas into practice.  More recent literature has evolved this two factor 
framework into three elements.  The addition is a stage within the innovation 
process within which ideas are sifted, ranked, prioritised and where raw ideas 
are incubated and transformed into testable concepts. 
 
O’Connor and Ayers (2005) advocated a three part programme for innovation 
in which the three elements are discovery, incubation and acceleration.  Such 
a three-part division of the innovation process is increasingly a feature of this 
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literature (e.g., Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1993; Veryzer, 1998; Tidd and 
Bodley, 2002; O’Connor, 2005; Vuola and Hameri, 2006; Hansen and 
Birkenshaw, 2007; Roper et al., 2008).  The three parts described are 
generally configured thus: a) the discovery or idea generation phase; b) the 
incubation or transformation phase and; c) the commercialisation or 
implementation phase.  
 
Regardless of the source of the original idea, this model assumes that all ideas 
are born as relatively raw, fragmentary, embryonic thoughts and connections 
and they require some level of incubation in order to develop the nascent idea 
into a testable concept. They are essential blocks in accomplishing the goal of 
new product or service development.  In contrast to the stage gate model, the 
innovation value chain does not assume that there are decision gates at 
intervals during the process that dictate whether individual projects will receive 
further funding and be continued.  The innovation value chain describes steps 
in a chain of activities that transcend the organising model or approach used. 
 
In the first stage, idea generation; new ideas and opportunities are identified 
and new technologies evaluated.  In the incubation or transformation phase, 
selected ideas are converted into testable concepts and evolved into business 
plans with proof of concept established and prototypes developed.  In the 
commercialisation, implementation or diffusion phase, the prototype moves out 
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of the R&D department and the overall organisation starts to put additional 
resources and demands on the new business idea. 
 
Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) recommend viewing innovation as a value 
chain comprising these three key phases: idea generation, (idea) conversion 
and (idea) diffusion. Figure 2.5 illustrates the Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) 
Innovation Value Chain. The innovation value chain is derived from the 
findings of five large research projects on innovation that Hansen and 
Birkinshaw undertook over the past decade. They interviewed more than 130 
executives from over 30 multinationals in North America and Europe. They 
also surveyed 4,000 employees in 15 multinationals, and they analyzed 
innovation effectiveness in 120 new-product development projects and 100 
corporate venturing units.  This firm-level perspective is more deterministic, 
connecting organisational performance and innovation success to company 
knowledge and internal resources. This view is consistent with a resource-
based or capabilities perspective on innovation and new product development 
(Foss, 2004). 
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Figure 2.5:  The Innovation Value Chain 
 
Source:  Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) 
 
Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) suggest that executives need to view the 
process of transforming ideas into commercial outputs as an integrated flow, 
from end-to-end.  The first of the three phases in the chain, they describe, is to 
generate ideas; this can happen in three ways.  Companies can develop ideas 
within a single department, or across the company using cross-functional 
teams or they can involve external partners to generate the ideas.  
 
The first phase is linked to organisational creativity.  Any new product 
development (NPD) process requires a high level of creative performance.  
According to Leenders et al (2007), creative performance is of paramount 
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importance in NPD projects and most NPD projects are managed through an 
NPD team as the organisational nucleus for innovation. Innovation inevitably 
involves creativity: the initiation, identification or discovery something novel, an 
idea, technology, or process that is new to the organisational setting which is 
then followed by its development and implementation (e.g. Amabile, 1988; 
Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Kanter, 1988; Klein and Sorra, 1996).   
 
Despite its importance, creative performance of innovation teams, however, is 
scarcely examined and knowledge about the conditions that enhance or 
obstruct innovation teams’ creative performance is limited (Kratzer, 2004). One 
factor that has been recognised to impact the creative performance is the 
team’s communication (e.g. Leenders et al., 2003) and team communication 
also involves, to a certain extent, disagreements between communicating 
colleagues. 
 
The second phase is to convert ideas; to incubate the best ones and to amplify 
the elements of the ideas that have most appeal.  More specifically, the 
second phase helps select, sift, rank and prioritise ideas for funding (or 
resourcing) aimed at developing them into products, services or practices. The 
third phase is to diffuse, exploit or implement those products and practices 
both inside the organisation or outside in the case of launching new products 
and services or creating new markets. 
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When organisations are asked to rate their innovation capability using the 
value chain model, Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) assert that firms typically 
fall into one of three broad “weakest link” scenarios. First is the idea-poor 
company, which spends a lot of time and money developing and diffusing 
mediocre ideas that result in mediocre products and moderate financial 
returns. The problem is in idea generation, not execution. By contrast, the 
conversion-poor company has lots of good ideas, but their leaders don’t 
screen and develop them properly. Instead, ideas can perish in budgeting 
processes that ‘emphasise the incremental and the certain, not the novel.’ 
Other managers subscribe to the “1,000 flowers” approach, letting ideas bloom 
where they may but never weeding the weaker ones out.  The need here is for 
better screening capabilities, not better idea generation mechanisms. Finally, 
the diffusion-poor company has trouble launching, placing its bets and profiting 
from its good ideas. Decisions about what to bring to market are made locally, 
and not-invented-here thinking can prevail. As a result, new products and 
services may not be comprehensively rolled out across geographic locations, 
distribution channels, or customer groups.  
 
Roper et al (2008) developed a similar model in which an innovation event, like 
the launch of a new product, service or process, represents the end of a series 
of knowledge sourcing and translation activities by a firm.  It also marks the 
67 
 
start of a means of value creation that, subject to the firm’s capabilities and the 
buoyancy of the markets it operates in, should yield an improvement in NPD 
results.   According to Roper et al. (2008), the first link in the innovation value 
chain is a firm’s knowledge sourcing activity; these authors focus in particular 
on the factors that drive firms’ engagement with particular knowledge sources; 
experts, research institutes etc. The second link in the innovation value chain 
is the process of knowledge transformation, in which knowledge sourced by 
the enterprise is translated into innovation outputs. This is modeled using an 
innovation or knowledge production function in which the effectiveness of a 
firm’s knowledge transformation activities is influenced by enterprise 
characteristics, the strength of the firm’s resource-base, as well as the firm’s 
managerial and organisational capabilities.   
 
The final link in the innovation value chain is knowledge exploitation, i.e. the 
firms’ ability to fully commercialise their innovations.  While this model builds 
closely upon the Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007) innovation value chain model, 
it does contain some specifics about how and, specifically, where firms can 
access knowledge that may be useful as a start point for new product or 
service ideas.  The authors classify five sources of such knowledge:  Internal 
dedicated R&D; backward linkages to suppliers and consultants; forward 
linkages to customers/consumers; horizontal linkages to competitors or joint 
ventures and public linkages to research institutes and universities. 
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The Roper et al. (2008) model maps well against the Hansen and Birkinshaw 
(2007) Innovation Value Chain (IVC) model  (Table 2.1). Knowledge sourcing 
is equivalent to idea generation: transformation is comparable to conversion 
and exploitation and diffusion are also similar.   
 
Table 2.1:  Phases in the Innovation Value Chain 
Phases Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
O’Connor and Ayers (2005) Discovery Incubation Acceleration 
Loewe ad Chen, (2007) Discovery Opportunity Realisation 
Hansen and Birkenshaw 
(2007) 
Idea Generation Idea 
Conversion 
Idea 
Diffusion 
Roper et al (2008) Knowledge 
Sourcing 
Transformation Exploitation 
 
It is worth noting that dividing the innovation process into an innovation value 
chain is not the same as creating a stage-gate process.  The stage-gate is far 
more prescriptive and mechanistic. It mandates a sequence of defined 
activities punctuated by key decision points.  The value chain is an indicative 
model to guide firms and teams in the key activity of facilitating innovation by 
knowing ‘where they are in the game.’ (Amabile and Khaire, 2008, p. 104).  
The gate process is the dominant linear model of innovation and it maps the 
flow of decisions that may punctuate the progress of an innovation project.  
The Value Chain, on the other hand, explores the individual activities that must 
be discharged within any specific project. 
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2.3 The Nature of Innovation – What Makes it Such a Challenge for 
Managers? 
2.3.1 Types of Innovation; Radical and Incremental 
Innovations are often analysed in terms of contradictions: incremental and 
radical (e.g., Green et al., 1995; McDermott and O’Connor, 2001); continuous 
and discontinuous (Veryzer, 1998); and sustainable innovation and disruptive 
innovation (Christensen, 1997). Diverse descriptions abound when it comes to 
defining radical innovation. Some use the label of ‘discontinuous innovation’ 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990), ‘emerging technology’ (Day and Schoemaker, 
2000), ‘architectural innovation’ (Abernathy and Clark, 1984), or even 
‘disruptive’ technology (Christensen, 2000). For the classification of these 
types of innovations, a four-box matrix is often used.  Such a matrix usually 
comprises a market or demand dimension (existing and new) and a technology 
dimension (existing and new). It is widely acknowledged that in terms of new 
products and services and their impact on both the industry and firm level, 
significant differences exist between radical and incremental innovations (Dosi, 
1982; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 2000). 
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Figure 2.6:  Types of Innovations 
 
Source:  Janssen (2008). 
 
Incremental innovation leads to small improvements in products, services or 
business processes.  Radical or breakthrough innovation, on the other hand, is 
‘game-changing’ and usually results in redrawing the rules of the industry or 
category.  In the above matrix, the consumer need dimension reflects the 
demand side and is divided into “manifest” and “latent. Manifest needs are 
needs that can be articulated and described by people; latent needs cannot, at 
least, not consciously (Narver et al., 2004). 
 
Bessant and Tidd (2007, p. 15) prefer a six-box model to describe the degree 
of novelty that separates incremental from radical innovation.  They use the 
analogy of comparing innovation to Russian dolls; i.e., you can change things 
at the (relatively low) level of components or else you can change the whole 
system.  For example, they say, you can put a faster microchip on the circuit 
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board for the graphics display in a computer (component innovation) or you 
can change the way computers work by creating a network linking pc’s to drive 
a small business (architecture innovation).  They note that there is scope for 
innovation at every level but that changes at the higher levels inevitably have 
implications for the lower levels. 
 
Figure 2.7:  Bessant and Tidd: Incremental and Radical Innovation 
 
 
Source:  Bessant and Tidd (2007, p. 15) 
 
Garcia and Calantone (2002) noted that the proliferation of different definitions, 
especially around the classification of ‘radical innovation’ was giving rise to an 
unhelpful ambiguity within the literature around new product development: 
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A plethora of definitions for innovation types has resulted in an 
ambiguity in the way the terms ‘innovation’ and ‘innovativeness’ are 
operationalised and utilised in the new product development literature… 
The terms radical, really-new, incremental and discontinuous are used 
ubiquitously to identify innovations. One must question, what is the 
difference between these different classifications? To date, consistent 
definitions for these innovation types have not emerged from the new 
product research community. (Garcia and Calantone, p. 110) 
 
Regardless of the variation in words used to describe radical innovations, 
some common elements are present in most definitions. The definitions 
generally allude to aspects related to high market and technological 
uncertainty, new market creation.  They often refer also to creating new 
capabilities in the innovating firm as well as the possibility of cannibalizing the 
firm’s prior business model.   Leifer et al. (2001) define radical innovation thus: 
 
A radical innovation is a product, process, or service with either 
unprecedented performance features or familiar features that offer 
significant improvements in performance or cost that transform existing 
markets or create new ones. (p. 103) 
 
Roberts (1999) suggests that a firm that consistently innovates will 
demonstrate sustained profitability but that breakthrough (radical) innovations 
are especially important to organisations. They enable firms to challenge the 
existing technological order and create new opportunities, new directions.  
Further, they allow firms to renew, reinvent themselves; to develop new 
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opportunities for business growth (Burgelman, 1983). They represent valuable 
and worthwhile sources of competitive advantage for firms (Barney, 1991). 
Therefore, Ahuja and Lampert (2001) argue that understanding the 
determinants of these type of innovations is critical to the literature on strategy 
and organisational learning.  Gary Hamel (2000) also argues in favour of 
radical rather than incremental innovation saying;  
 
Most companies long ago reached the point of diminishing returns in their 
incremental improvement programs. Radical, non-linear innovation is the 
only way to escape the ruthless hyper-competition that has been 
hammering down margins in industry after industry. (p. 36) 
 
In competitive markets, all innovation, but radical innovation in particular, has 
been argued to be a strategic imperative. Some commentators stress the need 
for radical ‘frame breaking’ discontinuous innovation at the expense of 
incrementalism. For example, Peters (1999) believes that “incrementalism is 
innovation’s worst enemy” (Peters, 1999: p. 27). He suggested that “the only 
sustainable competitive advantage comes from out-innovating the competition” 
(p. 29). 
 
Song and Thieme (2009) reviewed radical innovation from a transaction cost 
perspective and observed: 
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Radical innovations rely on both physical and human capital that is less 
standardized and more transaction specific (idiosyncratic) than 
incremental innovations. Often, new facilities and equipment are 
needed to produce a radical innovation. Likewise, market intelligence 
gathering activities in radical innovation are likely to involve new 
investments in both physical and human capital that is transaction 
specific. Firms (or their suppliers) often must develop new relationships 
with potential customers in unfamiliar market segments or use new 
methods of gathering intelligence (i.e., lead user analysis) when 
pursuing radical innovation. (p. 44) 
 
The degree of radicalness of an innovation, however, is conceptually 
challenging to define or measure.  Such categorisation of innovations as either 
radical or incremental is, for a number of reasons, subjective.  It is not one of 
hard and fast, bounded categories. Instead, there is a continuum of 
innovations that range from radical to incremental (Hage, 1980). A new 
product or service’s position on this continuum depends upon perceptions of 
those familiar with the degree of departure of the innovation from the state of 
knowledge prior to its introduction. 
 
Radical or breakthrough innovations are defined as new products that are the 
first to bring novel and significant consumer benefits to the market (e.g. 
Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Sorescu et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2005). These 
benefits can range from improvements to product features, such as packaging 
(e.g. a new type of spout on a paint canister), to opening up an entirely new 
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market (e.g. gambling or spread-betting on the performance of stocks and 
shares rather than on race-horses). On the other hand, incremental 
innovations are new products or services that do not deliver novel and 
significant consumer benefits to the market (like a new flavour or pack size of 
an existing product or brand).  However as Conway and Steward (2009, p. 17) 
assert, assessing the novelty or extent to which a new product is radical is not 
a straightforward matter.  They offer five perspectives for assessing the novelty 
or radicalness of an innovation.  These categories are not mutually exclusive 
and overlap to some degree. 
 
The embedded characteristics of the innovation: the degree to which the 
innovation offers improved technical functionality and performance as well as 
the quality of the underlying technology that enables this performance level. 
 
Benefit to the user/consumer through usage or consumption of the innovation: 
the degree to which the embedded characteristics of the innovation provide the 
user with new benefits or possibilities or changes to their patterns or routines. 
 
The breadth of diffusion of the innovation:  the more widely used an innovation 
is, the greater the collective impact it may have on society and business.  
Thus, the more pervasive (widely diffused and used) an innovation is, the more 
likely it is to be perceived as radical.  Innovations, like electricity, the 
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telephone, the internet have all been extensively diffused across geographies 
and business applications. 
 
The impact on an innovating organisation’s competencies and capabilities:  
Radical innovation is innovation that requires new technological knowledge to 
exploit it, whilst rendering existing technical knowledge, in that area, obsolete.  
In contrast, incremental innovation uses and builds upon existing technology.  
Thus radical innovation can be seen as competence destroying. 
 
The time elapsed since the launch of the innovation – The perceived novelty of 
an innovation decreases over time as it becomes more widely diffused and 
embedded in patterns of work or, indeed, becomes superseded by some 
newer innovation. 
 
The issue of novelty is raised in this discussion as central to the notion of 
radicalness; and novelty is a subtle element of the innovation process.  Novelty 
is generally defined as not necessarily a property of the innovation itself but 
specifically, novelty is a feature of the perception of the individual or 
organisation that adopts the innovation.  Zaltman et al. (1973, p. 10) see 
perceived novelty as a central feature of innovation: 
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Any idea, practice or material artefact perceived to be new by the 
relevant unit of adoption. 
 
In the same vein, Rogers (1995, p. 11) suggests that: 
 
It matters little whether or not an idea is objectively new as measured by 
the lapse of time since its first use or discovery…If the idea seems new to 
the individual, it is an innovation. 
 
Simply, this means that the perception of novelty of an innovation by an 
individual is generally linked to the point in time of adoption, rather than the 
point in time of the discovery or original commercialisation of that innovation.  
Ex post, the definitions of radical versus incremental innovations can be based 
on the effects of an innovation on the technology within that domain, the 
product assortment, the marketplace, or on the individual firm. Govindarajan 
and Kopalle (2006), for example, differentiate between the radicalness and 
disruptiveness of an innovation by arguing that ‘disruptive’ refers to market 
disruption whereas ‘radicalness’ is generally applied to the technology 
involved.  Garcia and Calantone (2002) take a broader perspective and state 
that radical innovations cause both marketing and technological discontinuities 
on a macro and micro level.   
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Radical innovation is increasingly the focus of academic research into the 
factors that cause or even promote it.  A number of contributions have already 
been made towards developing a model or inventory of correlates to radical 
innovation.  Many of the factors identified are at the corporate level and, as 
such, difficult for individual managers to influence.  Nevertheless, there is a 
growing body of work making a theoretical contribution to the construct of 
radical innovation.   
 
McDermott and O’Connor (2002) observe that because of the specific nature 
of radical innovation, the gestation period for such projects is long.  This is 
because often both the technology and the marketing opportunity are distant 
from the company’s current commercial footprint.  Golder et al., (2009) found 
that the gestation or incubation period for a range of (29) radical innovations 
they studied to be on average 23 years.  This project-longevity means that 
such initiatives will typically outlast the project team members and the 
management supporters who decide to commence them.  It is highly unlikely 
that the same management will survive to protect and champion the project 
and this factor adds to the uncertainty surrounding radical projects.  With new 
management, often comes new priorities and this combined with external 
market developments add to the on/off, stop/start nature that characterises 
many of these projects.   
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Prior research has identified an inventory of factors which are believed to 
support the outcome of radical innovation.    Such factors include a learning 
and continuous improvement culture (Bessant and Francis, 1997: McLaughlin 
et al., 2008); lead user involvement (Von Hippel, 1988); project management 
skills for managing individual projects and corporate systems for managing 
portfolio’s of innovation projects (Cooper, 1984; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992); 
cross functional teams with high ability to solve problems (Jassawalla and 
Sashittal, 1999; Sapsed et al., 2002); use of design thinking methods including 
user-centred design and prototyping (Dodgson et al., 2005; Brown, 2008; 
Verganti et al., 2007); centralising the team and creating an innovation hub 
(Ettlie et al., 1984; Leifer et al., 2007); organisational tolerance for ambiguity, 
failure and risk (Kalunzy et al., 1972; Nembhart, 2009); high levels of both 
individual and organisational creativity (Amabile, 1998; Tagger, 2002); clear 
and active senior management support  (McDermott and O’Connor, 2002); 
capacity for deep market insight and an ability to convert weak market signals 
into actionable innovation projects (O’Connor, 1998); a commercial willingness 
to engage with projects which have a lengthy gestation period and an 
associated high cost (McDermott and O’Connor, 2002; Golder et al., 2009) ; 
team climate for innovation (Anderson and West, 1998; Caldwell and O’Reilly, 
2003); firm size and position in the market (Christensen, 2007; Chandy and 
Tellis, 2000) and personal and corporate networks, alliances and relationships 
(Bessant et al. 2003; Reed and Walsh 2002;  Chesbrough, 2003; Birkinshaw et 
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al., 2007). In Chapter Eight, these factors will be revisited in the light of the 
case study experiences. 
 
In their book, Radical Innovation (2000; p. 19), Leifer et al, propose a useful 
and comprehensive inventory of ways in which radical innovation is markedly 
different from incremental innovation (Table 2.1).  The differences generally 
revolve around the longer timeline associated with radical innovation projects 
as well as the higher uncertainty attached to them in terms of technological 
and commercial success. 
 
Table 2.2:  Incremental Versus Radical Innovation 
 Incremental  Radical 
Project time line Short term – six months to two years Long term – usually ten years or more 
Trajectory Linear continuous path from idea to 
commercialisation 
Multiple discontinuities, gaps, hibernations 
and revivals, unanticipated events, 
outcomes and discoveries 
Idea Generation 
and Opportunity 
Recognition 
Occur at the front end of the process; 
critical events are largely planned for 
Occur sporadically throughout the life cycle 
of the project often in response to 
discontinuities of funding, technical, 
personnel or market 
Business Case Complete and detailed plan is made 
because of the low level of 
uncertainty 
Business model evolves through the 
technology and market learning that 
evolves through the project. 
Key players Assigned to cross functional team, 
each member has a clearly defined 
role 
Key players come and go and many remain 
interested through an informal network that 
often grows around such projects 
Organisational 
structure 
Cross functional team within a 
business unit 
Often starts in R&D but may migrate into 
incubation unit 
Operating Unit 
involvement 
Operating units involved from the 
beginning 
Informal involvement with operating units 
but project actively avoids becoming 
captive to an operating unit too early 
Adapted from: Leifer et al., 2000 (p. 19-20) 
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2.3.2  Innovation and Risk 
It has been suggested that radical or disruptive innovation is especially risky 
for firms.  Indeed, Kalunzy et al. (1972) define radical innovations exclusively 
in terms of risk.  This risk is associated with a lower likelihood or speed of 
product adoption or a lower likelihood of survival of the innovating firm. 
Researchers have even suggested that these products often fail in the 
marketplace because managers consistently overvalue their benefits relative 
to existing products, whereas consumers systematically undervalue them or 
forgo them altogether in favour of more familiar products (Gatignon and 
Robertson, 1985; Gourville, 2005).    
 
There is a general acceptance of innovation’s importance, by the leadership of 
most companies, but yet there is also an accompanying general dissatisfaction 
with the results accomplished by innovation investments (Dervitsiotis, 2006).   
Crucially, there is a difference between having innovation as a priority and 
having it as a capability (Hamel, 2005).  Sorescu and Spanjol note that many 
executives hold an unassailable belief in innovation as the ultimate strategic 
imperative, relying on it to spur growth and yield positive financial returns 
(2008). However, they say, profitable innovation remains an elusive goal.  
Some researchers posit that simply innovating more will generate superior 
performance (Bayus et al., 2003; Pauwels et al., 2004). Others argue that 
incremental innovations, which make up 90% of new product introductions, 
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have little or no impact on firm value (Christensen, 1997; Foster and Kaplan, 
2001).  Cooper called new product development (NPD) ‘‘one of the riskiest, yet 
most important endeavours of the modern corporation’’ (1993, p. 4). Davila et 
al. concur that more innovation is not necessarily better (2008, p. 17).  They 
contend that ‘innovation, like most things, is best in the right proportions.’ (p. 
18) 
 
Radical innovation, as noted previously, has traditionally been defined as that 
innovation territory where both technical and market uncertainties are high.  
Technical uncertainties refer to questions about the appropriateness and 
application of the underlying scientific knowledge, whether the technology is fit 
for purpose, whether the technical specifications of the product are right and 
whether it can be scaled up and made. Market uncertainties include issues 
related to customer needs and wants; to what extent consumers will adopt the 
new product or service and how the distribution channels will block or enable 
the diffusion of the idea. To these two uncertainties, Leifer et al. (2002) add a 
further two; resource uncertainties and organisational uncertainties.   
 
Among the organisational uncertainties were questions about the 
capabilities of the project team; recruiting the right people; managing 
relationships with the rest of the organisation; dealing with variability in 
management support; overcoming the short-term, results-oriented 
orientation of operating units, and their resistance to products that might 
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jeopardise existing product lines; and counteracting vested interests in 
the current business model. (p. 104) 
 
Resource uncertainties refer to the availability of physical, financial and human 
resources to get the necessary things done.  These were found in the Leifer et 
al (2002) study to require an inordinate amount of time from the project team.  
In fact, they concluded that the greatest contribution that organisations could 
make to the development of radical innovation is to manage the internal 
organisational uncertainties that are within their control. 
 
If firms learn to reduce these uncertainties in a systematic way—
through leadership and organizational and managerial approaches—
then radical- innovation project teams would be better able to address 
the less controllable and more chaotic market and technical 
uncertainties. (Leifer et al., 2001; p. 104) 
 
Furthermore, in markets started by a radical product, the first firms to enter the 
market have the lowest survival probability (Min et al., 2006). Perhaps 
consistent with this view, the numbers of breakthrough products or services 
launched in recent years have been declining (Jannsen, 2008). 
 
More attention is being paid recently to discontinuous, disruptive innovation 
because empirical studies have continued to identify a worrying pattern of 
results for large organisations.  Tushman and O’Reilly report this trend in 
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almost every industry studied including automotive, cameras, colour 
televisions, optical equipment, hand tools, stereo equipment, tyres and 
watches (2007). The incumbent market leader fails to maintain industry 
leadership during a sustained period of discontinuous change (Paapa and 
Katz, 2004, pp. 1-3).  Dosi (1981) stated that it is new, small firms that rapidly 
emerge as key players in a sector when there is a "paradigm shift" in 
technology, which alters radically the rate, direction and skills associated with 
a technological trajectory.  Similarly, Bessant et al., noted that most radical 
innovation in mature industries was emanating from start-up businesses 
(2004).  Organisations who have a dominant share of lucrative markets must 
ensure that they are not toppled by more agile, often smaller competitors who 
develop radical innovations in those markets (Christensen, 1997; Bower and 
Christensen, 1997). 
 
2.3.3 Some Common Barriers to Innovation Inside Organisations 
The fact that innovation demands creative, non-routine responses makes it 
difficult to design programmed actions that are more likely to deliver innovative 
outcomes a priori (Caldwell and O’Reilly, 2003).  Leenders et al. (2007) concur 
that companies are seeking to balance the largely loose and unsystematic 
conditions, under which creativity thrives, and the simultaneous need for more 
systematic design methods to reduce the risk and the costs of the project.  The 
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concern is often voiced that superimposing a system or predefined process 
onto the NPD process can stifle or hamper the necessary creativity.    
 
The idea of an innovation journey was proposed by Van de Ven et al. (1989) to 
illustrate the complexities, barriers, contingencies and uncertainties of new 
product, process and service development processes. Innovation processes 
are seen as expeditions into unexplored territories, which are “highly 
ambiguous and often uncontrollable and unique to its travellers” (Van de Ven 
et al., 1999, p. 21).  Emphasising the ambiguity of innovation initiatives, 
Markides (2002) outlined an inventory of elements that conspire against 
established firms in pursuing innovation: 
 
Compared to new entrants or niche players, established companies find 
it hard to innovate because of structural and cultural inertia, internal 
politics, complacency, fear of cannibalising existing products, fear of 
destroying existing competencies, satisfaction with the status quo, and a 
general lack of incentive to abandon a certain present (which is 
profitable) for an uncertain future. (p. 246) 
 
March and Simon (1958) discussed the opposing demands of exploration and 
exploitation in management and leadership of firms. Exploitative activities are 
usually dominated by mechanistic structures, predictability and routine, all of 
which help drive efficiency. Processes are rigid and are optimised for activities 
that lead to a better performance in a known environment (Tushman & O'Reilly 
86 
 
III, 1996).  Explorative activities, on the other hand, are characterised by more 
openness; they are more exploratory and entrepreneurial and consequently 
come with higher risk for failure – but also with the potential for higher success. 
Exploring new opportunities while simoultaneously exploiting current 
opportunities remains a significant management challenge.   
 
Doughtery (1992) speculates that for some organisations, the challenge will be 
too great: 
 
Despite the importance of product innovation, research has shown that 
established organisations have difficulty in developing and marketing 
commercially viable new products. (p. 77) 
 
Can large, old firms, in fact, change their fundamental principles of 
management or must they “die” to make way for new forms? (p. 90) 
 
Large organisations are arguably more successful at developing incremental 
innovations in familiar product groups and have been notably unsuccessful in 
being able to commercialise breakthrough ideas.  O’Reilly and Tushman note 
this phenomenon to be both commonplace and also fascinating (2004). They 
built on the description of an ambidextrous organisation as one which can 
simoultaneously focus on the operational requirements of today’s business 
while also seeking and building the transformational opportunities for the 
future. 
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Academics have acknowledged the requirement for firms, especially those in a 
highly competitive environment to combine both explorative and exploitative 
activities in a single business unit (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005). This type of management has been 
described as contextual ambidexterity. Jansen et al., argue that firms who 
follow it have to combine opposing coordination mechanisms that include 
decentralisation, formalisation and connectedness (2005). It has been found 
that this type of working requires high intellectual capabilities of the individuals 
within the innovating units. Individual managers within a firm or team have to 
decide themselves when and how to perform exploitative or explorative 
activities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Hence, the individual managers have a 
high influence on the innovativeness of their group (Subramanian & Youndt, 
2005). 
 
In this context, research has shown that it is often the managers themselves 
who are among the most significant barriers to innovation within firms and 
within projects. Some see innovation as risky and subversive and, instead of 
supporting it, they see their role as needing to protect the organisation from 
innovation (Storey and Salaman, 2005).  Culture (Pech, 2002) plays a role in 
the behaviours of managers which could be described as anti-innovation: 
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A dominant culture of conformity and followership generates “more of 
the same”, while a culture encouraging individualism and leadership 
produces new products or methods of production by harnessing 
employee creativity and innovation. (p. 559) 
 
Storey and Salaman (2005) were able to classify a number of companies into 
high and low performing, in terms of innovation.  For those whose performance 
was shown to be below average they found an attitude in which innovation was 
characterised as: inherently messy; hard to control; childish, creative; 
threatening and unsettling – even dangerous and irresponsible but not 
essential.  Contrastingly, in the above average performing companies they 
found innovation was seen as quirky; It has the capacity to break down 
barriers and bring new, useful ideas to the surface; it’s exciting; it’s exhilarating 
and it’s a key source of competitive advantage and central to success. 
 
2.4 Innovation in Teams 
According to Kratzer et al. (2004), teams constitute the organising principle in 
most modern, innovation companies.  A key source of the innovation initiatives 
of companies is the creative performance of the people they employ 
(Cummings and Oldham, 1997). One particular organisational response, the 
implementation of cross-functional teams, has progressively become a more 
common approach in the corporate quest for enhanced levels of innovation 
(Cox et al, 2003; Pearce and Sims, 2002). Empirical research has shown that 
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in 1997, 80% of (US) firms with more than 100 employees used a team-based 
approach to innovation (Cohen and Bailey, 1997).  
 
A number of reasons have been suggested as to why teams are the organising 
nucleus for innovation.  Innovation is often said to take place on the borders or 
fringes between disciplines, or specialities, when people start to share ideas 
with each other. These interactions are vital because they enable individuals to 
combine different understanding and experiences to generate and bring to the 
surface perspectives that may be different and more valuable than those held 
by any individual team member.  New product and service development is 
dependent on organisation members’ ability to combine and exchange 
knowledge (Smith et al., 2005) and hence teams are considered a natural and 
powerful option for creating and circulating innovative ideas.  
 
Edmondson (2002) argued that innovation inherently occurs at the team level 
because it requires learning behaviours, or transmission of knowledge that 
takes place through conversations between a limited number of 
interdependent people.  These interactions are vital because they enable 
individuals to combine different insights and experiences to generate and bring 
to the fore knowledge that is greater than that held by any single individual 
member of the team (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), in the sense that the whole 
is greater than the sum of the parts.   
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Working on innovation and NPD necessitates highly integrated teamwork 
(Dym and Little, 2000).  Teams, like individuals, process information by 
encoding, storing and retrieving it (Brauner and Scholl, 2000). But, unlike 
individuals, by communicating, teams build on the knowledge of others, 
exchange information experiences and insights and build new knowledge and 
create new ideas (Leenders et al., 2007).  Frequency of team communication 
(Kratzer et al., 2004) is also a mediating factor in the success of NPD projects.  
There is a heightened level of communication within teams where no formal 
approach is necessary between members (such informality is unlikely to be the 
case if the individuals are not connected by the team) and casual 
conversations, information exchange and discussions may emerge more 
naturally and easily.   
 
In essence, teams can offer more flexibility, productivity, and creativity than 
any one individual can offer (e.g. Gladstein, 1984; Hackman, 1987) and 
provide more complex, innovative, and comprehensive solutions to 
organisational problems (Sundstrom, DeMeuse and Futrell, 1990).  New 
product and service development is dependent on organisation members’ 
ability to combine and exchange knowledge (Smith et al., 2005) and hence 
teams are considered a natural and powerful option for creating and circulating 
innovative ideas (Jackson, 1992; Denison et al., 1996; Donellon, 1996; Griffin, 
1997; Thompson, 2003).    
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Although many people see creativity as essentially an individual practice 
(Amabile, 1998), empirical research findings by Taggar (2002) suggested that 
team level innovation processes are actually needed to bring individual 
creativity into use and that, without team level interactions, insights and efforts, 
these processes may be carried out in vain with no firm-level benefits 
emerging.  Similarly, although individual employees can develop innovations, 
teams of employees will be more important in influencing overall ability of the 
organisation to innovate (Anderson and West, 1998; Read, 2000; Lemon and 
Sahota, 2004; Noke and Radnor, 2004). 
 
Muthusamy et al. (2005) argue that as organisations are increasingly 
emphasising innovation, self-managing work teams (SMWTs) can be expected 
to facilitate the transition towards an innovative workplace.  SMWTs are often 
associated with high performance work systems, and their use is more 
widespread than any other flexible work practice (Osterman, 1994).  Such 
teams are responsible for carrying out their work as well as for supervising 
their team’s own performance. Instead of having a formal line manager instruct 
them, these teams are responsible for gathering information, making 
decisions, and meeting the organisational goals (Hollander & Offermann, 
1990). 
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Innovation is facilitated by organic structures and flexible work arrangements 
characterised by autonomy, higher degree of informality, intense information 
exchange, and participative decision-making (Taggar, 2002; Collins & Amabile, 
1999; Kanter, 1988). Since SMWTs demonstrate many of these 
characteristics, they can be expected to have a major impact on innovative 
behaviour (Dunphy & Bryant, 1996). 
 
2.4.1 Innovation within the R&D Context 
R&D is often the core activity and starting point for innovation (Kratzer, 2006). 
The R&D setting for innovation deserves specific consideration and treatment 
for three reasons: first, the setting is unique; second, the type and nature of the 
work is specific to that setting; and, third, the people engaged in R&D are also 
uncommon in many respects. R&D settings are unique insofar as quality rather 
than quantity and innovation rather than cost are the primary performance 
criteria (Keller, 1989). 
 
A concern voiced in the R&D management literature is the short-term focus of 
senior management. Mitchell and Hamilton (2007) noted a widespread sense 
that corporate strategy and short-term budget discussions frequently 
discriminated against longer-range and higher-risk R&D initiatives. By insisting 
that investments in R&D meet the same financial criteria that apply to all other 
investment decisions within the corporation Mitchell and Hamilton (2007) 
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suggest that the R&D community felt that this over emphasis and misplaced 
faith in financial ratios results in the rejection of many of the programs and 
lines of inquiry that held out the most promising opportunities.  This 
phenomenon make R&D a more difficult context in which to work as many of 
the most attractive projects are likely to be the very ones in high danger of 
abandonment because they will be the very ones which it is likely to be most 
difficult to justify on a return on investment basis. 
 
In terms of the type of work involved in R&D, Mumford et al. (2002) 
characterise the creative work of R&D as highly demanding, time-consuming, 
resource intensive and requiring a high level of persuasion and politics.  The 
tasks developed in this kind of work are uncertain, very risky and involve 
unforeseen processes, and as a result, setbacks and disruptions are likely to 
occur (Kim et al., 1999).  The very nature of R&D suggests that its outcomes 
are likely to stretch the boundaries of what is known in a certain domain.  
Therefore, the process will, by definition, lead teams into areas of novel 
technology where uncertainty is very high and where the safety of routines, 
best practices and established ways of working are, necessarily, absent 
because they have not yet evolved.   
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Many teams working in the industrial research or pharmaceutical R&D setting 
exist specifically to produce major, novel, and creative innovations that might 
be considered new to the world in scientific, technical or medical areas.  A 
distinction is traditionally made (e.g. by Bain et al., 2001) between research, 
which encompasses fundamental, basic, exploratory and applied research 
requiring high levels of new knowledge creation, and development, which 
covers technical service, product, and process development work involving the 
application of existing knowledge to solve particular problems (Leifer and 
Triscari, 1987).  
 
In sequence, research occurs before development.  It is the output of the 
research phase that is normally handed over to the development team to 
‘make it happen’ or ‘bring it to life’.  This conforms to the traditional linear view 
of innovation (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987), where ideas emerge in an 
environment of relative creative freedom and get gradually refined over time to 
the degree that they become more tangible and capable of development 
ultimately into products and services or tangible innovation assets. 
 
This process is often characterised as being inherently uncertain, dynamic, 
and to follow a seemingly random process (Kanter, 1988; Jelinek and 
Schoonhoven, 1990). The recognition and acknowledgement of the element of 
chaos was chronicled twenty-five years ago by Quinn (1985).  Cheng and Van 
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de Ven (1996) found that the actions and outcomes experienced by innovation 
teams tend to exhibit a chaotic pattern during the initial period of innovation 
development (R), the research phase, and an orderly, regular pattern during 
the concluding development (D) period.  This seems inherently intuitive as the 
‘R’ phase is the most creative and the ‘D’ phase requires that existing ideas 
(coming out of the ‘R’ phase) are developed into tangible innovation assets 
which are capable of undergoing research and proof of principle tests. 
 
Apart from the work of R&D having particular characteristics, research 
suggests that the people involved in R&D projects have special characteristics 
too.  First, they tend not to accept hierarchical control; are less loyal to their 
organisation than to their profession and they also tend to be chauvinistic 
about their technical speciality (Gomez et al; Miller, 1986; Von Glinow, 1988).  
Lack of respect for hierarchy makes them difficult to manage; moreover, since 
autonomy is important in performing their work, this exacerbates the 
management challenge (Kim et al., 1999). 
 
Innovation research primarily outlines that R&D team members to possess 
high intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1989), considerable technical expertise 
(Janz et al., 1997), and a high need for autonomy (Realin, 1985). 
Consequently, they are expected to have a low need for leadership (de Vries 
et al., 1999). Thus, one conclusion from this stream of research suggests 
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giving R&D teams as much intellectual autonomy and as little guidance as 
possible in managing projects. 
 
2.4.2 The Role of the Team Leader in Innovation Projects 
Effective leadership makes innovation and thus organisational growth possible 
(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997).  Getting the balance right between the linear, 
efficiency that organisations demand and the divergent fluidity that is most 
conducive for team-level creativity is a delicate matter and would seem to 
demand very experienced and intuitive leadership (Trott, 2005).  Buijs (2007) 
expresses the role of the leader very vividly: 
 
Innovation is about coming up with and implementing something new. It 
is about searching for ideas, exploring ideas, developing ideas, 
implementing ideas and successfully introducing the ideas (products) into 
the marketplace. Innovation leadership is about bridging the gap between 
dreams and reality, past and future, certainty and risk, concrete and 
abstract, us (‘we love innovation’) and them (‘they don’t want to change 
at all’) and success and failure. And all of these dualities are present at 
the same time. (p. 204) 
 
Team leaders perform a key role in innovation projects and in facilitating 
innovation in organisations (Montes et al., 2005).  In innovation projects, the 
role of a team leader is paramount; he or she ‘offers a new set of ideas and 
articulates enough imagination to create a new vision which narrows attention 
and rallies unity out of diversity’ (Cheng and Van De Ven, 1996: p. 610).   
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Team leaders can help coordinate action when members otherwise would not 
know what to do and this circumstance is likely to arise in the situations of high 
uncertainty that generally characterise the early phases of NPD research 
projects.  Edmondson (2003) suggests that the literature has downplayed the 
role of the team leader and has not provided helpful insight into the dynamics 
of team interaction in intense and uncertain situations which are the contextual 
hallmarks of innovation teams.  Leaders provide enthusiasm and support for 
creative ideas by protecting new ideas from premature evaluation, 
recommending new ideas, and recognising and rewarding the generation of 
new ideas. They also seek access to the resources necessary for creative 
ideas to be developed.  Further, they recognise individuals’ contributions to the 
innovation. Finally, leaders can also contribute to innovation by getting 
involved and encouraging others to get involved in developing new ideas 
(Mumford, 2002; Howell and Boies, 2004).   
 
Given the high level of uncertainty combined with an ever increasing level of 
task complexity that characterise innovation projects, Buijs, (2007) notes that: 
 
CEO’s who ask for innovation should be aware that this kind of 
leadership is rare. It is advisable to search for people who are able to 
handle this controlled schizophrenia, stimulate them, protect them, 
believe in them and then let them guide the innovation process. (p. 209) 
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In the literature on the role of teams generally, the issue of team leadership 
emerges as ‘one of the Big 5’ themes (Salas et al., 2005).  Paradoxically, the 
literature on innovation teams, where the context is characterised by high 
levels of uncertainty, fluidity combined with intense pressure, team leadership 
has not apparently been adequately recognised as a central factor in the 
success of those teams.  Buijs (2007) observes a gap in the literature in the 
area of leadership of innovation teams, which he notes ‘has hardly been 
discussed in the innovation literature.’ (p.203).  This gap in the literature has 
also been highlighted by Mumford et al, (2002); Edmondson (2009) and Nippa 
(2006) contends that: 
 
Comprehensive reviews of the broad research on critical success factors 
of managing product innovation in most cases do not emphasise 
leadership or leadership styles explicitly. (p. 2) 
 
Despite this view, I was able to identify in the literature a stream of research 
that explores the ideal characteristics of the R&D team leader (Table 2.5).  The 
R&D team leader, in many cases, if not synonymous with the innovation team 
leader, represents a close proxy.  Most articles included in Table 2.2 conclude 
with an inventory of skills that if possessed by the R&D team leader, seem to 
make their projects generally far more successful. 
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Table 2.3:  Research Papers on R&D Team Leaders, 1980 - 2010 
Studies Context Empirical or 
Conceptual 
Level of 
Analysis 
Roles/Functions of R&D Team 
Leader 
Maidique, 
1980 
Innovation 
Process 
Conceptual Organisation Technologist; Product 
Champion; Executive 
Champion; Sponsorship and 
Technological Entrepreneur 
 
Souder, 1987 Innovation 
Process 
Conceptual  Individual Leader, capitalist, exciter, 
integrator, scout, linchpin, 
exciter, translator, spotter 
 
Allen et al., 
1988 
R&D Project Empirical  Team Functional Managers Role 
Project Managers Role 
 
Ancona and 
Caldwell, 
1988 
 
NPD Project Case Study  Team Scout, Ambassador, Sentry 
and Guard 
 
Farris, 1988 R&D Project Conceptual  Individual Captain; strategic leader; 
Organisational leader, 
technical expert; catalyst; 
Informal leader, personal 
developer, climate creator, 
responsive leader. 
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Studies Context Empirical or 
Conceptual 
Level of 
Analysis 
Roles/Functions of R&D 
Team Leader 
McCall Jnr, 
1988 
R&D  Conceptual  Team Technical competence; 
controlled freedom; leader as 
metronome; work challenge 
 
Barczac and 
Wilemon, 
1989 
 
NPD Project Case Study Team Communicator, Climate-
setter, Planner, Interfacer 
 
Chakrabarti 
and 
Hauschildt, 
1989 
Innovation 
Process 
Conceptual Organisation Expert, Champion, Sponsor 
 
 
 
 
Howell and 
Higgins, 1990 
Technological 
Innovation 
Empirical Organisation Project champion, technical 
innovator, business 
innovator, chief executive, 
user-champion. 
 
Markham et 
al., 1991 
Technology 
Innovation 
 
Empirical  Team Champion; Antagonist 
Beatty and 
Lee, 1992 
Technological 
Change 
Case Study Organisation Path finding, Problem 
solving, Implementing 
 
Clark and 
Wheelwright, 
1992 
NPD Project Conceptual  Team Direct Market Interpreter, 
Multi-lingual translator, 
engineering manager, 
programme manager, 
concept infuser 
 
Friedman et 
al. 1992 
R&D  Empirical  Individual Project Management, 
Personnel supervision, 
Strategic Planning 
 
Henke et al. 
1993 
R&D   Task skills (functional and 
technical) and process skills 
(interpersonal) 
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Studies Context Empirical or 
Conceptual 
Level of 
Analysis 
Roles/Functions of R&D Team 
Leader 
Kessler and 
Chakrabarti, 
1999 
 
R&D Empirical Project Set clear time goals. Find team 
members with longer 
organisational tenure; Execute 
tasks in parallel. Avoid design for 
manufacture and CAD 
Youngbae 
Kim et al., 
1999 
 
    
Barczak and 
Wilemon, 
2003 
 
R&D Case Study Team Interpersonal, Project Manager 
and technical skills. 
 
Thamain,  
2003 
R&D Empirical Project Creates climate for creativity – a 
sense of community across the 
entire organisation. 
Should be action oriented 
providing resources, plans and 
directions for team members 
Helps identify and diffuse 
problems at an early stage. 
Has the ability to engage top 
management – to get resources, 
to ensure visibility for the work. 
And overall support for the 
innovative projects 
Facilitate a climate of active 
participation, minimal 
dysfunctional conflict and 
effective communication. 
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Studies Context Empirical or 
Conceptual 
Level of 
Analysis 
Roles/Functions of R&D 
Team Leader 
Filippini et al., 
2004 
 
R&D Empirical Team Objective setter; Strategy 
developer; Clear 
Communicator; Facilitator of 
customer and supplier 
involvement and Project 
Manager. 
 
Sarin and 
O’Connor, 
2009 
 
R&D Empirical  Organisation Motivator, Goal setter, 
Protector (protecting the 
team from any attempt to 
micromanage) 
 
Edmondson 
and 
Nembhardt,  
2009 
 
R&D Conceptual Team Project management skills; 
broad perspective; teaming 
skills; expanded social 
network; and boundary-
spanning skills. 
 
These papers collectively argue that an R&D team leader must both have 
‘soft’, people skills as well as project skills in managing complex, often 
technical, projects.  Some suggest that the team leader should also possess a 
high level of technical skills so that she can assess the quality of the work 
being produced.  In later papers, as Open Innovation increasingly becomes a 
feature of R&D processes and context, more emphasis is given to skills like 
boundary-spanning and networking.  
 
Many researchers argue that employees who are empowered and 
autonomous exert a higher level of control over their work. This degree of 
control means that employees feel more comfortable in their role to be 
103 
 
innovative in within their own jobs (Thamhain, 1990; Tang, 1999; Zwetsloot, 
2001; Nystrom et al., 2002; Amar, 2004; Mostafa, 2005; Muthusamy et al., 
2005).  
 
The need for effective leadership could hardly be higher than within NPD 
teams.  This point is made by Mumford et al. (2002) who note that the need for 
collaboration among team members places a premium on leadership. Strong 
team leadership includes the ability to direct and coordinate the activities of 
other team members, assess team performance, assign tasks, develop team 
knowledge, skills, and abilities, motivate team members, plan and organise, 
and establish a positive atmosphere (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Hinsz et al., 
1997; Marks et al., 2000).   
 
These are all essential elements of leadership in teams.  Team leaders also 
facilitate team problem solving. They provide performance expectations and 
acceptable interaction patterns and ways of working for members. They 
synchronise and combine individual team member contributions. Also, they 
seek and evaluate information that affects team functioning. They clarify team 
member roles and engage in preparatory meetings and feedback sessions 
with the team. (Klein et al., 2007; Burke et al., 2006; Stewart and Manz, 1995; 
Zaccaro, Rittman, and Marks, 2001).   
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Dolan et al. point out that, in innovation, it is especially necessary to develop a 
style of ‘facilitating’ leadership to ensure that the right things happen (2003).  
They see the essential characteristics as being the capacity to inspire, to 
articulate a vision and to hold teams of creative individuals together and 
channel their work.  Amabile and Khaire (2008) agree and point out that the 
leader’s job is to map out the stages of innovation and recognise the different 
skill sets, processes and technologies that are necessary to support each 
phase.  Their simple advice to people managing innovation and creativity; 
‘Know where you are in the game.’ (p. 104)  
 
Given the range and depth of skills required to manage an innovation team 
and successfully oversee an innovation project, as suggested by the research 
on leading R&D teams; it seems pertinent to ask whether one individual can 
possess all those skills or whether the task of managing the project ought to be 
split and a different leader assigned according to the phase the project is in.  Is 
it plausible to expect one person to be capable of being a visionary, explorer 
inspirer, inventor, motivator, crisis-manager, coach, expert, boundary-spanner, 
networker, facilitator, problem-solver, mentor, champion, persuader, 
ambassador and implementer?  Academic research has yet to provide a 
conclusive answer for this question. 
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2.4.3 Types of Leadership  
Bass (1990, p. 6) reports Napoleon’s quip that he would rather have an army 
of rabbits led by a lion than an army of lions led by a rabbit as indicative of the 
importance of leadership in teams.  According to Eisenhower, ‘leadership is 
the ability to decide what is to be done and then to get others to want to do it.’ 
(quoted in Larson, 1968, p. 21).    
 
Many approaches to the study of leadership exist (see Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2006) 
but, according to Judge and Piccolo (2004), “transformational–transactional 
leadership theory dominates current thinking about leadership research” (p. 
762).  Burns described transactional political leaders as content to work within 
a framework for the interests of their constituents; he referred to them as 
opinion-leaders, bargainers, bureaucrats, legislative leaders and executive 
leaders.  Transformational leaders, on the other hand, move to change the 
framework.  He classified them as intellectual leaders, leaders of reform and 
revolution, heroes and ideologues 
 
Downton (1973) and Burns (1978) presented this paradigm of transformational 
leadership describing it as a leader who asks followers to transcend their own 
self-interest for the good of the group, organisation or society; to consider their 
longer term needs to develop themselves rather than just their needs of the 
moment. Hence followers are converted into leaders and this is the 
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transformation alluded to in the term. 
 
Based on Burns’ (1978) influential work, Bass (1985) applied the theory from 
politics to the firm and organisational context and developed a theory of 
transformational leadership. In his ‘Full Range of Leadership Theory’, Bass 
(1985) described a full spectrum of leadership styles, distinguishing between 
laissez-faire, transactional leadership and transformational leadership. 
Laissez-faire, the so-called ‘nonleadership factor’ (Northouse, 2007, p. 186), is 
characterised by the absence of leadership. For example, the laissez-faire 
leader does not set goals, does not provide feedback nor do they provide 
support to followers in their efforts.  Laissez- faire leader behaviour is 
characterised by avoiding decisions, hesitating to take action, resisting 
expressing views, delaying responses and being absent when needed (Hinkin 
and Schriescheim, 2008). Although the data indicate that laissez-faire 
leadership or nonleadership are negative forms of leadership (Skogstad et al., 
2007), academic studies on laissez-faire leadership are more rare than 
examinations of other types of leadership (Dumdum, Lowe, & Avolio, 2002; 
Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996).  Hetland (2007) agreed with this 
assertion suggesting that “laissez-faire leadership behaviour is a destructive 
leadership behaviour” (p. 80) that warrants much more future research. 
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Bass (1985) and Yukl (2002) concluded that because most R&D teams are 
cross functional, that transformational leaders can convince members, through 
charisma, providing inspiration and acting as a coach and mentor, to look 
beyond their individual and functional backgrounds and work more creatively.  
In fact, charismatic leadership is seen as the primary component of 
transformational leadership in which subordinates are inspired to an enhanced 
level of performance by the vision and expertise of the leader (Bass, 1985; 
Pawar and Eastman, 1997; Yukl, 2002).  Bass (1995) suggested that the 
transformational leader also provides intellectual stimulation to subordinates 
and that, although related to charisma, is a distinct element of the leadership 
style.  Kanungo (1987) saw the transformational leader as one who engages in 
behaviours counter to the prevailing norms.  Keller (2006) suggests that it is 
quite natural for R&D teams to be positively motivated by intellectual 
stimulation and that their performance is likely to be helped by a leader who 
might suggest an alternative way of approaching a problem or a different 
source of scientific or technical information. 
 
It could be argued that different phases of the innovation process demand 
different leadership styles.  It has been consistently argued that 
transformational leadership is the preferred style for encouraging creativity and 
innovation through developing and inspiring followers as well as providing 
them with intellectually stimulating tasks.  This is most critical in the idea 
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generation phase of the innovation process (Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007). 
Transformational leadership can often persuade the team members to 
transcend their own self-interest for a greater, collective cause (Howell and 
Avolio, 1993). Keller (2006) found precisely this correlation in his longitudinal 
study in which one hundred and eighteen project teams from five industrial 
R&D organisations, from a range of industries, were surveyed about the 
influence of leadership style on their performance.  The inspiration and 
intellectual stimulation effects of transformational leadership was found to be 
more effective in research projects than in development ones.  He notes that 
research projects ‘usually deal with more radical innovations that require 
originality and the importation of knowledge from outside the project team’.  By 
contrast, the development projects generally focus on incremental innovations 
and modifications to existing products and more of the scientific and technical 
knowledge is likely to reside within the team.  In development teams, the study 
found that initiating structure was more effective.  Initiating structure refers to a 
system where the leader defines, directs and structures the roles of activities 
towards the attainment of the group’s goals (Bass, 1990; House and Aditya, 
1997; Yukl, 2002).  Keller’s findings are supportive of a contingency approach 
to transformational leadership in R&D teams. 
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A recent paper looking at the impact of transformational leadership on R&D 
teams has cast doubt on the significance of transformational leadership on the 
R&D process. Eisenbeiß and Boerner (2010) studied 52 team leaders and 256 
team participants in various R&D settings and did not find a correlation 
between transformational leadership and performance or output.  In fact, they 
found that giving teams autonomy was just as potent as high levels of 
transformational leadership.  This makes it plausible that laissez-faire 
leadership may have some application in the R&D field. They argue: 
 
As R&D teams are creative and innovative under low and high levels of 
transformational leadership, the question arises whether high levels of 
transformational leadership are necessary at all in the R&D context. 
Trusting in R&D team members’ high intrinsic motivation to innovate 
and their expert knowledge and thereby protecting their intellectual 
autonomy thus seem to be as effective as providing high levels of 
transformational leadership. (Eisenbeiß and Boerner, 2010; p. 369)) 
 
Apart from being seen in the leadership literature as an effective catalyst for 
innovative behaviour and creativity, transformational leadership has also been 
shown to be the more effective method of recruiting champions to give their 
support to innovation projects (Howell and Shea, 2001).  Innovation champions 
can make a crucial contribution to innovation projects by promoting their 
progress through organisational hurdles.  Transformational leadership is also 
commonly linked to change-oriented leadership through which organisations 
110 
 
can adapt themselves to a changing environment thus enhancing their 
capacity and potential to innovate (Yukl, 1999).   
 
In summary, there is much support in the literature for transformational 
leadership as being especially effective in the area of new product 
development, although recent studies are suggesting that team members’ 
intrinsic motivation exert just as powerful an influence (as any particular style 
of leadership) on their creative performance.  However, transformational 
leadership carries the additional benefit of assisting in the recruitment of 
champions for the team’s ideas.  Keller (2006) found that transformational 
leadership is has more positive impact at the front end of innovation projects 
where the focus is on generating novel ideas.  Transactional leadership then 
emerges as the more effective paradigm once the ideas have been harvested 
and the focus has switched to their development and implementation or 
launch.  These findings would suggest that when examining innovation 
projects using the IVC (innovation value chain), that transformational 
leadership would most effective at the idea generation stage; and possibly at 
the idea conversion phase.  But, transactional leadership would, arguably, be 
most effective at the diffusion phase when the ideas have been fine-tuned and 
developed to a state to be ready for introduction. 
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Support for creativity, risk taking and tolerance of mistakes are norms that are 
necessary to promote creativity or new ways of doing things in organisations.  
Teamwork and speed of action are norms that relate directly to implementation 
(Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996).  Both pairs are required; the first to generate 
and, the second to implement new approaches. Thus, the results support the 
idea that two separate component processes (creativity and its 
implementation) may affect innovation and consequently, innovative teams in 
organisations. It also further supports the notion of a divide between R&D with 
the first two factors (support for creativity and risk-taking) impacting more 
strongly on research and the second two factors (teamwork and speed of 
action) impacting more strongly on development.   
 
There may be a differential potency of various factors along the innovation 
process. Cheng and Van de Ven (1996) found that the actions and outcomes 
experienced by innovation teams tend to exhibit a chaotic pattern during the 
initial period of innovation development – the research phase, and an orderly, 
regular pattern during the concluding development period.  They described the 
process as an ‘innovation journey’ which typically consists of intrapreneurs 
who, securing support and funding of more senior managers or investors, 
undertake a sequence of events that aim to create and convert a new idea into 
an tangible asset or innovation.   
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Depending on the scope of the innovation, this journey can vary greatly in the 
number, duration and complexity of events that unfold along the way from the 
initiation of a developmental project to its implementation or termination. 
Whatever its scope, this journey is an exploration into the unknown process by 
which novelty emerges. This process is often characterised as being inherently 
uncertain, dynamic, and to follow a seemingly random process (Kanter, 1988; 
Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1990, Quinn, 1985). Spivey et al. (1997) suggested, 
‘those professionals who are charged with improving the new product 
development process may well feel as if they have been asked to bring order 
out of chaos.’   Amabile and Khaire (2008) also acknowledge this so-called 
chaotic phase of the process; ‘Because it’s impossible to know in advance 
what the next big breakthrough will be, you must accept that the discovery 
phase….. is inherently muddleheaded.’ (p. 104) 
 
Cheng and Van de Ven (1996) were concerned that not enough research had 
focussed upon the early stages of innovation, the generation of initial ideas 
and the fleshing out of potential developmental platforms of discovery because 
most researchers had devoted themselves to the more measurable elements 
of diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 2003) and the implementation of already 
developed innovation. In their study, they found that actions and outcomes 
experienced by innovation teams, in the research phase, were not consistent 
with an iterative, trial and error process; nor did they fit a random pattern – they 
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were, at the research stage, chaotic.  The recognition of the element of chaos 
was originally chronicled over twenty-five years ago by Quinn (1985). In their 
fieldwork, Cheng and Van de Ven examined two major collaborative 
pharmaceutical teams who worked for, in one case nine years and in the other 
twelve, and they argue that the innovation journey begins in chaos and ends in 
order.   
 
2.5 Summary 
In conclusion, innovation performance is a key indicator for most firms.  Senior 
management in most organisations are increasingly seeking proven methods 
to enhance their company’s capability at new product and service 
development.  R&D is the division in many large firms that is responsible for 
delivering on the firm’s innovation goals.  R&D departments usually organise 
into teams and it is teams that develop the innovation around projects and 
within firms. 
 
Existing models of the innovation process seem inadequate for providing 
actionable insight for organisations pursuing radical innovation.  Radical 
innovation is articulated as the innovation quest for many organisations.  
Consensus is emerging that radical innovation, although considerably harder 
to develop, offers richer opportunities to organisations than steady-state, 
incremental innovation.  It offers higher returns but comes with attendant 
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higher risk.  Consequently, researchers are calling for alternative approaches 
to creating an organisational infrastructure conducive to developing radical 
innovation (Leifer, 2001; O’Connor and Ayers, 2005; Phillips et al 2006).   
 
The fast pace of technological advance combined with the global nature of 
knowledge and market creation means that organisations are increasingly 
engaging in Open Innovation networks (Chesbrough, 2003; 2006).  Innovation-
centric organisations are supporting inter-firm co-operations and the 
development of an ecosystem of firms, sharing technologies and trading 
intellectual property, within a given industry or sector (West et al., 2006).  
 
In managing individual innovation initiatives or portfolios of NPD projects, most 
large organisations are using some form of the stage gate model. While this 
provides a helpful managerial framework for new product development, it has 
attracted criticism (Trott, 2005; Storey and Salaman 2005) principally for 
constraining the high level of creativity which is a necessary ingredient of 
innovation projects.   
 
Teams are the organising nucleus for innovation.  New product and service 
development is dependent on organisation members’ ability to combine and 
exchange knowledge (Smith et al., 2005) and hence teams are considered a 
natural and powerful option for creating and circulating innovative ideas. 
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Teams will be both the source of the creativity and also they will be the 
mediating instrument that guides the ideas through the organisational 
innovation process.  This innovation journey starts with a raw idea and, ideally, 
ends when that idea becomes a tangible, profitable innovation asset. 
 
This journey concept argues that innovation should be viewed as an end-to-
end process incorporating three distinct elements: Idea Generation; conversion 
and diffusion (Birkinshaw and Hansen, 2007).  Understanding that there are 
three phases and managing where one is in the process (Amabile and Khaire, 
2008) may be a key determinant in successfully managing innovation projects.  
The innovation value chain is a framework indicating the three stages of a 
journey that all innovation projects must go through in order to progress from 
the heartbeat of an idea to the introduction of a new product or service.   
 
Despite their familiarity with the market and dominant technologies, incumbent 
firms with market leading positions have a poor record in developing radical 
innovation (Doughtery, 1992).  Many factors conspire against larger firms 
being able to adopt the entrepreneurial agility associated with opportunity 
recognition and new product development (Markides, 2002).  Among the 
barriers within large firms, the attitude of influential managers to innovation 
overall is a significant hurdle (Storey and Salaman, 2005) as is the tendency 
for managers to want to conform and not be associated with risk (Pech, 2002).  
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Some of these barriers are especially prevalent in R&D departments where the 
work is demanding, time-consuming, resource-intensive but inherently 
uncertain and risky (Kratzer, 2006)  
 
Strong team leadership includes the ability to direct and coordinate the 
activities of other team members, assess team performance, assign tasks, 
develop team knowledge, skills, and abilities, motivate team members, plan 
and organise, and establish a positive atmosphere (Cannon-Bowers et al., 
1995; Hinsz et al., 1997; Marks et al., 2000). Dolan et al. (2003) point out that, 
in innovation, it is especially necessary to develop a style of ‘facilitating’ 
leadership to ensure that the right things happen.   
 
Team climate has been shown to be an important mediator in the development 
of innovative ideas within organisations.   Risk taking, failure tolerance and 
support for creativity have been specifically identified with the early phase of 
the innovation process.   
 
The innovation process is ‘inherently muddleheaded’ (Amabile, 1999).  It 
requires a purposeful navigation and management of ideas, projects, 
organisational resources, teams, processes, customers and deadlines.  As 
such, one of the crucial decisions senior managers should make in innovation 
is the selection if team leader for these projects.  The role of the leader is 
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critical in managing the progress of ideas from the invention phase through to 
implementation. 
 
Questions that are not adequately answered in the current literature surround 
the leadership of innovation teams; a topic which many researchers believe 
not to have been adequately explored (Mumford, 2002; Nippa, 2006; Buijs, 
2007; Eisenbeiß and Boerner, 2010).  Also, although the literature suggests a 
three phases of innovation projects (Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007; Roper et 
al., 2008), there has been little discussion of the differential importance of the 
three phases.  There are reasonable grounds for expecting that quality of 
ideas is the key determinant of the success of innovation projects.  If the quest 
for radical innovation must start with radical ideas, should managers build in a 
bias in favour of time and resources allocated to the idea generation phase 
rather than the other two phases?  This is the phase increasingly referred to as 
the ‘Fuzzy Front End’ and is the phase where external linkages play a central 
role in generating novel ideas.  This view would prioritise creativity over 
implementation in resourcing innovation projects.  It would also support 
management interventions with R&D and/or NPD staff to enhance their 
creativity. 
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More specifically, extant literature has established a connection between 
certain organisational elements and the outcome of radical innovation.  Some 
associations are positive: open innovation networks; teams, transformational 
leadership; culture; team climate while the literature suggests that other 
elements have a negative impact on radical innovation; rigid stage gates, 
closed innovation models, transactional leadership; management culture and 
aversion to risk.   
 
Informed by this literature, this study will look in depth at the interplay between 
the various elements and actors in the firm-level innovation process. The 
objective is to understand the complex relationships that exist between the 
factors affecting innovation management, throughout the phases of the 
innovation value chain to allow for a more complex view of innovation in the 
organisational context.  
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 
3.1 Objectives of the Chapter 
This chapter has four main objectives: to outline the research objective and 
questions; to describe the research philosophy; to explain the research design 
and to describe, in detail, the research process for this study.  The table below 
(Table 3.1) details the specific element of research design for this study.  This 
chapter discusses the various factors which led to these decisions. 
 
Table 3.1:  Key Elements of the Research Design for this Study 
  
Philosophy Interpretive 
Approach to Theory Inductive 
Methodology Case Study 
Research Instrument Semi structured, in-depth interviews 
Sample Design Census of participants in project 
Data Collection  
(Primary sources) 
Recorded and typed interview transcripts 
Data Collection 
(Secondary sources)  
Company reports, project plans, videotapes of consumer focus 
groups, briefing materials and presentation slide decks. HR 
department’s ’close-out’ report. 
Data Analysis Thematic Coding 
Time period Longitudinal study from 2007-2009 
Data Presentation Writing Up the Data in thesis format 
Quality Measures Trustworthiness 
 Credibility 
 Transferability 
 Dependability 
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3.2  Research Objective and Research Questions 
By definition, innovation requires ‘a shift from the norms of average behaviour’ 
(Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990, p. 20).  Hence, it is a topic that not merely invites 
but requires an in-depth evaluation of the people, processes, situations, events 
and contexts in which it happens (Savage and Black, 1995).  Sundstrom and 
Zika-Viktorrson (2009) acknowledge that although innovation is being studied 
with ever increasing frequency and intensity, there is still very limited 
knowledge of how internal (organisational) factors and external factors affect 
how innovation actually takes place within firms.  Van de Ven and Poole (1990; 
p. 311) hold that ‘an appreciation of the temporal sequence of activities in 
developing and implementing new ideas is fundamental to the management of 
innovation.’   
 
The objective of this study is to focus on the current practices in the 
management of innovation within GSK and to evaluate the degree to which the 
company optimises the organisational elements, which are conducive to the 
development of radical innovation.   
 
In terms of the study questions, this piece of research is intended to identify 
how raw, commercial ideas are generated, built and shared in teams; how they 
are sifted, prioritised and ranked; how some ideas are selected and others are 
abandoned; how team members network with external experts, lead users and 
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others and bring the learning back in for the benefit of the group; how the ideas 
are converted from nascent, fluid fragments into clear, concise and testable 
concepts; how teams can harness their collective creativity and yet still 
manage the level of efficiency and project management necessary to make 
things happen; how ideas can be championed effectively within an 
organisation; how some ideas ‘stick’ and others don’t; how teams should be 
managed and how leaders should behave in order to support the team to 
accomplish these goals across the phases of the innovation process. 
 
By answering these questions, through the in depth observation of two 
innovation teams in GSK, the research should produce useful, and possibly 
transferable, insights on what precisely are the organisational elements which 
are most conducive to the successful development, specifically, of radical 
innovation in R&D settings within large, complex, high-tech, global 
organisations. 
 
3.3 Describing the Research Philosophy 
Research with the objective of exploring, describing, understanding or 
evaluating topics in innovation management, such as the organisational factors 
conducive to developing radical innovation, are primarily investigating a social 
phenomenon (Blaikie, 1993). Authors such as Miles and Huberman (1994), 
Robson (1993), Yin (1994), Gill and Johnson (1991), Easterby-Smith et al, 
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(1991), Silverman (1999) and Blaikie (1993) show there are various options 
about how to approach such a social inquiry and that methodological choices 
are made according to the nature of the questions being addressed and the 
perspective of the researcher.  
 
Differences in research perspectives are often characterised as a debate 
between two major and opposing world views or methodological paradigms.  
The analogy can sometimes extend to characterizing one as ‘in the red corner’ 
with the other ‘in the blue corner’. (Patton, 1990). Describing these two 
overarching approaches in the social sciences, Benton and Craib (2001, p. 
119) put it: ‘there are two basic options; positivism or some form of 
interpretivism’.   
 
These approaches maintain distinct and different positions on the relationship 
between ideas and evidence (Miller and Brewer, 2003).  The research 
philosophy chosen will, according to Saunders et al (2007, p. 102), contain 
important assumptions about the way in which one views the world and these 
assumptions will underpin the research strategy.  They hold this is principally 
because the research paradigm selected makes a fundamental statement 
about the author’s particular view of the relationship between knowledge and 
the process by which it is developed or generated.   
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One key question which will play a role in determining the research approach 
is whether the social world is seen, by the researcher, as something that is 
external to those individuals within it, or is it a creation that they play some role 
in forming? (Bryman, 2004).  Thus, two opposite positions or paradigms exist: 
positivistic (sometimes called scientific or normative) and naturalistic 
(frequently referred to as constructivist or interpretive).   If the world is 
considered to have just one truth; or a question to have just one answer, then 
a positivistic approach is taken.  If truth, or the answer to the research 
question, on the other hand, is believed to be constructed from the perceptions 
of each individual in that social context, and that it may change with different 
individuals, then the approach is naturalistic or interpretive. 
 
Table 3.2, below sets out what are considered (Bryman, 2004, p. 20) the 
fundamental differences between the qualitative (interpretive, naturalistic) and 
quantitative (positivistic) approach in social research: 
 
Table 3.2:  Fundamental Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research Strategies 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Principal orientation to the role of 
theory in relation to research 
Deductive: testing of theory Inductive: generating 
theory 
Epistemological Orientation Natural Science Model, in 
particular positivism 
Interpretivism 
Ontological Orientation Objectivism Constructionism 
Source: Bryman (2004, p. 20). 
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In comparing qualitative and quantitative approaches, McClintock et al (1979) 
noted that it is the differences of method that are often emphasised (Fienberg, 
1977: 50). Qualitative methods are described as "thick" (Geertz. 1973: p6); 
they can contain insights and privileged information and: ‘can make a major 
contribution to the development of a meaningful survey design’ (Sieber. 1973: 
p.1342): they are "holistic" (Rist, 1977, p. 44). In contrast, quantitative 
approaches can be characterised as "thin" (Geertz, 1973, p.6). "narrow" (Rist, 
1977, p. 47), but  ‘hard and generalisable’ (Sieber, 1973: p.1335). 
 
In an essay, titled ‘Peaceful Coexistence in Psychology’, Taylor (1985, p. 117-
120) distinguishes between these two broad philosophical positions in the 
social sciences.  Those that favour the Positivist approach, he refers to as 
‘correlators’.  He sees this approach as relying on what he calls ‘brute data’ 
(i.e. data available to the scientist without the need for any interpretation) and 
is driven by the aim of finding one, singular, unvarying meaning for the data.  
Taylor contrasts the ‘correlators’ with what he refers to as the ‘interpreters’.  
These recognise human beings to be self-interpreting, whose actions and 
perspectives are inevitably tied up with how they see the world, their emotions 
and their values.  Taylor characterises ‘correlators’ and ‘interpreters’ as 
extreme points on the social science spectrum; he acknowledges that few 
investigators would fall entirely into one or other category.  Nevertheless, the 
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archetypes, of researchers at either end of the spectrum, are useful to uncover 
possible differences between the natural and the social sciences. 
 
Rosenberg (1988) summarises the dichotomy by asserting: 
 
When social scientists choose to employ methods as close to those of 
natural science as possible, they commit themselves to the position that 
the question before them is one empirical science can answer.  When 
they spurn such methods, they adopt the contrary view, that the question 
is different in some crucial way from those addressed in the physical or 
biological sciences.  Neither of these choices has been vindicated by 
conspicuous enough success to make the choice anything less risky than 
a gamble. (p. 4) 
 
In the business context, Cooper and Schindler (2008) suggest that what they 
refer to as the ‘controversy’ between qualitative and quantitative methods is 
more manifest in business decisions than elsewhere. They suggest that senior 
managers don’t have confidence in qualitative methods because the sample 
sizes are generally too small and that results are too susceptible to human 
error or sample bias.  However, they note that ‘increasingly, however, 
managers are returning to these (qualitative) techniques, despite their 
perceived shortcomings, as quantitative techniques fall short of providing the 
insights needed to make those ever-more-expensive business decisions’ 
(p.163).  Thus, once again making the point, that while quantitative studies 
offer generaliseability because of their large base of subjects or data points; 
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they may often offer only superficial observations and rarely produce the rich 
insights that organisations need when developing new products and services. 
 
3.3.1  The Positivist Approach 
Traditionally research has been conceived as the creation of true, 
objective knowledge, following a scientific method.  From what 
appears or is presented as data, facts, the unequivocal imprints of 
“reality”, it is possible to acquire a reasonably adequate basis for 
empirically grounded conclusions and, as a next step for 
generalizations and theory building.  So, the matter has long been 
conceived. (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; p. 1) 
 
Positivism embraces the quantitative tradition and is the philosophical stance 
of the natural sciences.  French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798 – 1857) is 
generally credited with inventing the term ‘Positivism’.   Positivism exalts 
science to the highest form of knowledge; indeed, scientific knowledge is seen 
as the only genuine form of knowledge. Benton and Craib (2001) suggest that 
this position can be characterised by a number of basic tenets which include: 
 
 ‘The individual mind acquires knowledge exclusively from our sensory 
experience of the world and our interaction with it. 
 Any authentic claim of knowledge must be testable by experience, 
observation and experiment and this excludes knowledge claims about 
anything which cannot be observed. 
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 Scientific laws are statements about general, recurring patterns of 
experience. 
 To explain any phenomenon scientifically is to demonstrate it as a 
‘scientific law’. 
 Scientific objectivity rests on a clear separation of testable, factual 
statements from subjective, value judgments.’ (p. 14) 
 
Bishop (2007) notes that under this paradigm: 
 
Theories are taken to be formal descriptions of facts, observable 
relationships among facts, and generalisations about facts and their 
relations.  Explanations of observed phenomena are framed as laws and, 
in turn, laws are thought to be subsumed under more general laws. (p. 
14) 
 
Bishop equates positivism with the scientific approach advocated originally by 
Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626), often hailed as the father of modern scientific 
method, who held that science starts by making specific observations; it then 
proceeds to empirical generalisations and tries to uncover predictable and 
lasting patterns or laws.  These observations and generalisations often give 
rise to the necessity for a new vocabulary of observational terms describing 
the particular patterns of behaviour of the phenomenon under investigation.  
Formal language is eventually customised to define the universal laws and 
principles that emerge. 
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Positivism in social science can be seen as a natural attempt to put the study 
of human, social and organisational interaction on a scientific footing by 
extending the methods and forms of observation, testing and explanation 
which have held sway in the natural sciences.  However, extending the 
philosophy of the natural sciences into the social sciences continues to be a 
matter of controversy.  Winch (1958) argues that the concepts appropriate to 
the analysis of social phenomena are demonstrably incompatible with those 
used in natural science.  Similarly, Hayek (1955) contends that modelling the 
study of social phenomena after the natural sciences has done great harm. 
Positivism or the scientific approach usually begins with a hypothesis or theory 
to be proved or disproved.   Naturalistic or interpretive approaches differ at the 
outset because they typically start with an immersion in a situation, allowing 
the themes to gradually become apparent.   
 
Positivism is a traditional approach to research design in which hypotheses are 
developed, experiments and surveys (or other research methods) are 
conducted to prove or falsify the hypothesis.  Rosenberg (1995, p. 11) explains 
that Positivists named their theories ‘hypothetico-deductivism’ and they held 
that the history of science is inseparable from a history of progress.  This, they 
describe as a history of increasingly powerful predictions and increasingly 
precise explanations of how the world works.   
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The hypothetico-deductive method is generally represented as a logical, linear 
sequence starting with an a-priori theory with the objective of either confirming 
or refuting it; see figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1:  The Process of Deduction 
 
Source: Bryman (2004, p. 9). 
 
Positivist methodologies are associated with quantitative research, which 
generally focus on causal explanations.  In this way, theory precedes data 
whereas in the inductive approach, the sequence is reversed and theory 
follows data.   
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3.3.2 The Interpretive, Inductive Approach  
Inductive, interpretivist researchers believe that social phenomena (like 
organising for radical innovation) cannot be cleanly extracted from context, 
thus creating complexities for investigations in the social sciences.   
 
Hermeneutics is the name given to the science of interpretation in general.  
Students of hermeneutics believe that human action is connected or even 
explained by desires and beliefs which are personal and individual.  They hold 
that methods employed in the social sciences must reflect the distinctive 
human capacity for language.  Hence, measuring physical, human activity in 
some sphere in search for causal regularities must be considered subordinate 
to the search for meaning in the social sciences.  Bryman (2004, p. 13) holds 
that at the heart of this clash is a division of emphasis on the explanation of 
human behaviour that is the principle priority of the positivist approach to the 
social sciences and the understanding of human behaviour, which is the chief 
concern of the interpretivist tradition.  The interpretivist term reflects the views 
of the many researchers and writers who have been critical of the application 
of the scientific model to the study of the social world.  Bryman (2004) 
suggests that they (interpretivists) share a view that the subject matter under 
scrutiny in the social sciences - people, organisations, human behaviour, and 
institutions - is fundamentally different from the natural sciences.  Therefore 
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the study of the social sciences ought to necessitate the use of different 
research procedures. 
 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) defined the characteristics of inductive research as: 
‘the grounding of theory upon data through the process of data-theory 
interplay, the making of constant comparisons, the asking of theoretically 
oriented questions, theoretical coding and the development of theory’ (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1994, p. 283). 
 
The qualitative paradigm studies the differences between people (and/or 
situations) and requires the social scientist, through some level of 
interpretation, to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman, 2004).  
That human action cannot be explained unless it is interpreted is not a new 
thesis.  Plato argued in the Phaedo (99 a-b) that human action can only be 
understood by interpreting its meaning.  One of the principal differences 
therefore between the two approaches is that while the qualitative, inductive 
approach observes behaviour, activities and phenomena, it also interprets their 
significance in the appropriate context. 
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Induction and deduction are often portrayed as mutually exclusive but in reality 
the issue is more one of emphasis than dichotomy (Fitzgerald and Howcroft, 
1998).  Mintzberg has long supported (1979) ‘research that is as purely 
inductive as possible’ (p. 584).  He notes two essential steps in the inductive 
process.  The first is Detective Work where patterns and inconsistencies are 
tracked down.  The second is the creative leap, which involves generalising 
beyond the data themselves.  He describes it as a data-led, exploratory 
approach involving: ‘peripheral vision, poking around relevant places and a 
good dose of creativity’ among other things that ‘makes good research and 
always will, in all fields.’  
 
Yin (2003) contends that the case study approach is essential when elaborate 
social situations are under scrutiny, because one of its strengths as a research 
methodology is that it affords a strategy for examining composite, real-life 
situations.  The case study approach successfully manages the countless 
inter-related elements embedded in real-life situations, which combine to 
create the phenomenon.  Idiographic, is how Bryman (2004) expressed the 
nature of case study research as its aim is to expound the distinctive elements 
of the event under investigation, while also attending to contextual features.  
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In summary, although the two research traditions are often portrayed as a 
debate between ‘hard’ (quantitative) and ‘soft’ (qualitative) research, each 
approach has considerable strengths.  Saunders et al, developed a schematic 
(Table 3.3) to underscore some of the critical differences in research 
perspectives between the deductive and inductive approaches. 
 
Table 3.3:  Major Differences between Deductive and Inductive Approaches to 
Research 
Deduction Emphasises Induction Emphasises 
Scientific principles. Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to events. 
Moving from theory to data. A close understanding of the research 
context. 
The need to explain causal relationships 
between variables. 
The collection of qualitative data. 
The collection of quantitative data. A more flexible structure to permit 
changes of emphasis as the research 
progresses. 
The operationalisation of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition. 
A realisation that the researcher is part 
of the research process. 
A highly structured approach. Less concern with the need to 
generalise. 
Researcher independence of what is 
being researched. 
 
The necessity to select samples of 
sufficient size in order to generalise 
conclusions. 
 
Source:  Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007, p. 120). 
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In some fields of study, a privileged hegemony has been enjoyed by the 'hard' 
approach (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, Walsham, 1995), to the extent that 'soft' 
research will always be seen as somewhat inferior if it is to be judged against 
the prevailing 'hard' standards.  However, Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
argue an awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of the two 
approaches and an attempt to accommodate them pluralistically leads to a far 
more complete picture. 
 
3.3.3 Ensuring Quality and High Standards in Social Research 
Yin (2003) suggests that for any research study to qualify as ‘valid’ it should 
pass certain design tests.  Three prominent and essential criteria are generally 
mentioned in the context of evaluating academic research: reliability; 
replication; and validity.  These are concepts which are very closely aligned 
with the quantitative, positivist tradition but they also have parallels for the 
interpretivist paradigm. 
 
Reliability is concerned with the stability of the measures used in the research.  
This facet of research design can be especially important when researchers 
are examining concepts which are intangible (like management practices) and 
may well be emotive; such as poverty, religion and racial prejudice.  Reliability 
is particularly important in quantitative research where the researcher will be 
concerned that the measures they use are consistent and stable. 
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Replication is important when researchers choose to re-run research projects 
and studies of others.  There may be many good reasons to try to replicate the 
work of a previous study.  But, for any study to be replicated in a later version 
the procedures must be very well explained in the original study.  That a study 
is repeatable using precisely the same methodology is sometimes seen as a 
quality measure for a study. 
 
Another important criterion for evaluating the quality of research is validity.  
Validity is concerned with the appropriateness and integrity of the conclusions 
that are generated from any specific piece of research.  Validity is generally 
measured in two ways: internal (or construct validity) and external validity.  The 
notion of construct validity refers to the question of whether the measures 
devised to record some aspect of a concept or outcome really does reflect the 
concept it is supposed to describe. This question of whether the measures 
employed really represent the concepts they are supposed to be scoring is a 
fundamental one. 
 
Internal validity is also concerned with the accuracy of the markers used for 
causality within a study.  It relates to whether a conclusion that attributes a 
causal relationship to two or more variables is actually correct and that the 
relationship so attributed is not capable of any alternative explanation.  Internal 
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validity measures just how confident we can be that the relationship attributed 
to the dependent and independent variables in the study is watertight. 
 
External validity relates to the question of whether the results of the study can 
be generalised beyond and outside the specific research context.  Bryman 
(2004, p. 29) notes that these measures of reliability and validity are ‘most 
obviously a concern for quantitative research’.  This is not to say that they are 
not a concern for qualitative research but to acknowledge that these measures 
are specific to areas of causal connections which are not always priorities for 
the interpretive tradition.  He notes that ‘grounding these measures and criteria 
in quantitative research makes them inapplicable or inappropriate for social 
research’.  It is important to note (Yin, 2003, p. 37) that generaliseability in the 
context of a case study does not refer to statistical generaliseability but rather 
analytical generaliseability where ‘the investigator is striving to generalise a 
particular set of results to some broader theory.’  Also, contribution to 
generaliseability can be attributed to the extent that the research findings 
replicate extant theoretical propositions or other empirical findings in the field. 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), in pursuit of alternative ways of evaluating qualitative 
research, propose trustworthiness as an overarching criterion to evaluate the 
quality of a research study.  Trustworthiness, in their view, involves 
establishing four key criteria:  Credibility - confidence in the 'truth' of the 
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findings; transferability - showing that the findings have some level of 
applicability in other contexts; dependability - showing that the findings are 
consistent and could be repeated; and confirmability - a degree of neutrality or 
the extent to which the findings of a study are shaped by the respondents and 
not researcher bias, motivation, or interest.  Many researchers endorse the 
concepts credibility, dependability and transferability, which have been used to 
describe critical components of trustworthiness (Guba, 1981; Patton, 1987; 
Polit and Hungler, 1999; Berg and Welander Hansson, 2000).  
 
3.3.4 How is Innovation Approached within the Current Literature? 
The top-ranked journal dealing with new product development and innovation 
(Rated A, according to the Harzing Index) is the International Journal of 
Product Innovation Management (JPIM).  This is the official journal of the 
Product Development and Management Association (PDMA).  In 2007, to 
celebrate twenty years of publication, the JPIM published a number of review 
articles evaluating both how the journal had been influenced over the two 
decades of its existence and how it had impacted on other publications.  These 
articles also audited and classified the methodological perspectives of the 
articles it had published over the two decades.  One conclusion (Biemans et al, 
2007) was that over the twenty years, the dominant research method used 
was quantitative; specifically, a cross-sectional, large-sample survey, and the 
focus most usually being at the level of the firm.  The surveys were 
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predominantly administered by mail with some telephone and email 
questionnaires being introduced more recently.  This demonstrates that the 
JPIM, a key organ of opinion in new product development, leans towards 
positivist, survey data.   
 
Gua (2005), in a similar JPIM review article and commenting on this 
phenomenon, holds that in this pursuit of generaliseability and reliability, 
scholars may depend heavily on a limited palette of survey methods and 
‘sophisticated software to treat their well-structured data.  This reliance risks 
unintentionally leading researchers to choose the studies that are tightly 
designed, exactingly executed and straightforwardly measured’ (p.255).  Like 
Daniels (1991) and Inkpen and Beamish (1994), Guo believes that the pursuit 
of statistical validity may lead scholars to continue to examine the same 
phenomenon repeatedly with a relatively low level of data.  There is, he says, a 
lack of diversification of research methods within the area of NPD research.  
Interestingly, a fact welcomed by Biemans et al. (2007); case study methods 
have almost doubled in popularity over the lifetime of the journal (rising from 
8% in 1984 to over 14% in 2003) which is an illustration of the increasing 
plurality of methods both being published in the journal and being undertaken 
in the field. 
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The design of this research study takes a different approach to the prevailing, 
positivist orthodoxy in the innovation field.  In that sense, it responds to the call 
for a more pluralistic approach to the study of innovation. Because the focus of 
the study was to understand how innovation happens in large organisations, a 
qualitative approach was preferred.  Moreover, the elements that were 
required to be probed in this study are complex human emotions, skills, 
responses, creativity, team-working and motivations. 
 
3.4 Case Study and Case Analysis 
In terms of epistemology, this study is a qualitative inquiry.  Having reviewed 
the literature; reflected on the practice of innovation in companies and 
performed the empirical work for this study, a case study emerged as the ideal 
mechanism through which to attempt to answer the research question.  
 
Denzin and Lincoln, (2000, p.190) point out, that as one begins the practical 
activity of generating and evaluating data to answer questions about the 
meaning of what others are doing and saying and then synthesising that 
insight into a published work: 
 
One inevitably takes up “theoretical” concerns about what constitutes 
knowledge and how it is to be justified...In sum, acting and thinking, 
practice and theory, are linked in a continuous process of critical 
reflection and transformation. 
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Case studies are appropriate when conducting exploratory research on 
complex social phenomena in their real life contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
1994). Additionally, as well as allowing researchers to observe formal, 
measurable elements of a process, they also reveal the informal elements 
such as social interactions which can be extremely important (Hartley, 1994). 
R&D managers have been found to be positively inclined to case study 
research (Gassmann, 1990).   
 
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010; p xiii) favour case studies as the best way to 
build knowledge about innovation: 
 
The only way to study the management of innovation initiatives is to 
compile in-depth, multiyear case studies.  Doing so is time consuming 
and expensive.  It requires extensive interviewing, followed by the 
meticulous process of synthesising hundreds of pages of interview 
transcripts and archived socuments into meaningful narratives.  This work 
requires access through unique partnerships with corporations, and 
corporations are generally willing to partner with only the top academic 
institutions. 
 
Yin (2009) defines a case study as: ‘an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident.’  Yin further asserts that a case study is especially appropriate when 
141 
 
the objective is to understand the workings of a real-life phenomenon in depth 
including contextual factors relevant to the study (Yin and Davis, 2007).   
 
Yin considers case study to be better able to rationalise the causal 
relationships in real-life events than empirical strategies.  Case study 
methodology also has the capacity to vividly describe the situation under 
investigation, providing important contextual detail.  It allows issues to naturally 
come to the surface, and in situations where the results or effects are 
indistinct, the case study methodology provides space to explore.   
 
For this project, a multiple (twin), longitudinal case study, based primarily on 
in-depth interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Stake, 
1994; Cresswell, 1997) has been selected.  In-depth interviews capture an 
individual's perception of events and behaviours after they occur, allowing 
important issues to come to the surface.  In-depth interviews in a twin or 
multiple case study have the highest potential to provide deep contextual 
understanding of the critical factors involved in the innovation process 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Mason (1996) holds that such interviewing is recommended when the 
evidence being sought is situational, contextual and interactional. Zorn (2001) 
also suggests the most useful interview format for conducting qualitative 
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research is often “semi-structured”.  Being ‘semi-structured’ places the 
interview at the centre of a range between; highly-structured, as is the case of 
an interview that consists entirely of closed-ended questions, and 
unstructured, such that the interviewee is simply given the opportunity to talk 
freely about whatever comes up. Semi-structured interviews offer topics and 
questions to the interviewee, but are carefully designed to elicit the 
interviewee’s ideas and opinions on the topic of interest, as opposed to leading 
the interviewee toward preconceived choices. To be effective, they rely on the 
interviewer following up with probes to get in-depth information on topics of 
interest.  Mason (1996) refers to this methodology as ‘qualitative interviewing’, 
an in-depth, semi-structured form of interviewing.  She sees them as generally 
characterised by: 
 
 A relatively informal style with the appearance of a conversation or 
discussion rather than a formal question and answer format. 
 A thematic, topic-centred approach where the interviewer does not have 
a set of pre-formatted questions, but rather has a set of themes and 
topics to explore. 
 The assumption that data are generated through the interaction because 
either the interviewee or the data itself are data sources. 
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Additional benefits of the case study analysis approach are that it accepts 
small sample numbers, allows for creative use of alternative data sources (of 
which there are several in this case study), places emphasis on historical 
outcomes as the key area to be examined and provides the ability to identify 
the causal mechanism that underlies the outcomes (Easton, 1995). The case 
study can also reflect and be sensitive to the context within which a 
phenomenon occurs and to the temporal dimension through which events 
unfold (Li, 1996). 
 
3.4.1 Data Analysis: Coding the Data, Linking Concepts and Data 
Ezzy (2002, p. 60) notes that data analysis in most qualitative research begins 
during data collection and that this is consistent with the dialectic theory and 
interplay between theory and data.   
 
Figure 3.2:  Relationship between Analysis and Collection 
 
Source:  Adapted from Lofland and Lofland, 1971, p. 132). 
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He notes that theoretical and practical questions are shaped and reshaped as 
data begins to be gathered.  This was the case with this study as, apart from 
the pilot, the interviews with the team leaders preceded the other ISF 
interviews and yielded some useful insights that otherwise might have been 
lost to the study.  Many theorists see data collection and analysis as 
interrelated processes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Becker, 1971; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1991) where they assert that the data analysis begins when the very 
first piece of data is collected.   This is particularly true in the case of inductive 
research where Ezzy (2002, p. 620) points out: 
 
Examining data right from the beginning of data collection for “cues” is 
what makes grounded theory “grounded”.  It is also the foundation of 
inductive theory building. 
 
Coffee and Atkinson (1996, p. 26) note that most analyses of qualitative data 
begin with the process of coding.  They stress that although coding is almost 
invariably a part of the analysis of the data; coding is not a substitute for 
analysis.  Coding is the process of reviewing the data and allowing the key 
themes and concepts to emerge.  
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The purpose of parsing, analysing and coding data is to allow theories and 
concepts to emerge from themes embedded in the raw data which can be 
woven or reconstructed into a theory grounded in the fieldwork; as Glaser 
states: 
 
The purpose of coding is to move from having a set of data to 
developing a theory by fracturing the data, then conceptually grouping it 
into codes that then become the theory which explains what is 
happening in the data. (1978, p. 55).  
 
In short, coding is the process of finding out what the data are all about. 
(Charmaz, 1995, p. 37). 
 
3.5 Research Design 
The research design is based around the longitudinal analysis of a double, or 
twin, case study in one specific firm over the course of three years.  The 
company involved is the second largest pharmaceutical firm in the world and 
one of the world’s top ten R&D spenders. Moreover, the initiative to be studied 
is unique within the company and is so singular in its design as to be likely to 
be unique in any setting.  The cases to study were chosen after extensive 
discussions with the company’s head of R&D and head of Innovation, head of 
Investor Relations as well as with one of the company’s (Global marketing) 
Presidents. 
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The corporate context in which this research was conducted will be extensively 
described in Chapter Four.  The company’s overall, published business 
strategy cites innovation as its key route to and priority for growth.  A number 
of initiatives were extant at the time in pursuit of new product and service 
development ideas to drive growth in the business.  While the ISF was not the 
only, or even the primary, innovation effort, it was seen as the most 
experimental and entrepreneurial innovation project that the R&D group had 
ever inaugurated.   As part of the preparation for this thesis, a number of 
preliminary interviews took place with key stakeholders within GSK to get 
some insight on which programmes were most appropriate for a study of this 
nature. The company’s senior leaders including the President of R&D, his 
counterpart in the commercial organisation; the President of the Future Group 
as well as the company’s Global Head of Innovation were interviewed.  All 
recommended this initiative, called Innovation Sans Frontiers, which was then 
underway within the R&D organisation.  This internal innovation initiative was 
ideally configured as an embedded, twin case study.  Gerring (2007, p. 37) 
defines such an approach as an ‘intensive study of a single unit or a small 
number of units (cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
similar units (a population of cases).’  This is perfectly aligned with the 
objective of using the leanings derived from the ISF project to help shed some 
light on which practices and processes may help accelerate innovation more 
generally in organisations and, more specifically, in teams. 
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3.5.1 The Right Case to Study - Why ISF is a Revelatory Case 
The Innovation San Frontiers (ISF) project within GSK was ideally constituted 
to yield fresh, relevant, possibly original and hopefully, transferable insights.  It 
was deliberately set up with a novel framework; certainly one that was unique 
for GSK.  The project involved pitting two equal (in theory) teams against each 
other to come up with radical new, business ideas capable of being launched, 
by GSK, within 3-5 years.   
 
Consistent with the processes associated with drug discovery, this twin team 
approach was almost analogous to a clinical trial where there is a control 
group but neither side knows which is the placebo and which is the active 
group.  In this case, they were both ‘active’ groups with neither designated as 
the ‘control’ but nonetheless the structure of the ISF initiative makes 
comparisons possible that could not have been achieved with a more 
conventional project or team design.  The teams were ‘created equal’ insofar 
as there were roughly the same amount of people on each team; both teams 
had an equivalent level of experience within its ranks; both teams had a 
nucleus of highly qualified and expert PhD scientists within it.  The teams were 
also both working to exactly the same brief, with the same deliverables, the 
same budgets and resources and the same deadline.   
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These factors mean that their experiences can be examined at a number of 
levels for insights into how innovation happens in a large, complex, R&D 
intensive, pharma company.  These factors also make the ISF a case study 
that falls into the category described by Yin (2009) as ‘revelatory’ because the 
case provides an opportunity to look behind the curtain of a large, global, R&D 
intensive corporation into a specific, unique, situation or context which would 
not ordinarily be allowed to be the subject of external or academic scrutiny. 
 
The case study was conducted using a longitudinal series of interviews. The 
approach was inductive and the objective was to allow the participants tell the 
story of their experience with the project without having to steer them towards 
any a priori agenda or hypothesis.  This research elicited the narrative of what 
happened over the nine months of the project, how it happened, who did what, 
how the team collaborated to leverage their collective skills and what results 
did they achieve.  Through their stories, it was hoped that common themes 
might emerge.  It was likely that similar experiences would give rise to 
common issues and themes which could then be analysed in more detail.  
Ultimately, the objective was to develop some guidelines which might improve 
both the experience and the outcomes of similar projects and initiatives in the 
future. 
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Members’ experience of the ISF project; the briefing, the work expended on 
generating ideas, following-up technologies, creating prototypes, testing them 
with potential end-users, establishing a potential value for these raw ideas – 
and finally, presenting their findings to senior management, were likely to be 
deep, personal and complex.  The research methodology used in this 
research, therefore, needed to be capable of handling this complexity. 
 
Mason (p. 40) points out that: 
 
What you want to know may be rather complex or may not be clearly 
formulated in your interviewees’ minds in a way that they can simply 
articulate in response to a short, standard question. 
 
As Gillham describes: 
 
The use of ‘open’ questions doesn’t mean that you have no control over 
the way the interviewee responds. Indeed, your (unobtrusive) control is 
essential if you are going to achieve your research aims, i.e. you need to 
‘steer’ for the direction and also ensure that key points or topics are 
covered. (2000, p. 45). 
 
3.5.2 Sample Design 
One of the advantages of studying a customised, time-bounded, internal, 
organisational experiment like ISF is that the number of personnel involved 
was limited and this allowed for interviewing the entire target population.  A 
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census approach was feasible and therefore the sample design required the 
assembly of the lists of team members on both teams along with a list of the 
SLT members who had been involved in designing, recommending the staffing 
and judging the outputs of the group.  Interviews were planned for all members 
of both ISF teams and with all members of the SLT at the time of the project. 
 
3.6 Describing the Research Process 
3.6.1 Fieldwork Phase 1: Deciding on the Right Case to Study 
The fieldwork process described in the following pages took place over a 
period of over two years from March 2007 to July 2009.  The first phase in the 
process was a series of exploratory interviews with the senior leaders in GSK.  
Meetings with the President of R&D (Dr Ken James) and with his counterpart 
in the commercial organisation (Tim Wright) were set-up to discuss the 
research proposal and, with them, to review possible GSK innovation 
programmes and initiatives which might be suitable for the type of study being 
proposed.   
 
They also wanted to identify the innovation programme or initiative within the 
organisation which would be most useful for them to spotlight in this type of in-
depth research.  These initial conversations were widened to include the 
company’s Head of Innovation (Donna Sturgess).  Also involved in these early 
discussions was the company’s Global Head of Organisational Development 
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(Dr Sandy Lionetti).  It was during these discussions that the ISF programme, 
which was then just approaching completion, was first mentioned. 
 
The ISF initiative was a supplementary innovation programme to the 
company’s already extensive, established innovation activities (see Chapter 
Four) and consequently, there was a strong interest in measuring its 
effectiveness both in terms of innovation outputs (or ideas for products and 
services GSK might launch in the future) as well as overall project design.  The 
company was interested to know whether there was merit in doing more of 
these initiatives and also what they might learn out of the structure, processes 
and outcomes of this version so that they could improve any future iterations of 
this type of programme.  
 
The ISF project suited this type of in-depth study for a number of reasons: 
 
1) It was a high-level innovation effort supported by senior management 
2) It had interesting and unique (for GSK) elements of experiment design 
insofar as it pitted two teams in competition against each other. 
3) It had an international dimension with the two teams located separately 
4) It had clear and explicit objectives for the teams 
5) It offered unprecedented access to highly qualified and skilled R&D 
people to conduct the study. 
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These discussions also helped bring to the surface some of the concerns of 
senior management about the company’s competency and approach to 
innovation.  These initial discussions, at the top (functional president) level of 
the company, were semi-structured but, essentially exploratory in nature.  The 
sequence of interviews and the structure of the entire project is provided in 
Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: The Research Process 
 
 
The first phase of the research process identified the ISF project and provided 
some of the organisational context that surrounded it.  These interviews 
provided rich insights into what senior management were attempting to do with 
this project.  These five interviews were conducted between March and 
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September 2007 and they lasted between forty-five minutes and ninety 
minutes each.  This phase both identified the right project to study and gave 
the research the imprimatur of senior management to proceed.   
 
As mentioned above, these interviews involved the function heads of the entire 
organisation; including the global presidents of innovation, marketing and 
R&D.  The project they identified, and recommended to be the subject of this 
study, was being managed by the R&D president and his team of direct 
reports. This group of R&D senior managers (all at the level of Vice President 
within the company) were called the Senior Leadership team (SLT). 
 
In setting up the ISF project (which will be described in detail in Chapter 5), 
each of the SLT members had been asked to nominate possible members to 
staff the ISF teams.  There were to be two teams with roughly a dozen R&D 
people in each.  R&D was located in two major sites; Weybridge in Surrey and 
Parsippany in New Jersey.  For the ISF initiative, one team would be based in 
the UK with the other based in the US.  The people who were nominated to 
join the ISF initiative all had to have shown some evidence of an above 
average level of creativity to justify their selection. 
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The SLT had three significant and separate roles in the management of the 
ISF project: they designed the overall organisational element of it and set the 
aims and objectives of the initiative; they nominated the people who would be 
working on the ISF project and they judged the quality of the work produced by 
the ISF team and they decided which (if any) of the resulting ideas would be 
taken into the overall R&D pipeline. 
 
3.6.2 Pilot ISF Interviews 
In keeping with good practice, a preliminary set of 6 (ISF-participant) 
interviews was conducted in order to pilot and pre-test the topic guide that had 
been developed for the interviews.  These were conducted in early February 
2008.  Included within this pilot group were interviewees from both (US and 
UK) teams and one of the team leaders was also included.  This pilot group of 
interviews helped in providing context for the rest of the fieldwork. 
 
3.6.3 Fieldwork Phase 2: Interviewing the ISF Participants 
The next phase involved interviewing the ISF team leaders and team 
members.  Seventeen interviews were conducted with the ISF teams between 
February 2008 and June 2009.  There had been 25 members over the entire 
project but some had left GSK either during the project itself or very shortly 
afterwards.  These interviews, because they explored the experiences and 
reflections participants of the project, were longer in duration (averaging 1h 
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45mins) and were recorded and transcribed with many of the transcripts 
running to over 30 pages in length.  The details of the participants and the 
times and dates of the interviews are recorded here in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4:  The Interview Schedule  
Team 
Senior 
Management 
Name GSK Role/Position Date of Interview 
1 Donna Sturgess Global Head of Innovation March 12th 2007 
2 Tim Wright President the Future Group April 3rd, 2007 
3 Dr Sandy Lionnetti Director of Organisational 
Development 
April 8th, 2007 
4 Robert Wolf SVP HR Global September 10th, 2007 
5 Peter Kirkby VP Marketing Excellence September 17th, 2007 
6 Gary Davies Director of Investor 
Relations 
September 24th, 
2007 
7 Dr Ken James President of R&D October 1st,  2007 
Team US    
8 Scott Coapman Team Leader ISF US 
NPD Project Leader 
February 6th, 2008 
9 Li-Lan Chen NPD Scientist February 6th, 2008 
10 Ayyappa 
Chaturvedula 
NPD Scientist April 28th, 2009 
11 Rajesh Mishra Medical Director April 17th, 2009 
12 Michael Buch NPR Director February 18th, 2008 
13 Susan Schwartz Medical Director April 22nd, 2009 
14 Prasad  Adusumilli NPR Scientist March 30th, 2009 
15 Brenda Schuler NPD Scientist June 1st, 2009 
16 Frank Deng NPR Scientist January 17th, 2008 
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Team UK  
 
  
17 Nigel Grist Team Leader UK February 18th, 2008 
18 Stuart Smith VP Dental Care February 8th, 2008 
19 Alex Stovell NPR Scientist February 5th, 2008 
20 David Uruquart NPR Scientist February 8th, 2008 
21 Ashley Barlow NPR Scientist April 9th, 2009 
22 David Parker NPR Scientist March 25th, 2009 
23 Jonathon Creeth NPR Scientist April 7th, 2009 
24 Peter Frost NPR Scientist April 20th, 2009 
R&D Senior 
Leadership 
Team (SLT) 
Name GSK Role/Position Date of Interview 
 
25 
 
Stanley Lech 
 
VP, R&D and Innovation, 
GSK Consumer Healthcare 
 
March 21st, 2008 
26 Teresa Layer R&D VP Sensodyne October 1st, 2008 
27 Kenneth Strahs R&D VP Smoking Control September 9th, 2008 
28 Geoff Clarke R&D VP Panadol May 7th, 2009 
29 Brendan Marken VP NPR June 2nd, 2009 
30 Simon Gunson VP NPD July 30th, 2009 
 
3.6.4 Phase 3: Interviewing the Judging Panel 
The third, and final, phase of the research involved six interviews with the 
senior leadership team in R&D.  This group had the task of reviewing the ISF 
work, evaluating all the novel ideas and assessing their potential within the 
organisation and deciding which projects were going to be progressed after the 
ISF project concluded.  As the ISF project was created to have a competitive 
element, it was important to ensure the voice of the ‘judges’ was captured in 
the analysis.  The table above (Table 3.4) shows the timing and number of 
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interviews in which the primary data was captured.  Table 3.5 below 
enumerates the number of pieces of secondary data that also featured in the 
overall analysis.  Broadly, the initial scoping interviews could be referred to as 
‘Phase 1’ and took place towards the end of 2007.  The bulk of the work and 
the key interviews in the ISF teams were undertaken in 2008 and are 
described here as ‘Phase 2’.  Finally, the interviews with the SLT of the R&D 
group took place last and are described as ‘Phase 3’ and took place in 2009. 
 
Table 3.5:  Additional Material: Secondary Material 
 SLT Briefing Documents for ISF Project – PowerPoint Presentation 
The initial briefing deck of 6 slides that were developed and used to brief the ISF teams both in the 
UK and US. 
 US Team Final Presentation to the SLT– PowerPoint  
The US team’s final presentation including all the concepts they presented at the final presentation.  
 US Team Microsoft Project Plan for the Initiative 
US team’s project plan which was created at the outset of the project and updated throughout and 
forms part of the analysis and helps corroborate the timings quoted within the fieldwork section of 
this report. 
 US Team Consumer Research for the ideas they presented 
Includes unedited video footage of a number of focus groups (~40 hours of footage)  in which the 
ideas were tested with consumers.  Also included BuzzBack first stage volumetric data on the 
ideas. 
 The UK Team’s Final Presentation to the SLT - PowerPoint 
UK Team Presentation including PowerPoint slides showing concepts and context for the ideas 
presented to the SLT at the final presentation. 
 Internal Company Magazine Describing the Outcome of the Initiative 
The R&D Organisation has an internal magazine in which this project was written up. 
 HR Project ‘Close-Out’ Report 
A junior HR executive, based in GSK Head Office, carried out what they described as a ‘cursory 
review and topline recommendations’ on the project after it had come to an end. 
 US Team Close Out Report 
The US team leader got his team to run a post-project review after the final presentation and their 
feedback on the experience of being in the team and observations on how it was run were captured 
on Think-Tank software. 
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Around the time of the decision to use this innovation initiative as the focus of 
the research study, the ISF project was already nearing its completion.  The 
project was due to conclude with a presentation of each team’s ideas to the 
R&D Senior Leadership Team (SLT) in New Jersey in July 2007.  The UK 
team was flying over to present their material for the first half of the day and 
the US team would have the afternoon of the same day to present their top 
ideas.  As part of the research project, this researcher requested and was 
granted permission to attend this final presentation of the ISF ideas. 
 
3.6.5  Timing of the Interviews 
For the initial interviews, in which the ISF project was scoped out and identified 
as an appropriate one for this study, most of the meetings were face to face 
and extensive notes were taken and subsequently typed up.  But these 
meetings with the senior presidents and function heads in GSK were generally 
shorter and more open and exploratory than the subsequent substantive and 
formal ISF interviews. 
 
Interviews with ISF members took place at least six months after their final 
presentation in New Jersey (July 2007). These interviews began with an initial 
telephone call to contact the two team leaders and to seek their permission to 
conduct a series of interviews both with them and with the members of their 
teams.  Once this permission was received, all interviewees were asked to 
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sign an informed consent form as part of the Dublin City University (DCU) 
research protocol. The team members were then contacted individually and 
the same process was entered into with them; interviews were scheduled and 
they signed and returned a consent form and these forms were lodged with the 
academic supervisor in DCU.  In all cases, prospective interviewees were 
contacted at least one month in advance of the proposed date of the interview 
to ascertain their willingness to be interviewed.  There was an enthusiastic 
response to the requests for interviews; nobody refused to be interviewed. In 
these preparatory calls, candidate interviewees were given an outline 
indication of the area upon which the research was to be focussed and they 
were told roughly how much time to set aside for the interview.  In all cases, 
the mention of the ISF project was sufficient prior information for them to 
prepare for the interview and this was helpful as some of the interviews were 
carried out some time after the project had come to an end and it was useful 
that the interviewees had looked at their notes beforehand.  Most of the ISF 
team interviews took place on the telephone and were professionally recorded 
and transcribed by a professional organisation (Intercall) who provide this as a 
corporate service.  The procedure required both interviewer and interviewee 
dial into a pre-assigned number, a person from the service provider would host 
the call and would introduce themselves and make sure that the interviewee 
was comfortable being recorded in this way and then the Intercall person 
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would ‘go on mute’, record the call and type it up from the recording.  A 
transcript was provided some three days later. 
 
This approach had as its objective that the interviewees would simply relate 
their experiences of the initiative.  The opening question; ‘tell me about your 
experiences of the ISF team and project’; invited them to give a 
comprehensive narrative or description of their experience in this context.  The 
only other ‘structure’ to the research design was that a topic-guide had been 
prepared with some bullet points with which to prompt the respondent if they 
did not cover this element in their own account of the experience.   
 
3.6.6  Identifying the Interview Themes 
In the case of this study, all the interview transcripts were printed off and 
assembled, some thirty in all; with some individual transcripts stretching to 
over thirty typed pages in length. In the first instance the transcripts were read 
without coding to give an overview of the general direction or flow of the 
interviews, and to assess the tone and context for any significant or unusual 
references, comments or patterns.  This first reading was done without making 
any notes on the transcripts.  On the second reading, some notes were made 
about the themes which were recurring most often.  On the third reading, an 
attempt was made to classify each transcript according to the issues that 
seemed to dominate each specific interview.  Interviews that had common 
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groups of similar themes were placed together.  Broadly speaking, and 
somewhat predictably, the transcripts and the themes that linked them seemed 
to cluster and divide naturally into three overall categories: the US Interviews; 
the UK Interviews and the Senior Management Interviews 
 
3.6.7  Coding the Data 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) point out that all researchers need to be able to 
organise, manage and retrieve the most important and meaningful bits of their 
data and the usual way to do this is by assigning tags, labels or codes to the 
data.  The identification of the relevant and appropriate concepts that rose to 
the surface in the interviews is important analytical work.  As Seidel and Keller 
(1995) note,  
 
Codes represent the decisive link between the original “raw data”, that is, 
the textual material such as interview transcripts or fieldnotes, on the one 
hand and the researcher’s theoretical concepts on the other. (p.52) 
 
In doing the coding, the Miles and Huberman (1994) approach was adopted, in 
which they describe codes as:  
 
Tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during a study.  Codes usually are 
attached to “chunks” of varying size – words, phrases, sentences or 
whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting.  They 
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can take the forms of a straightforward category label or a more complex 
one (metaphor). (p.56) 
 
The initial identification of concepts, topics or themes is often referred to as 
‘open coding’ (Ezzy, 2002, p. 87).  Having created a number of themes that 
occurred in the raw fieldwork, the next step was to develop a table in which 
these phrases were posted.  These themes were referenced in words, 
sentences and paragraphs. It is worth noting that all interviews were 
conducted one-to-one and took place at least three months prior to the 
commencement of coding and therefore there was no possibility of group think 
or research bias coming from any interviewee seeing or knowing what the 
codes are.  These codes and themes helped to organise and to retrieve the 
data.  Again, Miles and Huberman (1994) make the point: 
 
The organising part will entail some system for categorising the various 
chunks, so the researcher can quickly find, pull out and cluster the 
segments relating to a particular research question, hypothesis, construct 
or theme. (p. 57) 
 
This coding in which data are assigned to broad categories at a general level 
and thereby reduced to manageable proportions can be thought of as a simple 
form of content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980).  This part of the process sorts the 
data into a straightforward concept schema and then involves indexing the 
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interviews against the codes and retrieving the relevant quotes and placing 
them appropriately.  As Coffey and Atkinson note (1996, p. 29): 
 
Such coding and retrieving can be implemented in a variety of manual 
styles.  Texts can be marked up physically with marginal keywords or 
code words, different colours can be used to mark or highlight the texts 
and index cards can be used to cross-reference instances to numbered 
pages or paragraphs in the data. 
 
This process is not intended to restrict or limit the interpretations or dimensions 
of the data; it is not to simplify the data but to allow them be opened up and 
interrogated further including the attempt to look for further meaning or insights 
within the data.  The creation of overall themes in the data and the continual 
examination of the raw data against these themes creates a powerful dialogue 
between the researcher and the data.   
 
The next step in the coding is know as ‘axial coding’, so described by Strauss 
and Corbin (1990, p. 97) and this involves specifying a specific category or 
phenomenon in terms of the conditions that give rise to it and its impact on the 
respondents.  Ezzy (2002, p. 90) notes that the aim of axial coding is to 
integrate codes around the axes of central categories.  The formal process 
originally set out by Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggests that axial coding 
should focus on four specific dimensions: context, strategy, processes and 
consequences. 
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Table 3.6:  Coding in Thematic Analysis 
Approaches to Coding in Thematic Analysis 
Open Coding 
Explore the data 
Identify the units of analysis 
Code for meanings, feelings and actions 
Make metaphors for data 
Experiment with codes 
Identify the properties of codes 
Axial Coding 
Explore the codes 
Identify the relationship between codes 
Compare codes with pre-existing theory 
Selective Coding 
Identify the central story in the analysis 
Examine the relationship between the core code and other codes 
Compare the coding scheme with pre-existing theory 
Adapted from Ezzy (2002, p. 93). 
 
3.6.8 Writing up the Data 
While writing signals the final phase of the research process, it is still a crucial 
stage within that process.  Ezzy (2002, p. 138) notes that for many people 
discovery occurs in the process of writing as much as it does anywhere else in 
the process.  He goes further to say that writing is about creating results just 
as much as it is about reporting them.  He postulates that qualitative data 
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analysis is an interpretive task where, he says: ‘interpretations are not found – 
rather they are made, actively constructed through social processes.’ 
 
Richardson (2000, p. 923) considers writing: 
 
As a method of inquiry….a way of finding out about yourself and your 
topic…..writing is not just a mopping up activity at the end of a research 
project.  Writing is a way of knowing –a method of discovery and analysis.  
 
Many writers urge researchers to take the time to reflect on their data.  Time ‘is 
essential for the gestation of ideas’ (Garrett 1998, p. 29).  Using the metaphor 
of gestation implies that this is a process that both requires and benefits from 
spending an appropriate amount of time on it.  Ezzy (2002, p. 141) agrees  
 
Interpretations are not discovered solely by following the correct 
method…rather they are nurtured and discovered through a difficult 
process not unlike pregnancy and labour.  Writing is the moment when 
the ideas are given concrete form. 
 
Based on the coding and thematic analysis process in this research, four 
separate themes were identified.  These are provided in the table below and 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  Ezzy (2002) notes that researchers 
should search for the one ‘central story’ in the analysis and in this piece of 
research; the central story or overarching theme is that of team leadership.  
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Team leadership in this context is an issue that is central to the entire ISF 
story and membership experience. 
 
3.6.9 Themes Emerging from Coding and Thematic Analysis 
 
Figure 3.4:  Major Themes that Emerged in the Coding Phase 
 
 
3.6.10 The Challenge of Insider Research 
 
Participant observation ‘involves a level of immersion that allows the 
researcher to be able to intellectualize what is seen and write about it 
convincingly’ (Tian, 2010. p83). To develop a strong familiarity with the 
business issues being studied, participant observers must untangle various 
layers of meaning by engaging in a level of interaction that allows them to test 
Time Availability
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Use of 
Technology
Voice of 
Consumer
Idea 
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Boundary 
Spanning
Internal 
Networks
External 
Networks
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team’s work and 
enthusiasm
Structuring the 
Innovation 
Process
Team 
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Key Themes to Emerge from Coding and Thematic Analysis
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their insights about a setting. Ultimately, participant case study research is an 
inductive process, whose data is produced by repeated and prolonged contact 
between a researcher and informant, often with considerable mutual 
involvement in the personal lives, or occupational contexts of native 
participants (Tian , 2010). 
 
Participant observation is an approach grounded in a commitment to the first 
hand experience (Oliver and Eales, 2008) and exploration of a particular social 
or cultural setting (Atkinson et al., 2001; Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005) with 
the researcher either becoming actively involved (or having already been 
involved) in the situation being studied, participating overtly or covertly in 
people’s lives for an extended period of time (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
 
Through this process, the observer is able to interpret the meanings and 
experience the interactions of people from the role of an insider (Jorgensen, 
1989), enabling the researcher to place specific encounters, events and 
understandings into a fuller, more meaningful context (Tedlock, 2000). 
 
The expression ‘value free sociology’ was created by Weber (Weber, 1949) in 
an attempt to establish a less naïve and more sophisticated methodology.  
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It was taken by him to mean something equivalent to the more positivist 
notions of objectivity in the natural sciences. (Benton and Craib, 2001. 
p81) 
 
Weber agrees with the views of the positivists that a fact-value distinction 
ought to be preserved, and social science should only concern itself with 
questions of hard-data or facts, while remaining ethically neutral on questions 
of values. Weber argues that an adequate description of social practice 
requires us to understand the meaning of the practices to the agents involved, 
which, in turn, also presupposes an understanding of values (which demands 
the implementation of the ‘verstehen’ sociology). Thus, Weber insists that the 
researcher must understand the values of agents and consider both the 
subjective and objective dimensions of social life.  
 
Rosaldo (1989), writing in the context of the Weberian tradition, criticises the 
identification of detachment with scientific objectivity and the myth of the 
observer as a ‘tabula rasa’. He argues that it is rare, if not impossible, for a 
researcher to become truly detached. Rosaldo argues that Weber’s advocated 
neutrality does not exclude the scientist’s passion and enthusiasm, and that 
the Weberian perspective underestimates the analytical capability of feelings 
of anger, frustration, depression, passion etc. and results in the elimination of 
other valid sources of knowledge. Rosaldo concludes that the researcher is a 
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‘positioned subject’, whose ‘life experiences both enable and inhibit particular 
kinds of insight’ (Rosaldo, p. 19). This argument implicitly acknowledges the 
role of the researcher in the research process, and reintroduces the self in 
social research. 
 
The main coupterpoint to the ‘tabula rasa’ concept of value-free research came 
from what was termed phenomenology which emerged in the 1960’s and 
1970’s.  The prime mover in phenomenological philosophy was Edmund 
Husserl (Benton and Craib, 2001) who developed the concept of a 
‘phenomenological reduction’ which is an attempt to set aside what we already 
know about something and describe, instead, how we come to know it.  Also 
described as a way of tracing the process through which we give meaning to 
the world.  ‘It involves a suspension of our everyday, common-sense beliefs 
and an attempt to describe how we come by those beliefs.’ (Benton and Craib, 
2001. p83) 
 
Subsequent research challenged the idea of a social science in which the 
experience and values of the researcher had to be obliterated. Opinions differ 
whether an acknowledgement of the self is all that is required, or whether the 
self may legitimately be relied upon in the research process. Harris (2001) 
argues that the self ought not only to be disclosed, but may legitimately be 
utilised as a source of knowledge. The author discusses how her own life has 
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been affected by non-profit and voluntary organizations, which later led to her 
involvement in charitable work, and stimulated her academic interest in the 
subject. Thus the academic work is influenced by the researcher’s family 
history, and the researcher’s knowledge is enriched by her life experience and 
charitable work. 
 
Substituting the self in the research process does not mean that the research 
should be less rigorous. Ultimately it is incumbent upon the researcher to keep 
the subjectivity under control and balanced and present and analyse the 
evidence objectively.  With participant observation or insider research, as 
Jessop and Penny (1999, pp. 213-16) argue, we are always offering a view 
from “somewhere” and whilst this may not be an “all seeing eye, a view from 
everywhere” equally we cannot provide a view from “nowhere.” 
 
The selection of an embedded case study design (in GSK) poses a particular 
challenge arising out of the researcher’s close involvement with the 
organisation.  This challenge is more pronounced when framed against the 
backdrop of the ‘value-free’ research concept outlined above.  The author of 
the study has held the position of Director of Innovation Excellence for the 
commercial group in GSK. That he has never worked directly in the R&D 
(division of the) organisation means that the connection with the interviewees 
in this study has not been in a direct reporting line.  Louis and Bartunek (1992) 
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note that understanding and insights about a company can be acquired either 
by studying data about the company from the outside or by becoming part of 
the organisation and studying it from the inside.   
 
Since organisations can be viewed as, or are often compared to, societies with 
their own peculiar customs and practices, participant observation has become 
increasingly popular in organisational research (Iacono et al, 2007). Evered 
and Louis (2001) identify two different paradigms of organisational research, 
and term the two approaches ‘inquiry from the outside’ and ‘inquiry from the 
inside’. The former demands that the researcher be separate and apart from 
the organisation; while the latter is characterised by some level of personal 
involvement by the researcher in the context of the research.  
 
Familiarity with a firm can be acquired in two ways: by examining data 
published by the organisation e.g. company files, financials etc. (i.e. - enquiry 
from the outside) or by the researcher’s presence within the organisation 
(enquiry from the inside) and ‘being there’, becoming immersed in, and part of 
the phenomenon being investigated. The authors (Evered and Louis, 2001) 
reflect upon their own personal experience entering an unfamiliar 
organizational setting. They describe becoming aware that, despite their 
training in the scientific method, they were adopting a different mode of enquiry 
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to make sense of the new organisation: ‘It was a multisensory, holistic 
immersion’ (p. 387) whereby the authors were ‘noticing acutely’.  
 
They report that they did not test hypotheses, but relied on improvisation 
learned in practice. Published academic research offered little guidance in 
understanding the new organizational setting, whereas papers by industry 
practitioners appeared more meaningful and relevant. The authors conclude 
that the knowledge acquired through ‘inquiry from the inside’ is inherently more 
valid and relevant to the organisational actors. Management research presents 
challenges of its own. Managers are busy individuals, and are typically 
reluctant to allow access unless they can see some benefit to the organisation. 
Hence, access for fieldwork may be difficult to obtain, and, if granted, it, very 
often leads to helpful insights about complex practices. 
 
A major criticism often levelled at participant observation is the potential lack of 
objectivity, as it can be argued that the researcher is not an independent 
observer, but a participant in the phenomenon being observed. The notion of 
participant observer does presuppose a degree of emotional detachment from 
the subject matter, the clear objective of the researcher being the conduct of 
the research.  
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Inevitably participant observation raises ethical dilemmas: the investigation 
should not be conducted in a covert manner; informants should be informed of 
the nature and scope of the investigation. On the other hand, participant 
observation carries with it the concern that the presence of the investigator 
may influence the way informants behave. Informants may be suspicious of 
the researcher and reluctant to participate or be eager to please; they may 
interject their own impressions and biases etc. The personal relationship 
between researcher and informants may also influence the interaction (e.g. the 
researcher may empathise with his/her informants and vice versa). This ought 
to be taken into consideration when conducting the fieldwork. It is incumbent 
upon the researcher to build a relationship based on trust, and collect, analyse 
and display the evidence objectively.  
 
Coghlan and Brannick (2005, p. 61) support insider-research saying that it 
facilitates‘ the knowledge, insight and understanding of organisational 
dynamics, but also the lived experience of one’s own organisation.’  All of 
which are difficult to replicate with much legitimacy as an outsider.  In the 
current research, it was a particularly important consideration and challenge to 
maintain objectivity and neutrality.   
 
In this study the self, or author as participant, is not only explicitly 
acknowledged (for example, in this chapter discussion), but this dual role of 
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participant and researcher is also used as a source of knowledge. The author’s 
professional experience influences the research process, from the initial choice 
of the research topic and of the research method, to the presentation and 
interpretation of the findings. The academic work is enriched by the experience 
of the practitioner, and the reliability of the findings can be argued to be 
enhanced by the credibility of the researcher as an industry insider. The 
academic work in turn gives the author, through the collection and analysis of 
empirical data, further insights into the nature of innovation in large, global, 
R&D-intensive firms. During the course of the research project the author 
becomes more critical and reflective, increasingly aware of his reflecting in 
action, and better able to reflect upon this reflection in action and thus better 
able to articulate the tacit knowledge derived from the research.  
 
 
In the research project, strong and deliberate efforts were made to minimise 
concerns over subjectivity.  This was partly accomplished by relying on 
multiple informants; by including interviewees from different levels within the 
organisation as well as integrating extensive evidential support from 
documents and archives in order to support the findings which will be 
presented in the next chapter.  Other elements included incorporating 
vignettes of practice, videos, close-out reports, quotes from company files etc., 
and letting the facts speak for themselves; analysing the evidence objectively 
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through within-case and cross-case analysis, comparison with the extant 
literature, triangulation of data sources and of theories and, finally,  alternating 
between inside and outside enquiry, especially Chapter 4 which provides an 
in-depth analysis of both the industry and the company itself. 
 
 
3.7 Summary 
In this study a strong emphasis was placed on developing an effective 
research design.  This was necessary, because many management factors 
influence an organisation’s capacity to produce radical innovation.  In 
consideration of the research objectives it was concluded the research 
strategy had to be qualitative, using semi-structured interviews, which allow for 
the collection of rich deep data and the emergence of a relationship between 
theory and the findings. This facilitated an interpretive, inductive study, a mode 
of investigation largely missing from the field of disruptive innovation. 
Moreover, as innovation is often mediated through teams, it is important that 
the research design is capable of finessing subtle but significant interaction 
which may either encourage or inhibit innovation. Key elements of the 
research design can be summarised with the following four points: 
 
176 
 
1) As the process of innovation cannot be cleanly extracted from its 
context (organisational, team, individual or project), a decision to use 
qualitative, inductive research seems warranted. 
2) The ISF project offers a rich opportunity to study the innovation process 
within a bounded and unique organisational experiment which makes it 
a revelatory case study. 
3) The longitudinal aspect of the case allows for an in depth evaluation of 
precisely which processes had impact on the innovation outcomes. 
4) That the case study data explores three layers of management seniority 
within GSK (from C-level down) adds to the richness of the resulting 
insights. 
 
This case study offers a rare and privileged lens into a large, complex, global, 
R&D-intensive organisation.  The specific design of the ISF initiative itself, 
lends itself particularly well to case study analysis as it has been designed as 
an internal tournament for radical innovation ideas and it is time bound with the 
company’s own pre-defined success criteria built in.  Such a project design 
allows types of analysis which would not otherwise be possible. 
 
This inductive study seeks to develop insights from managerial practice 
through which to answer the research questions about how innovation 
happens within complex organisations. The study is qualitative for a number of 
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reasons; the participants in the project represent a group sufficiently small to 
allow almost a census of members and it is felt that the qualitative approach 
would allow a deeper, richer interpretation of the phenomena being studied.  In 
depth interviews were favoured as the approach most likely to yield authentic 
and practical insights from the individuals involved.  The study is a twin case 
study as it follows two separate teams which were competing against one 
another to develop ideas for radical new products and services for GSK.   
 
The case study also chronicles three separate but connected sequences of 
events: 1) the set of circumstances which led to the setting up of the project, 2) 
the experiences and reflections of the team members who participated in it and 
3) the views and evaluations of the judging panel who were charged with 
assessing the quality and usefulness of the ideas produced.  The selection of a 
case study analysis also allows for the inclusion of various types and sources 
of data.  Many secondary sources were available to the researcher to enrich 
the primary data with important context. 
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Chapter Four 
Background to the Pharmaceutical Industry and GSK 
 
4.1 Introduction and Purpose of the Chapter 
Studies suggest that teams are inevitably a product of the context in which 
they operate (Mathieu et al., 2008; Sarin and O’Connor, 2009).  The ISF team, 
the subject of this case study, was working within the R&D division of one of 
the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, GSK.  Hence an overview, not 
just of the company itself but of the industry in which it is competing is 
warranted.  The ISF project was initiated in 2007 and hence this analysis 
focuses on that year in particular. 
 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the competitive landscape and 
dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry at the time of this organisational 
initiative.  It explains how the industry was, at that time, coming to terms with 
falling success rates and rising costs of R&D.  It outlines some of the 
measures companies undertook to supplement or offset the prospect of 
declining revenue from their R&D pipeline.  Among the measures described is 
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the diversification of many companies’ portfolio of products.  One such 
measure involved the re-orientation of R&D away from small molecule 
medicines targeted at conditions affecting significant portions of the population, 
towards the discovery of medicines to treat specialist, niche conditions.  These 
treatments are generally more advanced and sophisticated, than conventional 
medicines, using biologics and vaccines.  This strategic approach, which was 
gaining sway in 2007, moved the pharma business model towards selling 
fewer products but at a higher price point. 
 
One of the sources quoted in this introductory piece is Dr JP Garnier.  Dr 
Garnier was the chief executive officer (CEO) of GlaxoSmithKline between 
2000 (from the original merger between SmithKline Beecham and 
GlaxoWelcome) for eight years to 2008.  As head of the world’s second largest 
pharmaceutical company, he dedicated himself to renewing the company’s 
engine of R&D and he wrote and spoke prolifically about this topic.  As he 
presided over his final AGM in May 2008, the Guardian (newspaper) wrote: 
 
Few industry observers doubt Garnier's vision and boldness - many of his 
reforms at GSK have been copied by rivals and the all-important 
"pipeline" of new drugs, once one of the worst in the industry, is now 
widely considered to be one of the best.  (Guardian, Nick Huber, May 
20th, 2008) 
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Garnier saw the increasing complexity and large scale of R&D operations 
being the culprit for many of the industry’s (and the company’s) problems.  He 
attempted to foster a more innovative, entrepreneurial and passionate culture 
in R&D.  An element of his internal programme aimed at making the GSK 
corporate culture more entrepreneurial cascaded into the Consumer 
Healthcare division and encouraged initiatives like ISF. 
 
The chapter then moves to a more context-specific description of GSK’s 
business and organisation.  The Consumer Healthcare division in which this 
case study takes place is profiled in detail.  In-company interviews are 
combined with external financial analyst reports to illustrate the central role of 
new product development to the success of the company; a role which was 
reflected in the company’s strategic priorities.  It is in this context that the ISF 
project emerged as a vehicle to deliver the radical innovation that the company 
so keenly sought for its pipeline. 
 
The chapter then describes how the company organises for innovation, 
generally.  The ISF initiative was supplementary to the regular, established 
innovation process within the company and it is this latter process, which is 
explained here.  Aside from the ISF project, the company had an elaborate 
and successful innovation programme and infrastructure and this is described 
in detail in this chapter.  This profile of the innovation process within the 
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organisation will help readers understand the context in which the ISF initiative 
was conceived, in the first place, and what made it different to the way 
innovation is conventionally managed in GSK Consumer Healthcare (CH). 
 
4.2 A Brief Overview of the Pharma Sector in 2007 
One simple fact defines the pharmaceutical industry: ‘The key to long-term 
growth has to be R&D pipeline success’ (McNamara, 2004; p 25).  Garnier 
(2008) stated: 
 
The business model of Big Pharma is straightforward. New products are 
discovered, developed, launched, and protected by various patents. 
Initially the products benefit from monopolistic – or at least oligopolistic – 
pricing. After 10 or 12 years, in general, patents expire and lower-priced 
generics come in, wiping out the revenues of blockbuster drugs in a 
matter of weeks. R&D must continually replace older products with new 
ones to stop the revenue base from shrinking. (Garnier, 2008, p. 70). 
 
The pharmaceutical market, in 2007, was going through a period of 
considerable change. Its traditional reliance on what are called ‘small 
molecule’, blockbuster (products with annual sales of US$1bn or more) 
compounds was beginning to wane.  Bain and Shortmoor (2010) reflect that 
market fundamentals had been changing with the erosion of the blockbuster-
drug model, traditionally supported by small-molecule drugs (i.e., drugs with a 
molecular weight of< 500 Da), in favour of an increased emphasis on biologic-
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based development.    The FDA explain as follows: 
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Biological products include a wide range of products such as vaccines, 
blood and blood components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, 
tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins. Biologics can be 
composed of sugars, proteins, or nucleic acids or complex combinations 
of these substances, or may be living entities such as cells and tissues. 
Biologics are isolated from a variety of natural sources - human, animal, 
or microorganism - and may be produced by biotechnology methods 
and other cutting-edge technologies. Gene-based and cellular biologics, 
for example, often are at the forefront of biomedical research, and may 
be used to treat a variety of medical conditions for which no other 
treatments are available. (FDA Website, 2009; 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices) 
 
The ‘Big-Pharma’ business model has traditionally relied heavily on small-
molecule products which were developed to prevent or treat illnesses and 
conditions that affected significant portions of the population.  Once the 
development costs were met, these drugs were relatively inexpensive to 
manufacture and distribute thus allowing companies to maximise revenue 
through aggressive marketing and selling campaigns.  However, once patent 
protection expires, these medicines are relatively easy for the generic 
manufacturers to replicate and proprietary manufacturers face what the 
analysts refer to as the ‘patent cliff’; a term which graphically describes the 
dramatic sales decline for proprietary brand pharmaceutical products once 
generic competition becomes available. The resulting commoditisation of the 
small-molecule market has forced the Big Pharma players to seek 
diversification into areas of high unmet need (e.g., oncology) or, in terms of 
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molecule type, into biologics, vaccines or consumer healthcare.  Another way 
pharma companies found to supplement revenue from a disappointing pipeline 
was to focus on their patent protection strategies and ensure they secured 
maximum-marketed portfolio revenues (Table 4.1). 
 
At this time, some companies were rebalancing their portfolios away from the 
original block-buster model, in favour of vaccines; a market segment which 
was seen to have higher growth potential. Consumer Healthcare (a term 
usually used to describe a portfolio of products or a division within large 
pharma companies which is concerned with the marketing of healthcare 
products which can be sold without prescription or over-the-counter OTC) was 
simultaneously becoming a high priority for some pharma companies. 
Paradoxically, in other companies, the reverse was happening and they 
considered Consumer Healthcare a distraction to their core business.  Hence, 
some companies were selling their consumer healthcare divisions but even 
more companies were queuing up to buy.  Three large consumer healthcare 
companies came on the market between 2006 – 2007 (Roche Consumer 
Healthcare, Boots Healthcare and Pfizer Consumer Healthcare) and, in each 
case the sales were over subscribed and had to go to sealed bid auction to 
determine who would secure the purchase.  It can be inferred from this that 
although some companies were divesting, even more were trying to acquire. 
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Table 4.1:  Factors Inspiring the Shift Away from the Primary-Care Blockbuster 
Model towards Niche Indications 
 
Source:  Datamonitor. 
 
In 2004, concern began to be reflected in the industry about the ‘R&D crisis in 
the pharmaceutical industry’ (McNamara, 2004. p. 18). Garnier (2008) noted 
that from December 2000 to February 2008 the top fifteen companies in the 
pharmaceutical industry lost approximately $850 billion in shareholder value, 
and the price of their shares fell from thirty-two times earnings, on average, to 
thirteen.  Garnier (2008) argues that although analysts attribute the loss of 
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confidence in the industry’s performance to a ‘perfect storm’ of issues like 
rising costs, stringent regulatory requirements, high-profile product withdrawals 
on the grounds of safety concerns; he believes ‘that declining R&D productivity 
is at the center of its malaise.’ (Garnier, 2008, p. 70) 
 
PharmaWatch (2008), a part of Datamonitor, in their review of 2007 specifies 
the conditions which made it such a difficult year for pharma companies.  First, 
they forecast that, between 2007 and 2012, the top fifty pharmaceutical 
companies will face patent expiries on $115 billion worth of drugs.  The report 
stated: 
 
Furthermore, in 2007 the FDA approved just 19 new products: the lowest 
level for over twenty years. At the same time, the cost of developing 
innovative therapies keeps rising, reaching an average of $800m to bring 
a drug to market: fifteen times higher than that recorded in the 1970s and 
more than three times higher than in the 1980s. This lack of true 
innovation, coupled with recently increased regulatory scrutiny and 
tougher cost-containment measures from payers to drive down prices, 
has made the healthcare environment more difficult to operate in than 
ever before.  (Datamonitor, 2008; Market Watch Biotechnology; p. 19). 
 
Coinciding with this was growing acknowledgment in the pharmaceutical 
industry generally that falling R&D productivity was a major factor affecting 
prospects for future company revenue growth and investor confidence.  The 
major expenditures for pharmaceutical companies occur in R&D and marketing 
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or promotional activities. Within R&D, productivity is measured by calculating 
the clinical quality, sales potential and number of pipeline products being 
developed relative to the time and money invested in their development. 
 
According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA annual report 2002–2003), US pharma companies’ global R&D 
expenditure increased from an estimated US$2bn in 1980 to more than 
US$30bn in 2001; the equivalent of a year-on-year growth rate in R&D 
investment of 13.9 per cent for the two decades. Over the same period of time, 
ethical sales grew by a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.8 
suggesting that the growth in product sales is below that of R&D investment 
and therefore, the calculation concludes; R&D productivity is declining. 
 
The decline in productivity appeared to be as a result of two factors; higher 
R&D costs combined with a lower success rate.  McNamara (2004) argues 
that the success rate in the development of new chemical entities was 
declining.  She quotes absolute success rate figures of just 0.1% - 0.2%.  With 
success rates that low from the R&D pipeline, she notes that companies have 
become heavily reliant on a few compounds with sufficiently high, global sales 
to recoup development costs and provide resources for future R&D 
expenditure. This gave rise to the majority of pharmaceutical companies 
basing their revenue growth model on high earning products such as 
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blockbusters.  Companies also sought to extend the patent life of their big-
brand, blockbusters by introducing minor line extensions, such as sustained-
release, in order to fend off generic competition. 
 
As internal R&D fails to generate the breakthrough ideas needed to create 
blockbuster medicines, pharma companies were increasingly looking outside 
their own labs to engage in Open Innovation partnerships, joint ventures, 
acquisitions and alliances.  According to Datamonitor (2009), the key drivers 
for this R&D licensing trend centre on: addressing the current R&D productivity 
crisis; overcoming patent expiry issues; matching R&D products with the 
company’s corporate strategy; and accessing enabling R&D technologies, 
which are too costly to support in-house. 
 
Smith (2009) points out the industry signals which have heralded the pharma 
R&D crisis for some years have been many and obvious. Slowing sales 
growth, low cost competition and incremental, rather than revolutionary, 
product development are all, he argues, characteristic signs of a maturing 
industry life cycle.  From these phenomena, he infers that the current model of 
the research-based pharmaceutical company is moving from maturity to 
decline. 
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Another issue commonly observed to be a barrier to R&D productivity and 
contributing to this decline, was the size of the R&D operations of the pharma 
companies.  There was an industry view that companies had allowed their 
R&D teams to get too big and that the bureaucracy inherent in such scale was 
slowing them down.  Again, Garnier (2008) sums up the view: 
 
Another culprit is the enormous size and complexity of the traditional 
pharmaceutical R&D organisation. In drugs, electronics, software, and 
other industries where fundamental discovery (as opposed to continuous 
improvement) is the key to success, size has become an impediment. 
(Garnier, 2008, p. 72). 
 
Garnier is emphasising here that ‘fundamental discovery’ is different to 
incremental innovation and it is in the quest for radical innovation, in his view, 
that size becomes a barrier to innovation.  His approach in GlaxoSmithKline to 
reducing the bureaucracy and enhancing the innovative culture inherent in 
large, diversified R&D divisions was to split the R&D group into centres of 
excellence in drug discovery (CEDD’s).  He argued: 
 
The way to solve the productivity problem is not to break up the 
pharmaceutical giants into smaller companies. It is to return power to the 
scientists by reorganizing R&D into small, highly focused groups headed 
by people who are leaders in their scientific fields and can guide and 
inspire their teams to achieve greatness. It is to seek the best science 
wherever it resides, inside or outside a company. It is to fix broken 
processes and promote a strong culture of innovation marked by a 
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passion for excellence and awareness that results matter. (Garnier, 2008, 
p. 73). 
 
Smith (2009) identifies another strategic trend called "repositioning" in the 
pharmaceutical industry which was being explored at that time. This describes 
the process where the industry R&D heads have begun commissioning 
specialist biotech firms to put their previously discarded experimental 
compounds, some that failed in clinical trials as long as twenty years ago, 
through a series of new tests. The hope is that a medication intended for one 
treatment turns out to be efficacious for some other condition.   There are a 
number of instances where this apparent serendipity has worked; Pfizer’s 
Viagra was originally developed as a cardiac treatment; GSK’s Zyban was 
developed as an anti-depressant but found to help people quit smoking; and, 
Pfizer’s Vareniclene was intended as a weight loss drug but it also was found 
to help people quit smoking.  All of them managed to secure sales of $1bn at 
their peak. 
 
Finally, pharma companies in 2007 were increasingly looking at acquisition as 
a means of boosting the assets in their own R&D pipelines.  The Financial 
Times, in a review article concludes: 
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Of the three ways for pharma giants to deploy their ample cash flow – 
pay it out, invest in research and development or buy someone – the last 
one makes most sense in the current low-return environment. R&D has 
not been a strong point for quite some time. (FT, 12th October 2010). 
 
In 2007, there were 11 mergers and acquisitions in the global pharma market 
but according to analysts, only two were of global scale and significance. 
Those involved, US-based Schering-Plough and UK-based AstraZeneca. 
 
Consumer Healthcare also became an area of increasing focus for pharma 
companies in 2007. It was widely thought that these businesses, with their 
well-known and durable brands, represented a more steady and (relatively) 
certain income stream in an industry where, in the prescription business, 
patent expiry could precipitate enormous changes in company value and 
prospects.  In 2006, Bayer bought the Consumer Healthcare division of Roche 
Pharmaceuticals.  Also in 2006, the Consumer Healthcare division of Pfizer 
was sold to Johnson and Johnson.  Many analysts believed that Pfizer 
disposed of its consumer healthcare division in order to bridge a revenue 
deficit which arose from the patent expiry of Lipitor (a cardio-vascular drug) 
which was going to leave a hole of $6bn on Pfizer’s balance sheet.  
Datamonitor’s (2009) review of Pfizer, focuses on the drought that afflicted the 
Pfizer pipeline between 1998 and 2004, during which period no major products 
were launched; they suggest Pfizer masked this lack of innovation with M&A 
activity. 
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Similarly, in 2007, Reckitt-Benkaiser succeeded in acquiring the consumer 
healthcare portfolio of Boots healthcare.  All three of these acquisitions were 
the subject of high profile, well subscribed auctions.  These acquisitions and 
disposals helped illuminate the various strategies being pursued by the large 
players.  Roche had decided to divest of consumer healthcare products in 
order to concentrate on biologics and cancer treatments.  Bayer, the original 
makers of Aspirin, had declared their strategy of being a top three player in 
consumer healthcare and so the sale was a perfect match.  Boots (Healthcare) 
decided to concentrate on its retail operations and was not intending to 
globalise the brands they had in the consumer healthcare portfolio (brands like 
Nurofen, Strepsils and Optrex).  These brands were very attractive to Reckitts 
who already had successful brands like Lemsip and Disprin and wanted to 
increase their scale in this segment. 
 
2007 was a year which saw a growing recognition of the decline of the 
traditional pharma business model and many observers concluded that it was 
the deterioration in productivity from R&D which was the main culprit.  The 
major pharma companies embarked upon a series of diverse initiatives in 
order to offset the inevitable fall in revenue which would result from a decline in 
R&D productivity.   
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Some companies re-engineered the R&D programme to focus more on higher-
value, more specialist medicines like biologics and vaccines.  Some tinkered 
with incremental innovation and even litigation to defend their molecules 
against generic competition, for as long as possible.  Others tried to 
compensate for the deficit in their internal R&D pipeline by agreeing joint 
ventures and licensing arrangements with smaller biotech firms.   
 
Despite many in the industry concluding that big-pharma’s scale was no longer 
an asset but actually a liability in bringing new compounds to market; still some 
companies tried to grow by significant acquisition.  But, generally, the 
acquisition activity was down on previous years.  Certainly, what the industry 
calls ‘Mega-deals’ were definitely out of fashion. Instead, pharma companies 
acquired companies who could deliver either strategically important technology 
or else access to the growing sales opportunities in emerging markets. 
 
Pharma companies increasingly turned to the stability and long-term 
profitability of the consumer healthcare segment as an attractive means of 
diversifying their portfolio.  As a result, 2006 and 2007 saw an unprecedented 
flurry of acquisitions in the consumer healthcare business.  But even within 
consumer healthcare businesses with their attractive high and steady 
revenues, innovation was still a key priority. 
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4.3 GlaxoSmithKline – A Summary Profile of the Company 
GSK is a research-based, pharmaceutical company with operations in over 
100 countries and employing over 100,000 people. The company was formed 
in 2000 from a merger between SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Welcome and 
is headquartered in London, UK.  GSK is a major global healthcare group 
engaged in the creation, discovery, development, manufacture and marketing 
of pharmaceutical and consumer health-related products.  While, GSK has its 
corporate head office in London, it also has operational headquarters in 
Philadelphia and Research Triangle Park (North Carolina), USA, and 
operations in some one hundred and fourteen countries, with products sold in 
over one hundred and forty countries. The principal R&D facilities are in the 
UK, the USA, Belgium, Italy, Japan and Spain. GSK’s products are currently 
manufactured in some thirty-eight countries. The major markets for the 
Group’s products are the USA, France, Japan, the UK, Italy, Germany and 
Spain. 
 
GSK operates principally in two industry segments: 
 
 Pharmaceuticals (prescription pharmaceuticals and vaccines). 
 Consumer Healthcare (over-the-counter medicines, oral care and 
nutritional healthcare). 
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R&D is a significant investment for GSK, in fact, the company is one of the 
world’s top ten R&D spenders across all categories and industries.  According 
to data compiled by the European Commission (NATURE, Vol. 450, 1st 
November 2007), the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sector has overtaken 
every other industry, including technology hardware and equipment to become 
the leading R&D investor worldwide. Pfizer is currently the largest R&D single 
investor in the world, with Johnson and Johnson (J&J) and GlaxoSmithKline 
also in the global top 10.   GSK spends approximately 14% of its turnover on 
R&D (GSK Investors Report Presentation Q2 2010).  This, high level of 
investment in R&D and consequent focus upon discovery and innovation, is a 
defining feature of both the industry and of the company and make it 
particularly suitable for inclusion in a study investigating the NPD process 
within R&D teams. Ornagh (2008) makes the point that in the R&D intensive, 
pharma industry ‘both margins and costs are largely determined by innovation.’ 
 
GSK’s 2006 Annual Report describes the company’s reliance on innovation as 
follows: 
 
Continued development of commercially viable new products is critical to 
the group’s ability to replace lost sales from older products that decline 
upon expiration of exclusive rights, and to increase overall sales.  
Developing new products is a costly and uncertain process.  A new 
product candidate can fail at any stage of the process, and one or more 
late-stage candidates could fail to receive regulatory approval. 
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New product candidates may appear promising in development but, after 
significant investment, fail to reach the market or have only limited 
commercial success.  This, for example, could be as a result of efficacy 
or safety concerns, inability to obtain necessary regulatory approvals, 
difficulty or excessive costs to manufacture, erosion of patent terms as a 
result of a lengthy development period, infringement of patents or other 
intellectual property rights of others or inability to differentiate the product 
adequately from those with which it competes. (p44)  
 
The Consumer Healthcare (CH) division of GSK is of immense strategic 
importance to the company overall.  The (London) Times wrote in March 2008: 
 
Glaxo (the entire company) trades on a price-earning multiple of about 11 
times earnings while the consumer healthcare companies seem to be 
closer to 20 times.  There’s a lot of hidden value there. 
 
Moreover, despite the fact that Consumer Healthcare develops products 
primarily for sale over the counter (rather than via prescription), the level and 
quality of R&D required, along with the regulatory oversight applied by national 
government agencies is equally high to those that apply to the prescription 
(also called ‘ethical’) pharmaceutical business. The same regulatory approval 
body and the same approval process applies to OTC medicines as to 
prescription ones.  It could also be argued that the same rigour and pressure 
applies to the level of innovation required to succeed in the very competitive 
OTC and personal care markets. 
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In 2007, (GSK) Consumer Healthcare was exhibiting positive sales 
performance with worldwide sales growth up 14% (Table 4.1) in that year. The 
CH division has a strong brand portfolio that includes Lucozade, Sensodyne, 
Panadol, Horlicks and Aquafresh.  2007 saw the US launch of Alli, the first 
over-the-counter (OTC) weight loss aid approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  Alli has subsequently also been launched in Europe. Alli 
is a major innovation for GSK and is considered by the company to be a 
breakthrough in the area of self-medication for weight loss.  Alli is an example 
of an open innovation approach in GSK as the molecule was originally 
launched by Roche Pharmaceuticals as a brand called Xenical; a prescription 
product to help with weight loss.  GSK bought the technology and rights to the 
brand in the expectation of being able to market it over-the-counter, in various 
markets around the world.  The process of taking a prescription product whose 
efficacy, but more importantly safety, has been satisfactorily demonstrated and 
allowing it to be offered for sale without prescription is known as ‘switching’.  
There are a number of examples of pharmaceutical products which have been 
successfully switched, having originally required a prescription; Tagamet and 
Zantac are notable examples.  Switching generally happens at the end of their 
patent protection, when products are facing generic competition and it serves 
to prolong the revenue stream attaching to a product by continuing to use the 
brand name and making it available direct to the patient. 
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Table 4.2:  GSK Financial Performance in 2007 
 
Source:  GSK Annual Report 2007. 
 
At £3.5bn (annual sales), GSK Consumer Healthcare is the Number 2 and 
fastest-growing consumer healthcare business in the world.  The figures above 
show sales up in 2007 by 14% (and again, in 2008, by another 14%). 
 
Through GSK’s Consumer Healthcare business, and its expertise in sales and 
marketing, its global footprint, the company is deemed to be well placed to be 
the partner of choice for ‘switch’ products, bringing them from the prescription 
to the OTC market. As noted above, many pharma companies do not have 
consumer healthcare divisions and hence when they have a molecule or 
medicine that is a candidate for switching, they are likely to look for a suitable 
partner for the venture.   
 
GSK CH has a number of leading brands in its portfolio (Table 4.3) 
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Table 4.3:  Products Turnover - 2007 
Product £m 
Lucozade 347 
Aquafresh 308 
Sensodyne 293 
Panadol 262 
Horlicks 174 
Source: GSK 2007 Annual Report   
 
The 2007 Annual Report for GSK states: 
 
Global healthcare markets are in a state of change. For example, there is 
an increasing trend for governments to cut state healthcare costs by 
influencing a switch from prescription to generic or OTC products. 
Looking ahead, healthcare is becoming more consumer-centred. 
Research shows people expect to be able to access medical knowledge 
and to influence their own treatments. For many, OTC products are their 
first destination for everyday healthcare. The company expects that the 
highest rates of growth for all healthcare businesses will be driven by the 
developing, emerging economies.  OTC is the foundation of healthcare in 
these countries. In China, for example, OTC accounts for 36% of drug 
expenditure, compared to 8% in North America and 10% in Western 
Europe. (p.5) 
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This recognition of the role of the trusted (CH) brands, as a first step in primary 
care in the vital, emerging markets in Asia has appeared to make the 
consumer healthcare division more attractive to the parent company than it 
had been before.  These are the markets from which the organisation expects 
to secure most of its growth in the coming years and hence the consumer 
healthcare brands could possibly provide a useful bridgehead for driving the 
business. 
 
The Consumer Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals businesses are not 
autonomous, separate businesses, but are intended to be complementary and 
synergistic in a number of important areas. They are both, according to the 
company’s 2007 Annual Report, backed by science-endorsed strategies and 
have a focus on R&D. The growing worldwide trend for patients to manage 
their own healthcare (mentioned above), first choosing OTC products, before 
consulting a doctor is a behaviour that signals positive future for the consumer 
healthcare brands. The company wants to be able to draw on these skills and 
knowledge in its Pharmaceutical business and share costs and resources. 
Consumer and Pharma also share expertise and resources in other areas, 
such as regulatory matters, R&D, marketing, HR, IT, distribution and 
procurement. 
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This chapter’s introduction discussed the issues and challenges facing the 
pharmaceutical business in 2007.  While consumer healthcare, to some 
analysts, looked more stable and reliable in terms of revenue potential; this 
business was not without its own challenges as outlined in the company’s 
2008 Annual Report (p. 23): 
 
The environment in which the Consumer Healthcare business operates 
has become ever more challenging: consumers are demanding better 
quality, better value and improved performance; retailers have 
consolidated and globalised which has strengthened their negotiation 
power and cycle times for innovation have reduced. 
 
But despite these challenges, the Consumer Healthcare business with its 
established and successful brands has offered some stability to the Pharma 
parent company. The consumer business accounts for 18% of the total 
company turnover.  A UBS Investment summary published in January 2009 
(UBS Investment Report on GSK, January, 2009), suggested that GSK 
Consumer Healthcare is an ‘under appreciated business in a robust market.’  It 
is worth pointing out that this UBS report is unique and a first for GSK.  Gary 
Davies, (in an interview with the author) GSK’s Director of Investor Relations 
says:  
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Traditionally, the pharma analysts for the investment banks review our 
(GSK’s) performance and they generally append some cursory analysis 
of the Consumer Healthcare business.  In the case of this UBS report, 
the analyst who prepared the report spent time with the senior executives 
in the company was a dedicated consumer healthcare and FMCG 
company analyst. Therefore the UBS report is the most detailed 
investment report ever into the CH business in GSK. 
 
UBS is a 150-year-old Swiss investment management, wealth management 
and investment analyst firm. In their in-depth report on GSK (published on 
January 6th, 2009) they note: 
 
Demographic and lifestyle changes, emerging markets opportunities, 
broadening of distribution channels, increased innovation, and Rx-to-
OTC switching will in our view cause an acceleration of industry growth to 
5% in the coming years. With GSK one of only two global players (the 
other being Johnson & Johnson) with high capabilities across our four 
key value dimensions, we believe GSK can perform well above the 
industry. 
 
Thus, the analysts believe that the Consumer Healthcare business is a 
significant and currently undervalued part of GSK.  They note: 
 
While the perfect storm (declining R&D productivity, patent expiries, and 
pricing and profitability problems) rages in pharma, GSK has 
diversification (through the Consumer Healthcare division) that should 
partially insulate GSK. 
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When reviewing the Consumer Healthcare company’s performance and future 
prospects, it is for innovation that the company receives some of its highest 
marks from UBS (Figure 4.1).  UBS evaluate GSK’s prior performance and 
current capability against a number of competitor companies along four key 
criteria.  These four criteria are explained in more detail in Figure 4.2 and are: 
new business opportunities; innovation; geographical footprint and; marketing 
excellence. 
 
Figure 4.1:  UBS Analysis of GSK Consumer Healthcare 
 
Source:  UBS Report on Global Consumer Healthcare Market and Competitors. 
 
UBS explain the definitions behind their rankings with the following explanatory 
chart: 
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Figure 4.2:  UBS Explanation of Units of Analysis 
 
Source: UBS Report on Global Consumer Healthcare Market and Competitors. 
 
GSK Consumer Healthcare also has a successful track record in acquiring 
smaller companies with strong regional brands and developing those brands 
globally.  The acquisition of Sterling Health in the early ‘90’s propelled the 
Panadol brand, from a regional analgesic brand into a global brand leader in 
pain relief.  Similarly, when GSK bought Block Drug in 1998, it was able to 
launch the Sensodyne brand for dentine hypersensitivity in many new markets, 
most recently in China (2008). Similarly, in 2007, GSK bought CNS, a local US 
manufacturer of Breathe Right nasal strips and within the first year of 
ownership, the brand had been launched in 46 new countries.  The company 
prides itself on being able to rapidly integrate and maximise the value of 
acquisitions. 
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4.4 The Consumer Healthcare Business 
The GSK Consumer Healthcare business operates in three main product or 
therapy areas: 
 
 Oralcare – i.e. toothpaste, toothbrushes and associated products. 
 OTC – Over The Counter medicines are those used to treat mild, self-
limiting ailments which can be purchased without a prescription. 
 Nutritional Healthcare – Nutritional drinks and health supplements. 
 
When separated out, the consumer healthcare sales performance, including 
2008, is shown as follows in table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4:  Composition of GSK Consumer Healthcare Annual Sales 2007 
 2008 
£m 
2007 
£m 
2006 
£m 
OTC Medicines 1,935 1,718 1,496 
Oral care 1,240 1,049 993 
Nutritional Healthcare 796 716 658 
Total Consumer Healthcare 3,971 3,483 3,147 
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The cornerstone of the GSK CH’s strategy is innovation.  The company’s 
president, in 2008, published a model outlining the strategy which was 
circulated to all senior managers (see Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3:  GSK’s Strategy ‘Cathedral’ 
 
Source:   John Clarke’s Briefing Documents for Senior Managers in GSK, 2008 
(GSK Consumer Healthcare Internal Strategy Document, published by the 
Divisional President, 2008). 
 
As can be seen from this model, the very first pillar of the strategy relates to 
improving the company’s ability to innovate; the primary growth strategy is to 
‘Accelerate Innovation’.  John Clarke became President of the Consumer 
Healthcare business in 2006; he is, and has been, completely unequivocal in 
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his commitment to innovation. In the Annual Report of his first year in the 
position he said: 
 
We expect to achieve this growth through a vigorous focus on delivering 
new product developments that are tightly aligned with consumer needs. 
 
In an interview with the (London) Times on 28th March, 2008, he reiterated: 
 
Consumers have a high interest in innovation.  It’s a consumer driven 
aspect of our market.  The moment you become an inferior product, you 
are in trouble.  Loyalty does persist and may carry your brand for a few 
years, but you must innovate to have better products. 
 
GSK is the number three Oralcare company in the world (Figure 4.4) behind 
Colgate and P&G (who market the Crest brand).  It is also the number three 
player in the OTC market behind J&J and Bayer.  In Nutritional Healthcare, the 
company is the market leader.   
 
Figure 4.4:  Euromonitor Global Rankings in OTC and Oralcare 
 
Source:  Euromonitor 2007. 
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4.5 Structuring the Company for Innovation – The Launch of the Future 
Group in 2004 
In 2004, the company announced a new business and organisational model 
designed to deliver better top-line growth with the objective of enhanced focus 
and simplicity.  The company’s new vision underpinning the changes was: ‘To 
be the fastest-growing consumer healthcare company, through innovation, 
centred on consumers and delivered by science.’  The principal rationale and 
drivers for the change were explained to be as follows: 
 
‘Innovation Delivered – We will be the best at creating compelling, 
differentiated ideas for our brands that we will develop and launch with the 
urgency of entrepreneurs. 
 
Compelling Communications – We will be the best at connecting with 
consumers and healthcare professionals through insightful and relevant 
communication. 
 
New Business – We will be the industry’s leader in generating new business 
from in licensing, acquisitions, new categories and switch (i.e. switching from 
prescription status to OTC). 
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Point of Purchase – We will maximise the availability and visibility of our 
brands for the shopper at purchase decision points. 
 
World Class Operators – We will execute better, faster and more efficiently 
than our fiercest competitors, while reducing non value-added costs.’ 
(Shaping Our Future; GSK Internal Publication, 2004) 
 
The most significant development signalled by this new structure in the 
business was the creation of a series of ‘Future Groups’, which were physically 
located in the business’ two HQ’s in the UK and US, and have a remit to 
manage the company’s biggest brands, globally.  These teams have a 
mandate to ‘deliver more innovation faster’.  The brands for which a Future 
Group was established were those whose ‘sales and market share were global 
and whose positioning was sufficiently similar such that they could be most 
efficiently developed using a global team’.  These brands represented 40% of 
the company’s turnover. 
 
At the time of the ISF project, three years later, GSK Consumer Healthcare still 
operated this model for centralised marketing and R&D unit for all of its brands 
that are marketed globally and have annual sales in excess of $250m.  Seven 
of the company’s brands qualify under these criteria. This unit was still called 
the Future Group and it retained central control of the overall brand and 
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marketing strategy, new product development pipeline and communications for 
the company’s most profitable and most valuable seven brands. Each of the 
seven brands has a dedicated team.  The responsibility of the team is global.  
Hence, each Future Team is responsible for creating a global strategy for the 
brand and, further, for developing new products under the brand franchise with 
the capacity to be launched globally.  On the commercial side, the team 
comprises people who are experts in insight or consumer understanding, 
ideation (generating new ideas, refining , prototyping and researching them), 
innovation, advertising, digital marketing, marketing to professionals (doctors, 
dentists etc) and brand strategy.  Some of these positions are mirrored in the 
R&D side with experts in new product research and others who are 
experienced in and adept at product development.  Decisions about the 
strategy, the NPD pipeline, the advertising for these brands are all taken 
centrally and then implemented locally by the individual markets or country 
marketing teams.  Future Group brands are sold in 120 markets (or countries) 
around the world.   The Future Teams are located in newly created ‘innovation 
hubs’ where new workspaces have been created with the intention of 
maximising the interaction between colleagues.  Each brand team has a ‘hub’; 
a space without physical offices or partitions and where everyone is expected 
to move around and work in a different space each day.  Two of these centres 
have been created, one in the New Jersey (Parsippany) and the other in 
Weybridge, Surrey. 
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The 2006 GSK Annual Report alludes to a new structure within the Consumer 
Healthcare R&D teams ‘whereby for the Global brands, R&D mirrors the 
commercial structure, with brand-dedicated R&D teams paired with 
commercial brand teams and both located together at the Innovation Centres 
in Weybridge, UK or Parsippany, USA.’  Combining the structures of 
commercial and R&D enables companies to combine these resources with a 
view to developing new and enhanced capabilities (Simon et al, 2007).  
 
Leenders and Wierenga, (2008) note that a number of terms have been used 
in previous research to describe a team of people working together on tasks 
connected with new product development, for example ‘integration’, 
‘collaboration’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘harmony’ with the common denominator 
being the joint behaviour towards the achievement of a shared goal.  (The term 
preferred in GSK is ‘fusion’ which is intended to describe a deep and 
purposeful collaboration among the R&D and commercial teams.) 
 
In terms of organisation structure, below is how the Future teams fit into the 
overall GSK hierarchy.  The worldwide CEO presides over the Operating 
Board of Directors, one of whom represents the Consumer Healthcare 
Division.  This President of the Consumer Healthcare Division has a number of 
direct reports of whom one is the President of the Future Group.  Reporting to 
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the President of the Future Group are the VP’s of each of the individual brand 
Future Groups and each of them have a team as noted above. 
 
The ISF project took place under the auspices of the R&D division of GSK.  
There were roughly 700 people working in R&D in that division at the time.  
Heading up the R&D function was Dr Ken James and his key direct report for 
this project was Stan Lech who was head of his group of direct reports called 
the ‘SLT’, Senior Leadership Team. 
 
Figure 4.5:  Organisation Chart for GSK in 2007 
 
Source:  GSK Internal HR Documents 2007 
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4.6 How Innovation Happens in GSK Consumer Healthcare 
In GSK, for the key brands, the Future Group manages innovation.  The Future 
Group manages the process through a phased approach, using cross-
functional teams.  The figure (4.6) below is one that I have developed (in my 
role of managing innovation excellence) in the Future Group which is used to 
brief new employees to the company about how new ideas are managed in the 
organisation: 
 
Figure 4.6:  The Innovation Process in GSK CH 
 
Source:  GSK Innovation Excellence Programme 2007 (internal document). 
 
The first phase is designed to ensure that whatever innovation results from the 
process is ‘on strategy’ for the brand.  This requires a deep immersion in and 
understanding of the brand, its competitive position, how consumers (buyers)  
relate to it, what they use it for, how they see it, the dynamics of the markets in 
which it operates and its history.  This phase involves detailed market 
segmentation for each of the areas in which the company operates where 
current consumers are mapped as well as the users of competing products 
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and brands.  However, the primary focus is to look to areas currently either 
poorly served or not served at all by the products currently on the market, to 
identify potential future opportunities.  
 
Then, as the diagram above illustrates, the process becomes a little more 
divergent as it enters the idea generation phase.  This is where, through 
various means such as: 
 
- Company Suggestion Scheme 
- Outside companies or partner firms/universities (now referred to as ‘Open 
Innovation’) 
- New technologies 
- R&D Breakthroughs 
- Consumer research 
- Brainstorming 
- Innovation meetings 
- Ethnography 
- Lead User Focus Groups 
- Online communities 
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New ideas are received and worked upon by a specialist, Ideation Director 
whose sole job is to investigate and scope out innovation opportunities and 
shepherd appropriate ones into the brand’s NPD pipeline. 
 
The next phase is Idea Development and it is concerned with fleshing out 
those new, often not yet fully formed ideas. The Ideation Director has to work 
with these ideas with the objective of amplifying the elements of them that 
have most appeal for consumers in that market.  Qualitative research is 
usually used here to establish whether ideas have a genuine heartbeat or not.  
Simultaneously, the R&D Future Group team will be doing whatever proof-of-
principle studies are necessary to ensure that the new ideas are technically 
feasible in the first place.  There is a close working partnership between the 
NPR Director and the Ideation Director as they work through this stage.  The 
outcome at the end of this phase will be a portfolio of fully finished ‘concepts’ 
which are ready for volumetric testing which is a form of quantitative research 
that explores the likelihood of potential consumers actually buying the product 
assuming it is to become available.  This phase is quantitative and provides 
the organisation with some certainty relating to the value of the projects being 
managed within its pipeline. 
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The next phase is Feasibility/Capability and this is a mainly mechanical phase 
where evaluations are made about the potential of the project.  The 
commercial attractiveness of most new projects will come down to an 
evaluation of how attractive the opportunity is when balanced against how 
difficult it might be to exploit.  The company has developed various filters and 
matrices for evaluation projects and ranking them against each other so that 
they can prioritise resources. 
 
If a project emerges from this phase, this means that it will be commercialised 
and the company has confirmed a willingness to make the necessary 
investment in manufacturing, clinical trials, packaging and the suite of activities 
required to bring the idea to market.  Once a project has reached this stage it 
is no longer ‘fuzzy front end’ but is now an established project within the 
company with its own critical path, project management team and milestones. 
It moves to another team at this point (although there is overlap for the 
handover and beyond) and the new team have expertise in global launch 
programmes.  It is their job to maximise the opportunity by planning and 
executing a global launch programme for the innovation. 
 
The above process is carefully planned, highly structured and reflects the 
philosophy of having stage gates coordinating the progress of individual 
projects.  The Future Group is the operator of this process for the company.  
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Under normal circumstances, the projects would be initiated by the Ideation 
Director along with their R&D partner (the NPR Director) and they would steer 
ideas into the NPD funnel.  In fact, this pairing will normally shepherd potential 
opportunities and ideas right up to what appears on the diagram as the third 
checkpoint or stage gate.  This stage is a meeting with the senior decision 
makers in the company, in a group called the Portfolio Management Board, 
where decisions are taken whether or not to progress with further (sometimes 
substantial) investment in the project. 
 
4.7 The Innovation Sans Frontiers Project (ISF) 
Each of the seven major brands (those with annual sales of/approaching 
$250m) has a dedicated team managing the innovation for that brand. 
Nevertheless, there was a feeling in R&D that there were some very talented 
people (principally R&D scientists) who might, with the right stimulus and 
conditions, deliver more ideas of value to the company.  It was also noted that 
the company’s innovation pipeline, at that time, had a large number of 
incremental opportunities coming through but not enough radical product ideas 
of sufficient scale, generally measured in sales potential.   
 
There was a proposal to set up a supplementary innovation effort using the 
most innovative people exclusively within the R&D group.  The R&D VP who 
leads all the R&D effort across all the Future Group brands in the Consumer 
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Healthcare business had been consistently impressed by the calibre of some 
of the ideas of his people, he cites an example of an individual in his team: 
 
Take X for example, always known for his way-out ideas that five, ten 
years on I look back and say, boy!  They were very visionary ideas, 
because that’s what we’re doing now!  But when you first talk to X, you 
go, Oh! Man, I can’t imagine that in our business.  But also he’s been 
able to rein in some of those ideas and deliver some very concrete 
projects.  So these people flip freely back and forth from creative to 
delivery, creative to delivery. 
 
One of the R&D VP’s who helped select the team members for the project 
described how the project first came about.  The company does an annual 
talent review for its executives where the senior managers devote a day to 
discussing the career plans and opportunities for the people under their 
management: 
 
There were a couple of things going on at the time. The first time we had 
a talent review process within the R&D community and we created a 
category of people that we felt were innovative.  And, the question that 
we discussed at talent review, well if you’ve got a group of people that 
identify as innovators.  Why don’t we utilise their skills in a different 
manner from classical projects?  And, so was really the idea that sort of 
stimulated the ISF. 
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To have been identified as an ‘innovator’ within this group meant that the 
individuals concerned needed to have shown a capacity to develop creative 
ideas and have demonstrated a high level of interest in new ideas: 
 
These people are highly creative, highly energetic, have a lot to bring to 
the organisation. Having selected them why don’t we ask them to work in 
two teams on identifying new ideas for the company through whatever 
creative processes they want to?  To basically utilise with a completely 
open brief unconstrained by interference by senior management and to 
for a period of time work on that and report back with their ideas. But it 
was really around being creative, having demonstrated that, having 
identified new technologies, showing an interest in new ideas all of those 
were consideration factors for the selection process. 
 
There was also a strong feeling at the time that the company was too 
bureaucratic and that this focus on process was frustrating the creativity of 
some of the R&D scientists.  The leaders of the Future Group R&D teams felt 
that it would be liberating for the teams to be unconstrained by the traditional 
regular reporting requirements of the company.  Incidentally, the issue of 
bureaucracy within GSK was one of the first issues raised by the new 
worldwide CEO, Andrew Witty who took the helm in May 2008 and very soon 
afterwards (August 14th, 2008) gave an interview to the Economist where he 
described GSK as a Police State. 
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It is a rare company boss, let alone one who has just got the top job, that 
can get away with likening his firm’s culture to a police state. But Andrew 
Witty, the new boss of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), a British pharmaceuticals 
giant, somehow manages to pull it off. He invokes that analogy—
tentatively, to be fair—to explain the cultural transformation he wants to 
see at GSK: away from today’s excessively regimented, rule-based 
approach towards the “utopia” of a simplified, values-based culture that 
trusts employees to do the right thing.  (The Economist, 14th August, 
2008). 
 
It was against this background, specifically, the following considerations – that 
the project was conceived: 
 
1. A feeling that there were some creative scientists who, if placed in the 
right team and with the right conditions, might deliver more ideas of value 
to the business. 
2. The R&D organisation wanted to make a statement to underline the 
culture of innovation they were determined to promote within R&D. 
3. A sense that if the scientists were freed from conventional red tape they 
might think more creatively. 
4. It was believed that this type of initiative would provide valuable insights 
about the capabilities of the participants that could inform future project 
team selection as well as promotion decisions. 
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The creation of this project represented a new and experimental departure for 
GSK in the area of innovation.  It also represented a supplementary effort to 
the significant and formal work streams that were already an essential part of 
the GSK structure. Its sponsor in the organisation was the worldwide vice-
president of R&D within the company. According to GSK’s head of 
Organisational Development, the management team that inaugurated the ISF 
team did so because of their shared hypothesis that: 
 
a. There is value in having competing innovation teams with an open remit 
and no formal, constraining reporting requirements. 
 
b. Innovation should thrive under conditions in which a team didn’t have to 
observe any conventional and formal company policies and rules. 
Specifically, the team did not have to present regular updates to senior 
management. 
 
c. The teams were encouraged to work with partners outside their 
traditional partners for ideas, design and research and this would bring 
new energy and original ideas into the business and expose the team to 
fresh thinking. 
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d. The teams were hand picked as key talent within the R&D organisation 
who had displayed strong qualities of entrepreneurship and innovation in 
previous roles. 
 
The R&D Vice Presidents in GSK Consumer Healthcare (all direct reports of 
the worldwide head) each nominated a number of candidates to join the ISF 
teams.  The company has two main centres for R&D (as noted above); one in 
New Jersey, USA and the other in Weybridge, Surrey, UK.  They are roughly 
equivalent in size and it was decided to have two teams, a UK-based one and 
a US-based one.  Approximately twelve people were selected to join each 
team.  The teams would have an equal spread of talent available to them and 
would be provided with equal resources including an initial discretionary 
budget of $250,000 for each team.  
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Chapter Five 
Fieldwork 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter Two, in reference to the Innovation Value Chain 
(Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007), the innovation process is often described as a 
journey in which each project goes through a series comprising at least three 
phases.  The phases begin with the process of generating the ideas, either 
internally within teams or using external experts and other sources,  and once 
the initial raw ideas are captured, the next phase is developing them into 
distinctive and compelling concepts which are capable of being communicated, 
both within and outside the company and tested with potential customers.  This 
phase also includes the sifting, ranking and prioritising ideas so that decisions 
are made about which ideas to progress and which to abandon.  At this 
second phase, teams are concerned with finding the essence of the ideas and 
amplifying the elements of each idea that might have most resonance with 
potential customers.  They are also concerned with prioritising ideas and are 
anxious that either they will progress certain ideas that ultimately turn out to be 
‘lemons’ or else abandon others which might have been more promising. 
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The third and final stage concerns the implementation of the ideas.  In process 
innovation , this might mean the introduction of a better form of production or 
distribution.  In product and service innovation, this phase generally refers to 
launching or introducing the idea  into some form of widespread use or making 
it commercially available. 
 
The ISF initiative followed the path described in the IVC and hence it seems 
logical to chronicle the innovation journey in narrative form using the inputs, 
insights and real quotes of the people involved.  Hence the structure of this 
chapter follows the project teams as they journey through the stages of the  
IVC within the project.   This case study is described in narrative form.  All of 
the sources quoted have been interviewed for this study.  The Innovation Sans 
Frontiers (ISF) programme took pace over a nine-month period and all the 
participants (except those who left GSK during the prgramme or very shortly 
afterwards) have provided an in-depth interview for this study.  This chapter 
begins with a desciption of why and how this singular and unprecedented 
initiative came about.  First it follows the story of the innovation journey of the 
UK team and then it switches focus to the story of the US team.  Finally, as 
happened within the project itself, the two stories merge for the final 
presentation of the teams’ innovation outputs, and the chapter will conclude 
with the comments of the overall head of R&D within the Consumer Healthcare 
(CH) division. 
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The objective of this chapter is to provide an in-depth report of the phases of 
an innovation project, written in the words of the managers involved.  The 
transcripts of managers’ reports of their experiences in the project provide an 
authentic account of how innovation actually takes place inside oganisations 
and within teams. 
 
5.2 How and Why GSK came up with the ISF Initiative 
5.2.1 October 2006 
Ken James, GSK’s President of R&D for the Consumer Healthcare division, 
had called his team together for a meeting in New Jersey.  It was October 
2006; James had been appointed to this role only two months before and this 
was a significant meeting for him.  The GSK Consumer Healthcare 
organisation had embarked on a major campaign aimed at improving its 
performance in new product development (NPD).  As part of this, the company 
had undertaken a significant internal reorganisation in which up to 10% of the 
global headcount had been lost; the part of the company which is charged with 
new product and service development was now called the Future Group.  So 
called, because they were charged with ‘creating the future’ for the company’s 
key consumer brands.  ‘Creating the Future’ was, in this case, essentially 
concerned with building a robust and well researched innovation NPD pipeline 
for the company’s major brand assets.   
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The Future Group was divided into two strands: R&D and Commercial.  The 
commercial team were charged with coming up with market-led, customer-
driven ideas for new products but it would be the R&D team that would have to 
bring them to life and ensure that they were technically feasible and capable of 
manufacture.  Consumer insight was the company’s conventional approach to 
generating ideas for NPD but the R&D team were also mandated to actively 
seek new technologies which might offer GSK commercial opportunities. The 
R&D organisation employed roughly 700 people at this time.   
 
The commercial organisation, a separate unit to the R&D organisation, had 
inaugurated considerable change in their ways of working to facilitate the 
specific future-focus of their role.  A new programme to embed a culture of 
innovation was being introduced into this part of the company.  Underlining the 
cultural change; roles were changed, titles, responsibilities, metrics – all 
reflected the a higher emphasis on innovation within the corporate culture. This 
reorganisation within CH was a major effort to make innovation systemic in the 
organisation and it owed its genesis to the strategy developed by the 
company’s CEO, Dr JP Garnier (described in Chapter Four).   
 
New role titles were aligned with the company’s approach to innovation and 
job responsibilities were more clearly connected with various stages of the 
innovation funnel or process within GSK.  Thus, new commercial roles were 
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developed with ‘ideation’ in the title to reflect the expertise required in the 
generation of high-potential raw ideas.  This role was involved with research; 
often referred to as ‘customer insight’.  It’s objective was to use global 
research to finesse insights which might lead to the generation of promising 
new ideas with consumer appeal.  Th Ideation role  required an ability to 
identify, crystallise and shepherd in new opportunities to the brand and 
company pipeline. 
 
This commercial ‘ideation’ role was aligned with the idea generation (mainly) 
and conversion elements of the innovation process (described in IVC) and this 
role was mirrored in the R&D organisation by new product research (NPR) 
specialists and teams.  Similarly, as ideas progressed within the organisation, 
the closer they got towards possible launch onto the market, the more they 
would be managed through the final stages of the process by conventional 
project managers.  Again, these commercial project managers and teams who 
were managing these projects towards launch also had counterparts in the 
R&D organisation who were called new product development (NPD) scientists 
and teams.  Figure 5.1, illustrates both the innovation process (central 
diagram) employed in GSK as well as the key personnel involved in each 
phase with the commercial teams shown in above the diagram and R&D 
illustrated below. 
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Figure 5.1:  The GSK Innovation Process/Funnel 
 
Source:  GSK Innovation Excellence Programme 2007 (internal document). 
 
2007 was a period of significant change in the GSK Consumer Healthcare 
organisation and James wanted to send a signal that the R&D team were keen 
not merely to play their part but they were enthusiastic about going further to 
deliver on the organisation’s ambition for innovation.  He too was engaged in 
an exercise to rebrand the R&D group as ‘Radical R&D’ and he was looking for 
a flagship project that might underline his team’s committment to the 
innovation agenda. 
 
James also had a nagging suspicion that company bureaucracy was stifling 
the creativity of some of his key people.  Now that he was at the helm, he 
wanted to take the ‘brakes of bureaucracy off.’  He felt that some talented 
people were being hampered in making their full contribution in terms of ideas 
because of the complexity of the company’s operating procedures and the high 
level of managememt oversight.  James was curious to see just how much 
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certain creative indivduals might achieve if they were let loose to follow their 
own ideas. 
 
A third consideration was also preying on his mind, the company’s pipeline of 
new products needed some additional ‘excitement’.  New product ideas 
currently being assessed and progressed in the company were adequate but 
James would like to have seen a few more ‘remarkable’ or radical ideas.  He 
had the view that the ideas curently in the pipeline were too conservative, too 
safe and not radical or ‘disruptive’ and definitely not revoutionary.  He knew 
that the portfolio would always need to reflect a balance between (radical, 
disruptive) ‘innovation’ and (safe, incremental) ‘renovation’ but he felt that the 
company was veering far too close to the latter category. 
 
That the pipeline was relatively threadbare on the company’s most significant 
brands was the single biggest factor in the decision to create the Future 
Group, as the commercial organisation, and the Radical R&D organisation to 
compliment it.  The table below lists the senior leadership team supporting the 
R&D organisation within GSK CH. 
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Table 5.1:  Ken James Senior Leadership Team in R&D October 2006 
Name Role 
Dr Ken James SVP R&D 
Bob Wolf SVP HR 
Stan Lech VP R&D Future Group 
Dr Ken Strahs Head of R&D for Smoking Control 
Brands 
Dr Geoff Clarke Head of R&D for Panadol 
Dr Alexis Roberts 
Mackintosh 
Head of R&D for Aquafresh 
Dr Teresa Layer Head of R&D for Sensodyne 
Brendan Marken Head of New Product 
Development 
Simon Gunson Head of New Product Research 
Jo Moore Head of Open Innovation  
Dr Sandy Lionetti Director of Organisational 
Development 
 
5.3 Proposing the ISF Programme 
Surrounded by his direct reports, the various R&D VP’s, the company’s top tier 
scientists, HR and R&D managers, James explained an idea he’d had which 
he called Innovation Sans Frontiers.  The essence of the idea was that he 
proposed to create a new project within which there would be two R&D 
innovation teams, one in the UK and one in the US.  Each team would be 
comprised of 10 to 12 existing R&D staff.  Each team would have 
approximately the same level of experience and ability within its membership. 
That both teams ‘would be created equal’ was an important tenet of this 
proposed initiative.  What would make these teams different was that they 
would have all conventional reporting constraints and procedures removed for 
231 
 
the duration of the project.  In other words, they would be freed-up from the 
bureaucracy and processes that he believed was hampering R&D 
performance. 
 
James wanted the project to run like a tournament or competition. Both teams 
would be given a budget, a team-leader and a set of explicit objectives in 
terms of the types of ideas and the number of ideas that were being sought.  
Crucially, they were also given a deadline for completion.  A specific date was 
designated for the following July, some nine months hence, for the teams to 
come together at a meeting in the US at which they would be asked to present 
their ideas to James and his direct reports (the R&D Senior Leadership Team 
– or, SLT). 
 
James asked his VP’s to nominate people from their staff to be part of this 
initiative.  Specifically, he was looking for the most creative people in the 
company to participate in this project with the objective of finding out what 
might happen if you put a bunch of top-class scientists together with very few 
constraints and a mandate to create radical ideas for which they have some 
passion.  The tone and style of the proposal, which was still relatively 
embryonic, was very much aligned with the strategic direction being advocated 
by the company’s CEO, Dr JP Garnier. 
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Not all the details had been thought entirely through and James’s meeting then 
turned their attention to establishing what would need to happen for this 
programme to come to fruition.  First, there was the issue of who to select for 
each team, what should be the ideal size of the teams; should they collaborate 
with each other or act independently?  On this last question, James was 
adamant that he wanted the teams to compete against one another and so he 
did not want them to collaborate.  Stan Lech (James’s most senior direct 
report) nominated the two people he wanted as team-leaders.  He nominated 
Nigel Grist (a senior research scientist who had been working on the Panadol 
analgesic brand) to head up the UK team and Scott Coapman (a project 
manager within the weight control product development team) to lead the US 
team.   
 
His selection for UK leader generated considerable debate within the SLT with 
many people opposing the nomination.  The reasons for their opposition are 
explained in greater detail in the pages that follow.  However, Lech insisted 
and the decision to approach Grist and Coapman and offer them the 
opportunity to lead the teams was ratified by the SLT.  Both Coapman and 
Grist were reporting in directly to members of the SLT; Grist was reporting to 
Dr Geoff Clarke, VP of R&D for Panadol and Coapman was reporting to 
Brendan Marken VP of R&D for Weight Control. 
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The SLT also scoped out the rules of engagement and ways of working that 
they envisaged for these teams within this initiative.  After a great deal of 
discussion, the following approach was agreed. Sandy Lionetti, the head of 
Organisational Development, in an interview, explained what was agreed.  The 
project would proceed and it would run along the following broad guidelines: 
 
 They would empanel between 10-12 members in each of two teams – 
one in UK and one in the US. 
 Insofar as they could, they would create the two teams equal in terms of 
the quality, technical expertise and experience of personnel. 
 They would nominate the people to be assigned to the teams and they 
would choose those they believed to be the most creative in their groups. 
 They would provide a budget of $250,000 to each team. 
 The teams would not be required to provide any report on their progress 
during the lifetime (nine months) of the project.  
 They concluded that team members be asked to allocate 20% of their 
time to the ISF project but the SLT would make no formal or official 
approaches to the line managers of the team members.   
 Members would be expected to manage their own diaries and current 
projects in a way that would release the necessary time to engage in this 
project. 
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Lack of senior management interference was always supposed to be a 
hallmark of the project and this is evident in the five-slide deck that was used 
to brief the new team. Adding a little more detail to the background of the 
project, one of Stan Lech’s R&D VP’s, Teresa Layer explains her 
understanding of the project: 
 
The first time we had a talent review process within the R&D community 
and we created a category of people that we felt were innovative.  
Described as innovate and the question that we discussed at talent 
review, well, if you’ve got a group of people that identify as innovators, 
why don’t we utilise their skills in a different manner from classical 
projects?   And so was really the idea that sort of stimulated the ISF.  
Where we said, you know these people are highly creative, highly 
energetic, have a lot to bring to the organisation. Why don’t we, having 
identified them from talent review, which is the first part of the question 
“how do we find them?” Having selected them why don’t we ask them to 
work on, dividing into two teams, identifying new ideas for the company 
through whatever creative processes they want to?  To basically utilise 
with a completely open brief unconstrained by interference by senior 
management and to for a period of time work on that and report back with 
their ideas. 
 
They then turned their attention to the the specific objectives of the project.  
Earlier in the meeting, there had been a portfolio review of the projects in the 
R&D pipeline and so they were able to suggest target objectives for the project 
teams.  Each team would be given exactly the same objectives (Figure 5.2): 
 
  
235 
 
Figure 5.2:  Slide from the ISF Briefing Pack 
 
Source:  ISF Briefing Pack (November 2006). 
 
Going through this point by point: The first bullet point asks for 5 ideas: one for 
each of the Future Group brands: Aquafresh, Sensodyne, Panadol, Smoking 
Cessation (Nicorette in US and NiQuitin in Europe) and Weight Control (Alli).  
The second bullet asks for three significant ideas (with a global sales potential 
of over $20m) in therapy or business areas outside the areas in which GSK 
was currently operating.  The final three points are really qualifying the types of 
ideas that were being sought.  Bullet three explains that priority will be given to 
ideas that would be capable of launch within three to five years. The company 
was not actively looking for anything with a longer-term time frame.  Point four 
demonstrates that the SLT are not viewing this as ‘a numbers game’ but they 
are conscious of the fact that the quality of the ideas is the key measure and 
the number of ideas each team generates will not be a factor in considering 
the winners.  Finally, point five demonstrates that they are looking for a  
polished presentation at the end of the nine months. 
236 
 
The targets for the project are very explicit and this slide is one of only five 
slides in the briefing deck.  The preceding slide made it very clear what the 
measurable outputs were expected to be and the opening deck of the briefing 
set the overall context of the over-arching project objectives.  It is worth noting 
that the issue of nomenclature around types of innovation is evident in this 
case study.  The discussion within SLT referred to ‘radical’ innovation but 
when this got translated to the slide briefing deck for the teams, the word 
‘incremental’, albeit preceded by the word ‘big’ was what appeared in the 
slides (see Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.3:  Slide from ISF Briefing Pack 
 
Source: ISF Briefing Pack (November, 2006). 
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With the broad objectives and ways of working agreed, the next task was to 
approach the team leaders and get them on board with the project.  Stan Lech, 
Ken James’ second in command, was given the resposibility for engaging the 
team leaders and organising the two team briefings.  The briefings were 
scheduled for November 2006; one in Surrey (UK) and one in New Jersey 
(US).  The pages that follow contain the story of the UK team and their journey 
(Figure 5.4) from the initial briefing until they travelled to New York to present 
their ideas.  After that, the US team’s journey is described in similar detail.  
Much of the story is written in a series of direct quotations from each of the 
members, as this is consistent with the semi-structured interviews conducted.  
Each quote you will read is either from a member of the UK team or one of the 
group of senior VP’s who both set up and judged the outcome of the project. 
 
5.4 Innovation Sans Frontiers - The UK Story 
 
Figure 5.4: Timeline for the UK ISF Team 
 
Source:  Chronicle of the UK ISF Project produced for this study. 
Timeline of events in UK ISF Team
6
December ‘06
Nigel suggest that UK team 
look broadly at areas that 
interest them
January ‘07
Nigel holds two meetings but 
few people attend.  He asks 
SLT if people’s diaries can be 
adjusted
February ‘07
Nigel arranges BCG 
presentation on idea 
generation, but few 
people attend 
March
The team get their own 
dedicated meeting room
April
Two members 
formally pull out of 
the team.
May
The core group try to 
prioritise ideas and one 
more member pulls out
June
Group holds one focus 
group with internal 
staff in GSK
November ‘06
Leaders chosen ; teams 
assembled and briefings 
held in US & UK
October ‘06
Ken James 
launches ISF Idea to 
his SLT
Generate ideasLaunching the Project
6
July
Team Fly to New 
Jersey to present ideas
Prioritise and research ideas
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5.4.1 Selecting the Team Leader 
Nigel Grist was selected as the leader of the UK Innovation Sans Frontiers 
Team in October 2006.  Grist had been with the company seventeen years 
when this project was set up.  He had always worked in R&D, first for 
SmithKline Beecham (SB); then for GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) when the two 
companies merged in 2001.  He had been involved in a number of functional 
areas within the R&D operation; New Product Development (NPD), tech 
licensing, external collaboration with third parties as part of the company’s 
open innovation initiative; he had also worked on some of the company’s key 
therapy areas such as oral care (the toothpaste and mouthwash ranges of 
Aquafresh, Sensodyne and Macleans) as well as the company's market-
leading analgesic (painkiller) portfolio which includes the brands, Panadol, 
Solpadeine, Hedex and Beechams.  Grist was a technical specialist within 
R&D.  His role, up to this, did not require him to have any direct reports. 
 
Grist was selected to lead the team; a role of considerable responsibility.  Grist 
would be leading a team of twelve scientists over a nine-month period with a 
mandate to deliver specific innovation targets.  The design of the overall 
project pitted his team against a team of similar size and similar levels of 
experience working in the US.   
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Grist describes the initial conversation with the SVP of R&D, Stan Lech, in 
which the ISF project was first outlined to him: 
 
When I was approached about whether I would like to take on the 
challenge, the way that I was briefed initially was that we were looking to 
do something different.  We were looking to give a group of scientists 
from within R&D total freedom. 
 
Following Grist’s installation as team leader, the attention of the senior 
leadership team then turned to filling the places of the team members.  To get 
selected to participate in this team meant that each participant would have had 
to attract the attention of senior management specifically in the area of 
creativity.  The head of R&D was looking for two very specific characteristics 
from all the members being assigned to this group.  As Stan Lech recalls: 
 
It was nothing to do with a popularity contest.  We specifically picked 
people that we viewed as being at least two standard deviations from the 
norm, or maybe three, and it was behavioural driven...behavioural and 
track record, so we were very aware that we didn’t want to put a bunch of 
weird and wacky people in the room that had no track records to delivery 
and deliver just a load of crap.  So I used two filters; behavioural and 
delivery. 
 
Specifically, in relation to the selection of the leader of the UK group, Lech 
reflects:  
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That was a bit of an experiment on my side, I think.  I knew this going in, I 
knew Scott (the US team-leader) would bring the very structured 
approach, almost stage gating and I knew that Nigel (UK team-leader) 
didn’t like process and so I knew he would be more of a free spirit around 
how it was all organised and that was a bit of an experiment itself. 
 
Given that the entire project was something of an experiment (insofar as it had 
never been done before), the choice of UK team leader was really building an 
experiment within an experiment.  Referring to Grist as ‘allergic to process’, 
Lech considered Grist to have considerable experience in various business 
areas and had a reputation for being creative and having an open 
management style. 
 
That the selection of this particular leader was a managerial experiment was 
underlined by the opposition Lech faced from his own leadership team about 
his choice of Grist for the role of team leader.  The VP of NPD, Brendan 
Marken, remembers registering his reservations to this assignment: 
 
I had concerns that the UK team-leader hadn’t got team-working skills; 
we had, in him, no leader, no co-ordinator and I raised strong objections 
to the point that my objection was noted.  I was afraid we were setting 
them (the UK team) up for failure.  My objection was noted but 
disregarded. 
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Geoff Clarke, also an R&D VP and on Lech’s Leadership Team, had some 
misgivings about the selection of Grist as leader but he, apparently, chose not 
to voice them at the time.  He considered Grist to be a good scientist and an 
experienced veteran of the GSK R&D environment but was concerned about 
his lack of team-management experience. 
 
Nobody could be surprised about the lack of leadership from Nigel when 
he’s never led a team in his life. 
 
Grist knew nothing of the debate caused by his selection. He was attracted to 
the opportunity, because, as he saw it; it offered a welcome chance to work 
without constraints: 
 
I saw it very much as a positive opportunity and something that would be 
a very interesting thing to do.  So that was pretty straightforward; ... it was 
great to have  the opportunity to do something completely without 
constraints. 
 
He was to have a team of twelve for this project and they were each, in theory, 
to devote 20% of their time to this project.   
 
5.4.2 Putting the Rest of the Team Together 
The VP’s of R&D then nominated people they felt would make a strong but 
particularly, a creative contribution to the team.  The people thus chosen were 
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nominated and assigned to the team; unlike Grist who had been personally 
approached and had the opportunity explained and offered to him (Figure 5.5).  
His team members were simply assigned to the team, in some cases without 
the prior knowledge of their direct line manager. 
 
Figure 5.5:  Who’s Who in the UK ISF Team 
 
Source:  Graphic developed for case study. 
 
Note:  The lighter boxes contain the names of the team members and the relative 
position of the boxes does not denote any hierarchy or reporting relationship.  
The members all had equal status within the team. 
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The other members of the UK team were nominated by top management 
within the overall R&D department.  There were twelve members plus Grist.  
The composition, while intended to ‘reflect a microcosm of the organisation’ - 
as Lech put it; comprised of eleven men and one woman.  All were PhD 
scientists but eleven were from the UK with one from the US and one from 
China.  They did reflect varying job grades within the organisation, ranging 
from a middle-manager (D-Grade) to a Vice President (Dr Stuart Smith). 
 
The Vice President on the team, Dr Stuart Smith had his own reservations 
about the composition of the team; he also felt that there was not a sufficient 
blend of skills represented within it: 
 
It felt to me that people have just put forward names of people who they 
considered to be creative or slightly wacky or disruptive or whatever and 
that doesn’t necessarily make for the most creative team.  I think actually 
having a balance of people might have been better, so actually potentially 
someone who was a bit more process orientated could have been useful 
for us I think.  I think just putting a bunch of whacko’s in the same room 
doesn’t necessarily get people to feed off each other and lead to 
innovative outcomes. 
 
Grist notes that, perhaps, from the very beginning, some team-members were 
less than enthusiastic about getting involved.  He points out that in his own 
case (as noted above), he was approached personally and offered the 
opportunity to lead the team whereas many of the others were nominated by 
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their managers and simply told of their involvement without having any choice 
in the matter. 
 
I was approached, offered the opportunity, got the chance to buy in easy; 
(other) team members were pretty much told they were going to be part 
of this activity and I think it would pretty much be more of an 
encumbrance to the team members, at least initially, because it was just 
another thing they had to do amongst a crowded work schedule.  So one 
of the recommendations I made is that people who are approached 
should just be approached about whether they would or wouldn’t want to 
participate.’ 
 
The other UK Team-members were conscious of the kudos attached to having 
been selected for this team and acknowledged its connection with their prior 
track record for creativity and innovation.  One senior R&D manager, Dr 
Ashley Barlow, attributes his selection to work he had done just before joining 
the ISF project: 
 
I had been with the company three years when I was approached to be a 
member of ISF.  The bulk of my research up to then loosely fitted under 
an innovation umbrella.  I had been running dentin hypersensitivity 
clinical pain research.  I had created different tools and different 
instruments – like brain imaging through to measuring oral health 
impacts.  So, I suppose a lot of that work was very in tune with the 
innovation outputs needed by management – and I think this put my 
name into the picture. 
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Another member of the team, Dr Peter Frost had been closely involved in a 
very big, successful, international, new-product launch for Aquafresh and he 
saw his selection for ISF as part of the reward for this: 
 
I was chosen because I came up with ISO Active because I had been 
involved in my previous job doing aerosols and furniture polishes.  That 
led to project Mousse and Project Reindeer – both of which are launched 
now around the world. 
 
This reference is to a (then) new product format under the Aquafresh brand 
which is gel-to-foam toothpaste.  The product is, in essence, the collision of 
shaving gel format with toothpaste formulation to create a different and better 
mouthfeel experience when cleaning teeth.  This idea had been developed by 
Frost, which he says occurred to him because of his prior history working with 
different liquid formats and aerosols.  This variant now sells well over $100m 
for GSK and has been launched under various brand names throughout the 
world: Aquafresh, Sensodyne and Pronamel. 
 
Dr Uruquart also reflects on the credentials in his background that may have 
brought his name to the attention of senior management: 
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Where I came from before GSK was Procter & Gamble in Newcastle 
working for four years in laundry detergents, so a lot of the chemistry was 
very, very similar.  But obviously the ways of working from P&G to GSK 
were notably different and I brought a lot of that experience with me. 
 
Another team-member, Dr Stovell was very flattered to be approached and he 
relished the opportunity to be involved: 
 
Yes... it felt good to be picked for this team, I felt special and yes it was 
really nice to be working on something that felt had a real impact, was 
properly backed and supported from on high and I guess also it was quite 
nice to be working on stuff a bit behind closed doors, not everyone else 
could see exactly what we were up to, so I quite like that feel as well, 
doing something a bit subversive. 
 
For the others, some, usually specific and notable, feature in their CV was 
responsible for their selection.  They were chosen because of some specific 
experience or expertise in their track record that made their manager identify 
them as strong in the area of innovation.   
 
5.4.3 The First Meeting to Launch the Project 
November 2007 
The kick off meeting was scheduled for Lech and his boss, Ken James to 
come to London, from their HQ in New Jersey, and outline to the team the 
parameters of the project; the key objectives, the resources available and the 
247 
 
timelines and milestones along the way.  Very quickly the new team members 
were appointed and invited to attend the briefing which was in November 
2007. 
 
The SLT’s VP on Sensodyne, Teresa Layer attended the kick off session and 
noted that this message of how highly this group were valued by senior 
management; how they’d been identified as innovators, was strongly 
conveyed.  The briefing also focussed on what was being asked for; what were 
the deliverables being demanded of these teams.  This was relatively tightly 
specified as per Figure 5.2. 
 
Lech explained exactly what the senior management team were looking for: 
 
We said, look, we would love one to two big ideas for a future group, 
we’d love to have one breakthrough idea within one of the future groups 
and then we’d love to have – an additional idea; an incremental idea that 
might be worth up to £25m– and then we said on top of that we’d love to 
have £100 million breakthrough idea, which had nothing to do with the 
future group, which was new business opportunity.  So that’s what we 
told them to do. 
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5.4.4 Getting Going with ISF 
December 2007 
The UK team then set to work.  As it turned out, of the full 13 members, ten of 
the team members were co-located in the Weybridge R&D site in Surrey and 
the other three were based at the Lucozade factory site at Coleford some three 
hours drive away.  Grist wanted to run the group with very little structure or 
process and he made this clear to the team members from the outset: 
 
One of the things that we tried to set out to do was not to have anything 
too process-driven, but to provide people with the opportunity to learn 
about new areas, find out new information, speak to new people, from 
which they could generate new threads.  So the philosophy was that 
rather than have a process whereby you go through different stats to try 
and pull ideas together, is you create an environment where people have 
the opportunity to read about new areas, talk to experts in different areas, 
interact with different people such that they can generate threads for their 
own development.  Now this was a little bit my way of thinking; it was 
shared, I would say, by half the team and I’d say the other half of the 
team really struggled with it. 
 
Dr Stovell recalls how Grist ran the first meeting; what he suggested be done 
and how he hoped the team would perform in this challenge: 
 
Well the first thing to say I guess is that Nigel was quite keen not to have 
any process at all, he “de-processed” everything we did as much as he 
could, which he felt was the right thing to do.  But in terms of how we 
approach the new ideas, the first thing he set us all to do was effectively 
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to dig around and come up with any interesting areas, anything that 
people felt were places worth exploring, any interesting technology sort of 
things.  So I guess he set us off on that before Christmas and then we 
had a meeting after Christmas for everyone to kind to bring along as to 
anything they’d found. 
 
Grist himself points out that there were no commercial people on the team.  
The people one the team were scientists with a track record for creativity and 
that’s what Grist wanted to amplify and explore with his group.  He notes: 
 
We took a slightly different view, which is that we were a group of 
scientists thrown together to come up with good opportunities.  Now I 
would say there are broadly two areas where you can come up with huge 
wins in terms of new products.  One is if you come up with a technical 
solution that is slightly different and can be positioned to an  unmet or 
inadequately met consumer need.  And that is what I would describe as a 
technically client-driven solution.  Or the other way you can do it is if you 
just happen to strike on an insight, or a piece of consumer understanding, 
which enables you to make something of what you have already got 
available in a light that hasn’t previously been recognised.  As a group of 
scientists I felt our role was very much to come up with new technical 
solutions.  Things that would at least be worth  exploring from a 
technical point of view. 
 
So I felt that we should at least stick with our scientific heritage, try and 
look at science in a different way, come up with novel technical solutions 
rather than trying to pretend that we were commercial folk when we 
weren’t.  So the thrust of what we were trying to do was very much get 
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into the science, look at how you might use pieces of science that have 
been applied in one area translated to another area. 
 
This distinction (between the primacy of science over marketing in how he 
approached the ISF challenge) is a key one in the narrative.  Implicit in Grist’s 
philosophy is that he wanted to focus on science or technology-driven ideas; to 
use the experience and expertise of his group of scientists to push the 
boundaries of new scientific knowledge.  This is a declaration that he is not 
going to use the market and consumer research as his guiding star; he is 
favouring the ‘technology-push’ approach to innovation ahead of ‘market or 
customer-centred’ innovation.  He is both very clear and very considered about 
this perspective, he further states:  
 
So part of the experiment was very much to isolate scientists and see 
what they came up with and we felt in that context it was worth us trying 
to focus on novel applications of science. 
 
Grist gave his people a mandate to go out and explore technologies and 
therapy areas in that attracted their interest.  He wanted them to go out and 
talk to specialists, academics, opinion-formers and to chase down any 
potential opportunities in areas in which they had some interest or connection.  
His commitment to ‘the science heritage’ reflects his view that his team were 
talented and experienced scientists and that his role was to leverage this 
strength rather than dilute it through dabbling in marketing areas.  He was also 
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committed to making sure his team were networking with external experts, 
universities, inventors and attending conferences to explore new, appropriate 
scientific areas. He saw his management style and role as that of a facilitator: 
 
We were inviting the external experts; we were highlighting to each other 
interest in sources of new scientific development and trying to create an 
environment where people would explore new areas and find out 
something they thought was of interest and then develop threads.  I don’t 
know how much sense that makes, but it’s the way that I’d seen the most 
creative people operate who I’d worked with within the organisation.  So 
very much individuals taking responsibility for developing their own 
threads of research, and interacting with other people to maximise where 
they might go with that. 
 
In terms of idea generation, Grist did not provide any particular guidelines 
except that he asked people to look to their own technical interests to see if 
they could find ideas of possible commercial potential to begin to explore.  In 
practice, this translated into some of the team looking at certain healthcare 
therapy areas, such as, in the case of Dr Stovell; sleep.  In the case of sleep, 
Dr Stovell contacted the National Sleep Laboratory in Guildford University and 
arranged to meet them and talk about possible gaps in treatment or possible 
areas for self-medication.  He brought their ideas and feedback back to 
Weybridge and he began to develop potential ideas to launch in the market for 
sleep aids.  Other members of the team began the process by examining 
252 
 
areas in which they had a specific interest and/or experience.  Stuart Smith 
began by examining opportunities in gum health. 
 
While, for some, there was great emancipation in this open licence to go out 
and experiment with new areas and ideas; others would have wished for more 
structure to be introduced.  One member (Dr Jon Creeth) recalled: 
 
The UK approach was chaotic with process largely absent.  It was like a 
playground where you could do exactly what you wanted. 
 
Dr Ashley Barlow, one of the team-members located at the Coleford site 
suggested: 
 
I think some people liked our team’s approach however, we were all 
smart enough to realise that unless you have some structure in place 
there was a risk that the chaos would have very little output.  So most of 
us wanted gates to aim at and deadlines to hit. 
 
Dr Peter Frost agreed: 
 
Nigel used very little framework for running the team.  He never set the 
scene but allowed everything to be completely flexible.  While (the) 
innovation (process) needs chaos – maybe the people don’t and a bunch 
of scientists generally want some structure.  I think it was a little bit 
chaotic and over the top.  I could have accepted it if at some stage, he 
intervened with some structure and showed us a path towards a goal. 
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Frost’s perspective was shared by Dr Jonathan Creeth who, similarly, found 
the absence of structure for the project quite intimidating and something of a 
barrier to his full involvement: 
 
But it was quite intimidating because it was so open ended.  If someone 
starts something off and need the edges smoothed – then I can help out.  
But when you get the totally blank piece of paper – which we never get - 
and the only hard thing on it was a deadline for delivery.  I thought that 
was intimidating right from the start. 
 
A few in the group, though, were self-starters and they relished the freedom to 
go out and talk to experts in different areas, but nonetheless, they 
acknowledged that some of their fellow team-members were struggling to 
make a strong contribution precisely because of the lack of structure.  Dr David 
Uruquart had joined GSK from P&G and he spotted this difficulty straightaway: 
 
What I would say is this was a very scattergun approach.  Nigel was very, 
very keen that he wanted to go as wide as possible and that he didn’t 
want to put any process in because he felt at that stage in the idea 
gathering point that he didn’t want to put any barriers on what we looked 
at.  Personally, I think that helped some people:  but for many others, I 
think it hindered their innovation capability because being given a 
completely blank sheet of paper almost moved them into torpor. 
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But the team had been asked before Christmas to look broadly into areas of 
science in which there may be potential opportunity and to come back in 
January with some early stage ideas of where further exploration might be 
warranted.  However, up to half of the team failed to come up with anything 
once the team reconvened in January.  Their first working meeting took place 
in Weybridge where the Coleford-based team were allowed to join on a 
videoconferencing line.  Dr Stovell recalls: 
 
I think we had a telecom with Coleford for that one; a video con in the 
formal VTC unit.  As I remember, we didn’t have everyone there and I 
would guess about only 50% to 60% of the team had actually done 
anything at that point. 
 
February 2007 
Grist arranged three consecutive team meetings in January and February.  
The Weybridge site was the venue with the Coleford contingent dialling in on a 
conference call.  The meetings were intended for people to share their ideas 
but it quickly became apparent that some people just hadn’t got started and 
came with no progress to report or no ideas to share.  The meetings were not 
seen as a success by the group and it also became apparent that less and 
less of the team were showing up and that some people were gradually, 
informally but unmistakably pulling away from the project.  
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Progress was far slower than Grist intended or had hoped for.  David Uruquart 
felt that Grist ought to have shown more responsiveness when he observed 
that some of his team experiencing difficulty in making the type of contribution 
he had been expecting from them: 
 
I think he was so married to his idea of how it would work that I think 
when things didn’t work he was relatively inflexible, and I think I would 
have liked to have seen, for instance, his ‘I don’t want any process’ 
became a mantra that despite the fact that we’d had about three different 
meetings in a row where frankly there’d been very little progress made, 
and people were obviously struggling to connect because they weren’t 
seeing it as he was, I think he could have been more flexible with his 
approach.  And I think he could have understood more the issues people 
who were in the team were having and tried to make adaptations to his 
style in order to do that. 
 
Grist knew the team was experiencing difficulty; he felt that their progress was 
slow.  But, as he had no schedule or plan, he had nothing to compare it 
against.  He began to become a little disillusioned with the attitude and 
performance of his team. He reflects, in this quote, on how his prior 
assumptions about the innovativeness of his people may have been mistaken: 
 
So, I had started from the position that people who are considered 
innovative should all be self-starters within the organisation.  So that, as it 
turns out, was an assumption too far, but I was working on the basis that 
everybody was at least individually driven to explore new avenues; and I 
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think some people are individually driven, but not necessarily to explore 
new areas, more just the ones they’re already familiar with. 
 
Grist made his first use of the budgeted resources, in March 2007, by hiring a 
specialist company called Bufton Consulting to come to one of his team 
meetings in Weybridge. Bufton Consulting are an Open Innovation 
Intermediary company.  GSK had worked with Bufton Consulting before, they 
had used their services as technology scouts in the past.  Grist had privately 
shared with them the ISF brief and they had examined it from the standpoint of 
their own commercial contacts; a group which includes inventors, research 
institutes, universities and small start-up technology companies.   In this way, 
Grist farmed out the task to get a commercial view on how a professional 
consultancy might approach it.  He also wanted to broaden the external 
contact base or network for his team and intended that Bufton Consulting 
might broker useful introductions for his team members.  This did have the 
desired effect as Bufton steered the UK ISF team towards some of the ideas 
that would eventually make it onto the team’s final presentation. 
 
Bufton had some proposals for the ISF team in terms of companies who were 
developing new technologies in adjacent healthcare platforms for GSK.  Two 
directors from Bufton Consulting came into GSK Weybridge to present their 
ideas and their contacts to the UK team.  However, less than half of Grist’s 
team turned up for the meeting.  Nevertheless, this did help to get some 
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people going and generating new ideas but it did not succeed in bringing the 
group closer together.  The Coleford group did not attend this session. 
 
Although a number of team members reported that they were beginning to 
struggle and had begun to seek direction; the provision of such specific 
management direction ran counter to Grist’s view of how the project ought to 
run. He felt that if people needed this type of leadership, then they weren’t the 
right people for this team.  He was unswerving and emphatic on this point. 
 
If I am going to be blunt about it, the people who were the right people on 
the team were the ones who felt energised and liberated by the freedom 
to explore where they wanted to go.  The ones who were the wrong 
people on the team were the people who wanted basically spoon-
feeding, directing and task allocation, and all the rest of it.  So here you 
probably see my values coming through, my personal values; I have a 
view that if someone is a scientist and they are chosen as an innovator, 
then they should be self-starters and they should feel motivated and 
liberated by the opportunity to start exploring different areas.  So for 
example, from the scientist’s point of view you are told ‘go innovate’, 
you’ve got a blank sheet of paper, find about a disease condition that is 
affecting a lot of people, which there does not appear to be an unmet 
need; go and read about it; go talk to some experts and see where it 
leads you. 
 
So that is very much my philosophy, so I think the answer to your 
question is the right people who were on the team did feel motivated and 
liberated by having total freedom in an environment where there was also 
some funding available and support from senior management to do it. 
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Dr Smith, the most senior member of the team in age, grade and experience, 
expressed the view that the absence of a very tight structure was  helpful in 
the case of the UK team; he refers to the fact that the team had a lot of ‘big 
personalities’ and that a tight management approach may not have been 
productive.  But, this was Grist’s dilemma; the ‘big personalities’ might very 
well have resisted too much structure, but without it, they had a better 
opportunity to dominate proceedings: 
 
I think if someone had tried to drive it with too rigid a process, I think we 
would have lost the creativity side.  There were some strong personalities 
and a range of very different personalities on the team and I think there 
potentially, some people got a too greater share of voice. 
 
Grist’s philosophy was by this stage, certainly at odds with the declared needs 
and wants of the majority of his team.  But Dr Frost points out that the team 
themselves could have come to a collective decision about the type and level 
of management structure they actually needed.  He believes the team could 
have discussed this and made appropriate representation to Grist. But, they 
didn’t. 
 
In a situation like this, you can’t win.  Maybe the way to do it is to allow 
the team decide how much structure they want.  You should ask not how 
is the leader going to run the group but ask how the team can lead the 
team – what do the group want in terms of structure and leadership. 
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5.4.5 Difficulties Persist in UK Group 
March 2007 
The project was structured on the assumption that everyone would devote 
20% of his or her time to working on it.  However, no provision was made to 
adjust people’s objectives or lighten their workload accordingly.  This became 
an increasingly difficult issue for team-members and was especially magnified 
as the team itself had not really evolved into a cohesive group and hence 
some people were prepared to abandon the ISF group if they felt their ‘day-job’ 
was suffering.  By April, two members had formally quit the team with another 
five largely disengaged (insofar as they were not contributing anything) but still 
formally, or technically remaining members. 
 
Grist found this an acutely difficult issue to deal with and he struggled to 
persuade people to stick with the project.  One of the exacerbating issues was 
that although the individual team members had been approached by senior 
management to let them know they were participating, in many cases that 
person’s direct line-manager had not been similarly approached and this lack 
of foresight resulted in some unnecessary tensions occurring.  Grist describes 
it: 
 
The only thing I would say is the time issue was a huge one, which is that 
the ideal was that people spent 20% of their time on this activity, but it 
was pretty clear that none of their day job was going to be allowed to 
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disappear as a part of that equation; so people were left often doing it in 
the evenings.  That would be my only question about the level of support, 
certainly in terms of allowing us to get on with it, leaving us as an 
autonomous group.  I thought that as part of the experiment, that was all 
excellent.  My only query is around the time. 
 
Grist raised this issue with the Senior Leadership Team back in November 
when he foresaw it becoming an issue; asking them if any provision could be 
make to clear some people’s diaries and alter their other project timelines but 
was not given any leeway in this regard: 
 
In fact that question was asked at the beginning and it was made pretty 
clear that the day job was not going to go away; to some extent I could 
see that left a few people feeling somewhat burdened from the off.  In 
fact two or three people pretty much dropped out. 
 
An interesting feature of the overall constraint on the team’s time availability 
was that, generally, the higher up people were in the organisation, the more 
pressing were the routine demands on their time and the less likely they were 
to be able to contribute to a project like ISF.  This left an attractive opening for 
the younger, more junior members of the team to ‘punch above their weight’ 
and to advance their own ideas more easily. 
 
Dr Alex Stovell, the team’s youngest and most junior member recalls: 
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I think ability to commit a significant amount of time would be one of the 
biggest barriers.  I guess I was lucky in as much as I was one of the more 
junior members of the team, probably the most junior actually, and I 
suspect that the amount of time that you could free up to work on this 
was probably related to grade to a certain extent.  So the higher up 
people were, the harder it was for them to dedicate a sufficient amount of 
time to it.  That being said, I think I would have made time for this just 
because it was great, I would have found the time.  So I think a certain 
amount is down to individual’s attitudes to it as well  – they just drifted in 
and out; some people deserted the team because of the time issue and 
their other priorities. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum in terms of experience and age; Dr David 
Parker who was one of the members located at the Coleford site where they 
handle R&D and manufacturing for Lucozade, Horlicks and Ribena, had a 
different view of the time availability issue and he found it a genuine barrier: 
 
Time was a key barrier – 20% of your time was just not feasible. Great 
innovation doesn’t come easily out of thin air – it’s a combination of great 
curiosity and a great deal of thinking. One day a week was the wrong 
way to start it off.  You can’t come up with a great idea just because 
today is ‘innovation day…. 
 
In fact, Dr Parker was one of the first to have to abandon the project purely 
because of his inability to find the time to participate: 
 
I withdrew from ISF very early - never really got into it - due to lack of 
space in my schedule. 
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For Grist, this was the key issue he faced at the early stages; people were 
feeling the pressure of contributing time to ISF while still being asked to deliver 
a full day’s work in their ‘day job’.  He would have liked to see some 
management support offered to him in this area but none was forthcoming. 
 
The gist of it is that there was some initial resistance from people who, at 
a time when there was a lot of pressure on the organisation, and they 
were already working relatively long hours, saw it as another thing they 
were being asked to do without giving up any of their existing work time, 
so it became a little bit of an encumbrance.  I felt some of that could have 
been avoided just by inviting them and selling it as an opportunity a little 
bit more, rather than just telling them they were participating. 
 
Like most organisations, GSK is rarely static, and this initiative was taking 
place against a backdrop of significant change in the company.  The R&D 
Group generally were going through a transformational change process where 
they were re-branding themselves as ‘Radical R&D’ and this entailed new job 
descriptions and new roles for certain people.  Dr Creeth remembers: 
 
Time was a huge problem.  I was in a new job and was thrown in the 
deep end in a new job and to do this well it required more time. It was just 
at the wrong level; the worst level – if it was more than 20% we could 
have got more involved – if it was less than 20% then you could fit it in. 
 
David Uruquart sums it up: 
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So frankly there were a number of people who dropped during the way 
because they couldn’t commit any time to it, and there were a number of 
others that did actually go to the end, but frankly committed hardly any 
time to it whatsoever.  People’s allocation of time to the initiative was 
inversely proportional to their seniority in the organisation. 
 
Those located off the principal R&D Weybridge site seemed to have more 
difficulty in staying the course of the project.  They may have felt the lack of 
structure and process more acutely than the others who, at least, had 
proximity to each other to fall back on when they wanted to discuss and review 
ideas.  Dr Barlow, in April, reluctantly, had to quit the team: 
 
I found the time required became increasingly difficult to deliver.  I had to 
stand down from the team because my other projects were suffering 
badly.  So, I had to stand down or otherwise I would have been a ghost 
member of the team. 
 
The other members also noticed how difficult it was to sustain the appropriate 
environment and atmosphere for creativity and innovation when you were only 
connected on a conference call and so were not surprised when the majority of 
the Coleford group eventually disengaged from the team (one left formally in 
February and another in April).  Dr Smith recalls: 
 
And I would say another challenge the UK team had was having to do 
pretty much everything by teleconference because we rightly had the 
representatives from the nutritional business in Coleford and I think, that 
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does impact the dynamics of any meeting if you consider doing things 
only by phone. 
 
Dr Stuart Smith also broached the issue of time as a barrier to people’s 
involvement: 
 
I think 20% of the time was the intended bit.  But I think the challenge 
which became apparent is 20% of time was not made, so it was one of 
those things you spent 20% of your time, but you have to do everything 
else as well.  And I think that impacted heavily on the team because 
everyone is so busy it’s very hard to find 20% of anyone’s time unless 
you actually reprioritise and cut things out. 
 
Dr Frost also mentions the time issue as an inhibiting factor to the team’s 
progress:  
 
Biggest flaw was that we didn’t have time to do it.  The one big learning is 
that you allow people enough time or you don’t do this at all.  Many 
people couldn’t commit to the meetings and didn’t contribute as they 
might have. 
 
Only one of the team members, Dr Stovell, questions the authenticity of the 
issue of time availability; he suggests that some people may have been using 
it as an excuse to explain their own lack of interest, enthusiasm and 
involvement: 
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I’m not totally convinced that these people wanted to free up their time, 
they were using it as an excuse, it’s kind of the feeling I got in certain 
quarters. 
 
5.4.6 Channelling the Team’s Work 
April 2007 
But meanwhile, some positive steps were being taken and ideas were being 
generated and incubated by the group.  Despite the few ‘casualties’ along the 
way, a core team informally evolved to become the ideas engine for this team.  
Dr Stovell, who had the time to devote to the project, explains: 
 
Of course, there were others who didn’t turn up to many meetings.  But 
there were, I guess sort of three, four, five of us who did as much as we 
could, turned up for as many meetings as we could and really got behind 
it.  So we kind of had a bit of a sub-unit that was working well together, 
specifically I guess between me and David just because we always work 
well together and have done before and we have got the common sort 
innovation language.  So that was a natural pairing that worked well and 
we carried a few others with us.  And we did deliberately jump in on the 
sleep area to try and  ...drill into the sleep (therapy) area as a new area 
and we thought at the time that this would be a good example to others 
as to how they might drill into any other new areas because they could do 
a similar thing.  It didn’t actually happen, nobody else got to grips with 
any area in the same way that we did with sleep. 
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While some people were used to working on teams or sub teams and were 
expecting to be paired with a partner, or a small group, to work on something; 
they were disappointed as Grist allowed things to evolve organically.  This 
meant that for most people, although nominally on a team, they were actually 
working alone.  Dr Creeth recalls: 
 
I think we were united in our approach but we weren’t like a coherent 
team.  I thought we’d divide ideas up between two’s and three’s and 
some of us would work in sub-teams.  Only people who had overlapping 
interests worked together – mainly we all shot into the distance and 
worked apart from each other. 
 
There was also a sense that just a few of the original 13 were doing all of the 
team’s work while the others disengaged to varying degrees.  Dr Uruquart 
recalls the lack of engagement by many of the team:  
 
Of the twelve there were probably three people that spent the required 
amount of time in it, and we are…I can be counted as one of those; we 
spent our time on it additional to the day job. 
 
Dr Stovell also notes: 
 
The entire UK group never actually met once during the entire period… 
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Dr Smith also has this recollection that the team was more a collection of 
individuals with no actual time when they all met together: 
 
It was very difficult for the team to ever actually get to meet in its entirety 
I don’t know whether we ever actually had everybody present at the 
meetings.  
 
5.4.7 Creating the Team Spirit and Psychological Safety 
For those that did commit and participate, Grist was very open about the ideas 
they could pursue and he created a very positive environment for people to 
volunteer new and fragmentary ideas.  All members, who attended, 
commended the atmosphere in which the meetings were conducted; people 
felt encouraged to contribute raw, incomplete ideas without any sense of self-
consciousness.  Dr Frost remembers the brainstorming meetings with some 
fondness: 
 
On the positive side, it was quite sparky, quite innovative, we used our 
networks to generate ideas that we were interested in  - and a small 
number of us met up every two weeks or so to download all our ideas.  It 
was a great notion getting creative people together to build on people’s 
ideas.  It was great fun – I loved it. 
 
Grist made it clear that he was open to radical ideas and this stimulated some 
members of the team to deliver them.  Dr Creeth recalls: 
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There was a good climate built with the team – there was recognition that 
if it didn’t sound wacky in the first place, it probably wasn’t any good! 
 
But there were some within the team who weren’t sharing all their information 
and who, some people suspected, were using this group to incubate ideas, 
which they intended to deploy elsewhere or within some different group.  Dr 
Frost was sceptical about the participation of some: 
 
Some people, even in meetings, were quite guarded  - some of them 
were (working) on other initiatives to do with innovation and I felt they 
were keeping some of the ideas for another purpose. 
 
5.4.8 Choosing which Ideas would make the Cut 
April 2007 
The team continued to generate and develop ideas, albeit mostly as 
individuals rather as a collaborative group or team.  By now, over half the 
project time had elapsed and some among the team were beginning to get 
anxious about starting to focus on the very best ideas that they could present 
at the final New York review.  This involved bringing people together and trying 
to get consensus around which were the ideas of highest potential.   
 
But Grist continued to see his role as facilitator, just to encourage people to 
follow the ideas for which they had a passion rather than to impose any formal 
structure on getting it done: 
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A huge amount of ideas were generated often by individuals or small 
groups.  We’d then take a look at it as a team and point out what we 
thought the merits or challenges of the different ideas would be.  And 
once you start sharing discussions amongst a broader group, it became 
more obvious what would or wouldn’t necessarily be the best 
opportunities.  So it was done a little by consensus, but one of the 
guiding principles was that if somebody felt really strongly about an idea 
and they were prepared to present it to senior management and 
champion it then they would get the opportunity to do so. 
 
Some of the team members expected more prescriptive and directional 
intervention.  Dr Frost recalls: 
 
We had meetings which ought to have been moving the ideas forward 
but instead ended up being mired in the minutiae of individual ideas 
because there was no formal process to select the high-potential ones. 
 
Dr Barlow notes that personalities played a big part in which ideas were 
pursued within the group.  He notes that the personality and position of the 
originator, rather than the inherent quality of the idea, may have had more 
influence on which ideas were chosen to make the final presentation: 
 
There were ideas that were very personal to members of the group and 
largely went through purely on the strength of the passion the individual 
had for the idea.  Personalities came into play.  Unless there was an 
obvious fundamental flaw, people were happy to see those ideas carried 
forward especially if those passionate individuals were happy to do the 
groundwork. 
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Dr Frost concurs with the point that the strength of the personality of the 
originator played a part at least equal to the strength of the idea itself in getting 
ideas supported: 
 
This is where the system failed – because we had lots of very strong 
ideas.  Some of them made it through because of the power of the 
personality rather than the strength of the idea itself. 
 
Dr Smith recalls that the team’s process for screening ideas and ranking the 
ones they wanted to focus on was hampered by the fact that they didn’t apply 
any dedicated, customised screening process.  He notes that they really 
‘chatted through’ the options and ideas: 
 
In teasing out the positioning and the difference between something that 
might be huge and something that might be “a lemon”.  I think a 
screening process would have been a good discipline to go through if it 
was done properly; I think what we did was to use a bit of experience and 
…  I think if we were going to have gone a step further than that we 
would have needed to do a much more in-depth analysis; I think there is 
probably a question was what the end points since we chatted through.  I 
think it probably, looking back at it; it’s probably not that clear what the 
expected end point of the process was. 
 
Dr Barlow focuses on how the absence of rigid structures allowed people 
pursue the ideas for which they had most enthusiasm; 
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No formal process for ranking or screening ideas; we just went with what 
people thought were good ideas at the start. 
 
Grist’s view was simply that if one of his team had a strong passion for an 
idea, then he would support them to continue to run with it: 
 
Absolutely, because that was one of the challenges when you come to do 
the idea screening, inevitably people have a lot of ideas and sometimes 
you have to do it by majority voting and that can leave a very sour taste 
in people’s palates if they have a real passion for something and other 
people don’t share it.  So the acid test that we applied was that if you’re 
prepared to stand in front of senior managers for three or four minutes 
and justify why it’s such a good idea, you get the opportunity to do it. 
 
Dr Smith, the VP (most senior in terms of rank) among the group, thought that 
it was quite a positive thing that people with passion for ideas should be 
allowed to continue to make the running with them until they ran out of steam.  
He reflects: 
 
Whilst we did have some that we were able to kill off for a variety of 
reasons, I would say that if somebody had genuine heart and enthusiasm 
for an idea, they were allowed to run with it, which actually I think is the 
right way of doing it.  I think that for this sort of process, the enthusiasm is 
more important than having to put the stickers on the chart and decide 
which will be best, because remember we’re doing it from a scientific 
perspective.  So some of the areas of science would not have been 
strengths of everyone on the team, so there had to be an element of 
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trust, if someone felt this was an area that they were expert in and felt it 
was a good area to explore and that would carry on. 
 
5.4.9 Rising to the Challenge 
May 2007 
This was a difficult time in the life of the project.  Grist was becoming a little 
more disenchanted with some of his team and some among his team were 
becoming equally disenchanted with him.  The tension was amplified because 
the deadline was looming and although the freedom to explore novel avenues 
was a very liberating factor in the beginning of the project; now that the finish 
line was coming into view, the team began to experience some concern about 
whether they had been going on the right direction. 
 
Grist began to wonder about just how innovative his team actually were: 
 
The working styles and personal capabilities of the people on the team 
were hugely variable.  Some people were not innovative.  I would say 
that others have a track record for being hugely innovative and you start 
off with an open mind, clearly, and you assume everyone’s innovative.  
By the end of the project I was wondering how some people had been 
identified as innovative, when in my view they weren’t. 
 
Grist’s view remained that the people who were truly innovative would rise to 
the challenge and their natural creativity would emerge regardless of how the 
team was managed.  But, some found this a very challenging environment in 
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which to work.  The total absence of direction continued to intimidate many 
team-members; Dr Stovell recalls: 
 
Nigel’s style did not suit everybody. There were people there I think who 
just needed to be told what to do which is in some ways surprising from a 
team that was supposedly selected for creativity. Many would have 
benefited from more structure – they wasted lots of time being rudderless. 
 
Some people had an affinity or natural inclination towards, either certain types 
of innovation projects or else specific dimensions of the innovation process.  
Dr Creeth raises this point: 
 
Normally, we plan our projects and you have an outline in your head.  In 
new product development you don’t come up with the new ideas – you 
embellish them.  So, it’s very rare to have a completely blank page. 
 
Dr Parker, one of the three Coleford-based members of the team was also 
frustrated with the leader’s approach: 
 
The leader didn’t provide sufficient clarity of purpose and then let 
individuals get on with it….there was no clear leadership.  We ‘faffed 
around’ a lot for the initial phase and then scrabbled around at the end…. 
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Dr Creeth concurs that a formal, open idea-screening process was really 
neglected and that people had the licence to carry through ideas purely on the 
grounds that they felt a sufficient personal interest in them. Hence, there was 
some doubt within the team that the very best ideas were being progressed. 
 
Most of the ones that died were ones that people weren’t sufficiently 
bothered about.  The palette of ideas was formed by what people wanted 
to do rather than a collective view from the entire team. 
 
Grist was aware that certain people were disengaging and he decided that 
rather than try to convince them to either stay with the project or return to it, 
that instead, he would focus his attention on the core group who were really 
committed and were contributing: 
 
As time went on, it became increasingly clear to me that if we were going 
to deliver anything as a group, trying to get the individuals involved who 
were not contributing that much was just wasting my effort and time.  I 
know that, so I switched from trying to support everyone, encourage 
everyone, to actually working with those who were committed, because 
that was the way we were going to deliver the most by the deadline.  So 
they got to a point halfway through where, if people were expressing a 
reluctance to contribute for whatever reason and said to me, “look I don’t 
think I can do this”, I said, “I’d agree, yes, let’s get things re-arranged” 
because it was actually draining my time and energy trying to get people 
into the fold if they weren’t really there. 
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June 2007 
Even at this late  stage of the project, time and momentum was slipping 
because many of the team members were either looking for more direction or 
were looking for a more collaborative approach where they might get paired 
with someone or placed on a sub team to make their contribution that way.  At 
this point, Grist decided to spend a little more of his budget and he brought in a 
professional market research company; Frank Research.  Frank Research is a 
company which is used regularly by the GSK organisation for qualitative 
research.  Based in Oxford, they are experts in small scale, impressionistic, 
qualitative research.  Grist commissioned them to expose some of the group’s 
ideas to potential consumers so that he could get an objective steer on which 
were the lead ideas and had the most appeal. 
 
Hwever, Grist had left it a little late to call Frank  Research in to perform the 
sort of focus groups that they would normally run in this type of project.  
Frank’s director of client service, Hugh Shelton pointed out that they wouldn’t 
have sufficient time to recruit the research respondents, for focus groups,  
externally.  A solution was found through which the respondents and focus 
group participants were found internally within GSK, from among staff on one 
of the sites, and the research was run during the course of the day within the 
GSK office environment. 
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Dr Uruquart, describes how this element of the process worked: 
 
And then we took the whole range of ideas through essentially an internal 
consumer group that we run at GSK House to start identifying which 
ideas triggered with people and which ones worked.  And then also 
similarly at the same time we were looking technically for evidence to say 
which ones we think technically would work and then we married those 
together to come up with our lead ideas. 
 
Grist notes that, for him, this customer interaction was not the biggest priority 
for the project and he deliberately left it till last thing on the team’s agenda: 
 
We didn’t want to neglect consumers completely; because we recognised 
they’re the end customer.  We just felt that in theory at least the onus was 
on us as a group of scientists; …  So part of the experiment was very 
much to isolate scientists and see what they came up with and we felt in 
that context it was worth us trying to focus on novel applications of 
science rather than looking at customer wants. 
 
Then, Grist got a lucky break when someone who had exited the team and not 
contributed for 6 months, arrived back to help out towards the end.  Grist 
remembers: 
 
Another team member who had unofficially left, and they came back into 
the fold with three or four weeks left, were hugely beneficial to the team, 
but were not in a position to contribute over six months. 
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Grist also became more proactive in managing the contributions of the team as 
a group.  He had noticed that little more than half the team were contributing 
and he decided to re-engineer the team by formally asking those that were 
‘drifting in and out’ to formally leave the project.  He explains why he wanted to 
weed out the people whose contribution was negligible so that they wouldn’t 
dilute or contaminate the enthusiasm and energy of the rest of the group: 
 
So one of the things I observed is that if you’ve got half a team committed 
and half a team that isn’t - I’m using half as a simplistic estimation - then 
actually that half that’s committed will be far more motivated and 
focussed if you get rid of the half that isn’t.  So it’s the old one about if 
you’ve got people not really involved, drifting in and out and you’ve got 
different levels of commitment to the cause, actually it’s hugely beneficial 
for the team to jettison the ones that aren’t committed. 
 
Once Grist had stripped the team down to the core, active group, they began 
to refine their ideas and decide which ones they wanted to present.  The team 
reported that they now worked with more agility and purpose and they started 
to craft their final presentation.  Dr Smith recalls: 
 
When we did the presentation I think there was a great feeling of team 
spirit when the presentation was being put together.  Before that I think 
there was probably a tendency for it to be a bunch of individuals who 
have been tasked with something. 
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Grist wanted the presentation to be ‘slick and professional’.  With the team, he 
discussed having music and some strong visual stimulus to accompany the 
presentation.  His team started to assemble images of nature and images of 
innovation in science (e.g. the Apollo space craft), which they would use during 
the presentation.  Some images they had professionally printed onto exhibition 
stands and banners for deployment in the room in which the presentation was 
to take place. 
 
Dr Stovell was closely involved in the preparation for the big presentation in 
New Jersey: 
 
I think it was a three-hour presentation to the SLT in Parsippany, so I 
think we had the morning and then the US team had the afternoon, just to 
be sympathetic to our jet lag.  So I think we had eight, if I remember 
rightly, of the thirteen strong team who managed to make it for that and 
we mixed it up, we had presentations, we had table demos, we had little 
factoids chucked in because we had just this huge volume of interesting 
stuff that we wanted to give a flavour of, so we just chucked in little bits 
and pieces here and there, had some posters as well. 
 
On arrival in the US, the UK team decorated the conference room in which the 
presentation was to be made with vibrant and colourful images of nature.  
They also printed giant posters of people associated with scientific invention 
like Einstein and with artistic invention like, Dali.  They used powerpoint as the 
medium for their presentation and some of the ideas had prototypes which the 
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team demonstrated on small tables on the perimeter of the room.  They 
presented 27 ideas in total and these were grouped by theme; such as ideas 
around sleep (therapy) or ideas around skincare.  Presenting everything they 
had is consistent with their open and fluid approach.  But, later, Dr Uruquart, 
thought that this had been a mistake on their part as he thought presenting so 
many ideas made it difficult for the SLT (the judging panel) to focus on the 
specific, individual ones that might have real potential for the organisation. 
 
Yes I think if we have been able to get some more concrete numbers 
around some of our better ideas we could have maybe cut 25 down to 15 
and then they would have been presented in a stronger fashion and got 
more purchase within the organisation, because of that if we had a bit of 
better evaluation on them rather than just present pretty much everything 
that we had if we got to that stage. 
 
5.5 ISF – The US Experience 
November 2006 
Scott Coapman was chosen as the leader of the US project team for ISF.  At 
the time of the project, he had been working for GSK for exactly 10 years.  
Prior to that, he worked for six years with P&G also within R&D.  Within P&G, 
he had been responsible for early stage qualitative research on some of their 
new business ideas.  In GSK, Coapman was a (Global) Project Manager within 
R&D.  This is a role which is different from a technical expert.  The role of 
project leader brings the discipline of project management to bear on all 
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elements of the project and works alongside a technical lead on most projects 
to make sure all the complex elements of the project move along with sufficient 
pace.  Coapman describes: 
 
It has the same remit of project managers overseeing the project, but 
now it was no longer just the technical side, it was the R&D work 
streams, which involved the regulatory, the clinical, the safety; it was the 
commercial work streams which included any type of consumer research, 
advertising, development schedules, ultimately any of the commercial 
activities that were required to get the product from idea to the shelves of 
Walmart, with on-air advertising. 
 
In terms of career development, Coapman had voiced a desire to work with the 
commercial teams alongside the technical R&D side as he had done in P&G 
and he made this wish known to his manager, who at the time was Ken James 
(later to become the company’s President of R&D and architect of the ISF 
initiative).  The opportunity presented itself in the form of a marketing 
secondment to the company’s US operating HQ in Pittsburgh.  Coapman 
recalls: 
 
Well, it took about five or six years before the opportunity presented itself 
and it nicely did with an opportunity in smoking control Pittsburgh NPD 
marketing group.  And it was really doing just the sort of stuff that I 
thoroughly enjoy doing whilst at P&G.  So doing some of the upfront 
consumer research, writing concepts, going out talking with consumers 
and focus groups.  Fielding some quantitative concept studies, working 
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back with the folks in Parsippany to make sure that these concepts 
weren’t promising something that just technically was a pipedream. So I 
was actually in Pittsburgh for nine months on that. 
 
Following his selection as team leader for ISF’s US group, Coapman described 
the target outputs were for his group: 
 
And it was all around the concept of let’s get a group of R&D people and 
it was intentionally made just R&D folks for this round of the ISF and let’s 
give them an operating budget of around a quarter of a million Dollars 
and let’s give them nine months of time; and the brief was essentially, go 
for it come up with some ideas, some new product ideas and report back 
to us in nine months.  And it was really pretty much that open. But they 
essentially said, aspirationally, the output they would like to see 1) good 
size idea for each of the future team brands and then aspirationally three 
new ideas, new product ideas that were outside of any of the therapeutic 
categories that we currently operated in. 
 
He also described the scale of the ideas that were being sought: 
 
The other thing that they wanted to see was for any of these ideas, they 
didn’t want things like just simple line extensions, like a new flavour 
change to Aquafresh but really something that was rather big.  And they 
said you know for purposes of trying to gauge a big idea, the thought 
around £20 million incremental was thrown out as something to target for. 
 
He was conscious of proposing ideas which had a chance of being brought to 
market within a time frame of three or four years: 
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Another area that they asked us to try to ring-fence the ideas too, are 
things that could be brought to market by 2011.  So, we found through 
our ideation, through the whole ISF project, we found some ideas that we 
thought met the big sales volume criteria, but since they were FDA 
(requiring extensive clinical trials) type projects and such we didn’t see 
that they could make it by 2011 so those were parked.’ 
 
As with Grist’s team, Scott’s team were selected by the SLT and he did not 
have any influence on who was chosen.  Coapman was given a list of his team 
members (Figure 5.6): 
 
Figure 5.6:  Who’s Who in the US ISF Team 
 
Source:  Case study interview notes. 
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Note: The lighter boxes contain the names of the team members and the 
relative position of the boxes does not denote any hierarchy or reporting 
relationship.  The members all had equal status within the team. 
 
The US team were only 11 in total whereas the UK team started with 13 
members.  However, there is considerably more diversity in the US group with 
three women and more international representation, especially from Asia.  The 
US team were also all based in one location; the company’s US R&D facility in 
Parsippany in New Jersey. 
 
Stan Lech arranged a briefing in the US R&D Headquarters in Parsippany 
where all of the team members were based and where Lech and most of the 
SLT were also based.  The same slide presentation was used (as had been 
shown in the UK earlier the same week) and this constituted the start point for 
the US team.  Within that first week, Coapman got the entire team together for 
a meeting.  Coapman had a clear plan for how the team were going to 
accomplish what was expected of them: 
 
When I kicked off the meeting, I had a very clear vision in my mind of 
what we wanted to be in a position to present to SLT 9 months later.  And 
it wasn’t just, you know, some ideas that have been bounced off a couple 
of consumers perhaps, or bounced off internal people.  I wanted to be 
able to bring forward quantitatively tested concepts of new product ideas 
that we had actually thought through on the technical side and had clear 
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approaches on how we would go about the whole thing technically.  But I 
wanted to make sure we had the consumer heartbeat established and 
established to the point that we had some quantitative concept consumer 
test results on that 
 
So, looking at that as kind of the end point of what we wanted to deliver 
to SLT 9 months after the project was complete, we backed that into 
experience and project management.  You know I had an MS (Microsoft) 
project time schedule and everything set up for it.  And so we kind of 
cracked it out and said alright for the first three months we are going to 
do nothing but do ideation and collaboration on those ideas; and the tool 
we had used, recognising this was a quite disparate team, disparate in a 
sense they were still a number of R&D functions all with a day job to do 
and this was kind of an add-on type activity for them to actually put time 
against. 
 
The team decided to create a team name or brand for themselves and they 
came up with Curious George, the 1940’s cartoon character.  In the original 
stories, Curious George, a monkey, was brought from a zoo in Africa to live in 
‘a big city’ in the US.  His appeal for the ISF team is that because everything in 
his new American world was so novel that he kept asking questions; questions 
which were sometimes very profound.  This was the spirit the US team wanted 
to inculcate in themselves; a restless curiosity and sense of joy in discovery. 
 
Below (Figure 5.7) is the Microsoft Project planning schedule for the US, 
Curious George team.  The plan breaks the project into discrete phases with 
key dates and milestones indicated.  The team leader developed this plan at 
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the very beginning of the project; he shared it with the team members and they 
agreed to try to work to it so they would stay on track to meet the deadline at 
the end of the project.   
 
Figure 5.7: The US Team Project Plan for the ISF Project 
 
Source:  US Team Documents. 
 
Coapman arranged with the site’s Facilities Management team to have a 
dedicated meeting room for his team and this project.  Each of the team 
members got their own key.  The team held their meetings in this room and 
eventually it was to become the storeroom for all their prototypes and 
competitor samples.  From the first week, Coapman set up weekly meetings; 
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two per week Mondays and Fridays, for two hours each.  He wanted all the 
team’s meetings to be face-to-face and this was possible given that all of the 
team members were based on the same site. 
 
5.5.1 Getting Started 
One of the more senior members in terms of seniority, Dr Buch recalls: 
 
We had regular team meetings where we all sat in a conference room; 
one of the things that we did that I think worked very well is we reserved 
a team room and we had a dedicated team room where we could keep all 
of our materials and we met there weekly.  In fact, in the beginning we 
met twice a week. 
 
Coapman also acquired software licences for all of his team for a tool called 
‘ThinkTank’ created by a company called Group Systems.  ThinkTank is 
described as ‘group intelligence software’ and it allows people post up ideas 
via computer, generally in a very raw fashion regardless of where they are or 
the time of day.  The ideas can be seen and commented upon by other 
members of that project and, ultimately, they can be voted on by the team 
members to determine which ideas have most appeal.  Coapman describes 
the starting phase: 
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What we agreed to do is meet twice a week for two hours, we set up 
Group Systems as the key tool for doing the ideation and used that as a 
repository for people to enter, essentially cores of ideas, so it wasn’t fully 
flushed out concepts, but it was people that had stumbled across 
interesting technologies, whether it be from scanning the store shelves at 
Walmart to finding infomercials at night to little blurbs on the internet, a 
whole variety of sources.  Iconoculture was another rich source of some 
neat ideas that were coming out. 
 
Just post into this ThinkTank session, the core of the idea and it was then 
made immediately visible to the rest of the team and they could easily 
just click on that idea and pose questions or challenges or improvements 
to how that might go forward.  So we did that for about three months. 
 
Coapman also tried to stimulate the team’s thinking by giving them a voice 
recorder (Dictaphone) so that if they were struck with an idea at any time of the 
day or night, they could record it.  He also asked them to go out into retail 
environments that were not on their normal shopping itinerary and to look for 
new and stimulating ideas and bring them back to the group’s team meetings: 
 
One of the first exercises that I gave the folks to do after we kicked it off 
in, I guess it was January was, I had a grab bag and in this grab bag I 
had a piece of paper and one said ‘Circuit City’, one said the ‘Dollar 
store’, one said ‘Wal-Mart’, one said ‘CVS’, one said oh a couple of other 
things, it was a grab bag and people randomly took back and their 
assignment was to go out to that particular venue, look in an area that’s 
outside of the standard health care arena and come back with at least an 
idea as to how you might develop a product that kind of stems from that 
idea.  
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Dr Chaturvedula recalls: 
 
I think we used many tools – Scott gave us an audio recorder so we 
could record our ideas wherever we were.  He asked us to select some 
stores and go and find interesting things – I went to Sharper Image and 
we started to look at different ideas.  In the first stage, we were just 
throwing out ideas, nobody was judging – we were all just adding and 
building.  We used Think Tank an electronic tool. 
 
In this phase, the team devoted themselves exclusively to generating ideas.  
Dr Adusmilli recalls: 
 
First step was coming up with ideas and we used a software package 
called Group Systems – which facilitates the building and adding of ideas. 
 
Similarly, Dr Buch recalls how they, initially at least, tried to favour bold ideas: 
 
Initially, what we did was we all just sat around the table and tossed 
ideas out and, you know, kind of wild and wacky stuff, the crazier the 
better. 
 
Dr Schwartz also recalls how Coapman managed these meetings: 
 
Scott created a high comfort level – people were very open, transparent, 
nobody was uncomfortable.  He was very neutral – he was very good in 
terms of the psychology – people felt comfortable. 
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Dr Chaturvedula echoed this theme; 
 
The team was very friendly, the environment was encouraging – nobody 
was turning off any ideas everyone was building on ideas. 
 
Over the first three months, through the combination of face to face meetings 
and the online facility to post ideas remotely, the US team got up to 300 ideas.  
A couple among the group, somewhat cynically felt that this high level of ideas 
had been reached because most people came into the project with a number 
of ideas already.  Dr Buch noted: 
 
Most people seemed to gravitate towards and source their ideas from the 
business areas and therapy areas with which they were already most 
familiar. 
 
Dr Lilan Chen agreed that the composition of the 300 ideas generated by the 
team included a substantial number that people had been nurturing for some 
time, certainly since before the ISF initiative: 
 
Generating the idea is pretty good actually. Basically many of us just 
came in with old ideas so that’s why we would generate over 300 ideas 
so quickly. 
 
  
290 
 
Dr Chen also had another perspective on GSK’s appetite for radical innovation 
that tempered her interest in looking at radical. ‘Blue-sky’ ideas.  She believed, 
from her experience, that the company would not support anything except 
incremental ideas and so she confined her own contributions to safe, near-
term, line-extension type of ideas: 
 
Although we were asked to try to come up with ideas or concepts that 
were totally radical different from the role we are in, the business we are 
in. And spend a lot of time and effort in blue-sky areas - I just didn’t do it. 
I didn’t think that the company would go for these ideas; I didn’t think it 
would work so I did not support for those concept and ideas items. 
 
Coapman observed that at this stage sometimes the high level of technical 
knowledge possessed by most of the individuals on his team was actually 
limiting the ideas that they were developing.  They tended to curtail their 
thinking just because they knew what might be technically feasible.  He found 
it refreshing to have one or two people on the team who were technically 
naive: 
 
I think in the generation of the ideas themselves… the less versed people 
are in the technical side of things may have been a stronger asset for us, 
to get someone closer to just your general everyday consumer like Greg 
Smith (Regulatory Affairs) for example.  R&D people tend to over think 
things and may not attempt ideas because they may know a lot about the 
technical limitations of things, it can almost sometimes can be a self-
confining thing. You get someone saying well that is not possible 
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because this, and that.  So sometimes that was a bit stifling and it took 
some management to say, well put that aside, the idea unto itself, the 
benefits that it can deliver.  Maybe the technology that is being suggested 
to deliver that don’t; appear feasible, but there are many ways to skin a 
cat, so let’s just look at the benefit that it delivers, the insight that could 
bring the consumer into the product idea, how you could talk about it, 
how you actually technically execute against it, let’s park that aside for 
now.   
 
5.5.2 Incubating and Prioritising the Ideas 
At the end of the nine weeks dedicated to generating ideas; the ideation 
phase, Coapman directed his team, in accordance with their project plan, to 
stop having raw ideas and he decided to move them into the second phase: 
 
At the end of nine weeks we kind of said alright, we need to stop this 
now, we can’t go on in perpetuity for ever generating new ideas, but you 
know in order to meet the timeline of doing some qualitative research on 
some of the promising ideas and the quantitative buzz back research, we 
need to stop now.  So we essentially terminated the ideation phase and 
of the 300+ ideas that we had generated. 
 
The team had three hundred early-stage ideas but they knew that the ideal 
final result would require them to reduce that to just 8 ideas, so they felt that 
they needed to begin a process which would whittle overall number of ideas 
down.  They used ThinkTank again, which allows participants to rank ideas 
and vote on them.  While, for some ideas there was no market data, Coapman 
felt that the ThinkTank process was providing a layer of objectivity for these 
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decisions.  The team would individually rate the chances of technical success 
for various ideas and compare that against the possible market value of the 
idea and make their voting decisions accordingly.  Coapman adds: 
 
We also used Group Systems as a way for everybody to vote in on, 
alright based on a variety of criteria; what is the technical feasibility, what 
do we think the commercial value is and that really was kind of a finger in 
the air type thing.  Do we think it’s $40 million incremental, do we think it’s 
less than that.  We didn’t have any strong market research to really back 
that up, so it was largely, you know, intuitive of what people thought. 
 
The group worked together using the electronic tool and through a process of 
discussion and debate, they were able to reduce the number of ideas from 300 
down to 200.  
 
Scott’s prior experience in marketing both for P&G and GSK equipped him well 
to orchestrate the next phase of the research process.  He employed an 
external company called Buzzback.  Their approach is to get an online panel 
whose demographics match those of the target audience for each project.  
They expose the panel to two ideas at a time and ask them to indicate which is 
their preferred one.  They then use an algorithm to establish, after multiple 
exposures, a ranking as defined by the consumers.  Thus, if you have a 
significant number of ideas and want to establish which ones have most 
appeal with your target audience Buzzback offers a suite of tools to help.   
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Traditionally, Buzzback is used if you have approximately 100 ideas and want 
to find out what are the top 10.  But in order for ideas to undergo the Buzzback 
methodology, all the ideas have to be written and rendered (illustrated) in the 
same high presentational standard.  They are referred to a ‘concepts’ and this 
denotes a clear description of exactly what the idea is; what benefits it offers, 
how or if it has been tested (i.e. ‘clinically proven’) and this information is often 
accompanied by an indicative selling price.   
 
Dr Adusmilli recalls this element of the process: 
 
We took 200 ideas into an online quantitative tool called Buzzback.  We 
hired an (graphic) artist and a copywriter to render them as professionally 
as we could.  We also fixed on a selling price for each idea.  Each idea 
was seen monadically by 100 people – then we prioritised the top ones. 
 
5.5.3 Researching the Value of the Ideas 
Coapman understood, from his prior roles, that in (new product development) 
concept research, there are very established formats for presenting the ideas.  
The leading research companies have been carrying out research on new 
products for several decades now using similar methodology.  Converting the 
raw idea, which can often be a technical one, into a crisp concept that a 
consumer can understand, is a skill that commands a premium in the 
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marketing world.  If done badly, a good concept can end up being killed purely 
by mediocre execution.   
 
Coapman was very conscious of this and so he spent a high portion of his 
budget on specialist consultants who were on the roster for the (GSK) 
commercial organisation and who were expert in the art of concept writing.  He 
was trying to successfully anticipate possible methodological objections that 
might be raised by the commercial team when they were presented with the 
US Team’s ideas. Coapman was keen that the organisation would adopt his 
team’s ideas and assimilate them into its pipeline.  Hence, he wanted to 
present the ideas in a format which was congruent with how GSK manages its 
NPD ideas. He didn’t want to lose the contest on the basis that he didn’t use 
exactly the right testing methodology or the right illustrator to develop the 
concept. As he explains it: 
 
One of the concerns we had with this whole project from the beginning 
was you know, it would be terrible if we came out with a bunch of great 
ideas and we tested them in a way; and then we brought them forth and 
we were told that it wasn’t valid research because we didn’t do it the way 
that the commercial folks would have done it; or we didn’t test it with the 
right types of consumers or such.  So we wanted to put our best foot 
forward and make sure, minimise the chances that the data we 
generated would be second-guessed and pooh-poohed so to speak. 
That’s why we had intentionally selected people that the US business 
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had already done work with, they had confidence in them, they’d proven 
themselves. 
 
The Buzzback process allowed the team to get down from the 200 remaining 
ideas to a final brace of seventy-five ideas.  With seventy-five ideas remaining, 
Coapman brought in a team, comprised of two professional illustrators to work 
with his team so that they could accurately capture the visual essence of the 
ideas being proposed.  He brought his own team together for one of their 
regular meetings and they briefed the commercial illustrators.  Coapman 
describes the process: 
 
We actually hired a group by the name of Insync Design which was 
conveniently located right up the street here.  The Aquafresh (US 
Marketing) team had used this company before to do some visualisations 
for some of their Aquafresh things and so you know, it was a very easy 
person to engage in that.  In a similar fashion, two of the illustrators from 
Insync Design came in and for two days sat down with us face-to-face; 
we explained through what the idea was, the concept, in our mind what 
the product would look like and they would be doing sketches right in 
front of us.  You know rough sketches right in front of us and sketching 
them out and saying, is this what you mean and we’d say no, maybe a 
little different and they’d re-sketch it; and then they came back to us with 
electronic files in about two weeks time and we put the image to the 
concept, the articulation of the concept and made up concept boards. 
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Dr Buch recalls that Buzzback was helpful in eliminating some of the 
superfluous ideas that may have had a passionate sponsor within the group.  
This was an objective, scientific method of homing in on what consumers 
themselves felt to be the ideas with the most appeal. 
 
And that is when we started to narrow the list down and we narrowed it 
down to about seventy-five and then really started focus in on those.  We 
focused in from two aspects, one was the technical aspect – was it 
technically feasible and if so how would did we do it and then the second 
aspect – was to try get some consumer feedback so we started to think 
about consumer research for example, to get the consumer feedback on 
those seventy-five or so ideas.  Then we narrowed it down from there. 
 
He notes, however, that not everyone was prepared to agree with the 
Buzzback results: 
 
We sought Buzzback’s information input but we did not necessary agree 
with it all the time. 
 
5.5.4 Difficulties Emerge in the Selection Process 
Scott’s team now began to experience some difficulties with this phase of their 
process.  Despite having a process for selecting the most attractive ideas, 
there was still some friction around how the process was used and to what 
extent the results of the (Buzzback) concept research should be taken as the 
definitive guide to which ideas should go forward.   The Buzzback process 
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relies on an online evaluation of an idea.  The respondent gives a very fast 
reaction; an almost visceral, gut-feel.  These types of tests can favour ideas 
that are straightforward, already familiar and conventional.  Dr Buch, who had 
been involved in this type of concept research before recognised this possible 
shortcoming of the process: 
 
We realised that there could be some ideas that were just so far out there 
that Buzzback probably did not really probe it as effectively as we would 
have liked.  There were several ideas actually that did not necessarily do 
real well on Buzzback that we ended promoting towards the top of our list 
anyway.  That is just based I think on consensus of the group, we had a 
group fairly highly trained people who had been around the block a few 
times and I think that there was strong gut feel that an idea was a good 
one it went forward regardless of what the data showed at the early 
stage. 
 
The group used their own judgment to promote some ideas that did not score 
well in research.  They went on instinct and experience when it came to certain 
ideas.  But Dr Chen found that this fluidity and reliance on personal judgment 
allowed certain people to preserve pet ideas and a number of ideas that she 
felt had been already exited, suddenly resurfaced: 
 
We were going to screen each idea and somehow we didn’t do it in a 
systematic way and I think that suited some members having their 
personal objective.  What I mean by personal objective is, they probably 
send in that idea in the first place. They just want to carry out, they just 
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want to carry and run with it. And then were used, sometime the medium 
wasn’t managed very well. It got out of hand or discussion about 
someone propose their own, I mean just try to elaborate and sell their 
idea to a team. And they were going on and on for hours and hours and 
he or she not giving it up at all. 
 
Dr Schwartz was also surprised that some of the ideas that she felt lacked the 
scientific credentials for the contest were allowed stay in.  She felt that 
Coapman was not refusing any ideas, he didn’t see it as his role to screen out 
any ideas; he wanted the consumers to have the ultimate decision: 
 
Scott felt we shouldn’t disqualify too many ideas – he wanted the 
consumers to decide.  He didn’t like to take the responsibility to eliminate 
ideas no matter how bad they were.  Some ideas had zero science and 
they made no sense to me. 
 
Dr Chen felt strongly that Coapman ‘was too nice to say no to anyone’ and that 
he ought to have shown stronger leadership in managing the exit of some of 
the ideas that she felt had been rejected in research.  Dr Mishra (Medical 
Director, and one of the two most senior people in the team) agrees that 
Coapman did not lead this phase well: 
 
Ideas kept coming back and this was a lack of formal leadership from 
Scott in ensuring the exit of the ideas and he wasn’t adequately forceful.  
Scott should have played good-cop, bad-cop. 
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Dr Schwartz noted that people became too attached to their own ideas and 
continued to try to progress them even though the team felt that these 
particular ideas had already been rejected: 
 
Even after we had agreed to eliminate certain ideas from consideration – 
nevertheless, they kept coming back.  People were unwilling to abandon 
their own ideas. 
 
One of the team members, who was mentioned regularly as being the primary 
offender in this regard, has a very different view of how to interpret the 
rebounding of ideas.  Dr Assumilli notes: 
 
To have an effective team, you’re bringing in people with creative abilities 
– and usually they’re very passionate about what they do and not willing 
to let go ideas they care about.  When you have passionate people 
promoting ideas – they are bound to come back again and again – and I 
think that’s a healthy thing.  I think we needed the passionate people. 
 
5.5.5 Finding Time for Innovation 
April/May 2007 
During this period, some team members also began to experience 
considerable pressure in their ‘day job’ and were finding it difficult to carve out 
the time to participate in ISF.  Coapman took an active stance in managing this 
for some people.  Having established a pattern of two physical meetings per 
week, each lasting a minimum of two hours, Coapman did not expect a full turn 
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out at each meeting.  Dr Schwartz noticed a decline in the attendance when 
they were going through this difficult phase: 
 
Time was a problem – rarely had many people at each meeting mostly 
only four or six per meeting.  Especially when people were arguing about 
ideas that we all thought had been killed. 
 
The team spirit seemed to sustain them through any specific pinch points that 
threatened to take members away from the team.  They managed to 
compensate or even to work with the members to help them through 
particularly busy periods so that they could continue to contribute to the team.  
Dr Mishra notes: 
 
My view is that people just managed it by working over 100% anyway.  
No-one held back because the team felt the sense of one-ness. 
 
In some cases, though, it went further than that, the team managed together 
and helped each other out.  Dr Buch recalls: 
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I was told just to just do what you need to do and get it done and that is 
really what we did.  I think most of the people on the US side realised that 
they just had to juggle things and do it effectively.  I did hear a few 
complaints from people saying their managers were kind of getting on 
them about it.  When that happened the team just sort of coalesced to 
take on others peoples responsibilities to free them up for a week or two 
if we had to.  It was really a well functioning team where I think everyone 
had a good sense of camaraderie.  People stepped in when they were 
needed and sometimes people had to step out to get something done 
that was urgent.  But others just filled in for them. 
 
Coapman did find a way to get people to prioritise the ideas, both their own 
and the others.  Having done the first phase of quant research through 
Buzzback, the team were still left with a number of ideas that scored well and a 
number that didn’t score so highly but were still well-regarded by the group 
because of their originality.  Coapman notes that the spectrum of ideas was 
still very wide: 
 
… there were 75 concepts and they were all over the map as far as 
therapeutic categories.  It was smoking control, it was nutritional, it was 
analgesics, it was respiratory care, it was weight control.  And then there 
were these bizarre outside anti infected gum control ideas, a variety of 
different devices. 
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5.5.6 Setting Up Consumer Focus Groups 
May 2007 
To break the deadlock, Coapman hired a professional market researcher as a 
consultant to the project.  Again, it was someone known and trusted by the US 
commercial business.  The researcher took the Buzzback results for the 
seventy-five products that had been tested and she performed some further 
analysis.  She looked at the concept scores and derived a formula, which she 
referred to as ‘need-gap analysis’.  This involved looking at a number of 
variables within the concept score and working out a calculation that combined 
the attractiveness of the idea with the importance of the need the idea is 
intended to fulfil.  Coapman recalls: 
 
The way that Lauren had suggested the best way to do this given the 
number of different variations of categories that we were in, was to 
calculate a need gap score for each of the concepts, so it was better able 
to compare on an apples-to-apples basis the general strength of the idea 
with consumers.  So essentially you know, the strength of their interest in 
the product and the benefit that it provided was essentially a 
mathematical product of those two values.  So at the top box for those 
two, we multiplied them together and got a need gap score.  And that’s 
largely how we prioritise which are the ideas that were the strongest.  So 
those ones that were very strong, we went back and said now let’s go 
back and throw these in front of consumers face-to-face. 
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This new algorithm got the number of top-level ideas down from seventy-four 
to a more manageable seventeen.  Coapman then arranged for each team 
member to plan and moderate their own customer focus group.  This meant 
arranging a group of target customers to attend a research group.  Each team 
member would have to moderate the group and show their ideas, using the 
opportunity to get customer feedback on their ideas.  Coapman thought this 
would be a useful learning opportunity for his team of scientists to get in front 
of consumers and to show them their ideas.  He was confident that the 
consumers would automatically push back on ideas that didn’t appeal to them 
and this would be a good mechanism to cull some of the poorer ideas and 
allow the team concentrate on the ones that emerged as the strongest from 
this process.  The idea of standing in front of customers was a very new 
proposition for almost all the team members whose natural R&D home is 
generally in the laboratory. 
 
They were each given some training from the professional researcher so they 
knew how to handle the consumers in the group and Lauren, the researcher, 
managed all the logistics around recruitment, scheduling and the provision of 
the right stimulus material.  But the scientists in the group still had to run the 
group and manage the dynamics of a focus group.  The research groups were 
videotaped.  Coapman recalls: 
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Few, if any other than myself, had ever either attended a focus group as 
a viewer, you know most people had maybe attended a focus group but 
some had never attended a focus group, not to mention actually being 
out in the front room with consumers and talking with them, people found 
that to be extremely valuable, so much more beneficial to their 
understanding of the idea of when they are talking with them human 
being to human being, person to person and getting the scoop right from 
the horses’ mouth. 
 
One of the team members, a medic from the Regulatory Affairs department 
was very daunted by the prospect of running his consumer group.  However, 
he proved so good at it that the organisation recognised this talent 
subsequently and have used him to do focus group research outside this 
project.  Coapman recalls: 
 
I think some of the groups that Greg Smith actually facilitated were 
fantastic; he has got kind of a very natural speaking ability to connect 
with consumers.  I think that was a hidden talent that he never was aware 
of and he has since been recruited by the medical affairs group who are 
doing some focus groups and they actually recruited him to actually do 
some Breathe Right focus groups.  So I mean he really enjoyed doing 
that, I think he did a fine job of it and so I think that was a hidden talent 
that he never knew existed.  
 
The others also found value in presiding over the focus groups and exposing 
their ideas to potential customers.  Dr Mishra remembers this aspect: 
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The experience of talking to consumers was very uplifting, energising, 
very motivating, very, very  - there was an end goal in mind and that was 
very powerful. 
 
Dr Buch had some experience of attending focus groups before but he enjoyed 
seeing the others experience this element of consumer interaction for the first 
time. 
 
It was not quite as foreign to me I had done lot of that, but it was really 
fun to watch some of the people on the team who had never done it.  
Because you could see the light bulb come on.  It was truly an epiphany. 
As an observer of them I think I could see it in them almost more than 
some of them realised it in themselves. 
 
Dr Chen was one of those who hadn’t done this before and she explains how 
she learnt a lot from it: 
 
Oh yes, yes do you know I conduct a focus group that’s very interesting 
to me. Yes before I had only some vague ideas about the consumer and 
how research is done but after the ISF I have more idea of what concept 
testing really is and how to test this and then how to read the test result 
ok. And then how to put the whole thing together and then get the 
consumer research knowing about how the consumer feel, how they 
respond to your concept.  I’m a technical person and I’m able to come up 
with a modified concept immediately I hear the feedback and then, ask 
their input again and they respond again. So it was very helpful for me to 
actually tell me to actually design what will be the actual product alright. 
And yes I have more thorough understand about the how the idea being 
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initiated and been tested and being refined and how can I also offer our 
designs for an actual product to meet consumer’s needs. Yes I do learn a 
lot from the focus group experience. 
 
The focus group process did provide the basis for the elimination of certain 
ideas and the promotion of others.  These sessions were videotaped and 
played back for the other team members and this seemed to ease the passage 
to consensus that had been so difficult to arrive at prior to that.  Dr Assumilli 
also recalls how the consumer research helped the team to flesh out their 
ideas: 
 
I enjoyed the consumer interaction so that when we presented them, 
there was a lot of meat on the bone in terms of consumer research.  
Without the consumer piece, senior managers could not make good 
decisions on which ideas to progress. 
 
June 2007 
Now, with the slimmed-down list, Coapman decided to engage with some of 
the internal stakeholders who would ultimately be evaluating these ideas.  He 
decided to informally approach the VP’s of R&D on the key business Future 
Groups to make sure that the ideas his team were going to propose were not 
ones which had been explored before.  He explains: 
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We did some balance checks because … we really didn’t have visibility 
as to whether or not these were truly new ideas or whether they were 
something that they (the Future Groups) had looked at before.  You know 
there is no huge central repository of every idea that has been looked at 
across the organisation, so some of these ideas may easily have been 
repeats of things that may have been considered. So rather than spin our 
wheels and go back reinventing the wheel… we did convene with the 
commercial and R&D futures heads… and said here are some ideas that 
are being batted around, we think there is some value to them for these 
reasons, would they be on strategy, would they be off base from what 
you consider? …Just to make sure we weren’t reinventing the wheel and 
going down a path that they already had data to say this is a non-starter 
for us. 
 
5.5.7 Preparing for the Presentation Day 
The group now started to focus on the remaining ideas and how to express 
them.  They started to think about the presentation itself and how to prepare 
for it.  They kept the graphic designers and the copywriter on board and really 
refined their key concepts.  In the end, although the brief suggested eight 
ideas, the team presented seven.  Coapman managed the choreography for 
the final presentation: 
 
We figured there was about seventeen of the seventy-four that performed 
quite strongly that we recommended we should take forward.  Now the 
reality was that when we presented to the SLT we had I guess four hours 
of time and there was no way to do justice to those ideas in appropriate 
depth in that period of time, so we culled it down and presented … seven 
to the SLT, but reminded them and say there’s about a dozen or so more 
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that we feel very strongly about.  And after that presentation at SLT we 
got in some further details and briefed the other VPs on these are some 
additional ideas that we didn’t flush out when we met with you in the 
formal meeting, but we think they are strong, strong information there to 
go forward on. 
 
Coapman and his team chose the seven ideas to formally present to the SLT 
at the final presentation.  Their choice reflected a balance between trying to 
get one idea in from everyone on the team while also choosing the top 
performing ones overall.  The remaining concepts formed the appendix in their 
presentation slide deck and document.  The US timeline is represented below 
(Figure 5.7).  It tracks the number of ideas that were generated and then 
follows the process as they advance towards the final presentation. 
 
Figure 5.8:  US Idea Management Process 
 
Source:  Case study documents 
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The final presentation took place in Parsippany in a conference room within 
the company’s major R&D site.  The date was the 7th of July, 2007.  A full day 
had been allocated to reviewing the presentations.  Both teams were present 
along with the SLT and some of the company’s senior commercial team.  The 
UK team presented in the morning, there was a break for lunch after which the 
US team’s ideas were presented.  At the end of both teams’ presentations, the 
SLT congratulated both teams and provide structured feedback on the ideas.  
There was no official ‘winner’ declared at the meeting and, indeed, within the 
SLT opinions were divided about which of the teams had done the best job.   
 
5.6 The Big Day 
5.6.1 How the Teams Rated each Others’ Performance 
Most of the R&D people would have had some connection with each other 
through various project teams over their time with GSK.  However, as there 
had deliberately been no contact between the teams for the duration of this 
initiative, they were most curious to see what the other team had come up 
with.  Those that did travel from UK for the presentation found it fascinating to 
see how the US team had gone about it and just what they had come up with.  
In the teams’ introduction to their presentations, they revealed their ways of 
working and it became apparent the amount of time each team had devoted to 
both generating the ideas (ideation) and evaluating them.  Dr Uruquart (UK) 
recalls: 
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For me Nigel’s process actually to some extent overdid the ideate and 
under did the evaluate.  And I actually think when I looked at both 
processes I'm envious of some of the things that the US got to do but I 
would not have wanted to be in one of their groups. 
 
I guess what I am getting to is I love the ideate rather than the evaluate.  I 
can do the evaluate.  I would have liked to see more evaluation built into 
ours, but I wouldn’t have liked it to have gone to the point where Scott 
went to where frankly your squeezing ideation band to a couple of weeks 
in order to get everything evaluated.  And there’s a happy medium and I 
don’t think either of us actually found it. 
 
Grist also recognised that the more structured approach of the US team might 
have some advantages: 
 
We knew they were going to take a slightly more pragmatic, doable 
approach and we took a rather more ambitious and adventurous 
approach.  I have to say that I was impressed with what they did and I 
was pleased that what the two groups had come up with and done was 
different. 
 
The obvious overarching structure of the US approach was the first element of 
the presentation to make an impact on the UK team.  It is the process and the 
not the ideas that seems to strike the UK team first.  Dr Stovell recalls his 
reaction: 
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There was quite a difference between the UK and the US teams 
approached the whole thing.  I mean the US had a much more structured 
approach, they had dates by which they had to stop having ideas for 
example, whereas we were effectively having ideas right up to a couple 
of days before and some stuff made it into our final presentation that had 
only come to the table – well in fact there was some stuff that went into 
the presentation that none of us had actually seen other than the person 
who presented it.  So our process was wide open. 
 
Dr Uruquart also noted the process as the principal thing that separated the 
two teams.  He envied the US team in some of the items they had managed to 
achieve, primarily the consumer research.  But, overall, he felt that he, 
personally, was more comfortable in the idea generation phase than in the 
more analytical phase: 
 
Me, I couldn’t have coped with Scott’s system, I would have gone mad.  I 
mean, because for me the whole beauty of this process was that we were 
free to go and explore and Scott’s process by going so ‘end-to-end’ 
basically totally minimised the amount of time they could explore in order 
to maximise the times that they could evaluate.  For me Nigel’s process 
actually to some extent over did the ideate and under did the evaluate.  
And I actually think when I looked at both processes I'm envious of some 
of the things that the US go to do but I would not have wanted to be in 
one of their groups. 
 
I guess what I am getting to is I love the ideate rather than the evaluate. 
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Grist could see the differences in the ideas as well as in the approach.  He was 
pleased that the quality of his team’s ideas seemed to stand up to the 
competition pretty well. 
 
I was really pleased actually when I saw their ideas because they were 
so different.  I When I saw the presentations I was actually really pleased 
that they were so different, because that was part of the experiment and I 
thought there were aspects of what they'd done that were better than 
what we'd done, and I looked at what we'd done and thought there were 
aspects of what we'd done that were more advantageous than theirs.   
 
So I was just really pleased that we hadn't all trotted out the same stuff, 
because I thought that would have been disappointing. We knew they 
were going to take a slightly more pragmatic, doable approach and we 
took a rather more ambitious and adventurous approach. 
 
Dr Jon Creeth remembers his impression of the US presentation: 
 
The contrast in how the teams went about it was amazing.  One, ours, 
was very emotional, full of visual appeal and big ideas and the other was 
very logical, linear and methodical and a bit predictable. 
 
Dr Smith reflected after the US presentation that he felt their ideas were 
weaker than the UK ones and he attributed his perceived difference in quality 
to the styles of leadership of the respective leaders: 
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Our ideas were more creative although I suspect we could have had a 
fraction more process, but overall it didn’t matter too much.  I think it was 
better to have less process and keep the free flowing, the chaotic bit of it 
going, than have more process and stifle the creativity. 
 
In the US appraisal of what the UK had developed, Dr Buch (US) recalls: 
 
It was really interesting when we went the final presentation to see the 
difference between the UK approach and the US approach. I think the US 
approach appeared to be a bit more structured.  I don’t know which one 
actually was correct, I think the UK approach demonstrated a 
tremendous amount of creativity but I think the way they approached their 
presentations weren’t quite as defined as ours.  On this side of the pond I 
think we went into a bit more of how things could be executed.  Whereas 
the UK team went into more of the pie in the sky really unique idea type 
stuff. 
 
Coapman also was slightly surprised at the way the UK ideas were presented.  
They had not followed the format he had expected: 
 
The UK team they took the approach, and not right or wrong it’s just they 
took a different approach, and they kind of looked at some more global 
areas of interest that GSK might be considered in.  So they didn’t come 
back specifically with defined product ideas, concepts validated, you 
know? For example, sleep was an area that they thought could be a big 
opportunity here for GSK, sleep disorders.  Should that be a therapeutic 
area we should be getting into?  People just don’t sleep as well as they 
should today, they don’t sleep as long, they don’t sleep as well.  Lack of 
sleep interferes with productivity, lack of sleep interferes with energy 
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levels the next day, so they took a kind of more holistic approach as far 
as what are some of the therapeutic areas we should be getting into and 
then there were some examples of some ideas that they thought would 
help fill that space. 
 
Dr Chen was also impressed with the creativity of the ideas of the UK team but 
was surprised that they appeared to have failed to answer the brief, specifically 
the requirement to have some estimate of consumer appeal and market size: 
 
To me, I was very impressed by the UK team. UK present more concept 
and idea ok but they don’t hit the science a little bit ok and they hit the – I 
don’t think they count down any consumer research ok. ... Ok but then 
present many great ideas actually. I was very impressed with the concept 
and the ideas that they have come out.  The quality, the numbers and 
then the area, which is the idea, then get into it. I was very impressed in 
the way they presented it too. But given they were told that the way that 
the SLT wanted them to do it or either the way they want the favourable 
objective which is the…we were briefed to present need to have some 
scientific rationale and then estimate the possible market consumer 
needs and then market opportunity and then what will be the possible 
time for launch, something like that. They did not meet those criteria 
which is true SLT did give us some guideline about. 
 
5.6.2 The Judges' Decision  
July 2007 
The presentations were made to the R&D SLT with all the key members of the 
team present to hear and discuss the ideas.  Each team was given the same 
time to make their presentation with the UK choosing to go in the morning and 
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the US taking the afternoon.  The UK team had prepared some visual stimulus 
for the room with cardboard cut-outs of some of their ideas.  They had also 
assembled a collage of posters and images of science in technology and in 
nature.  They had posters made of these and these were hung around the 
room. 
 
The US team used a lot of video footage of their team talking to consumers 
during their presentation.  They had less contextual imagery and more project-
specific content.  The SLT paid careful attention to everything they heard and 
saw and the casting vote on which team had delivered on brief better rested 
with the Senior VP, Stan Lech.  He sided with the US team and concluded that 
they were the competition winners.  However, this was not formally announced 
and there was no winner or loser declared on the day.  The role of SLT on the 
day was to provide a positive reception for the ideas and to discuss which of 
them could be brought forward to implementation and how it might be done. 
 
Afterwards Lech explained why he favoured the US submission: 
 
Honestly the edge went to Scott’s team. I think it is because it was 
structured and they had data and they had consumer research, they had 
pretty much concrete data from the consumer.  They ran it like you 
should run a project. Scott’s structured approach was very much on brief.  
It was like this is what we can do for the future groups that we think we 
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have a 25 million and these are some opportunities that were new 
businesses.   
 
The UK just looked at pretty much new businesses – again I think 
because Scott was very structured and he took the brief as we told him 
and the UK said, no, we’re going to go after the big ideas, we’re not going 
to spend time on the Future Group.  And that was just the way it 
unfolded.  And I can also tell you that the workflow from the structured 
versus the unstructured was very interesting too.  Scott was very much 
very methodical about time, its meetings and scheduling and the UK did 
like the cram.  Like the college cram.  They would get together and just 
brainstorm intensely come back and them cram again for hours and 
hours and come back where Scott was kind of metered.  So there was a 
very different environment set-up. 
 
Lech is reflecting that the UK team did not deliver on the brief that he had 
thought was specific and unambiguous.  They did not generate ideas for the 
five big brand groups; the Future Group.  Instead, they focussed on entirely 
new ideas in entirely new categories.  He notes that they were considerably 
less structured than the US team and he equates this with their failure to 
adhere to the brief but he does acknowledge that they (UK) did bring a lot of 
creativity to the table: 
 
The people in the UK just tend to be a lot more free spirited and less 
structured and that unstructured approach created a lot of conflict I think.  
It’s a very interesting thing in the UK they very rarely got face to face.  – 
Why?  Because they could not arrange their calendars to get face to 
face.  But if they would have forced it they would have said – look this is a 
317 
 
very important thing you need to do folks, we have got to clear our 
calendars.  They would have forced things to fit; right and then they 
would have had other things not happen.  Which I think is what the US 
did; I think the US forced ISF to be a priority.  As well as having the 
structure which Scott provided. The end of the day they both did really 
great.  It’s just when you play it back the US was more structured and it 
just tended to come over a bit more credible than what the UK presented 
but the UK was very high in creativity. 
 
Lech acknowledged that there were, as he puts it, ‘stronger personalities’ 
within the UK group and these may have been harder to manage than the 
people on the US team. 
 
There were a lot more rebels in the UK and the people in the UK were a 
bit more out of control, and that’s kind of reflective of their personality 
behaviour.  For Nigel, it was like herding cats…. But there’s some big 
personalities in the UK.  If I look at the personality metre, there’s no 
question that personalities in the UK were much stronger. 
 
Stan’s own direct reports did not share his opinion that the US had won the 
contest.  Many of them, in fact, thought the opposite.  Simon Gunson, VP of 
New Product Research reflects: 
 
The UK team were wild, wacky and weren’t inhibited - but the US team, 
driven by that structured approach – it was all facts and data.  It seemed 
very much driven by potential science opportunities.  The UK team were 
prepared to go that little bit further. A lot of the US stuff had been done 
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before and a lot of the UK stuff was completely off the wall, in a good 
way, new – just what we wanted. 
 
Another of Stan’s SLT, VP for Panadol R&D, based in US was very critical of 
the US approach.  He made the point that the group had been deliberately 
comprised exclusively of scientists.  Additionally, they had the generation of 
scientific ideas as their end goal and he was disappointed that they didn’t 
focus on the science instead of spending so much time working with 
consumers. 
 
What the US did was put an awful lot of effort into making videos of 
consumers.  What I wanted was some rigour and depth of work on the 
basic science. 
 
He was most animated about this and was not the only one to hold this view 
among Stan’s senior team, he continued: 
 
What I saw was that a lot of effort had been directed towards consumers 
– what I was looking for was far more of the scientists and far less of 
scientists trying to run focus groups.  I didn’t find this refreshing because 
a lot of money and a lot of effort went into this ISF project.  I didn’t think 
this was approprate because this was not a training exercise. As 
scientists, they ought to have focussed exclusively on the science and 
not got bogged down in marketing. 
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Simon Gunson (VP for NPR) agrees with the opinion above and is in 
opposition with the US approach of spending so much of their time and budget 
with consumer research: 
 
I prefer the Nigel (UK) approach – if we look at innovation in its truest 
form, some chaos is necessary.  I absolutely believe - that if we had a 
commercial team – then, yes, research was appropriate but there’s no 
point in making first rate scientists become second rate market 
researchers. 
 
Go out there, innovate, find the scientific opportunities – if we like them – 
then, fine – we’ll go off and do the market research.  But in my view, 
that’s not what R&D are there for.  They’re there to develop scientific 
ideas.’  I think there should have been far more effort on the science and 
only after that has been developed, evolved should you engage with 
consumers.  But they spent effort engaging with consumers despite the 
fact that this could have been done better by professionals.  But the ideas 
should have been well developed first. 
 
I was expecting more, better science from scientists.  They diluted the 
science by engaging with consumers.  We would have judged the 
science. 
 
Reflecting on the UK approach, Dr Layer, of the SLT,  expressed surprise that 
although the teams had been explicitly been exempted from having to report 
their progress, she still felt that they (the UK team in particlar) ought to have 
checked back with her or one of the other SLT members: 
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It was all very underground when it was going on.  It appeared to be quite 
underground and I had thought even though our brief was, you were not 
to step in and manage this let them be.  I still thought, I had expected that 
people would give me a shout and just tell me where they’re at and no 
one did.  And I have to say it was an element of surprise for me. 
 
Dr Layer also criticised the lack of project prioritisation from the UK team in 
particular.  They showed a wide variety of potentially valuable ideas but did not 
place them in any apparent rank order: 
 
Yes I do, I do think we got value. Do I think we’d have had better value if 
things had been better structure?  Yes I do, but as I think we had to sift 
through and some of the ideas were wonderful, they really were.  But at 
the end of the day it came back to we had to decisions on prioritisation.  
At the end of the day we didn’t have a modus operandi of being able to 
progress all of the ideas.  We had to sift and sort and make selection 
decisions but we didn’t necessarily have all the facts and data but I would 
have presented back if I’d been on the team a rank order of their ideas. I 
would have said, my top three are X, Y and Z.  But what we got was quite 
a long list of stuff.  And I think what would have been excellent to have 
had would have been a list of the ideas and then share them all.  And 
then say: And here’s what we believe are the, if you’re only going to pick 
two to go with it’s these two. 
 
In conclusion of this element of the narrative, the final word should go to Stan 
Lech, chief architect of the project.  Lech asserts that the project was a 
significant success for the business as a whole.  He confirms that the company 
have managed to get seven big (circa $20m) ideas out of the ISF project.  He 
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also cites it as a success on another level.  Apart from delivering potentially 
lucrative ideas, the project also gave him visibility of the various talents within 
his department. 
 
It was phenomenal.  We had at least, well, let me tell you.  We had fifty-
seven ideas, we chopped thirty right out of the box, we then took forward 
seven ideas*, which are currently baked into either new categories, 
strategic growth initiatives, or a future group.  So, I think we ended up 
with seven of the ideas of high interest out of fifty something, and three of 
those are going to be actively pursued as new category ideas, and I 
believe four of them are already baked into the future group kind of 
exploratory plan.  So, seven more ideas, I think that’s pretty damned 
good!  
 
Also, I have better visibility now of the real strengths of some of these 
people too. So, it was good for us to be able to assess talent.  I’ve had a 
discussion with at least two or three people on ISF about their future in 
innovation, because I was so impressed by what they had done that I can 
see that they have a bigger package than what I thought they had. 
 
*Four ideas from the UK and three from the US team. 
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Chapter Six 
Themes and Analysis 
 
6.1  Introduction and Purpose of this Chapter 
‘There are many reasons why attempts to “manage” or facilitate innovation are 
fraught with difficulty’ (Storey and Salaman, 2005. p. 31).  The narrative of the 
ISF experience brings to the fore a number of contextual factors connected 
with this initiative of which some were enablers and others blockers to the 
successful practice of innovation and, specifically, new product development. 
These contextual factors provide a vivid and practice-based illustration of why 
innovation and, specifically, new product development, is widely considered to 
be so difficult to perform in a way that is predictable, repeatable and 
systematic within an organisation.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the issues that emerged as most 
significant within the case study.  It will describe these issues in the actual 
words of the team members.  By identifying and classifying the individual 
themes drawn from the case study, this chapter will assist in categorising what 
are the key practical, managerial issues which are likely to either facilitate or 
inhibit innovation and successful new product development in large 
organisations.   
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This case data provides insight into the practice of new product development 
that might be helpful in devising better guidelines for future managerial practice 
in innovation in large organisations.  The research question centres on how 
innovation actually happens inside large, global, R&D intensive organisations 
with a particular focus on radical innovation; how ideas are generated, 
incubated and implemented and how teams can best organise for innovation.  
This analysis of the case data provides insights into the questions that 
informed this study, including: how firms and teams prepare for innovation; 
how managers develop practices and processes which are helpful to firm-level 
or project-level innovation and how leadership, in such a context, is 
operationalised and how firms can create team or project-level infrastructure 
conducive to innovation.   
 
Given that innovation, specifically new product development, is a complex and 
non-routine activity within organisations, it is not surprising that there was a 
wide range of significant themes that emerged from the fieldwork interviews.  
Some of these issues seem very prosaic, intuitive and straightforward and 
would not, at first glance, appear to warrant a place on an inventory of 
innovation management practices.  Yet, they were reported as having a 
significant impact on the performance of the teams and hence on the outcome 
of the overall project.  Indeed, it is an advantage of this type of case-based 
research that it allows practical considerations to come to the surface which 
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might be less likely to be detected using broad brush quantitative surveys 
unless they were specifically probed. 
 
The issues raised can be grouped or clustered into four discrete classifications 
(see Table 6.1).  First (Section 6.2), there are the issues of team set-up and 
initiating structures.  Second (Section 6.3), issues emerge which come under 
the heading of processes, and, these include issues like meeting frequency 
and location, the use of IT and the process for harnessing the voice of the 
consumer in the project. A third (Section 6.4) significant issue centres on 
networks both within and outside the organisation.  The fourth (Section 6.5), 
and possibly most significant set of issues, involves leadership and the 
leadership styles that were applied to these teams at various stages during the 
project.  In terms of sequence, this chapter will begin with the issues of 
initiating structures and move towards what transpire to be the overarching 
themes of networking and leadership. 
 
Within each theme described, evidence from the case study will be presented: 
first, from the team member interviews; next, from the interviews with the 
senior leadership team as well as quotes, where appropriate, from the 
company’s close-out report on the project.   
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Table 6.1: Classification of Case Study Themes 
Themes Constituent elements 
Structure Making time for innovation 
Squaring-off line managers 
Size of team 
Space to innovate 
Process Ways of working 
Harnessing the voice of the customer 
Objective methods for idea prioritisation 
Networks Bridging Ties (internal) 
Boundary Spanning (external) 
Recruiting innovation champions 
Leadership Channelling the team’s work 
Structured V’s loose management 
 
6.2   Project and Team Structure 
6.2.1 Devoting the Time to Innovation 
No issue was raised with more frequency, in terms of the number of ISF 
interviewees who raised it, than time.  While, it seems so elementary and 
rooted in common sense, the way that this issue, of limited time, was handled 
in the ISF initiative was such that, according to the participants, it had a 
considerable, negative impact on both the levels of participation and the quality 
of engagement of team members.  The issue surfaced in a number of ways.  
First, the team members were asked to devote 20% of their time (or one day 
per week) to the project but no provision was made for the accommodation of 
their other, prior, work commitments.  Their workload or objectives were not 
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adjusted accordingly.  In practice, this meant that the team members had to 
both deliver their original objectives as well as working on the ISF project.  
Some felt that this was not feasible; they couldn’t juggle their diaries 
sufficiently to release the time required for ISF and reported that they were left 
with no alternative but to retire from the project.  
 
Additionally, the way the project teams were formed and the members chosen, 
the Senior Leadership Team (SLT) omitted (what transpired to be) a critical 
step of advising each individual’s line manager of both their appointment to the 
ISF team and of the strategic prominence of this project in the view of senior 
management in the company.  As a consequence, the line managers were 
often very negatively disposed to the ISF project and were, in some cases, 
actively discouraging their direct reports from working on their ISF assignment.  
This meant, ironically, that the devotion of time to the ISF project, for some, 
became a subversive activity, which had to be conducted in an almost 
clandestine manner.   
 
A third factor was that those in the organisation, and on the ISF team, who had 
line management responsibility for a high number of direct and indirect reports 
were especially constrained in the time they could devote to ISF without 
compromising the level of attention they were allocating to their supervisory 
duties.  This gave rise to a situation where the more junior R&D people were 
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able to engage more with ISF and devote more time and energy to it.  
Although some senior managers, including a Vice President, had been 
purposefully selected for the group, their contribution to the team became 
severely limited and many of the more senior members, especially in the UK 
group, had to abandon the ISF project entirely due to lack of available time.  In 
practice, there was a rough and inverse correlation between the seniority of 
the member and the time they were able to commit to ISF.  This was 
particularly the case with the UK members.  There were two types of 
withdrawal or departure from the teams of which the latter type was far more 
common; either a formal declaration that the time commitment was too heavy 
and that the individual could no longer continue to participate in the ISF 
programme, or alternatively, a gradual but informal drift away from the team 
and the project.  More members defected from the UK team than from the US 
one but there was no significant difference in the seniority between the teams. 
 
Table 6.2, below, captures some of the comments from team members where 
they allude to the issue of time.  No individual is quoted more than once.  It is 
apparent that within the UK team, this was more of a critical issue than for the 
team members in the US. This may be because of the more structured 
approach adopted by the US team, which gave high visibility to the level of 
member participation right from the start. The US team met and connected in 
person far more often and they were able to discuss availability issues and 
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help each other out.  Nevertheless, time was an issue for both teams.  
Moreover, in the company’s project close-out report, this is acknowledged as a 
serious flaw in the project design.  This flaw is acknowledged alongside the 
separate but related issue around not briefing line managers. 
 
Table 6.2:  Finding the Time for Innovation 
Issue and Source  Direct Quotes 
Time Availability  
UK Team  
 
“I withdrew from ISF very early - never really got into it - due to 
lack of space in my schedule.” 
 
“Time was a key barrier – twenty per cent of your time was just not 
feasible. Great innovation doesn’t come easily out of thin air – it’s a 
combination of great curiosity and a great deal of thinking. One 
day a week was the wrong way to start it off.  You can’t come up 
with a great idea just because today is ‘innovation day’….” 
 
 “Time was a huge problem.  I … was thrown in the deep end in a 
new job and to do this as well: it required more time. It was just at 
the wrong level; the worst level – if it was more than 20% we could 
have got more involved – if it was less than 20% then you could fit 
it in.” 
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Issue and Source  Direct Quotes 
 “Biggest flaw was that we didn’t have time to do it.  The one big 
learning is that you allow people enough time or you don’t do this 
at all.  Many people couldn’t commit to the meetings and didn’t 
contribute as they might have.” 
 
“So frankly there were a number of people who dropped during the 
way because they couldn’t commit any time to it, and there were a 
number of others that did actually go to the end, but frankly 
committed hardly any time to it whatsoever.  People’s allocation of 
time to the initiative was inversely proportional to their seniority in 
the organisation.” 
 
‘My key learning was that I didn't have the space to begin to do the 
kind of job I wanted to do and if I am asked to participate in a 
similar exercise I would negotiate very hard on what I give up 
doing whilst on the project, rather than having a vague offer "to 
look at it".’ 
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Issue and Source  Direct Quotes 
Time Availability US 
Team  
 
“I did hear a few complaints from people saying their managers 
were kind of getting on them about it.  When that happened the 
team just sort of coalesced to take on others peoples 
responsibilities to free them up for a week or two if we had to. “  
 
“Time was a problem – rarely had many people at each meeting 
mostly only four or six per meeting. ‘ 
 
“My view is that people just managed it by working over one 
hundred per cent anyway.  Nobody held back because the team 
felt the sense of one-ness.” 
 
Time Availability: SLT 
(Senior Leadership 
Team) Comments 
“In the UK, I felt the guys felt they had enough time and the people 
we had on it were prepared to put in the little extra needed.” 
 
“Culturally, in the US, they need to be more prescriptive in the way 
they work – they need their manager to give permission – that’s 
why in the US there was an overall much more structured 
approach than in the UK.” 
 
“People’s managers weren’t told what was going on.  It left some 
people isolated as their managers may not have known  - so it was 
run like a secret society; some of their leaders, understandably, felt 
undermined.” 
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Issue and Source  Direct Quotes 
Time Availability 
Close-out Report 
Comments 
“Majority of time given was own rather than 20% of job hours.” 
 
“Communicated by line managers that it is an out of hours activity, 
lack of clarity between SLT and line managers.” 
 
“Some managers repeatedly communicated to focus on day job 
and not ISF and some individuals were made to feel guilty if 
working on ISF” 
 
 
In summary, very many of the team members voiced their perception of not 
having sufficient time to devote to the project.  Nevertheless, both teams 
managed to deliver a portfolio of ideas that were sufficiently impressive that 
the senior leadership team declared the overall project a success.  The issue 
of not managing the reporting lines with the line managers was a deficiency in 
the project design.  This was reported to have caused unnecessary stress for 
the people involved. 
 
6.2.2 Size Matters in Innovation Teams 
At the outset, both teams were formally comprised of twelve or thirteen 
members each.  But in each case, it was a core group from within that number 
that did most of the work.  This transpired mainly for two reasons.  First, three 
members of the UK team were located at a separate site and all three 
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eventually disengaged from the project, reporting that they were feeling 
somewhat disconnected from the main team.  The fact that their team leader 
did not create any processes to channel the work of his team was undoubtedly 
a contributory factor in their feeling of isolation. Had the project required a 
more intense, full-time engagement from the group located off the main R&D 
campus, their gradual isolation from and ultimate abandonment of the project 
may not have occurred. 
 
Second, many of the participants had a high number of direct reports and they 
reported finding it challenging to juggle their ‘day job’ with the time commitment 
required for ISF and they consequently elected to abandon the project.  The 
combination of both of these factors prompted a number of the participants, in 
the interviews, to voice the view that a group comprising 6 to 8 would have 
been preferable to the larger group which had been originally assigned.   A 
third element to emerge from the interviews was that with too many on the 
team, there was an opportunity for certain team members to ‘coast’ and 
contribute very little to the programme.  Those who were so disposed could 
ride on the coat tails of the rest of the team without having to make much 
personal contribution because the commitment to the group was relatively 
loose and there was always the option of leaving the group if the workload got 
too demanding. 
 
333 
 
The issue of size of team is not easy to separate from issues around both the 
duration of the project and the question of whether people should have been 
seconded to it on a full time basis rather than for this notional twenty per cent 
of their time.  By itself, the team size, as a factor may not have been so 
problematic.  But, when it was coupled with such a lengthy commitment to a 
project for a notional twenty per cent of people’s time, it certainly was reported 
as an issue for almost all participants.  Within Chapter Five, it is apparent that 
the UK team began to build momentum and to perform to a much higher level 
only after they had formally requested the ‘drifters’ to leave the team 
altogether. Once the team had been reduced to eight from the original thirteen, 
their performance improved. 
 
In essence, the question seems to boil down to whether it is better to have a 
(relatively) large number of people with partial commitment to an initiative for a 
long period or whether it’s better to have more intense engagement with fewer 
people working full time and over a shorter period.  In hindsight, many team 
members came to the view that it would have been better to have had the 
exclusive, full-time devotion of fewer people for a shorter time period.   
 
This view was consistent with almost everyone in the UK team where the team 
was not all co-located. These sentiments are reflected in the direct quotes 
included in the table below (Table 6.3): 
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Table 6.3:  Size of Team 
Issue and Source Direct Quote 
Size of Team – UK Team “Twelve/thirteen is too cumbersome – somewhere around 
six or seven feels optimal.” 
 
“Thirteen people is too many; you can be hidden away 
without doing enough and remaining anonymous.  A couple 
of groups of 5 would have been more effective.” 
“There were thirteen people nominated onto this team who 
were each supposed to be spending twenty per cent of their 
time.  I would argue very strongly that the ideal number of 
people for this type of activity is six; you might go with seven 
in case you lose someone.” 
Size of Team – US Team “So our core group was around six-eight and it was about 
the right size actually.  We all could sit around the 
conference table and look one another in the eye and 
everyone had an opportunity to speak.  It was about right.”   
 
“Most of the work was done by a core group.  When you 
have too many it’s hard to get decisions made and to get 
things done.” 
 
“The one change I would make would be to have smaller 
teams but to dedicate them full time to the project.” 
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Issue and Source Direct Quote 
 “I really think one of the advantages is that my team had 
was that we were able to get together almost on a minute’s 
notice and go to that room and brainstorm and that is 
impossible when you are located at a distance like Coleford 
(the UK second site involved in the project) is.” 
Size of Team - SLT “It’s not about the size – it’s more about the diversity of 
expertise.  I would think it’s more important to have the 
variety of specialities – medical, regulatory, R&D, 
Formulating, clinical, project-management.” 
 
“First, on the time front, I would make sure these people felt 
that this wasn’t an add-on to their day job.  I would free 
them up entirely for this. 
 
Size of Team –  
Close out Report 
“Teams of eight are the ideal numbers” (sic) 
 
 
6.2.3 The Space to Innovate – Having the Right Environment 
Within the transcripts from this case study, there is ample evidence to support 
the idea that physical environment was felt to have an impact on the 
management of innovation projects of this type.  It seems that the fact that 
innovation, by its very nature, is non-routine and requires that those involved 
probe into new areas, suggests that this is harder to do while remaining in the 
same physical environment where the routine work is normally carried out.  No 
336 
 
doubt, there are both physical and psychological reasons for this.  Physical 
reasons, in this particular case include, the logistical concerns of needing 
somewhere to store prototypes and competitor samples.  Team members 
wanted somewhere they could meet and discuss ideas as well as show and 
demonstrate prototypes and technologies.  The allocation of a dedicated room 
for the team and the project was the operational outcome in both cases in UK 
and US and this seemed to have considerable positive benefits.  Apart merely 
from the physical facilities that the room offered, having a specific meeting and 
storage facility also seemed to enhance the team members sense of identity 
with the group and the project. 
 
This case study also exposes some of the difficulties in managing innovation 
teams that are geographically dispersed.  In this case, the UK team were 
located across two R&D sites, situated about 300kms apart.  But although they 
were geographically dispersed, and that constituted a challenge in itself; they 
did not have either of the compounding issues of different time zones or 
different languages to contend with, which is increasingly the case for some 
large organisations.  Three quarters of the team were on one site in Weybridge 
while just three members were in a separate site in Coleford.  The larger group 
managed to secure a dedicated innovation room, on site, assigned to them 
and were able to use that as the project head-quarters.  Individuals used that 
room to work in and they were able to hold what few meetings they had there.  
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The Coleford group however, because they were only three in number, were 
not able to secure any dedicated facilities on their site.  Additionally, possibly 
associated with the relatively ‘laissez-faire’ management style adopted in the 
UK group; the Coleford team gradually reported feeling isolated from their 
team resulting in them separating and ultimately abandoning the project 
entirely. 
 
This outcome; the failure to harness the potential of the smaller group located 
off the main site, has implications for the leadership of innovation projects in 
GSK and perhaps in more general contexts too.  It suggests that when creative 
work is expected of the team, a higher level of connectedness, whether 
physical or virtual is desireable.  It suggests that those members, not located 
with the main team, should have an almost higher or more potent affinity with 
the project vision to sustain them through the project in the absence of the 
personal, face-to-face interaction with the other team members. In this 
instance, given that the entire team never actually met face-to-face, it seems 
that the UK leader’s expectation that all the participants would rise to the 
challenge and deliver on what he expected of them was somewhat naïve, 
especially in relation to the participants who were not located with the main 
group (Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4: Creating the right space to innovate 
Issue and Source   Direct Quotes 
The Space to 
Innovate 
 
UK Team 
‘We eventually got our own project, team room which was 
a great place for us to work and store work-in-progress 
materials.’ 
 
With so many ideas, we had lots of prototypes and 
samples and these took up quite a bit of space so we 
needed somewhere they could all be easily accessed by 
all team members. 
 
‘My direct boss wasn’t so keen on my involvement, so it 
was great to have a dedicated room to disappear to.  I 
could retreat in there and do my ISF stuff.’ 
US Team We had regular team meetings where we all sat in a conference 
room; one of the things that we did that I think worked very well is we 
reserved a team room and we had a dedicated team room where we 
could keep all of our materials and we met there weekly.  In fact, in 
the beginning we met there twice a week. 
 Our team room, the ‘Brisbane Room’ was where we kept 
all the research material, the samples, where we held our 
meetings and where people went when they had a spare 
minute to work on the project. 
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SLT Comments   
 ‘As part of our support, when they asked for it, we gave 
each team their own room for brainstorming and working 
on the project and that seemed to be important to them to 
make them feel like a special group or team.’ 
 
6.3 Processes 
This section explores the processes that were employed by the innovation 
teams.  Beginning with the issue of the prioritisation of ideas and the ensuing 
conflict management (6.3.1); it also describes how the teams managed to 
harness the voice of the consumer (6.3.2) within their ideas.  It further 
describes the teams’ efforts to champion their ideas (6.3.3) in order to build 
internal support for them within the organisation. 
 
6.3.1 Prioritising Ideas  
Prioritising the ideas that were generated within both teams in the ISF project 
was problematic.  It was the single activity that, according to the interviews, 
generated most disharmony and conflict within both teams.  But, it was 
especially stressful for the UK team, as their leader had made a very 
deliberate decision not to have any formal process by which to rank his team’s 
ideas.  He told his team that if they had sufficient passion for their idea to 
persevere with it; develop it and present it at the final meeting in US. He said 
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that, purely on the basis of their commitment to it, he would support the idea 
being taken forward.  For many on the UK team, this lack, not only of objective 
ranking, but of any type of ranking or screening process, was frustrating and 
failed to provide the type of structure and guidance they sought.  They felt that 
because no criteria had been set, that the group were potentially (and possibly 
inadvertently) treating large and small ideas with the same level of attention.  
Moreover, because some of the ideas were very technical and specialist, many 
members of the team weren’t appropriately qualified to judge their quality and 
relevance. 
 
Separately, in a number of the interviews, at all levels in the organisation and 
in both research centres, it was acknowledged that the ‘personalities in the UK 
were a lot stronger.’  This phenomenon materialised most in this context 
(deciding which ideas to promote and which to abandon) insofar as it was 
difficult to separate the ideas from their originator and it is posited in the 
interviews that some of the ideas made it through the process more on the 
strength of the personality and influence of their originator than purely on their 
own merit. 
 
Theoretically, prioritisation of team ideas ought to have been a high priority for 
the leaders because they had a specific mandate to present back a maximum 
number of 9 new ideas.  The UK team largely ignored this requirement and so 
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they did not apply any upper limit to the number of ideas they presented.  This 
lack of prioritisation certainly contributed to their ultimate loss of the 
competition (see Stan Lech’s comments in Chapter Five).  It is suggested by 
the judging team (SLT) that the strength of the personalities involved in the UK 
team made it difficult for Grist to formally rank his team’s ideas and that this 
was a major flaw in his team’s output.  He failed to divorce the ideas from their 
originator and hence was unable to rank them, which made it very difficult for 
the organisation to deal with them afterwards and to assess which ones to 
prioritise. 
 
Creating a rank order for their ideas was a problem too in the US team but for 
slightly different reasons.  First, they had subscribed to a very rigid but 
objective and independent form of online research to evaluate the likely 
commercial potential of their ideas.  This virtual research tool is very well 
established for multinational companies like GSK for providing some advance 
(e.g. financial planning) assumptions, like purchase intent, for product and line 
extensions that the company is planning.  Many organisations of equivalent 
scale to GSK use the research approach and company involved.  It compares 
the sales potential of new ideas to a database of benchmarks or norms that it 
has developed over many years of conducting similar research. 
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The strength of the research tool is in calculating potential incremental revenue 
opportunities for incremental product launches.  It is not generally recognised 
as having the same level of accuracy when it is used on radical, breakthrough 
product concepts.  Even its promoters acknowledge this shortcoming in the 
method as they concede that all new ideas are being compared to existing, 
often market-leading products.  For this reason, some of the US team 
members who rated their own ideas more highly than the research did, were 
reluctant to accept its results.  In querying the accuracy of the research, they 
claimed, possibly correctly, that the research instrument was not adequately 
sophisticated to measure the potential of their ideas.  They felt that their ideas 
were too radical to be properly measured by conventional research 
techniques. This dispute led to a lot of conflict within the team. 
 
Another source of conflict in this phase was a difference of opinion among a 
small number of US team members (and regularly voiced by one member in 
particular) about the company’s genuine appetite for radical ideas. The initial 
brief had specifically told the group to seek out Radical Ideas. One of the 
principal researchers on the US group was convinced that although GSK had 
asked for radical ideas, that what they really wanted were near term, 
incremental, easy-to-implement ideas and hence this individual set themselves 
in strict opposition to any ideas that didn’t fit that perception.  This personal 
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bias provided another barrier for the team in creating and progressing the 
radical agenda. 
 
The table (Table 6.5) below contains the verbatim quotes from interview 
participants, specifically on this topic.  No individual respondent is quoted more 
than once: 
 
Table 6.5: Finding a Way to Prioritise the Ideas 
Issue:  
Prioritisation of Ideas 
Direct Quote 
UK Team “If you fire up twelve or thirteen individuals who are supposed 
to be relatively creative and tell them to all go get their own 
ideas, then how do you then sit them down and argue which 
ideas do you take forward and which ideas do you leave 
behind?  And do that in a way that divorces personalities and 
egos from it, is always quite tricky.”  
 
 “This is where the system failed – because we had lots of very 
strong ideas.  Some of them made it through because of the 
power of the personality rather than the strength of the idea 
itself.” 
 
“If somebody had genuine heart and enthusiasm for an idea, 
they were allowed to run with it, which actually I think is the 
right way of doing it because, remember, we’re doing it from a 
scientific perspective.  So some of the areas of science would 
not have been strengths of everyone on the team – so there 
had to be an element of trust.” 
 
“There were ideas that were very personal to members of the 
group and largely went through purely on the strength of the 
passion the individual had for the idea.  Personalities came 
into play too much.” 
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Issue:  
Prioritisation of Ideas 
Direct Quote 
US Team “Although we were asked to try to come up with ideas or 
concepts which were totally radical, and spend a lot of time 
and effort in blue sky areas - I just didn’t do it. I didn’t think that 
the company would accept these idea and I did not support 
those concept and ideas items from others either.” 
 
“Even after we had agreed to eliminate certain ideas from 
consideration – nevertheless, they kept coming back.  People 
were unwilling to abandon their own ideas.” 
 
 “To have an effective team, you’re bringing in people with 
creative abilities – and usually they’re very passionate about 
what they do and not willing to let go of the ideas they care 
about.  When you have passionate people promoting ideas – 
they are bound to come back again and again – and I think 
that’s a healthy thing.  I think we needed the passionate 
people.” 
 
“Ideas kept coming back and this was a lack of formal 
leadership in ensuring the exit of the ideas and he wasn’t 
adequately forceful.  Scott should have played good-cop, bad-
cop.” 
 
SLT “In the UK, they had a few more rebels; a lot of rebels, a lot of 
free thinkers.  They had more personality clashes, more 
problems – they were more out of control.  If you look at the 
personalities – the personalities in the UK were a lot stronger.” 
 
“If I’d been on the teams, I would have presented back a 
ranked order of ideas; I would have said ‘my top three are….’ 
But what we got instead, from the UK, was a long list of stuff 
with no prioritisation.” 
 
“The edge went to the US team because it was structured and 
they had the data and they had the consumer piece.  They had 
concrete consumer data and they ran the project in a metered, 
structured way.” 
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Issue:  
Prioritisation of Ideas 
Direct Quote 
 “The UK team were unstructured people, who were 
unstructured with their time and tended to take on too much to 
begin with .  Whereas in the US, the people were more 
structured and therefore less stretched.  The people in the UK 
just tend to be a lot more free-spirited and less structured and 
that created a lot of conflict for them.” 
 
Close-Out Report “If someone is passionate enough to want to present; then go 
for it, it is all about belief.” 
 
“Struggled with commercial volumes estimates for ideas. Key 
is don’t get hung up on them (numbers); focus on heartbeat 
and technical feasibility.” 
 
 
6.3.2 Harnessing the Voice of the Customer 
Desouza et al. (2008) assert that organisations in today's competitive 
marketplace are increasingly innovating in partnership with their customers 
thereby subtly changing their innovation strategies from "innovating for 
customers" to "innovating with customers".  In the ISF project, the issue of 
customer (or in this case, ‘consumer’) involvement in the innovation process 
was a particularly contentious one.  This case study is laced with 
contradictions and differences both of opinion and interpretation on this issue.   
The original project brief asks specifically for ideas that have been ‘tested with 
consumers’, implying that the teams will have had to go through at least one 
round of consumer research to be able to estimate the potential in-market 
value of their ideas.  They are asked for a sales and market estimate, including 
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some calculation of market share.  So, there is an explicit requirement to 
conduct market research and to allow the voice of the consumer to have a say 
in which of the teams’ ideas have the most market appeal. 
 
In the US team, this mandate was taken very seriously and the team spent 
more than half of their total project time in the consumer research phase of the 
project.  They had their ideas developed as concepts, which were 
professionally written and illustrated.  They then engaged in impressionistic, 
qualitative, focus-group research to finesse the elements of these concepts 
and identify the ideas with most consumer appeal.  These focus groups also 
doubled as a learning experience for the team in which the members actually 
moderated the groups.  This was then followed by early-stage, volumetric, 
online, quantitative research.  Indeed, in naming them (the US team) the 
winner of the ISF initiative, the President of R&D specifically alludes to the 
consumer research they conducted and cites it as the main reason that they 
had won. 
 
Notwithstanding this view (which ultimately prevailed within the ISF context), 
there were other, differing opinions about this.  The UK team leader felt 
strongly that he did not wish to dilute the focus on raw science by his group of 
qualified and experienced scientists.  He did not wish to compromise any of 
the potentially ground-breaking and radical ideas they had by seeking 
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consumer feedback within this phase of the process.  He believed that the 
strength of his team was their scientific background and expertise and that 
they should really concentrate on this element to the exclusion of market 
research.  His view was shared by the majority (although not all) of the SLT.   
 
The question was asked, by a number of SLT members, about why would one 
bother to ‘make a second rate market researcher out of a first-rate scientist?’  
Why should the scientists dabble in marketing when their primary role is to 
develop new and high quality ideas, rooted in science?  It was also noted by 
the people who held this view that the ISF project had not been designed as a 
training exercise and hence it was a waste of the scientists’ time to become 
engaged in market research to the extent that this was done in the US.  
Consequently, although the US team were officially the ‘winners’, a significant 
group of the SLT acknowledged that they believed the UK portfolio of ideas to 
have been more radical and certainly, more original. Moreover, more of the UK 
ideas are still in the GSK pipeline as of May 2011 than US ones. 
 
It is worth noting that there was universal support, within both the teams and 
the SLT, for the idea of including consumers in the product development 
process but the debate really centred not around if but when (and to what 
extent) this should happen.  The US team built the consumer feedback loop 
into the heart of their process while the UK deliberately made only a token 
effort at the very end.  As already noted, the UK team’s ideas were observed 
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to be more radical than the US ones.  The US ones were described as 
incremental, even predictable.  While there may not be a causal relationship 
between the timing and level of consumer input and the degree of radicalness 
of the ideas developed; it is a noteworthy correlation.  Because of their distinct 
focus on consumer research, it could be argued that the US ideas were 
‘market-led’ while the UK ones represented more of a ‘technology-push’ 
approach.   The US team spent 50% of their time, from March to July (2007), 
on the market research and concept development element of the project.  The 
actual quotations below illustrate the sentiments of the stakeholders involved 
(Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.6:  Harnessing the Voice of the Consumer 
Issue and Source Quote 
Voice of the Customer  
UK Team 
“So I felt, as a bunch of scientists, that we should at least stick with our 
scientific heritage, try and look at science in a different way, come up 
with novel technical solutions rather than trying to pretend that we were 
commercial (marketing) folk when we weren’t.  So the thrust of what we 
were trying to do was very much get into the science, rather than doing 
a balance between science and consumer research.” 
 “To me, it would have been much more beneficial if the commercial 
people would have worked on the ideas with us to flesh them out and 
help with prioritisation.” 
 
“Nigel (UK Team Leader) was very keen that we didn’t stop ideating 
very early.  And essentially given the timeline we had we could either 
choose to stop ideating about a month in and put everything through 
BuzzBack (online quantitative research provider used by US group) or 
we could choose to keep ideating and go with a slightly more qualitative 
than quantitative approach.” 
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Issue and Source Quote 
Voice of the Customer –  
US Team 
“It was really fun to watch some of the people on the team who had 
never done it (run focus groups).  Because you could see the light bulb 
come on.  It was truly an epiphany. As an observer of them I think I 
could see it in them almost more than some of them realised it in 
themselves.” 
 
“Some of these people had never seen focus groups before.  I don’t 
think they really even had an idea how they were conducting prior to 
this so it was really good learning experience for a lot of people too.  
They got to do something that they just normally don’t do in their job.” 
 “Yes, before I had only some vague ideas about the consumer and how 
research is done but after the ISF I have more idea of what concept 
testing really is and how to test this and then how to read the test result 
ok. And then how to put the whole thing together and then get the 
consumer research knowing about how the consumer feel, how they 
respond to your concept.  I’m a technical person and I’m able to come 
up with a modified concept immediately I hear the feedback and then, 
ask their input again and they respond again.” 
 
“Being out in the front room with consumers and talking with them, 
people found that to be extremely valuable, so much more beneficial to 
their understanding of the idea of when they are talking with them 
human being to human being, person to person and getting the scoop 
right from the horses’ mouth.” 
Voice of the Customer - SLT “I didn’t find this refreshing because a lot of money and a lot of effort 
went into this marketing effort.  I didn’t think this was approprate 
because this was not a training exercise. As scientists, they ought to 
have focussed exclusively on the science and not got bogged down in 
marketing.” 
 
“The edge went to the US team because it was structured and they had 
the data and they had the consumer piece.  They had concrete 
consumer data and they ran the project in a metered, structured way.” 
 
“What I saw was that a lot of effort had been directed towards 
consumers – what I was loking for was far more of the scientists doing 
science! And far less of scientists trying to run focus groups.” 
 
“A lot of the US stuff had been done before and a lot of the UK stuff 
was completely off the wall, in a good way, new – just what we 
wanted.” 
Voice of the Customer –  
Close out Report 
“A chance to communicate with consumers, challenging but great 
experience.” 
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6.4  Networks:  Internal and External 
The working style and task approach of the two teams was characterised by 
considerable variation between the US and the UK, but nowhere was this 
divergence more evident than in their use or non-use of networks.  Informal 
networks within the firm, as well as the network of external linkages that they 
created and managed for this project, had an important bearing on the 
strength, the diversity as well as the kind of innovative activity conducted by 
the UK group in particular.  The UK team actively engaged in discussions with 
internal experts and external collaboration partners while the US team-
members, almost exclusively, confined themselves to desk research.  
Moreover, for the US team, their meetings were closed, they did not invite 
people in to share their ideas nor did they engage in any purposeful outreach 
programme in developing their ideas. 
 
One of the very first actions of the UK team leader was to brief the project out 
to an innovation intermediary.  He contacted Bufton Consulting, an innovation 
agency, specialising in open innovation, working in the healthcare field in the 
UK but with links internationally, and gave them the same brief he had been 
given as the ISF project mandate.  This immediately gave the UK team access 
to novel ideas and technologies which may not have occurred to the team 
members were it not for the Bufton connection.  He also encouraged his team 
to go out and meet with experts in the fields in which they were interested and 
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this did happen.  The Sleep Laboratory in the Surrey Sleep Research Centre 
became a contributor to some of the ideas proposed by the UK team. 
 
The interviews show that the UK team adopted an open approach where they 
actively sought fresh input and novel ideas from external experts and partners.  
They forged alliances, they met with experts and they invited intermediaries in 
to help them identify potentially interesting new technologies and therapy 
areas.  The US team, on the other hand, were more internally focussed.  They 
had closed meetings in which they exchanged their own ideas and they logged 
their ideas using a computer programme called ThinkTank.  This programme 
allowed them to post the ideas, to classify them under certain headings, to 
rank them and to vote on them.  One of the US team also suggests that the US 
team found it easy to generate a high number of ideas because many people 
went into these idea generation meetings with a number of old ideas that had 
already been discussed prior to this initiative.  While the US team focused their 
attention on getting consumer input into their ideas, the UK team concentrated 
on getting external, expert input into the generation of theirs (Table 6.7). 
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Table 6.7:  Building Networks 
Issue and Source Quote 
Forging Networks– UK Team ‘So the philosophy was that rather than have a process 
whereby you go through different stats (market statistics) 
to try and pull ideas together, is you create an environment 
where people have the opportunity to read about new 
areas, talk to experts in different areas, interact with 
different people such that they can generate threads for 
their own development.’ 
 
 ‘We were inviting in the external experts; we were 
highlighting, to each other, interest in sources of new 
scientific development and trying to create an environment 
where our people would explore new areas and find out 
something they thought was of interest and then develop 
threads’ 
 ‘So I felt, as a bunch of scientists, that we should at least 
stick with our scientific heritage, try and look at science in a 
different way, come up with novel technical solutions.  We 
wanted to get into the science, talk to experts, see what’s 
exciting out there and bring it back and discuss it in our 
team.’ 
Using networks – US Team First step was coming up with ideas and we used a 
software package called group systems – which facilitates 
the building and adding of ideas. 
 
 Initially what we did was we all just sat around the table 
and tossed ideas out and, you know, kind of wild and 
wacky stuff, the crazier the better. 
 We did not consult anyone outside the company in 
developing the ideas; we did it all within the group with one 
exception when we needed expert opinion on ozone 
 Generating the idea was pretty good actually. Basically 
many of us came in with old ideas so that’s why we would 
generate over 300 ideas so easily. 
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SLT Comments  
 The behavioural piece, we were looking for people that 
were very open to radical ideas, we were looking for the 
people that had previously suggested to us ideas that 
didn’t fit in the current business that we’re in, we were 
looking for people on the R&D side that had least a string 
of patents or applications, so we know that there’s not only 
the initial thought, but also the follow-through. 
  
We would have far preferred to see the US team engage 
with experts instead of engaging with consumers – they 
might have got more original ideas that way. 
 
6.4.1 Championing the Ideas 
One of the key features of the design of the ISF project was that it purposefully 
dispensed with the need for the team, or specifically the team leader, to make 
any regular or even interim progress report to senior management.  This 
applied for the full nine-month duration of the project.  It was seen as an 
emancipatory measure, to free up the team, from ‘red tape’, to concentrate on 
the science and to pursue appropriate, novel ideas without the conventional 
reporting constraints that would normally apply to innovation teams working in 
GSK.  It was considered by the SLT that the paperwork involved in the 
conventional reporting protocols were too onerous for some of the more 
creative R&D people and by removing them; these people may have a unique 
opportunity to flourish. 
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The teams were required to report in only two circumstances: a) if they needed 
specific resources and b) if they over spent their budget.  Both teams 
approached senior management for the allocation of a dedicated creative 
space; and both secured the use of a special room at their respective sites.  
They were able to use this room to store samples, competitor products and 
prototypes and it was also used as the dedicated space for people to work on 
the project either on their own or in sub-groups.  The rooms also became the 
places where each team would hold their meetings.  Neither team needed to 
request additional funding. 
 
In complying with this element of the project structure, the two teams, once 
again, adopted vastly differing strategies.  The US team adopted an approach 
where they didn’t formally report progress, but informally the team leader 
stayed in regular contact with the SLT.  He briefed all the VP’s (on the SLT) 
during the project to sensitise them to the types of ideas that were surfacing in 
his team; he also wanted to make sure that they were looking in the right areas 
and territories.  He was also anxious that his team didn’t put a lot of effort into 
areas that might have been explored before.  He correctly identified that the 
organisation did not, at that time, have a knowledge bank or knowledge 
management system where ideas, which are currently under review or ones 
that have previously been investigated, are filed.  Hence, it was entirely 
possible that his team might spend a lot of time and resource on something 
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that had already been considered and discarded.   By doing this extensive but 
informal consultation process, he was conditioning the judging panel so that 
they knew what to expect from the US team and there ‘would be no surprises’. 
 
Anticipating possible future objections to the team’s output, the US team 
leader also spent a lot of time speaking with the (US in-country) marketing 
teams to make sure that he was following the appropriate guidelines for how 
concepts should be written and ideas presented for research within GSK.  As 
was previously noted, there were no commercial experts on either team and 
the US team leader wanted to make sure that he was following the appropriate 
guidelines for bringing the commercial ideas to life.  Hence, he consulted 
extensively with the US commercial teams and sought and used their advice.  
He ascertained who the preferred suppliers were for these services (illustration 
and copywriting) and he used the same vendors to help develop and render 
the concepts from his team.   In this way, he hoped to be able to overcome any 
possible objection from the judging panel about the quality or the validity of his 
team’s work.  He did the same for the research providers for both the 
qualitative and quantitative phases and hence the US team employed not just 
the same research techniques to validate their ideas but they used the same 
companies that the commercial arm of GSK would have used themselves. 
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In contrast to the US team leader’s approach to internal boundary spanning (or 
bridging-ties); the UK team leader did not engage in any discussions with the 
SLT or any other internal group.  His approach was to keep everything under 
wraps so that the SLT would be ‘pleasantly surprised’ when they saw the ideas 
for the first time at the presentation in Manhattan.  Below (Table 6.8) are some 
of the direct quotes from the team members and the other stakeholders as 
they relate to this issue. 
 
Table 6.8:  Innovation Champions in ISF 
Issue and Source Quote 
Championing Innovation –  
UK Team 
“Nigel (UK team leader) said that ‘this is an R&D initiative’ – he 
encouraged scientific type ideas but not necessarily 
commercial ones.  He had a scientific approach rather than 
one which was consumer driven.  He didn’t talk to anyone in 
senior management about the ideas that were on the table.  
We were sailing blind.” 
 
“Some of our ideas were on the brand, Aquafresh and we 
didn’t want to show them to (the team on) Aquafresh too early 
in case they didn’t like them, and then when we present them, 
we present an issue.”  
 
 “We wanted to make an impact and so we didn’t want. 
Them (SLT) to know in advance what was coming.  I guess we 
had faith in the ideas.” 
 
 ‘I think they deliberately stayed away and the whole point of it 
was ‘what would these guys do in a vacuum with a little money 
and just a brief?’  So leaving us alone was a vote of 
confidence in us and our ability to deliver ideas.’ 
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Issue and Source Quote 
Championing Innovation – 
US Team 
“He (US team leader) did lots of sensitising the management to 
what ideas and areas we were thinking of – but he didn’t get us 
involved with these bi-laterals  - Scott (team leader) did it all and 
got the right tools, using the right people and getting quantitative 
data as well.” 
 
“We had quite a few of them (ideas for GSK brands) and we 
suspected that maybe these were some ideas that had already 
been looked at.  So rather than spin our wheels and go back 
reinventing the wheel, we did convene a meeting with the 
commercial and R&D Futures Heads (the SLT and their 
commercial counterparts), and said here are some ideas that are 
being batted around, we think there is some value to them for 
these reasons, would they be on strategy? Would they be off base 
from what you consider? … Just to make sure we weren’t 
reinventing the wheel and going down a path that they already 
had data to say this is a non-starter for us.” 
 
 “We knew he (US team leader) was in dialogue with senior 
management and this ensured that they knew and approved of 
what we were doing – this was very reassuring for us.” 
Championing Innovation - 
SLT 
“My observation was it was all very underground when it was 
going on.  It appeared to be quite underground and I had thought 
even though SLT’s brief was, you were not to step in and manage 
this, let them be.  I still thought, I had expected that people would 
give me a shout and just tell me where they’re at and no one did.  
And I have to say it was an element of surprise for me.” 
 
“When we first set it up, we told them right away we did not want 
to be ‘in their underwear’, you know.  We specifically told them 
why we picked them, they said you are the best, the brightest and 
creative people we have and we gave them a lot of confidence 
saying – we know you can deliver this.” 
 
“Along the way I think I checked in with Scott twice and I think 
Nigel just once.  But Scott would often show me some ideas and I 
would go – that’s interesting.  I would give a little bit of guidance, 
but not much, but they knew that we were interested but the 
interest was not meddling.” 
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6.5 Team Leadership 
The themes discussed so far; team structure; team processes and building 
networks have all been drawn from the lived experience of the participants in 
the project.  In each case, while there were some necessary components built 
into the programme, the overall ISF project design was found to be imperfect 
in some significant way on all counts.  However, all of these individual issues 
are connected to an overall theme of team leadership.  One key element that 
makes this particular case study such an intriguing and revelatory one is that 
the two assigned leaders took such divergent positions on how they would 
perform their leadership role. 
 
From the transcripts of the team members’ experiences of the project, it is 
clear that the approach of the leader is paramount.  The influence of the leader 
is difficult to overstate in this case study.  That the two individuals interpreted 
this role in such vastly different ways, adds to the texture and richness of this 
study.  Although one team was declared a winner; this was a relatively hollow 
accolade when most of the judging panel actually sided with the ‘losing’ team.  
Moreover, subsequent career moves within the organisation have seen a 
significant promotion for the leader of the ‘losing’ team while the leader of the 
‘winning’ team has not seen any equivalent promotion. 
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The case study is described in detail in Chapter Five, however, it is worth 
recapping on a couple of the significant elements with regard to leadership and 
how it was manifest within the teams; because it was the differences in the 
leadership style and approach that lend this study a particular fascination.   
 
Within the ISF initiative, the selection of the team leaders was done with 
deliberate care.  However, the choice of the UK team leader attracted a lot of 
controversy and outright opposition with even the SVP of R&D acknowledging 
that this particular selection ‘was a bit of an experiment’. 
 
The UK team leader chose a hands-off approach.  He never brought the full 
team (physically) together; he didn’t channel the work; he didn’t assign people 
into sub-teams and match the tasks to their respective strengths; he didn’t 
engage in any boundary-spanning or coalition building for the ideas; he didn’t 
adhere to the terms of the brief; he didn’t objectively prioritise the ideas but just 
allowed people run with the ones that appealed to them most; he didn’t 
manage the research piece effectively and when people on his team needed 
direction or guidance, he failed to provide it.  He didn’t channel the work or 
provide feedback on the quality of the ideas. One member of his team 
experienced a ‘significant, stress-related, health incident’, which kept them out 
of work for over 6 months afterwards and was widely attributed to the stress 
that arose from being on the UK team.  But despite these apparent failings of 
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conventional team-leadership, the UK team-leader was absolutely true to the 
twin notions that creativity requires freedom to explore ideas and that 
innovation needs to have an element of chaos to emerge.  He also exhibited a 
style of Pygmalion type leadership by continually expecting his team to deliver 
the high levels of creativity that he originally thought they possessed or, at 
least, hoped they did.   
 
Moreover, the ideas his team produced were widely considered to be more 
imaginative, creative and disruptive than those of their US rivals.  A key pillar 
of his approach was that he refused to interrupt the scientific focus of the ideas 
to engage in any consumer validation or market research.  He believed that 
the project offered ‘a bunch of scientists’ an opportunity to explore scientific 
ideas and he remained faithful to this till the end.  He accepted that chaos is an 
essential part of the fuzzy-front-end of innovation and he allowed, or even 
encouraged, chaos to override structure.  
 
He, effectively, defied the original brief for his team and ignored the 
requirement to select a small (eight) number of well researched ideas in favour 
of devoting more time to the science (or applying idea generation to science) 
and ultimately coming up with a high number of untested ideas.  He defied the 
mandate in two ways.  First, he didn’t carry out any meaningful market 
research on any of the ideas and; second (but related), he did not rank them 
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and prioritise the top scoring ideas.  Instead, he merely presented a large 
palette of ideas with no indication of which might be the ones with highest 
potential. 
 
A vastly different approach was favoured by his counterpart; the US team-
leader.  A former career project-manager, his well-organised style underscored 
his commitment to timelines and processes.  He managed to get his team to 
meet a couple of times a week, he introduced dedicated innovation software to 
the process so that his team could work on, register and even vote on ideas in 
real time regardless of their location.  He planned out the phases of the project 
and made sure his team were kept on track.  He channelled their work 
effectively and he was totally faithful to the original brief.  Not only did he 
conduct an exemplary research element to the programme, he also integrated 
some useful learning opportunities for the R&D team to interact, often for the 
first time, with consumers (although, this last piece proved highly 
controversial).  He delivered on all the objectives and he used his corporate 
experience, by arranging informal meetings with all the key stakeholders, to 
ensure that the SLT were prepared for and positively disposed to the ideas 
that his team had developed.  His highly organised approach ensured that his 
team won the competition.  But notwithstanding being declared the winners, 
some questions remained about the quality, ambition and even originality of 
the ideas his team came up with.  He was also heavily criticised for spending 
362 
 
so much of the project time in the research process; there was a suggestion 
that bringing the consumers into the process so early and so intensively 
blunted the creativity of the ideas.  He was also criticised for making the 
process too technology-driven and having too much bureaucratic process.  
This latter comment is a phenomenon already recognised in the literature, 
specifically noted by Loewe and Chen (2007); ‘But sometimes, an overly eager 
project manager intent on making sure that everything gets done on schedule 
will let the calendar take precedence over the content and the quality of the 
outputs.’ 
 
Below are some direct quotes from both team leaders and members, provided 
alongside quotes from the judging team and some lines from the official project 
close out report (Table 6.9).   
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Table 6.9:  Team Leadership in ISF 
Issue and Source Direct Quote 
Team Leadership –  
UK Team 
“The UK approach was chaotic with process largely absent.  It 
was like a playground where you could do exactly what you 
wanted.” 
 
“We were all smart enough to realise that unless you have 
some structure in place there was a risk that the chaos would 
have very little output.  So most of us wanted (stage) gates to 
aim at and deadlines to hit. And, we never got them.” 
 
“Nigel used very little framework for running the team.  He 
never set the scene but simply allowed everything to be 
completely flexible.  While innovation needs chaos – maybe 
the people involved don’t. And, a bunch of scientists generally 
want some structure.  I think it was a little bit chaotic and over 
the top.” 
 
“I mean, the US had a much more structured approach, they 
had dates by which they had to stop having ideas for example, 
whereas we were effectively having ideas right up to a couple 
of days before (the presentation) and some stuff made it into 
our final presentation that had only come to the tables – well in 
fact there was some stuff that went into the presentation that 
none of us had actually seen other than the person who 
presented it.  So our process was wide open.” 
Team Leadership –  
US Team 
“When I kicked off the meeting, I had a very clear vision in my 
mind of what we wanted to be in a position to present to SLT 
seven months later.  And it wasn’t just some ideas that have 
been bounced off a couple of consumers perhaps, or bounced 
off internal people.  I wanted to be able to bring forward 
quantitatively tested concepts of new product ideas that we 
had actually thought through on the technical side and had 
clear approaches on how we would go about the whole thing 
technically.  But I wanted to make sure we had the consumer 
heartbeat established to the point that we had some 
quantitative concept consumer test results on that.” 
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Issue and Source Direct Quote 
 “Scott’s planning was essential, he had an end-game, he had 
a timeline.  Creativity is the well-spring of innovation but you 
have to move it forward and Scott’s processes really helped 
move it along comfortably.” 
 
“Scott created a high comfort level – people were very open, 
transparent, nobody was uncomfortable.  He was very neutral 
– he was very good in terms of the psychology – people felt 
comfortable.” 
 
 “We wanted to make sure that the organisation’s curiosity was 
met and we did what we called an ISF fare and we set up all of 
our posters and concepts and learning out on the patio at the 
GSK café here and had an open fare (exhibition) where we 
actually displayed everything that we did and people were able 
to walk through, we had each of the sets of concepts manned 
by one of our ISF members and people cold stop by and look 
at the concept and read it, ask questions about what it was 
about.” 
  
Team Leadership –  
SLT 
“I had concerns that they hadn’t got team-working skills; we 
had no leader, no coordinator and I raised strong objections to 
the point that my objection was noted.  I was afraid we were 
setting them up for failure – particularly the UK team.  My 
objection was noted but disregarded.” 
 
“One of our people, who made the main presentation for UK 
team, experienced a pretty serious medical incident afterwards 
that kept him out of the business for six months – and I wonder 
how much did the ISF project contribute to his condition?  If 
there had been a better structure in the UK, I wonder would he 
have experienced this condition?” 
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Issue and Source Direct Quote 
 “If we had commercial members as part of the team, we might 
have been able to prioritise the ideas afterwards a little better – 
because now we have no modus operandi for moving the ideas 
forward.  We’ve had to sift and sort without really having all the 
data necessary to make the right decisions.” 
 
Team Leadership –  
Close Out Report 
 Leaders owned logistics 
 No right or wrong way of doing things 
 UK team ignored guidelines 
 US team focused on timeline and delivery 
 
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has taken the interview transcripts and highlighted the themes 
that emerged from the lived experience of the team members.  It focuses on 
the team-level and individual-level experiences to identify issues which may 
possibly be converted into framework guidelines to help increase the efficacy 
of future innovation management programmes in large, global organisations. 
The research objective was to analyse, in detail, how an innovation project 
actually unfolded within GSK and to isolate the key factors which are 
conducive to innovation across the three phases of the innovation value chain 
(Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007). 
 
This case study reflects the complexity known to characterise the innovation 
process. It seems apparent, from this case at least, that there are four specific 
dimensions that ought to be addressed in the innovation process for 
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companies wishing, not only, to create an infrastructure conducive to 
innovation but also wishing to get tangible innovation outcomes from such 
initiatives.  These four dimensions are structure, process, networks and 
leadership.  The findings from the case study for each of the themes will now 
be discussed. 
 
6.6.1  Team and Project Structure 
A first important finding of the case is that basic, hygiene-factors ought to be 
anticipated and built in to the planning phase of initiatives like this one.  Such 
factors are reported, in this case, to have an adverse effect on the experiences 
of the individual team members. The case data also suggests that had this 
issue been managed differently, the outcomes of the projects might have been 
superior; although, this cannot be stated with any real authority.  These 
fundamental issues relate to how these teams and programmes are set-up and 
structured.  The key issues around structure that emerged as significant in 
terms of the impact they had on the team were the appropriate allocation of 
time to do the work required.  Also, issues like “squaring-off” the project with 
the team-members’ line managers were thought to be crucially important.  The 
size of team is also a factor as is the duration of the project and whether the 
entire team, or even just the leader, are devoted to the project full time.  
Having a dedicated, appropriate space to innovate was also reported to have a 
bearing on the experiences of the teams.  
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What this study has shown, in summary, is that the majority of the 
interviewees, following their experience with the project, believed that it would 
have been better to have had smaller, tighter and (full-time) dedicated teams.  
They suggest that teams of between five to eight members would have been 
preferable to teams of twelve or thirteen members.   
 
The interviewees also make the point that the organisation failed to 
communicate either the purpose or the profile of the project to the line 
managers of the team members.  This had the regrettable consequence that 
some of the team members were made to feel that working on the ISF project 
was an almost subversive activity as they had not received any 
encouragement or mandate to work on it from their direct line manager. 
 
However, despite being raised in many interviews, it remains debatable just 
how important these issues of structure really were.  In terms of outcomes, 
both teams satisfied the brief and delivered what was required, albeit with 
considerable variation.  It seems that, at best, it can be asserted that many of 
the team members report that they would have been able to perform to a 
higher standard had the company managed to anticipate and manage these 
issues better.  These cautions should serve as a reminder to managers 
charged with setting up innovation programmes that these structural elements 
are significant and they warrant spending some time to get right. 
368 
 
6.6.2 Issues of Process 
The second tier of issues that need to be addressed in setting up innovation 
teams lend themselves to the description of process issues.  This refers to 
issues around how the team manages the phases of the innovation journey.  
Under this broad heading come specific issues like how the team rank and 
screen their ideas; how they develop them into testable, research-ready 
concepts and how they harness the voice of the ultimate customer into the 
innovation process. 
 
In this case, neither team had a robust or definitive way of screening their 
ideas and this caused team conflict in both teams.  Although the UK team 
applied the personal passion of the individual team member as the first filter of 
the quality of their ideas; this caused some disquiet amongst the rest of the 
team who worried that without any additional criteria, an inordinate amount of 
time might be devoted to ideas which may be of very low commercial potential. 
 
In the US, the team developed a screening process with two phases; an 
internal ranking and an external one.  First, they used the software tool, 
ThinkTank to vote on their entire portfolio of ideas, taking only the top ranked 
ones forward to qualitative research.  After that, they used a volumetric tool 
called BuzzBack to assess, using an online consumer panel, which of the rest 
of the ideas had most appeal with the target market at which they were aimed. 
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This way, they had a good sense of the potential in-market value of each of 
their ideas.  But nevertheless, conflict emerged within the team, for two 
reasons.  The first reason was that some among the team felt that their own, 
individual ideas were truly radical and therefore that the testing mechanisms 
(such as BuzzBack) used lacked the subtlety to be able to appreciate the full 
potential of their ideas.    
 
The second issue which exacerbated the team conflict in US was the very 
passionate view held by one team member, in particular, that despite what the 
company said in its briefing about the quest for radical ideas; she held that 
GSK were not really serious about this and had an appetite only for the most 
basic upgrades to their product portfolio.  Hence, this team member argued 
constantly against the inclusion of any ideas that could be termed radical.  
Team conflict was unnecessarily high in both teams although it arose for 
different reasons within each team. 
 
Both teams handled the issue of the voice of the customer very differently and 
it will be argued later that this had a significant influence on the type and 
dimension of the innovations proposed by each team.  In the UK, the team 
leader felt that the opportunity to get experienced scientists to immerse 
themselves in the scientific data surrounding new ideas was more beneficial 
than using the project time to canvass the views of potential future customers.  
370 
 
He argued strongly in favour of allowing the scientific experts engage with the 
science, create and build new ideas and, when the time was right, he felt that 
marketing people could evaluate the market potential of those ideas.  In this 
sense, he ensured that his team actively spent all the ISF project time in the 
idea generation phase of the initiative.  They never really moved into any 
further elements of research or testing.  The UK team leader showed a total 
commitment to the science element of the idea generation phase and he 
eschewed the notion of asking consumers for their reaction to the ideas 
(thinking they would only dilute them), wanting instead to maximise the time he 
could keep his scientists refining the science of their ideas. 
 
In contrast, the US team leader spent only a quarter of the project time, 
generating the ideas.  The US team started to research their ideas first through 
qualitative research using focus groups and ultimately through quantitative 
online surveys.  The US team were active in all the stages of the innovation 
process.  While the UK placed their faith in the ability of their scientists to 
unlock some great ideas by focusing on the technology, the US had equal faith 
in the role of the consumers in developing high potential new ideas.  For three 
quarters of the duration of the ISF project, the US team were engaged in the 
process of consumer research in its various phases.  The US team’s process 
of validating their ideas through consumer research paid dividends for them, in 
terms of the competition outcome.  It meant that they were ultimately 
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presenting a limited palette of pre-validated ideas, all of which were 
researched and which had in-market values attached to them.  They were 
presented using the appropriate concept writing format; the right type of 
research numbers with which the senior management team were used to 
looking at commercial opportunities and these features made them easier to 
assimilate into the prevailing business model than the UK ideas which were 
still relatively raw by comparison.  The leader of the SLT who designated them 
as the winners specifically alluded to the fact that they had done the consumer 
research as the critical element that swung the decision in their favour. 
 
Nevertheless, the rest of the SLT members were not convinced that the US 
were worthy winners.  In their interviews, they described the US ideas as 
predictable and incremental. Conversely, they saw the ideas presented by the 
UK team as being more original and radical.  In the end, the competition or 
tournament was not conclusive.  It had an official winner; the US and an 
unofficial winner; the UK. 
 
6.6.3 Network Issues 
A third element that features as instrumental in the process is the extent to 
which the team and the leader used networks both within and outside the 
organisation and how leaders champion their ideas internally with senior 
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stakeholders to increase the likelihood of their adoption after the project has 
concluded. 
 
Innovation champions play a vital role in protecting ideas from premature 
evaluation and in persuading senior managers of their merit.  The US team 
leader maintained a constant but informal dialogue with the SLT members so 
that they were aware of the nature and type of the ideas being developed on 
that team.  Moreover, the US team leader made sure that his team were not 
wasting team resources on ideas, which had already been evaluated in some 
prior R&D programme.  The US team leader sensitised the internal audience 
for the ideas his team were working upon for the competition. 
 
By contrast, with considerably less project management experience under his 
belt, the UK team leader, chose not to communicate his team’s ideas to the 
SLT, he wanted the ideas to be a ‘surprise’ on the day of the final competition 
presentation.  This strategy did not work out so well for him and attracted some 
negative comments from members of the SLT who expected to be consulted 
during the process, notwithstanding the provision in the project set up which 
freed the team leaders from any reporting constraints. 
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Internal experts can often add understanding and insight to ideas, which can 
strengthen them immeasurably.  The UK team identified, pursued and 
consulted with internal experts in certain therapy areas.  The US team did not 
connect with anyone from within GSK on their ideas.  GSK has over 100,000 
people on the staff and it tries to promote internal connectivity between them in 
order to share and develop knowledge within the company. By neglecting to 
reach out to possible experts within GSK, the US team were missing an 
opportunity to develop their ideas.  
 
But for organisations seeking radical innovation, external networks seem more 
significant, than internal ones, in achieving this objective.  The UK team 
excelled at this part of the project.  They approached Bufton Consulting, an 
open innovation intermediary, and effectively sub-contracted the entire project 
by providing Bufton with the brief they were working to.  Bufton consulted with 
their client base of inventors, research institutes, academics, start-up 
technology companies and reverted to the UK team with some valuable 
external contacts.  The UK team also engaged with the Continua Alliance (an 
Open Innovation Network specialising in connected healthcare) and this 
connection provided them with a number of potential leads from which many of 
their ideas eventually emerged.  Teams which purposefully manage their 
external networks appear, in this study, more likely to find novel and useful 
ideas to bring into their innovation programme.  Many of the UK ideas relied on 
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external technologies and originally sprang from the external, open contacts 
the UK made from early on in the project.  This external focus was largely 
driven by the team leader who, made useful eternal introductions for his team. 
 
The US team, by contrast, neglected this networking element of the idea 
generation phase.  They failed to engage with anyone outside their own team 
and this omission was obviously a limiting factor in the range of ideas that they 
ultimately recommended. In one instance, they did consult with an external 
expert  (in ozone technology) but this was really to fine-tune an idea upon 
which they were already working.  The most common criticism of the US’ 
portfolio of ideas was that they were predictable and incremental and they 
lacked the vision of those suggested by the UK team.  It seems that one 
reason for the more limited range of ideas was that the US team did not 
engage in networks wither within GSK or outside it. 
 
6.6.4  Leadership Issues 
Finally, and this is possibly the strongest finding of the fieldwork, leadership is 
a critical component to the direction, the momentum and the outcomes of 
innovation programmes.  In the ISF story, both leaders achieved a version of 
success but they did so in very different ways.  One leader led the innovation 
charge by systematising the procedure and minimising the opportunity for 
chaos to develop. The other preferred a looser, more flexible, highly open and 
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networked approach.  This study points to an issue that remains unresolved in 
the literature; can the same type of leadership be equally effective along the 
three phases of the innovation value chain? Similarly, can the type of 
leadership that yields incremental innovation also be effective in the quest for 
radical innovation? 
 
As noted, there is rich contrast in the leadership approaches adopted by both 
team leaders.  The UK team leader stuck rigidly to his philosophy that ‘the only 
process is there is no process’.  He was also absolutely faithful to the notion of 
the scientists sticking to the science and not dabbling in market research.  
Therefore, he defied the brief by not evaluating the commercial potential of the 
team’s ideas through consumer research.  He did this purposefully in order to 
spend the additional time being immersed in the science and technology.  The 
UK team leader also brokered valuable introductions for his team and forged 
connections both inside and outside the organisation.  This networking 
approach had the effect of shepherding in more creative, original and novel 
ideas into the UK portfolio of ideas. 
 
The next chapter takes up some of these issues further. This chapter has 
looked at the experiences of the ISF team and has used them to explore the 
themes that naturally emerged from their involvement in the project.  
Consequently, the starting point for this chapter is the team-members’ 
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experience.  The starting point for the next chapter is the innovation process 
and over that is laid the teams’ experiences.   
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Chapter Seven 
An Analysis of the Project Outcomes; Evaluating the Ideas 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three objectives: first, to discuss the outcomes (in terms of 
the NPD ideas proposed) from the project teams and draw conclusions about 
the type, number and quality of the ideas or concepts developed by each 
team.  Second, to classify the concepts on a spectrum of radical to incremental 
and, third, to discuss the project outcomes and processes through the lens of 
the Innovation Value Chain and to attempt to connect the variation in 
approaches taken by each team to its three phases. 
 
This chapter explores the ISF case systemically, or holistically and analyses 
the variation in project processes and resulting outcomes that was described in 
Chapter Five.  This chapter will look at the objectives of the ISF initiative and 
follow this through right up to the outputs.  The analysis provided here looks 
beyond the sentiments, experiences and opinions expressed in the interviews 
and provide an analysis of the programme outcomes. Moreover, the level of 
analysis in this chapter now shifts beyond the teams and focuses on the 
innovation project itself.  It attempts to match the case data on this project with 
the theory surrounding the innovation process and, using this backdrop, to 
explain the wide variation in outcomes for the two teams.  The chapter will 
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begin with an examination of the differences between the two teams’ outcomes 
and then discuss differences in their processes and attempt to identify the 
strength of the link between the two. 
 
7.2 Description of the Outcomes from each Team 
In order to understand the project outcomes using existing literature, it is 
necessary to revert back to the case study data itself and present exactly what 
those tangible outcomes were.  Both teams were given identical instructions; 
to come up with nine novel, ‘radical new product ideas’ for the business.  Six of 
the ideas were, ideally required to be aligned to the global brands currently 
marketed by GSK.  Hence from these ideas, the SLT were hoping to get novel, 
high-potential ideas in therapy areas or categories with which the organisation 
was already familiar and successful.  To respond to this element of the SLT 
brief would have required the teams to look at new technologies, new ‘active 
ingredients’, new delivery systems (oral, nasal, suppository, transdermal etc) , 
new formats (i.e. liquids, gel-caps, tablets, transdermal formats, sprays etc)  or 
even new routes to market, new business models, new service ideas or new 
distribution models within the wide framework of the therapy areas and health 
and wellness markets in whch the company already operated. 
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The brief also asked for three additional ideas outside the current ‘footprint’ of 
the company i.e. ideas in new areas, new therapeutic categories in which the 
business was not currently operating.  The specific chart from the briefing pack 
is shown below and makes these requirements very clear: 
 
Figure 7.1:  Slide from the ISF Briefing Meeting 
 
Source:  ISF Briefing Pack – Internal Documents. 
 
This study has already provided a situational context from the perspective of 
the organisation in which the initiative took place, GSK.  But what has not yet 
been discussed is the situational context for this programme within the 
innovation process itself.  Had the teams been totally faithful to their original 
brief, their final presentation should have comprised a set of novel, commercial 
ideas in the therapeutic categories (Figure 7.1).   The table below reflects their 
mandate; one new idea for each of the organisation’s six core categories and 
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then three additional concepts from outside the footprint of the existing 
business: 
 
Table 7.1:  The SLT Mandate to Each of the ISF Teams 
Category Number of Ideas 
Requested by SLT 
Smoking Cessation 1 
Aquafresh (oralcare brand) 1 
Sensodyne (brand specialising in relief of dentine sensitivity) 1 
Weight Control (alli – the main GSK band in this category) 1 
Denture Care ( Polident and Poligrip being the big GSK 
brands in this market.) 
1 
Pain Management (Panadol being the major GSK brand) 1 
Other – ouside those therary areas 3 
Total number of new ideas required from each team 9 
 
In attempting to explain the wide variation in the outputs of both of these 
teams, it is worthwhile paying close attention to exactly what each team 
produced.  At the final ISF presentation, which was the ultimate showcase for 
their outputs, the US team presented seven concepts to the SLT (as opposed 
to the nine that had been requested).  They really arrived at that number based 
on two considerations. Firstly, these seven were their top performing concepts 
in research and, secondly, they knew that in the presentation itself, they had 
between three and four hours to present their portfolio of ideas.  In order to do 
justice to each idea, especially to be able to show video footage of the 
consumer reaction to the ideas and to present their research results, they 
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allocated thirty minutes in the final presentation for each idea and settled on 
seven as the ideal number to try to communicate within their time slot. 
 
The UK team, for a number of reasons, did not prioritise their ideas.  Moreover, 
they had no research results to present except of the most preliminary kind.  
Hence, they allowed their people present as many ideas as they could and 
they allocated their time by person rather than by concept.  They presented 27 
ideas in total; some more finished than others.  Neither team really conformed 
strictly to the brief; neither side, for instance, found any new ideas for the 
denture care category.  Table 7.1 below lays out the teams ideas against the 
quotas requested in the brief. 
 
Table 7.2:  Ideas Delivered Compared to Original Brief 
  
 
 
SLT 
Mandate 
Actual 
Distribution of UK 
Ideas Presented 
Actual 
Distribution of US 
Ideas Presented 
Smoking Cessation 1 1 1 
Aquafresh  1 1  
Sensodyne  1  1 
Weight Control  1 1  
Denture Care  1   
Pain Management  1  1 
Other – ouside those therary 
areas 
3 24 4 
Total number of new ideas 
from each team 
Required 
9 
Delivered 
27 
Delivered 
7 
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In analysing the ideas further, another layer of variation of outcomes between 
the teams becomes evident and this relates to the classification or typology of 
the individual ideas.  The brief asked for ‘radical’ ideas.  Indeed, the GSK R&D 
team overall had restyled their department logo to include the terminology 
‘Radical R&D’ within their nomenclature and internal company branding.  In 
order to discuss in more depth the relative positioning of the ISF ideas on the 
radical: incremental spectrum, it is worth pointing out how GSK classifies 
radical innovation within its internal project management processes.   
 
In assessing its portfolio of projects, GSK looks at two principal elements 
within specific NPD projects; the technology required to deliver the idea and 
the market (customer segment) for which it is intended.  If both the technology 
required and the target market are outside the current operating footprint of the 
organisation, then such an innovation is classified as ‘radical’ or 
‘breakthrough’.  If both the technology and the target market or customer 
segment are within the current scope of operations; such an innovation would 
be internally classified as ‘incremental’.  The following paragraphs provide 
some examples of NPD ideas that fall either into or between these two 
opposing categories. 
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7.3 Innovation in ISF – Incremental or Radical 
In reviewing the individual ideas from both teams and attempting to assess 
them in terms of either radical or incremental ideas, adapting the broad criteria 
indicated above, they have been classified into four categories which reflect 
the areas of both technological and marketing uncertainty.   
 
a) ‘Incremental’ innovation captures those ideas which use the same broad 
technology, mode of action, science or active ingredient within an existing 
brand.  This suggests that the idea is a minor line extension within a 
known market and using known and familiar technology.  A ‘mist pen’ for 
Nicorette (see below) is an example of this category where the market 
targetted is familiar to the organisation; smoking cessation, and the active 
ingredient also familiar: nicotine.  But the delivery mechanism, a spray 
mist device, is new.  The main nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) 
brands are already available in gums, lozenges and even nasal sprays 
and this idea is for a new NRT format; a spray pen (see below). 
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Figure 7.2:  The Commit Mist Pen 
 
Source:  US Final Presentation ISF Project. 
 
b) The second classification is ‘New brand but known science’.  This is the 
category that attracted the fewest ideas. It proposes that GSK brings 
existing science into a new therapy area that would warrant the creation 
of a new brand. An example of this was an idea of using Blackcurrant 
technology (from Ribena) to develop skin-care products based on 
possible skin care benefits of the rich anto-oxidant concentration in 
Blackcurrants. 
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Figure 7.3:  Ribena Skincare Idea 
 
 
Source:  UK Final Presentation, ISF Project. 
 
c) ‘New science to known market’ describes the process of adding new and 
better technology to existing brands.  Self-warming toothpaste for 
Aquafresh or Sensodyne (see below) is an example of this category.  A 
warm toothpaste would have more efficacy in killing bacteria. Toothpaste 
is a familiar market for GSK where they are the number-two, global 
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competitor; but, self-warming toothpaste represents a new technology for 
that market. 
 
Figure 7.4:  Self-Warming Toothpaste 
 
Source:  US Final Presentation, ISF Project. 
 
d) ‘Radical’ is the description given to ideas which take the company both 
into new markets and into unfamiliar technology.  These ideas propose 
the development of new brands (new marketing competence) and new 
scientific areas.  An example of this idea is the digital foetal monitor for 
expectant mum’s concept (see below). 
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Figure 7.5:  Digital Foetal Monitor for Expectant Mums 
 
Source:  UK Final Presentation, ISF Project. 
 
The UK team submitted twenty-seven ideas and (Figure 7.6) all but one of 
them (or 96%), require or suggest new technology incorporating new scientific 
knowledge.  To bring these ideas to the market would require that GSK commit 
to the acquisition of new specialist, scientific knowledge.  Of the UK team’s 
concepts, 50% were what could be described as radical –i.e., new technology 
in new markets.  This reflects a very high level of novelty from this team, the 
ideas are totally unconstrained by the current competencies and technologies 
that are strengths of GSK. 
 
By contrast, the US team’s concepts were not skewed so much in favour of 
radical ideas.  Of the seven concepts, three demanded new technology; two 
were intended for new brands or new markets and one qualifies as ‘radical’.  
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Most are in the area of current brands and markets for GSK; suggesting mainly 
line extensions for existing brands. 
 
Figure 7.6:  ISF Outputs; Radical V’s Incremental 
 
Source:  Analysis of the portfolio of ideas from both teams 
 
This analysis delineates very clearly the variation in the outputs of the two 
teams competing in the ISF programme.  From this analysis, I propose to 
separate the two teams, and to treat the UK team as an exemplar of Radical 
Innovation (because, this is what they delivered) and the US team as an 
exemplar of Incremental Innovation.  This is not to elevate the UK team or 
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denigrate the US; both teams delivered satisfactory outputs albeit with 
considerable variation between them.   
 
Radical innovations have the potential to transform entire industries; 
incremental innovations provide low- risk potential for product upgrades 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al., 2008). Nevertheless, they contend, it is 
important for each firm to agree their own definition because not only do 
different types of innovation play a different role in the organisation’s portfolio 
but they also require different management styles to facilitate them.  In that 
context, the next chapter (Chapter Eight) will analyse the antecedents and 
factors which may have contributed to the development of radical ideas in the 
case of the UK team and incremental innovation in the case of the US.  It will 
subsequently suggest an organisation-level of project-level  framework which 
may be helpful for organisations who have a purposeful objective in pursuing 
either radical or incremental innovation or exploring both. 
 
7.4 The Innovation Processes Employed in the Case Study 
The following section will explore the processes used by each team in their 
response to the project challenge.  Within this section, large themes like the 
idea generation approach is discussed.  Idea generation is, in itself, a process, 
although it encompasses other processes within it. Moreover, it was the first 
phase in the project and the one in which the approach of both teams is 
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contrasted.   
 
In the case of the UK team, the bulk of their time, energy and effort was 
concentrated on the idea generation phase.  Hence, it is proposed, for the 
purpose of clarity to include their use of both internal and external networks in 
this (idea-generation) section also.  In keeping with the chronological narrative 
approach adopted in both Chapters Five and Six, it seems appropriate here 
also to access the literature through the richness of the teams’ experiences in 
the sequence that they occurred.  Hence, this section will begin with a review 
and discussion of the idea generation processes.  It will then progress to 
processes used in the idea conversion phase, including the issue of idea 
prioritisation and voice of consumer (VOC) issues.  It will discuss the practice 
and theory around innovation champions and their role in smoothing the path 
for ideas inside organisations. 
 
7.4.1 Idea Generation and ISF – The UK Team Approach 
The generation of novel and useful ideas is a necessary precursor to 
innovation.  It is an essential ingredient for innovation projects.  Amabile et al. 
(1996) propose:  
 
All innovation begins with creative ideas... We define innovation as the 
successful implementation of creative ideas within an organisation. In this 
view, creativity by individuals and teams is a starting point for innovation; 
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the first is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the second. 
 
The ISF project began with the idea generation phase.  Both teams started 
with a blank page and both teams approached it differently.   The UK team 
embarked on a more substantial outreach or boundary spanning programme 
with research institutes and universities.  Specifically, they made a site visit to 
the Surrey Sleep Research Centre in Guildford University, Surrey.  Here they 
met and talked with the Principal Investigator on a number of sleep studies and 
these discussions formed some of the basis for two specific ideas that the 
team ultimately presented to the SLT. 
 
The team leader also arranged a meeting with Bufton Consulting, an Open 
Innovation intermediary consultancy, located in Reading.  Bufton Consulting 
were given a brief, consistent with the team’s own brief, to go scouting for 
interesting technology in certain therapy areas and to report back to the UK 
ISF team with their findings.  From this meeting, Bufton returned with some 
promising technology ideas in digital disease management.  This is an area of 
healthcare, which has subsequently been very well developed and is referred 
to under the heading of ‘tele-health’ or ‘connected healthcare’.  Bufton 
Consulting approached the UK team with ideas about digital diabetes testing 
and monitoring devices as well as foetal monitoring devices.  Both these ideas 
led the ISF team into contact with experts in those fields and these ideas were 
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developed during the project and were ultimately selected for inclusion in the 
final presentation. 
 
The UK team leader encouraged the team to look for areas in which they had 
an interest or where there might be interesting, relevant new technology and to 
go and talk to external experts in different fields: 
 
One of the things that we tried to set out to do was not to have anything 
too process-driven, but to provide people with the opportunity to learn 
about new areas, find out new information, speak to new people, from 
which they could generate new threads.  So the philosophy was that 
rather than have a process whereby you go through different stats 
(market statistics) to try and pull ideas together, is you create an 
environment where people have the opportunity to read about new areas, 
talk to experts in different areas, interact with different people such that 
they can generate threads for their own development. 
 
The UK team leader discussed with his team the two possible approaches, he 
saw, to their task.  He contrasted the customer-driven, insight-led innovation 
with technology-push approaches.  He concluded that his team should really 
focus on the technology route rather than the consumer insight.  He had 
legitimate reasons for this approach; first his team was comprised entirely of 
technical people, scientists, medics and regulatory specialists and, following 
from that, they did not have any marketing or market research people or 
expertise on the team.  In his interview, he describes his selection of this 
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approach very clearly: 
 
Now I would say there are broadly two areas where you can come up 
with huge wins in terms of new products.  One is if you come up with a 
technical solution that is slightly different and can be positioned to an 
unmet or inadequately met consumer need.  And that is what I would 
describe as a technically client-driven solution.  Or the other way you can 
do it is if you just happen to strike on an insight, or a piece of consumer 
understanding, which enables you to make something of what you have 
already got  available in a light that hasn’t previously been recognised.  
As a group of scientists I felt our role was very much to come up with new 
technical solutions.  Things that would at least be worth exploring from a 
technical point of view. 
 
Although not labelling it as such, Grist is actually describing the difference 
between technology-push and demand-pull innovation.  He is declaring his 
preference for the former.  The leader’s intention to focus exclusively on the 
science struck a chord with other members of the team.  One member, in 
particular, makes the point that GSK, in his view, has often had strong or 
promising technical ideas for which the company was unable to match an 
equally compelling consumer insight. 
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And I think as an organisation we have had that, many, many times in the 
past where we sometimes are not able to unlock the concept with the 
consumer straight away and we tend to back away from it and say oh it 
failed, it didn’t score well and we don’t keep going at it enough to 
understand why it failed and how we might change it to make it work.  
And I think there is lots of scientific opportunities that weren’t understood.  
So overall I was extremely enthusiastic about the approach of looking for 
innovative new business opportunities, addressing it predominantly from 
a scientific, R&D perspective. 
 
The UK team also prioritised the creation of external networks with thought-
leaders in certain therapy areas which were outside the GSK current served 
markets. As already noted, they spent some time in the national sleep 
laboratory, talking to experts in the area of sleep and this input is evident in 
some of the ideas they ultimately presented.  The top two ideas they presented 
centred on the sleep category.  Following the feedback from Bufton 
Consulting, the UK team also looked very closely at the area of tele-health or 
electronic devices to aid self-diagnosis or treatment.  GSK is a member of an 
Open Innovation alliance called the Continua Alliance.  In their own words, 
Continua Alliance is:  
 
A non-profit, open industry alliance of the finest healthcare and 
technology companies in the world joining together in collaboration to 
improve the quality of personal healthcare. 
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In simple terms, the Continua Alliance connects healthcare companies whose 
NPD ideas may be leading them closer to medical device or electronic 
solutions with technology companies whose own NPD efforts might be 
increasingly leading them towards health and wellness products.  The 
Continua Alliance works on big themes (or disease states) and invites suitable 
partners to collaborate.  The themes include diabetes, cardiac disease and 
COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease).  The UK team went and met 
with people from Continua and discussed some ideas with them and, following 
that, they sought out and met with internal GSK experts on diabetes.  In the 
Pharma division of GSK (by far the largest part of the company), diabetes is 
one of the company’s specialist areas. When company personnel forge 
connections with subject matter experts in other parts of their own 
organisation, this practice is, and these relationships are often referred to as 
bridging ties. These are knowledge-sharing ties spanning internal boundaries 
in a formal organisation.  Existing empirical studies demonstrate a correlation 
between bridging ties and improved innovation performance (Tortoriello and 
Krackhardt, 2010). 
 
By connecting both with Bufton Consulting, the Continua Alliance (boundary 
spanning) and the GSK diabetes team (bridging ties), the UK team came up 
with a number of ideas around tele-health both in diabetes and in foetal 
monitoring during pregnancy.  These ideas qualify as radical under our prior 
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headings as they imply both a new brand from GSK, as they do not fit naturally 
under current brands within the company’s brand portfolio, and they are based 
on technology, which is not currently being used within the company. 
 
7.4.2 How the US Team Managed the Idea Generation Process 
In contrast, the US team very quickly mechanised the process of idea 
generation.  Team members were given dictaphones to record any ideas they 
had while out of the office.  They were also provided with access and training 
on innovation software tool (ThinkTank® from Group Systems) with which they 
could list, cluster and prioritise their ideas online.  Further, they were given a 
future trends presentation by a specialist trends company, called Iconoculture.  
This presentation made predictions about possible future trends in healthcare, 
wellness and self-medication and these predictions acted as prompts and 
stimulus for possible ideas for the team.  In this way, the US team was making 
limited use of external consultants as part of their idea sourcing.  However, 
they did not engage with suppliers or with universities and research institutes 
and this may have left a gap in their preparation.  The team leader 
acknowledges:  
 
As far as connecting with Research Institutes or KOL’s (Key Opinion 
Leaders)… we didn’t do a lot of this…and yes, most of our research was 
desk/literature/patent research-based.  In just one instance, we did, 
however reach out to a world-renowned expert on medical applications 
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for ozone… which served as input to a number of ozone-based new 
product/device ideas that were formally tested via concept study with 
BuzzBack. 
 
The US team leader intended to fully comply with the brief by covering the full 
spectrum of activities required, and so when he created his project plan, he 
allocated only the first nine weeks of the nine-month project (25% of the 
project duration) to the idea generation phase (see Chapter Five).  During this 
phase, the US team’s approach to the idea generation task was to rely 
primarily on electronic brainstorming which is the use of computers to log, 
post, build upon and rank ideas. The team very rapidly developed a way of 
working that revolved around twice-weekly meetings. The brainstorming (or 
search for new ideas) was often done at these meetings but using the 
ThinkTank tool.  Coapman, the team-leader, was a trained facilitator with this 
tool.  
 
Software such as ThinkTank facilitates brainstorming without the need for 
face-to-face interaction.  It also allows participants to contribute their ideas 
anonymously (Diener, 1979; Thompson, 2003).  It allows team members to 
generate a lot of raw ideas without having to leave their own desks.  
Participants can also review the other participants’ ideas and build upon them. 
This method of brainstorming is especially useful if team members are located 
on different sites where face-to-face meetings are difficult to arrange.  It is 
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paradoxical that it was the US team who embraced this technology when they 
were all co-located while the UK team did not use it despite being dispersed 
over two sites. 
 
The US team were, when compared to the UK approach, very inward looking 
in how they scouted for new ideas.  A number of the SLT members criticised 
the US ideas for lacking originality and being too predictable.  One explanation 
for this is provided by one of the US team members, when she says that most 
of the US ideas were ideas that had already been floating around the 
organisation for some time beforehand and had become ‘hobby-horses’ for 
some of the team members. 
 
Generating 300 ideas is very easy actually.  Basically, we just find old 
ideas and put them in. 
  
There was one further, possibly subliminal, brake applied to the US idea 
generation process which came in the form of this same team-member’s 
refusal to develop or even support any ideas that were, in her view, radical.  
She felt, that despite the company’s stated desire to receive radical ideas for 
its pipeline, that GSK would never accept anything really novel or risky.  This 
made sure that the ideas that she contributed were centred on modest 
performance enhancements of current offerings but she also discouraged her 
team mates from developing or promoting any ambitious, radical ideas. 
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‘I do not think the company. I mean, even though we were told there’s a 
no limit and the sky’s the limit but … I just do not think that the company 
were to go for it. Doesn’t matter how much data; I just do not think the 
company was open to really new ideas. 
 
In summary, the US team did not create an environment conducive to 
developing radical innovation even at the preliminary stage.  By not developing 
or encouraging external, or even internal, networks, they were limiting the type 
and direction of the ideas that would emerge.  On top of that, there were 
people on the team who considered that it was their role to protect the 
company against innovation and to actively discourage imaginative, novel, 
possibly radical ideas.  However, the US team emerged from this phase and 
had, within nine weeks, assembled a portfolio of 300 ideas, which they then 
went on to test.  
 
7.5 Idea Conversion in the ISF Project 
Variously referred to as conversion (Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007), 
transformation (Roper et al, 2008) or incubation (Paulus and Huie Chuan, 
2000); this phase involves selecting the ideas that have most appeal.  As 
Hansen and Birkenshaw (2007) note: 
 
Generating lots of good ideas is one thing; how you handle (or 
mishandle) them once you have them is another matter entirely. New 
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concepts won’t prosper without strong screening … mechanisms. (p124) 
In the ISF project, this second phase, in the strictest sense, was really only 
undertaken by the US team.  In the UK, the phase of idea generation 
continued right up to the end.  Although, certain team members who had 
formalised their ideas did have conventional concepts ready for testing but for 
the most part, the UK ideas were very early stage, embryonic and not fully 
formed.  By contrast, the US team really put time and effort into doing the 
second step to a high level.  So, once a quantity of novel, high potential ideas 
are identified and collected, the next phase of the project involves what are 
often prickly decisions about which ideas to prioritise and which to abandon.  
Ideas often take on a very personal dimension, as each team member is 
naturally and especially fond of their own contributions and may be reluctant to 
discard their own ideas and embrace the ideas of others.  This is an area 
where team conflict is almost inevitable as was demonstrated in this case 
study. 
 
Once the selection decisions were made and the uncertainty, which 
characterises innovation, was overcome, then the US team entered a period of 
high performance. They managed the consumer research process, moving 
from qualitative to quantitative research very efficiently.  They rendered their 
ideas very professionally, using expert copywriters and illustrators to convey 
their ideas in the most appropriate way for the research process. The project 
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management skills of the team leader came to the fore as soon as they had 
left the ‘fuzzy front end’ behind them. 
 
7.6  The Variation in Outcomes for the Two Teams 
The large variation in approach and outcomes in the case study data prompts 
a number of questions; including why did the teams produce different types of 
ideas, and, more importantly, is the variation in process and leadership, 
observed in the previous chapter, associated with different outcomes.  It could 
be argued that the UK team invested all their time and energy in the idea 
generation phase of the project; they concentrated on invention and never got 
around to either of the other two following phases; conversion and diffusion 
(Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007).  In that sense, one could suggest that the UK 
ISF team were not actually an innovation team as they were not active across 
the full spectrum of activities that constitute the innovation value chain.  They 
confined their activities principally to the idea generation stage.  Despite this 
(or possibly because of it), the UK team were credited with producing the more 
original, novel and radical ideas of the two groups and this may, in part, be 
attributable to them spending so much time in the creative realm of idea 
generation.  It could also be connected to the fact that they built better internal 
and external networks to access knowledge, ideas, expertise and insight.   
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There were considerable differences in the teams’ approaches to the 
challenge.  The UK team, for instance, did not engage, in any significant way, 
with consumers.  They believed that their mandate was to maximise the 
technical, scientific input into their ideas and this higher focus on the science is 
likely to have been a contributory factor to their ideas (being widely reported 
as) having more of a breakthrough feel to them than the US ones.  The 
absence of customer feedback combined with their alliances with technology 
consortia (Continua Alliance) had the effect of making the UK ideas more 
technology-led than consumer-driven.  Further, it could be argued that the UK 
team were deliberately pursuing radical ideas whereas the US team, with their 
very high level of consumer interaction and tight project management, may 
have been destined to, or certainly more likely to, develop incremental ideas.  
This interpretation will be explored further in the coming pages. 
 
The more tightly project-managed US group coached all their members 
through what appeared to be a very positive developmental experience, for 
each individual involved, of running a consumer focus group.  Each member of 
the team had to run a focus group with consumers from the target group for 
which their idea was intended.  For many, this was the first time that they had 
ever interacted with customer research; and, in this case, they were not just 
attending it but they were actually moderating the group. In this context, it 
could be suggested that the US team were building an innovation capability 
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within their team by building skills that would endure beyond the lifetime of the 
ISF project. On the other hand, the UK team were exclusively building ideas 
and not, intentionally, building capability.   
 
The US group also managed to carry out both qualitative (as noted above) and 
quantitative research on their ideas which demonstrated that they performed 
better in the latter stages of the innovation value chain: conversion and 
diffusion.  It’s worth noting that these latter stages of the innovation process 
were part of the original brief and in carrying them our as part of the project, 
the US team were being entirely compliant.  This compliance also points to a 
perspective that the US were more process focussed while the UK were more 
focussed on the outcome.  One of the SLT members notes: 
 
The US team’s ideas were more line extensions for existing brands than 
genuinely original, novel, radical ideas.  The US stuff was predictable and 
really just incremental. 
 
If the teams could be plotted along a continuum stretching from explore to 
exploit; the US team would have been at the explore end with the UK closer to 
exploit. The US ideas almost all exploited existing brands and technologies 
whereas the UK team’s ideas were predominately exploring new technologies 
and/or new markets. There is a difference between the ‘R’ and the ‘D’ in ‘R&D’ 
(Bain et al., 2001). Research is the phase where new ideas are very valuable 
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while development is more concerned with bringing the new ideas into being.  
Hence, the UK could also be classified as a research Team with the US more 
of a development team. 
 
One further classification that might separate the two teams is their approach 
to the challenge.  The US team, with their adoption of project management 
tools, critical path, schedules and principles can be described as having 
followed a linear, stage-gate approach to the innovation process.  The UK, 
whose approach was not formally managed through a sequence of stages or 
gates, adopted more of a network approach.  The network approach, in their 
case, implies that they were more outward facing and adopted an approach 
more consistent with open innovation. 
 
Table 7.3 below summarises some of the major dimensions upon which there 
was a significant difference between the approaches and processes of the two 
teams which seem likely to have had an inpact on the outcomes they 
ultimately produced.  These issues are further discussed in the following two 
chapters. 
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Table 7.3: Approaches of the Teams to the Process of Innovation 
Radical Innovation 
Based on UK Team 
Factor Incremental Innovation 
Based on US Team 
Loose and flexible  
 
Leadership Tight and structured 
Internal experts are sought out and 
their expertise is harnessed in 
building the concepts. 
Internal Networks/ 
Bridging Ties 
Internal experts on various 
promising therapy areas are not 
sought out or tapped into.  The 
team is self-reliant. 
 
The innovation team takes 
responsibility and does not actively 
build internal networks to support the 
ideas. They prefer to ‘surprise’ the 
senior managers. 
 
Finding Champions for 
the ideas within Senior 
Management 
 
The search for future supporters 
for their ideas is purposeful and 
actively managed.  SLT are 
sensitised to what’s coming; ‘no 
surprises’ is the approach. 
 
Team is comprised of a group of 
individuals with little formal contact 
who pursue specific ideas through 
largely personal motivation.  Team 
members largely unaware of each 
other’s projects 
Team working Effort is made to channel the 
team’s work, meet regularly, 
achieve consensus and to reduce 
team conflict. Team continually 
reviewing each other’s work as a 
group 
 
No formal project plan.  Only one 
deadline. 
 
Project Management 
 
Plan developed with milestones, 
deliverables and critical path with a 
series of interim deadlines 
 
Ideas are actively scouted from 
outside the company and 
relationships are initiated with 
external experts.  Team is externally 
focused 
 
External Networks Experts asked to advise once only 
on a consultancy basis on projects 
that have been initiated internally.  
Team is internally focused 
 
Consumer research is considered 
once the scientific bases of the ideas 
have been established. It has low 
priority. 
Technology-led 
Voice of the Consumer Consumer research dominates the 
process and dictates the type and 
level of novelty in innovation.  It 
has top priority. 
Customer-led 
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Chapter Eight  
Discussion 
 
8.1  Chapter Objectives and Contents 
This study began by asking what insights might be gained by studying closely 
the innovation processes and outcomes of a large, global and successful 
company. Specifically, the study explores how the company organises to 
encourage radical innovation. It emerges from this study of GSK that within a 
team-based innovation experiment, two sets of NPD ideas were developed; 
with one set qualifying as radical ideas for innovation while the other set was 
more incremental.  This significant difference leads to the further question of 
what were the antecedent processes and issues that led to such wide variation 
in outcomes. 
 
This discussion chapter has two objectives: first, to propose a framework 
which fuses the practice-based insights (derived from this study) with relevant 
theory with the objective of developing possible future guidelines for managing 
innovation projects in GSK and other large, R&D-intensive environments, and, 
secondly, to determine whether extant litertaure can furnish an adequate 
explanation for the variation in outcomes from these two teams. 
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In terms of extant literature, the case study is an example of a team-based 
innovation initiative that focuses on the earlier phases of the innovation value 
chain (IVC).  Specifically, the case data presents variation in terms of types of 
innovation; radical and incremental. It also highlights variation across the 
innovation process, including variation in how the teams were managed.  The 
case analysis identifies a number of themes that emerge from the study, which 
emerged through the analysis and coding process, reported in Chapter Six.  
These issues are as listed in Table 8.1: 
 
Table 8.1:  Key Themes from ISF in Managing Innovation Projects 
Themes Constituent elements 
Structure Making time for innovation 
Squaring-off line managers 
Size of team 
Space to innovate 
Process Ways of working (use of IT, co-location) 
Harnessing the voice of the customer 
Objective methods for idea prioritisation 
Networks Bridging Ties (internal) 
Boundary Spanning (external) 
Recruiting innovation champions 
Leadership Technical Skills 
People Skills 
Project Management Skills 
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The case described in this study is positioned in the context of (1) the activities 
occurred upstream in the innovation process; at the fuzzy-front end; the idea 
generation and conversion phases (2) the case is an experiment in team-
based innovation  and, specifically, (3) the case highlights considerable 
differences in the leadership of such teams.  Although often graphically 
represented as a sequential flow, the  innovation process is regularly 
described as non-linear (Caldwell and O’Reilly, 2003).  The structure of this 
chapter follows the path taken by the project itself.  It begins by looking at 
issues surrounding project initiating structures. Next, the idea generation 
phase, as it was managed by the two teams, is discussed and analysed.  
Other processes are then discussed with reference to the relevant literature; 
managing and prioritising the ideas, managing the voice of the customer, using 
internal networks and championing ideas within the organisation.  Finally, the 
issue of leadership is discussed. 
 
The figure below (Figure 8.1) graphically maps the stages of the IVC in which 
the two teams were active during this project.  Their endeavours will be 
described in detail later in the chapter but this graphic illustrates that the UK 
team were really only active within the idea generation phase while the US 
team extended their efforts across all three although they stopped 
considerably short of getting a new product or idea launched or introduced. 
 
409 
 
Figure 8.1: Mapping the Teams’ Activities Across the IVC 
 
(Adapted from Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007) 
 
This chapter will now review the issues and themes emerging from the study 
data.  The first part will reprise the key issues or themes that emerged from the 
case.  Then, in the following section, each theme or tension point is discussed 
in terms of how it is currently positioned within extant literature.  The 
discussion of each issue will conclude with some interpretation of possible 
implications of the case for current thinking. 
 
8.2 Overview of the themes from the case  
It is widely acknowledged that, in terms of new product (and service) 
development and their impact on both the industry and firm level, significant 
differences exist between radical and incremental innovations (Dosi, 1982; 
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Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 2000).  There a plethora of 
classifications to define radical innovations (in particular) with some 
emphasising their impact on the technology; others stressing their disruption to 
the market; still others focusing on their novelty and more relating the 
radicalness to its impact on the parent organisation (See Chapter Two). 
  
But many authors concur that firms must determine for themselves which of 
their innovations are deemed to be radical and which are incremental for two 
reasons; first, because firms need to balance their innovation portfolio and 
second, differing managerial practices favour different outcomes and firms 
need to organise accordingly.  In this case, the challenge put to the two teams 
was to develop ‘radical innovation’ and for the purposes of this analysis, 
‘radicalness’ is being defined as including ideas that suggest both new 
technology and new markets. 
 
This chapter has followed the operating model of the Innovation Value Chain 
(IVC) (Hansen and Birkenshaw, 2007) which divides the innovation process, 
regardless of whether the outcomes are radical or incremental, into three 
discrete phases.  Having examined the performance of the two teams, within 
each of the IVC stages, it is clear that the UK team elected to immerse 
themselves in phase one for the entire duration of the project and didn’t really 
perform meaningfully against the ‘conversion’ or ‘diffusion’ phase.   
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Conversely, the US team spent only a quarter of their time in the idea 
generation phase after which they focused their attention on performing well in 
the two latter phases.  Within both the idea generation and conversion phases, 
the US team neglected to build networks within the company (bridging ties) 
and outside the organisation (boundary spanning), confining their search to 
desk-based research and this omission seemed to limit the novelty or 
originality of the ideas they eventually presented.  The UK team did, however, 
manage to include the sub-phases proposed by the IVC model; in-house, 
cross-pollination and external idea generation.  It is suggested that the 
superior novelty of the UK team’s ideas is due, certainly in part, to their 
external focus in the quest for original ideas. 
 
 Making this distinction between the two outcomes allows for an analysis of 
what precisely, in this case study, were the antecedents that led to the 
variation in outcomes.  Specifically, in practice, what type of management 
would seem to better facilitate each type of innovation?  Many companies will 
seek a balanced portfolio of new ideas with both radical and incremental 
opportunities and this analysis adds useful insights into the factors that favour 
one or the other. 
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Leifer et al. (2002) make the point that large companies have great difficulty in 
bringing radical innovations to the market: 
 
While it is clear that radical innovation is important to firms concerned 
with long-run growth and renewal, it is also clear that large, established 
firms have difficulty managing the radical-innovation process. Large, 
established firms have grown excellent at managing operational 
efficiencies, and at introducing next- generation products. However, the 
chaos and uncertainty that come with commercializing new technologies 
for markets that may not yet exist require vastly different competencies. 
(p. 102)  
 
In this context, it is to be anticipated that there will be a higher level of 
managerial interest in the factors that promoted radical innovation within this 
case study than those that facilitated incremental innovation.  One conclusion 
of this case study is likely to be that organisations can tailor their management 
practices to purposefully facilitate the type of innovation they seek.  They can 
structure programmes and teams in a way, which is likely to lead to one or 
other, incremental or radical innovation, outcomes.  Indeed, they can structure 
individual projects to match desired outcomes.  As noted in Chapter Two, 
many organisations will actively manage quotas of projects in each area.  
Hence, these guidelines will be of significant managerial interest to managers 
tasked with managing and balancing an innovation pipeline. 
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The figure below (figure 8.2) summarises what are the principal findings of this 
case study.  The first, as noted above is that there is a difference between 
radical an incremental innovation and that organisations can develop 
structures and processes and can choose team leaders in a way that will 
maximise their chances of developing either form of innovation.  Analysing the 
individual structures and processes; conclusions can be drawn on the impact 
of various elements on programme outcomes.  Four principal headings 
emerge from this case study analysis: structure, process, networks and 
leadership.  The figure below shows how these issues co-exist and overlap in 
innovation projects. 
 
Figure 8.2:  A Four Factor Framework of Innovation Based on ISF Programme 
 
Source:  Graphic developed from case study findings 
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8.3  A Four Factor Framework for Practice 
The table above is based upon the insights from the practical case of the ISF. 
This is a possible framework identifying the principal areas of tension that 
might affect the outputs of innovation teams in comparable settings.  This 
representation reflects the layers of issues that need to be taken into account 
when embarking on a team-led innovation initiative or activity.  It 
acknowledges the elementary (but nonetheless important) structural issues 
around establishing the ways of working and selection of team members.   
 
Initiating Structures 
These issues connected with the initiating structures of the project were 
shared by both teams insofar as both had to cope with time constraints; both 
teams had to cope with finding a space to innovate; both teams had to deal 
with the issue of providing cover for team members to work on the ISF project.   
 
Although, these were reported as significant constraints in the experiences of 
the team members; they did not appear to materially affect the outcomes 
produced by the teams.  In other words, both teams produced satisfactory 
outcomes despite the constraints of time shortage and the need to balance 
other work commitments.  There are four elements to how initiating structures 
impacted on this case study.  First, on a practical level, the notional 
assignment of 20% of people’s time just didn’t seem to work for the individuals 
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involved.  Many reflected that a more intense commitment allocating more, or 
preferably, all of their time for a shorter duration might have resulted in 
superior outcomes, although this is impossible to test.  A second element that 
was reported to have had a negative impact on the project was that the SLT 
did not adjust anyone’s workload, or make any effort to adjust it to take 
account of participants’ involvement in this project.   This seems somewhat 
naïve in hindsight; to expect the teams to deliver radical breakthrough ideas for 
the organisation but to do it without interrupting their other activities. 
 
Compounding this, the SLT neglected to clear the participation of certain team 
members with their immediate line managers.  This resulted in the line 
managers, being reported as, becoming a barrier to engagement with the 
project.  Such a reaction could easily have been anticipated and dealt with.  It 
was always possible that the line managers would feel overlooked and might 
possibly, as a consequence, try to thwart the input of their subordinates.  
Failing to legislate for this in planning the project meant that participants had to 
almost conceal their involvement on ISF from their managers; or certainly be 
overly discreet about it and their contribution to it became seen to be almost 
subversive. 
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The third element within the initiating structure was that those members of the 
team who had most line responsibility, or, specifically, most people reporting to 
them found it most difficult to sustain a high contribution to the project because 
of the competing demands on their time.  In the UK team, this was most acute.  
Some of the senior managers perceived that there was little structure to the 
project and little direction coming from the team leader and so some, stealthily, 
started to withdraw.  UK team members who were located on a separate site 
from the main group were particularly affected.  Ultimately, this group all pulled 
out of the project.  But the withdrawal of some of the senior managers had one 
positive consequence; it gave the younger, junior team members the 
opportunity to take a more central role in the project.   
 
Nevertheless, one would have to assume that the project could have 
benefitted from the wholehearted commitment and engagement of the entire 
group rather than the reluctant and fleeting connection of some (usually senior) 
people and the enthusiastic energy of others (usually junior).  What happened 
in the UK team was a function of both, initiating structures where no provision 
was made to lighten the workload for the members during the period of their 
involvement, and of the leadership of the team, which failed to provide clarity in 
directing the team members’ work. 
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The fourth element was simply the size of the team.  Reflecting on the 
experience, the universal view from the participants was that the teams were 
too large.  Starting with 12 or 13 members made coordination of meetings very 
difficult; it made decision making difficult and it allowed certain people to hang 
back, even withdraw and not contribute as much as others. 
 
Space to Innovate 
At a prosaic level, one of the elements that made a positive impact, according 
to both teams, was when they were assigned their dedicated innovation team 
room.  It seems to make intuitive sense that if you want people to break out of 
the routine and to think differently, then they are more likely to do it in a place 
which is away from their own routine; away from their desk.  Assigning a 
dedicated space also allows them to store and exhibit stimulating samples, 
ideas, images and other team related artefacts in one place where people can 
go and interact with them.  Having a team room or a project room provided a 
physical space to go for meetings and for individual work.  It also seemed to 
provide a psychological boost in demonstrating the importance of the initiative 
by assigning it a dedicated space. 
 
Other elements of the initiative appeared to be more highly associated with 
successful innovation outcomes.  Elements such as how the teams were 
managed and how well connected they were, both inside and outside the 
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organisation, (especially the latter) had far more influence in delivering 
superior outcomes.  Hence, issues of initiating structure are hygiene factors; 
implying that while they need to be managed properly, they will not, in 
themselves, deliver the desired outcomes.  Additionally, even if they are poorly 
managed, as they were in this case, such factors, alone, did not seem to stifle 
innovation to the extent that they might derail the entire project. Consequently, 
in the diagram above, they appear on the bottom of the table. 
 
Prioritising Ideas 
Prudent managers should also anticipate handling issues around managing 
the selection, screening and ranking of ideas in a way that does not cause 
unnecessary team conflict. Ideas should be screened in a way also that 
minimises the team’s chances of selecting an inappropriate idea or, conversely 
overlooking a potential winner.  One possible solution to resolve this would 
have been to have a commercial person on the team.  In that way, the R&D 
specialists could concentrate on the science and technology while the 
commercial person investigated the likely market application and sales 
potential of the ideas being worked on.  There was a concern, especially in the 
UK team, that minor ideas were receiving the same attention and resource 
from the team as potentially breakthrough ideas but that they were not 
equipped or sufficiently experienced to be able to tell the difference.  Of 
course, there is no fool proof guideline for establishing the future value of ideas 
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and the more radical the idea is, the more difficult it is to assign a value to its 
commercialisation. However, within GSK, there are a team of specialist 
commercial people whose role it is to make these type of, albeit necessarily 
fallible, projections.  Such a specialist would have been helpful on the team. 
 
In the absence of a commercial person to help with these prioritisation 
decisions, a bespoke (decision) framework would have been a helpful way to 
rank the ideas.  But without such a framework, the UK team were susceptible 
to a disproportionate influence of personalities.  They readily conceded that 
many ideas made it through to the final rounds more on the strength of 
personality of the originator than on any demonstrable, inherent quality of the 
idea. 
 
Examples abound of frameworks for ranking and prioritising ideas but naturally 
the better ones are customised to fit the specific context.  Neither team 
developed their own framework, nor did they make use of a standard template 
for one.  Not having one left their decision-making very open to influence but, 
on the positive side, it may also have allowed them the flexibility to include 
more radical ideas.  Frameworks are also fallible and can often favour ideas 
that are most adjacent to the current repertoire.  Hence, they can discriminate 
against radical ideas.  Arguably, some framework would have been useful for 
the team but not one that was too rigid.  One that gave direction for 
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prioritisation would have been helpful but it would also need to have sufficient 
flexibility to allow for truly novel ideas. 
 
Voice of Customer 
The four-factor framework derived from ISF also suggests a balanced view of 
integrating the voice of the consumer/customer into the process and argues 
that how and when this is done can be critical to the overall project outcome.  It 
also argues that the prominence given to the customer input can have an 
inverse relationship with the novelty of the ideas being progressed.  Customers 
can, in some instances, have a narrow view of the market and may be less 
well disposed to ideas, which, in their view, involve radical changes from the 
status quo. One of the reasons that the US team was declared the winners of 
the competition was that they had managed to verify their ideas through 
consumer research.  They had carried out two rounds of consumer research 
by the time the ideas were finally presented to the SLT.  The ideas had 
performed well in research and therefore it was concluded that there was 
some proven consumer interest in the ideas.  However, the dominance of the 
consumer research element of the US team’s approach gave rise to 
considerable controversy with other members of the SLT who vehemently 
disagreed with the priority it was afforded in that group.  They believed that the 
ambition and quality of the science was diminished by the focus on market 
research.  Moreover, they believed that if you put a bunch of high-performing 
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R&D people together, it seems a poor use of their time to use them in 
managing a marketing research project. 
 
This debate brings to the fore the issue of how to harness the voice of the 
customer into innovation projects.  The question, in the case of GSK, is not if 
but how. This is a delicate balance; managing to integrate the voice of the 
customer in the development of ideas in a way that strengthens those ideas 
rather than diminishes or constrains them.  It seems that if the voice of the 
customer is too dominant, that the ideas will be biased towards merely 
incremental changes.  But if the voice of the customer is absent from the 
process, there is a high risk that the project will be so divorced from consumer 
wants and needs that it will fail to be commercialiseable.  Once again, like the 
innovation process itself, this is a contingent model with no single, simple 
correct way of doing things in all instances. 
 
In the ISF project, both leaders took opposing views to the importance of the 
market research element of the project.  In the US, the team elevated this 
element and devoted up to three quarters of their time to managing it, showing 
evidence of their market pull approach.  While the UK team leader wanted the 
science to lead the process and his interaction to researching the appeal of his 
team’s ideas was perfunctory.  Thus the UK team exemplified a technology-
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push approach.  It seems that both were extreme perspectives, where a 
middle course might have been more suitable. 
 
Networks 
The framework indicates the high value to the team of purposefully managing 
their network of professional contacts both within and outside the firm. This is 
seen as particularly impactful in the quest for radical innovation.  Networks 
played a central role in this case in three crucial areas: external collaboration 
networks; internal expert networks; and internal networks of idea champions 
 
Bufton Consulting, a commercial open innovation intermediary, were called in 
by the UK team leader and were provided with the same brief that the team 
themselves had received.  Bringing them in and asking them to respond to the 
brief with ideas and contacts proved to be a decisive move for the UK team.  
Bufton identified both specific areas of interest as well as potential commercial 
partners that fed into the UK team’s final presentation.  It was, in some part, 
due to the Bufton-inspired ideas that the UK team were generally considered 
to have proposed the more original and novel ideas. 
 
In contrast, the US team did not engage any external partners for the idea-
generation stage of the process.  This was one critical difference between the 
two teams.  The US team’s ideas were criticised for being unoriginal and 
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predictable and this is not surprising as one of their team members suggests 
that many of the ideas they proposed were ideas that had been suggested 
many times already (See Chapter Five) and that the ISF, for some people, was 
merely the latest platform through which they could promote favourite ideas.  
But by bringing in external consultants at the early stage, the UK team helped 
ensure that their initial palette of ideas was fresh and original. 
 
The UK team also performed well in making connections within GSK with 
subject matter experts in different parts of the company.  Hence, internal 
experts on diabetes were consulted for input to some of the ideas being 
hatched in the UK team.  This connection with internal experts strengthened 
the ideas and built on the knowledge already residing in the overall 
organisation.  The US team confined themselves to desk research and did not 
make any external or internal connections during the idea generation phase. 
 
However, where the US team did perform well was in actively seeking support 
for their ideas in advance of the presentation.  The US team leader held 
numerous meetings with the individual SLT members to let them know about 
the type of ideas that his team were working on; he thus sensitised them to 
what was likely to be presented in the final meeting.  So, when the US team 
presented, there were no surprises for the SLT, they each knew in advance 
what was being proposed and had been briefed in detail on any ideas that 
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were specifically in their area of responsibility.  Interviews with the SLT confirm 
that they preferred the US approach of keeping them abreast of developments 
within the project.  Some expressed frustration at the UK’s failure to ‘check in’ 
at any time during the nine months; even though such autonomy had been part 
of the initial project design. 
 
Team Leadership 
Finally, the framework illustrates that the selection of team leader is a crucial 
one.  A strong team leader is likely to have the technical expertise to manage 
the task; the creative ability to deal with the ambiguity required; the soft people 
skills to effectively leverage the talent of the team and keep them motivated 
and focussed throughout the journey; the political acumen to position the ideas 
with senior management to increase their chances of getting traction in the 
pipeline; the commercial judgment to be able to make prioritisation decisions 
accurately and the experience to facilitate the process effectively. Effective 
project leadership has been identified as one of the most important 
mechanisms not only for managing team dynamics but also for steering the 
teams successfully and efficiently through the new product development 
process (McDonough and Griffin, 1997). Thamhain (2006) suggests that 
effective project team leaders are social architects who understand the 
interaction between organisational and behavioural variables and can act 
accordingly to satisfy both. 
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Consistent with prior studies, this case study reinforces the link with 
transaction leadership and incremental innovation and between 
transformational leadership with radical.  The model below outlines, in 
summary, how managers can organise for the type of innovation they require 
to suit varying objectives within an organisation. 
 
Table 8.2:  Leading Teams for Radical or Incremental Innovation 
Radical Innovation 
Based on UK Team 
Factor Incremental Innovation 
Based on US Team 
Loose and flexible 
Transformational 
Contingent 
 
Leadership Tight and structured 
Transactional 
Systematic 
Internal experts are sought out 
and their expertise is harnessed 
in building the concepts. 
Internal Networks/ 
Bridging Ties 
Internal experts on various 
promising therapy areas are 
not sought out or tapped into.   
 
The team is self-reliant. 
 
The innovation team takes 
responsibility and does not 
actively build internal support 
networks for the ideas. They 
prefer to ‘surprise’ the senior 
managers. 
 
Finding Champions 
for the ideas within 
Senior Management 
 
The search for future 
supporters for their ideas is 
purposeful and actively 
managed.  SLT are sensitised 
to what’s coming; ‘no 
surprises’ is the approach. 
 
Team is comprised of a group of 
individuals with little formal 
contact who pursue specific ideas 
through largely personal 
motivation.  Team members 
largely unaware of each other’s 
projects 
Team working Effort is made to channel the 
team’s work, meet regularly, 
achieve consensus and to 
reduce team conflict. Team 
continually reviewing each 
other’s work as a group 
  
426 
 
Radical Innovation 
Based on UK Team 
Factor Incremental Innovation 
Based on US Team 
 
No formal project plan.  Only one 
deadline. 
 
Project Management 
 
Plan developed with 
milestones, deliverables and 
critical path with a series of 
interim deadlines 
 
Ideas are actively scouted from 
outside the company and 
relationships are initiated with 
external experts.  Team is 
externally focused 
External Networks Experts asked to advise once 
only on a consultancy basis 
on projects that have been 
initiated internally.  Team is 
internally focused 
 
Consumer research is considered 
once the scientific basis of the 
ideas has been established. It 
has low priority. 
 
 
Technology-led 
Voice of the 
Consumer 
Consumer research 
dominates the process and 
dictates the type and level of 
novelty in innovation.  It has 
top priority. 
 
Customer-led 
 
This project also reinforces the approach of situational leadership by 
demonstrating that the ideal type of leadership for an innovation project is 
determined by the stage of its development.  Within this case study, each team 
captain exemplified an extreme end of the leadership spectrum.  The UK 
leader refused to allow any process interfere with the loose, flexible approach 
to facilitation that he favoured.  By contrast, the US team leader did not allow 
any loose or flexible conditions to pertain as he managed the project with tight 
metrics and timelines.  While both approaches delivered some level of success 
within the project, neither, from the point of view of the participants was ideal.  
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The UK approach did little to foster cooperation between team members or to 
channel their work.  While the US approach was very mechanistic and 
process-driven and was reported to have constrained the fluid conditions 
necessary for creativity. 
 
8.4   Positioning the themes within the literature 
This next section positions the issues that emerged from the GSK case study 
(alluded to above) within the appropriate literature in order to see if such 
literature provides a satisfactory explanation for the stark variation in outcomes 
from the two teams.  This study suggests that a four-factor model (Figure 8.2) 
provides a project-level framework for managing radical innovation projects.  In 
that context, it is worth reviewing prior contributions from research of the 
factors that have been found to be connected with the theory and practice of 
radical innovation. 
 
Factors connected to radical innovation 
Many of these factors found in prior research are systemic company or 
industry characteristics.  These are factors, generally, outside the control of an 
individual project or team leader.  Hence, this study is of particular interest to 
managers as it presents a practical framework, which they can readily apply at 
the level of the project or team.  . 
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Table 8.3: Factors Associated with Radical Innovation 
Factors correlated with radical innovation Key Authors 
 Learning and continuous improvement culture  Bessant and Francis, 1997 
McLaughlin et al, 2008 
 Active User Involvement in NPD  Von Hippel, 1988 
 Overlapping and parallel working  Wheelwright and Clark, 1992 
 Appropriate structure for managing innovation 
projects  
Cooper, 1984 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1992 
 Cross functional teams with flexible problem 
solving capability 
Jassawalla and Sashittal, 1999; 
Sapsed et al, 2002 
 Use of prototyping tools, techniques and design-
thinking 
Dodgson et al, 2005 
Brown, 2008 
Verganti et al, 2007 
 Use of a radical innovation hub or centralisation Ettlie et al, 1984 
Leifer et al, 2007 
 High levels of individual and organisational 
creativity 
Amabile, 1998 
Taggar, 2002 
 Organisational tolerance for ambiguity, failure and 
risk 
Nembhart, 2009 
Kalunzy et al, 1972 
 Strong and active market understanding and 
insight; ability to interpret weak signals 
O’Connor, 1998 
 Relationships, collaborations and networks Bessant et al. 2003; Reed and 
Walsh 2002, Chesbrough, 2003 
Birkinshaw et al, 2007 
 Clear and active support from senior management McDermott and O’Connor, 2002 
 Lengthy development stages and associated high 
cost 
McDermott and O’Connor, 2002 
Golder et al, 2009 
 Firm size and position in the market Christensen, 2007 
Chandy and Tellis, 2000 
 Team Climate for Innovation Anderson and West, 1998 
Caldwell and O’Reilly, 2003 
 Start-ups and new entrants behind most 
discontinuous innovation 
Bessant et al, 2004 
 
 
429 
 
In terms of the issues which surfaced as signicant in the case, the following 
section probes the literature for guidance on how these issues should or could 
have been managed within the project. 
 
8.4.1 Structuring for Innovation 
As already mentioned in this section, the following issues emerged as 
significant in the context of initiating structures for innovation projects: 
 
1. Devoting the right amount of time to innovation 
2. Squaring off the participants’ line managers 
3. Getting the size of the innovation team right 
4. Finding physical spaces conducive to innovation 
 
These were significant issues for managers involved in the project.  Storey and 
Salamander (2005) conclude that there is considerable value in attending to 
managers’ experiences and insights because these same managers set the 
tone for everyday talking and thinking about innovation within their firms.  
Moreover, they offer important data for understanding which combination of 
factors act to promote innovation and, conversely, which combination stifles 
innovation.   
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8.4.2 Devoting the Right Time for Innovation 
Best practice guidelines for product development teams usually take one of 
two possible directions; human resources practices or technical guidelines 
(Pattit and Wilemon, 2005).  As this case study demonstrates, both those 
approaches have a contribution to make but neither is, by itself, sufficient. The 
allocation of sufficient time to devote to a project is a hygiene factor in any 
organisation and the fact that this basic element of structure was absent (or, at 
best, poorly managed) from ISF speaks to the lack of effective, practical senior 
management support for the project. Swink (2000) highlights that senior 
management support for NPD practices, such as cross-functional NPD teams; 
enable team members to accomplish their goals by providing vision, direction, 
enthusiasm; but crucially, priority and access to required resources.  This 
provision of access to resources and designation of ISF as a priority activity 
was missing in the execution phase of this project. 
 
The literature on the effective management of R&D or innovation teams is 
silent on the issue of making time, clearing calendars, removing obstacles and 
allowing the team the time to devote to the task.  Yet, this is a basic, necessary 
but insufficient condition for a climate of creativity to flourish.  The identification 
of a low level issue like time availability, which could appear elementary and 
intuitive and yet is reported to have such a significant impact on the outcome 
and experience of the project, is one of the merits of the case study approach.  
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Such a routine issue may not have been picked up through a survey 
instrument unless it was specifically identified in advance and explicitly probed 
in the fieldwork. 
 
Similarly, in their study ‘Views from the Trenches’, Barczak and Wilemon 
(2003) found that the most frequently cited source of conflict impacting NPD 
teams revolved around similar ‘company-level systems, policies and 
procedures’ over which the team itself has limited control.  54% of their 
respondents cited conflict with senior management and other organisational 
units (functional departments) as the major sources of company-level conflict.  
Friction with senior management was concerned with policies and procedures, 
support, and resources.  They note:   
 
Specifically, respondents noted that conflict often resulted in negative feelings 
about the project, frustration, and stress. These feelings, in turn, often affected 
morale and commitment to the project. (Barczak and Wilemon, 2003: p 473) 
 
Barczak and Wilemon (2003) also asked team members about the major 
sources of stress they experienced on NPD teams. 37% of their respondents 
cited ‘schedule pressures’ as a stressor in NPD.  This was the single biggest 
‘source of stress’ cited in the survey and the ISF experience confirms its 
significance. 
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The ISF (Innovation Sans Frontiers) began with the assumption that a 
commitment of twenty per cent of participants’ time would remain a fixed ratio 
throughout the duration of the project.  This assumption ignores the phases of 
the innovation process and how practitioners may need the flexibility to get 
more or less engaged as both the nature of their specific input and the 
intensity of the overall project demands.  In extreme circumstances, when the 
potential of the project warrants it, the organisation should build in flexibility for 
employees to devote more, or even all, of their time to certain promising 
projects (Boyle et al., 2003).  It is further recommended that team members’ 
reporting relationships should remain flexible so that, should it be necessary, 
reporting lines could be adjusted for the sake of the project.  In this context, 
Hellinghausen and Myers (1998) suggest that ‘functional managers represent 
one of the largest obstacles when implementing cross-functional teams, mainly 
because such managers will be required to give up some of their power so that 
the team can accomplish its goals.  This was also the case in the ISF project 
as some line managers actively discouraged their direct reports from spending 
time on the project.  Storey and Salaman (2005) also found that in poor-
performing innovators, it was often the case that managers saw their role as 
protecting the firm from innovation, which in some cases, they saw as 
subversive and even childish.  In such cases, managers themselves, represent 
one of the biggest barriers to innovation. 
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Additionally, Warwick University’s KIN (Knowledge and Innovation Network’s; 
2006, p. 11) benchmarking study of innovation communities noted that Project 
Leaders were frequently asked to assume the responsibility for projects ‘part-
time’ and would be expected to find the time required.  The ‘KIN’ 
recommendation is that companies give their people adequate time to work on 
these projects rather than merely hope that their executives will ‘find the time’.  
Govindarajan and Trimble (2010) argue that best practice in innovation 
projects suggests that each project has a dedicated resource (person or team) 
and this is augmented as necessary by technical or functional specialists from 
within the company.  They conclude that organisations cannot simply ask and 
expect employees to participate in an innovation team where there is no full 
time, dedicated resource to manage the process or project. 
 
This facet of the project design could have been anticipated by the SLT 
(Senior Leadership Team).  Additionally, by neglecting to bring the functional 
line managers ‘on-side’ with the project, they left the team members open to a 
high level of potential conflict and personal stress.  This conflict and stress was 
clearly reflected in the actual experiences of the team members.  Moreover, 
there seems to be consensus from the participants that it would have been 
preferable to assign or second people to the project full-time, even if for a 
shorter period, than have this notional 20% of time dedicated to it over the 
longer period. 
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The case data highlights the importance of these issues to the experiences of 
the team members involved in the ISF initiative.  While highlighted in selected 
studies, this is not an issue largely studied in the literature. 
 
8.4.3 The Right Size for an Innovation Team 
Research on team size indicates that teams are most effective when they have 
enough, but not more than enough, members to perform the group task 
(Guzzo, 1988; Guzzo and Shea, 1992; Hackman, 1990).  Academic research 
by both Bouchard and Hare (1970) and Renzulli et al (1974) found that the 
output of creative ideas on a per-employee basis decreased as team size 
increased.  Some research on group structure implies a curvilinear relationship 
between group size and innovation. Very small teams, of three people or less, 
it is suggested, will lack the diversity of viewpoints and perspectives necessary 
for innovation (Jackson, 1996), whereas large teams (above twelve or thirteen) 
will become too unwieldy to enable effective interaction, exchange, and 
participation (Poulton, 1995). 
 
There is much support in the literature for the use of small project teams (e.g. 
Whitten, 1995; McConnell, 1996; Carmel and Bird, 1997; McConnell, 1998; 
Sawyer and Guinan, 1998; Humphrey, 2000; Jiang and Klein, 2000; 
Whitehead, 2001).  As the size of the group gets larger, the difficulties of 
agreeing objectives, ensuring appropriate participation in decision making, 
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achieving consensus on what constitutes high quality, and getting unanimous 
support for innovation, all increase (Curral et al., 2001).  Specific details on 
precisely the optimum number to include in an innovation team can vary with 
industry and will depend on the complexity of the initiative.  Foote’s (2003) 
survey of new product development teams in the beverage industry showed:  
 
Proving the old adage that too many cooks spoil the broth (or the brew), less 
than one quarter of companies report having more than ten members on their 
NPD team. Nine is the average team size. (p12). 
 
Previous research and theory suggest that increasing group size will hinder 
effective innovation (Curral et al., 2001) since there will be physically more 
team members who need to reach agreement on actions and decisions; more 
who will seek to have their say in decision-making; and more who will interpret 
and discuss quality of task issues. Pozen (2010) claims that within groups of 
10 or more, members engage in what he calls “social loafing”: They stop taking 
personal responsibility for the group’s actions and rely on others to take the 
initiative and get things done. Large groups also inhibit consensus building, 
which is a vital ingredient in innovation teams.  The more members there are, 
the more difficult it can be to reach agreement, and consequently fewer 
decisions are taken and, consequently, less gets done 
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Tasks demanding high levels of innovation generally pose high demands on 
team members including remaining united in the face of external conflict and 
resistance, and managing the uncertainty necessarily connected with 
innovation. Curral et al. (2001) demonstrated that increasing team size has a 
deleterious effect on innovation-related group processes under task conditions 
that require high levels of innovation. 
 
In summary, teams should be comprised of a sufficient number of members to 
have, between them, the technical knowledge required to accomplish the 
innovation task.  But such teams should not have higher than sufficient 
numbers as this has been shown to have a negative impact on team 
processes and, ultimately, team innovation performance.  The ISF teams were 
originally planned to have twelve members each and this was thought to be 
too many by the participants as they struggled to function effectively using all 
their members.  The literature, too, supports the view that twelve is too many 
and that between six to ten (obviously, depending on the task) would be more 
advantageous in most circumstances. 
 
While the data does not allow for an evaluation of what would represent the 
‘right’ size for an innovation team, it does highlight that it may not be team size 
that matters most but rather team management and leadership.  Both teams, 
nominally, were similar in size but the UK team had a significant number of 
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members who did not engage.  The process described in the UK, what the 
case suggests is the radical innovation team, is that it was ‘individuals’ and not 
the team that drove the development of ideas. So, in the context of the extant 
literature that focuses on the right sized team, this case data suggests that this 
question may be much less important when the task specifically mandates 
radical innovation.  
 
8.4.4 The Importance of Creative Spaces for Innovation 
Many practitioners, when providing guidelines for best practice in successful 
business creativity will point out the impact of the physical working 
environment on people’s ability to be creative (Reinersten, 1997; Kelley and 
Littman, 2001).  This advice seems especially pertinent to the early stage, 
fuzzy-front-end of the innovation process where novel ideas are being 
specifically sought and encouraged.  
 
There is an intuitive logic to the idea that because innovation, by definition, 
implies exploring the unknown, that it should be facilitated by breaking the 
routine of the ‘day job’ and physically moving around into a different and more 
creative space.  Collaboration Rooms, Creativity Labs and Innovation Centres 
are becoming increasingly popular in large organisations (Wycoff and Sneed, 
1999).  Most conventional meeting rooms are designed for presentations 
rather than collaboration.  Case-based examples abound in the literature for 
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example; Suzanne Merritt buying used furniture and prevailing on family and 
friends to paint vibrant colours on the walls of what became the Polaroid 
Innovation Laboratory (Merritt, 2010).  Gordon MacKenzie of Hallmark is 
known for having created their innovation engine room by finding old roll-top 
desks for sale and using abandoned milk churns as waste paper baskets. As 
another example, the technology innovation firm, IDEO is often cited (Kelley 
and Littman, 2001) as an example to be followed in this regard for the fact that 
they allow their staff to bring their bicycles inside the office and hang them up 
on various pulleys located near workstations.  One of their staff has an aircraft 
wing suspended from the ceiling over his desk and staff are encouraged to 
bring in ‘cool new stuff’ which is often showcased on a number of technology 
trolleys that people move around the building and use the contents as stimulus 
for brainstorming for various projects.   
 
In the case study, while the original project design had not legislated for the 
teams to have any dedicated space; this was facilitated on request and it 
appeared to play a positive role for both teams in three ways: 
 
a)  It enhanced the teams’ sense of identity having a room exclusively 
dedicated to the business of the project 
b)  It provided the teams with physical space in which to have their meetings 
and to store their prototypes and project paraphernalia 
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c)  It was especially useful for those managers whose own line managers 
were not supportive of the project by providing them with a private space 
to get out of the way and discharge their duties in relation to the project. 
 
The case data supports a positive effect accruing to innovation efforts when 
management provide a dedicated space for the team to meet and collaborate 
together.  In the case of the ISF project, both in the US and UK, once a 
dedicated room had been allocated to the team, it had an immediate and 
beneficial effect.  The rooms in question were conventional meeting rooms in 
R&D buildings and could not be described as creative or zany in any way.  
Nevertheless, just having a dedicated space for the team to meet and work 
together appears to be conducive to both types of innovation. 
 
8.4.5   Processes in Organising for Innovation 
The case data highlights two key process differences between the teams that 
appear to be instrumental in the outcomes they ultimately delivered: first was 
the way they prioritised their ideas and second, was the way they harnessed 
the voice of the consumer into their ideation process.  These two processes 
are closely linked.  A third process, in which there was also considerable 
variation in the two teams’ approach, was their use of specialist software and 
technology to assist with the process of idea generation. This third element did 
not appear to be a significant factor. 
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8.4.6 How to Prioritise Ideas and Manage Conflict? 
The major factor identified in the literature that impedes creative performance 
is control (Amabile, 1998; Angle, 1989; Kanter, 1983; Oldham and Cummings, 
1996).  This is generally a controlling form of management where autonomy is 
restricted.  A culture that supports and encourages control will result in 
diminished creativity and innovation (McLean, 2005). The primary reason for 
this is that too much control negatively affects intrinsic motivation. According to 
Amabile (1988), whose (KEYS) model of creativity asserts three equal 
components of organisational creativity: technical expertise, creativity and 
intrinsic motivation, asserts that expertise and creativity skills must be 
accompanied by intrinsic motivation to produce highly creative behaviour.  The 
output of such creative behaviour, in the context of NPD, is a set of potential 
new product, service or business model ideas. 
 
Once the ideas were generated, a next step (which followed really only in the 
case of the US) was to rank and prioritise the ideas that were likely to feature 
in the team’s final presentation.  Two key points are central to understanding 
this element of the theory and practice of team-based innovation management.  
First, there will inevitably be task conflict in the innovation process; the nature 
of the process renders that inevitable.  Second, the conflict is likely to be most 
acute at the point of the process, which is most convergent.  The innovation 
process is often represented as a series of steps with each one having an 
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element which is divergent; where all ideas are welcome; where quantity takes 
priority over quality and where no judgment is involved.  There is rarely conflict 
at this phase because no selection or prioritisation has to be made.  But 
invariably every project arrives at a point where choices have to be made and 
where some ideas are eliminated and others progressed.  Loewe and Chen 
(2007) represent it thus (Figure 8.3 below).  At each phase, it is the convergent 
element, where certain ideas are being jettisoned, that will give rise to conflict. 
 
Figure 8.3:  Convergent and Divergent Phases of the Innovation Process 
 
Source:  Loewe and Chen, 2007 
 
Ozer (2003) notes that two types of mistake are likely to occur at this point of 
the process; either the company passes over an idea which had genuine and 
significant potential or the company pursues an idea, which subsequently fails 
in the market.  In either case, firms could accrue big losses.  The former leads 
to missed investment opportunities and the latter to high costs with 
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disappointing return on investment.  Consequently, it is clear that it is in the 
best interest of firms to make accurate evaluations of NPD opportunities. 
 
Because innovation is such a complex set of processes, to describe and enact 
it, scholars and practitioners evolved a stage-gate model that almost all 
companies now employ in some shape (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt, 1997).  Acknowledging both the complexity of the process 
and its centrality to the survival of most organisations, companies started to 
structure the process in the 1960’s. Tushman (1977), based on the previous 
work of Marquis (1969), describes these emerging structures and separates 
out different phases of the innovation process: idea generation, problem 
solving and implementation.   These are now integrated into a more recent 
model (Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007), the Innovation Value Chain in which 
the equivalent stages are; idea generation; (idea) conversion and (idea) 
diffusion.   
 
Schmidt et al. (2009) contends that the new product development (NPD) 
processes that exist in most organisations consist of just two basic elements: 
activities and review points (See figure 8.4 below). Activities basically resolve 
issues and assemble data about the viability of successfully completing the 
project. In between the development activities are review points where the 
project is reviewed and a decision is made to either go on to the next stage of 
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the process, abandon it, or hold it until more information is gathered and a 
better decision can be made.   
 
Figure 8.4:  Activities and Review Points in a Stage-Gate Innovation Model 
 
Source: Cooper, 1995 
 
Hayes et al. (1988) created the original new product-development funnel that 
provides a framework for analysing and thinking about how innovation unfolds 
in companies. This funnel concept is equally valid on levels of analysis for the 
organisation, the project or, as in this case, the level of the team.  The first 
phase (Idea Generation) involves the creation of new ideas. At this start point, 
the main task is the creative widening of the funnel by knowledge acquisition, 
idea creation and exploration (Kratzer et al., 2006).   For this phase, best 
practice suggests that ideas are not filtered or judged as the objective is to 
encourage the generation of as many ideas as possible (Kelley, 2001, p. 57). 
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Thereafter, the funnel must be narrowed by evaluating and prioritising the 
ideas and concepts, resulting in the selection of one, or a limited number, for 
prototype and possibly design for manufacture, followed by pilot production, 
manufacturing ramp-up, and, ultimately (if successful), market launch.  This 
narrowing of the funnel, by necessity, requires the exit of a number of ideas as 
the process moves from divergent (i.e. all ideas are welcome) to convergent 
(i.e. certain criteria are being applied to the selection of ideas and some ideas 
will not survive the screening process).  Cooper (1999) rates this as one of his 
top six success factors for successful product development: ‘Tough go/kill 
decision points or gates—funnels, not tunnels.’ It is this exit process where 
ideas are jettisoned by the group (resulting in the ‘funnel not tunnel’) that 
causes task conflict within the team as naturally individuals, especially the 
idea-originator, have become attached to certain ideas which may 
subsequently be earmarked for exit.  Cooper (1999) noticed this phenomenon 
in his database and he described the inability or unwillingness of companies to 
kill projects as a major failing in corporate innovation management. 
 
Howell et al. (2005) note the presence in some organisations of what they call 
‘stopping champions’.  These are the opposite of ‘innovation champions’ who 
generally rally support to help ideas progress through the funnel.  Conversely, 
Stopping Champions use political tactics and their networks to rally supporters 
to halt a project.  They often achieve this by posing strategic and financial 
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arguments for project withdrawal, and involving team members in establishing 
decision criteria to evaluate whether to continue or exit the project.  
 
The stage-gates mentioned above have generally built-in decision criteria, 
which are applied to filter out non-performing ideas and concepts at all the 
major ‘gates’ of the process and they play some of the role of a ‘stopping 
champion’. Edmondson and Nembhard (2009) hold that competing viewpoints, 
so essential for generating new ideas and making sound decisions can also 
lead naturally to conflicts that waste valuable time and can start to erode team 
relationships (as happened in both ISF teams). Indeed, as soon as a 
significant disagreement erupts in a product development team, dysfunctional 
behaviour and processes may be the rule rather than the exception, leading to 
frustration and flawed decisions (Edmondson et al, 2003; Edmondson and 
Smith, 2006).  However, Clerq (2009) argues that the benefits of an innovation 
strategy for firm performance critically depend on the willingness of different 
functional departments (e.g., marketing, R&D) to accommodate conflicting 
viewpoints (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007) and this diversity, they argue, 
requires expert management to be harnessed for the benefit of the project. 
 
Reflecting the combination of talents required to lead innovation in companies, 
Buijs (2007) titled his article: ‘Innovation Leaders Should be Controlled 
Schizophrenics.’  In it, he makes the point that team leaders, in order to deliver 
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successful outcomes, have to manage conflicting agendas, objectives and 
personalities (p.208): 
 
If the team is feeling down, then the leader should be optimistic; if the team is 
overly enthusiastic, then the leader should be cool. If the team has fallen in 
love with an extremely funny idea, then the leader should point out which were 
the original objectives of the innovative task. If the team rejects all of the ideas 
and they focus too much on feasibility, then the leader should provoke them to 
dream and to let at least some of the wild ideas be considered. 
 
Disagreement arising from differences in opinions and perspectives of team 
members is labelled task conflict in the academic literature in contrast to other 
interpersonal conflicts possibly due to personality clashes and incompatibilities 
among team members (Jehn, 1995). Task conflict is referred to as Team 
Polarity in the particular case of innovation teams and NPD projects (Van 
Engelen et al., 2001, Leenders et al., 2007).  While team polarity may sound 
like a condition that warrants immediate repair and one that can only harm the 
team and its work, this is not necessarily the case.  In fact, it is thought, 
contrary to the view expressed above by Edmondson et al, (2003), that team 
polarity can have positive as well as negative consequences (e.g. Souder, 
1987; Van Engelen, et al., 2001).  
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On the positive side, team polarity, forces teams to consider perspectives and 
evaluate issues and opportunities more deeply than they otherwise might (De 
Dreu and Weingart, 2003).  It can also make team members more flexible in 
their thinking (Carnevale and Probst, 1998). Conflict and disagreement about 
tasks can be helpful in defining the issues involved in the discussion (Putman, 
1994); it can assist in developing new ideas and approaches to tasks (Baron, 
1991). Indeed, frequent disagreement on alternatives has been shown to be a 
quality of successful teams (Bourgeois, 1980).  Team Polarity is of most 
advantage to teams and initiatives when it occurs in the early phase when 
ideas are being generated. 
 
However, the negative effects of team polarity can be harmful to teams.  It has 
been shown to be detrimental to performance and satisfaction (Blake and 
Mouton, 1984; Pondy, 1967). Team polarity can impede the flow of work by 
delaying crucial decisions, especially if the team members are aware of each 
other’s difference of opinion (Pelled, 1995).  It can erode relationships; lead to 
flawed decisions and result in dysfunctional behaviours (Edmondson and 
Nembhard, 2009). 
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Therefore, a good team leader needs to have ambivalence to team conflict 
because a certain amount of it is healthy but too much of it is dangerous.    
 
However, the process for whittling down ideas from a high initial number to a 
more manageable group with some prospects of success, is not a 
straightforward one.  The existing idea generation literature (often called the 
brainstorming literature), according to Girotra et al. (2003) is deficient in this 
regard because its focus is exclusively on the creation process and it pays less 
attention to the selection processes that teams need to develop and use to 
choose the most promising ideas. 
 
Many companies have developed idea-screeners, which are decision aids 
(Ozer, 2003). In such a capacity, idea screeners should help decision makers 
make decisions more effectively and efficiently. However, if they complicate 
the decisions then they will defeat their purpose.  In this (ISF) context though, 
a key criterion, based on the project mandate, for deciding to keep or abandon 
an idea was its sales potential.  Sales potential will ultimately be a feature of 
demand and availability and these are impossible to know with precision or 
certainty at the idea generation stage.  However, there are certain ways of 
framing broad market size and making assumptions either top down (i.e. what 
percentage of the market are we likely to capture) or bottom up (i.e. how many 
people will buy/use it; how often and extrapolate that for a national or 
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representative population).  Either way, these estimates are imperfect and 
provide a rough indication only of potential sales revenue.  Hence, the type of 
conflict, lack of clarity and indecision described in the case study is inevitable 
unless the teams had agreed an a priori scoring system for the ideas.   
 
Goffin and Mitchell (2005, p. 187) note that although financial considerations 
should be the dominant decision criteria for innovation projects, unfortunately 
the financial information available at this early stage is likely to be at best 
incomplete or else totally unavailable.  This, they assert, is inevitable for a 
number of reasons; first, the completion date for the project may lie very far 
into the future and so there will be a high level of uncertainty about the 
condition of the market and the likely customer reaction in this context and this 
condition is more likely to prevail in the case of radical innovation.  The second 
is that the preparation of a detailed financial plan requires a lot of effort that 
many companies find hard to justify when the idea is still an early stage 
concept. 
 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1997) also found that even if detailed financial 
projections are made, innovation project managers often have little faith in 
them.  The more successful companies in Cooper’s studies are those that 
include financial projections as just one of a selection of more broadly based 
indicators.  This, according to Goffin and Mitchell (2005, p. 203) is analogous 
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to the use of tools like Balanced Scorecard to measure company performance.  
They argue that when financial measures are of questionable validity, the 
project selection process can be improved by including other criteria that have 
been shown to be correlated with successful new product development.  Had 
they developed a scale or scoring mechanism of this type, the team polarity 
issue is likely to have been mitigated significantly. 
 
This concept is broadly supported by the ISF story because, although the US 
team won the competition, it was generally considered that their ideas were 
the ‘more predictable’ or imitative while the UK ideas were seen as more 
original or innovative.  So, although the US team was able to generate 300 raw 
ideas, in the end, the final seven they presented were not thought to be radical 
or disruptive to a high degree. However, in the case of the UK team, there 
were no such decision criteria nor were there any milestones or gates.  This 
left the task of culling some of the ideas with lower potential up to individuals; a 
scenario which was inevitably going to lead to a high level of role polarity. 
 
In the ISF story, it could be argued that neither team struck the appropriate 
balance; the US team had little if any team conflict and the UK, possibly, had 
too much.  The ISF story reveals that both teams managed the first element of 
the process concerned with the generation of new, raw ideas successfully.  
Both teams report that they were able to generate in the region of three 
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hundred raw ideas.  The literature on creativity in the innovation process would 
suggest that the US team, because of the way it was (relatively) tightly 
managed, would have found it harder to generate creative, radical, new ideas.  
 
In terms of implications for practice, the ISF story marks an interesting 
counterpoint to the theory.  In theory, there should be task conflict at the start 
of a project so that diverse opinions are accommodated and reflected in the 
number and variety of novel ideas that enter the funnel for the project.  
However, once a selection has been made of which idea or ideas are going 
forward, the team should coalesce around that decision and the task conflict, 
in theory at least, should diminish (Kratzer et al., 2006).  Thereafter, the project 
is entering the next phase which is likely to be (idea) conversion followed by 
(idea) diffusion or implementation.   
 
Task conflict or role polarity is neither prevalent nor useful at this point.  
However, in the case of the US, it was precisely at this point that the role 
polarity began to surface as they struggled to definitively eliminate some of the 
ideas even after the consumer research had rejected them.  This conflict may 
have contributed to the incremental nature of the portfolio of ideas ultimately 
presented by the US.  Indeed, this is very likely to have happened given the 
predisposition of one of the team members to oppose any radical ideas that 
were being evaluated by her team. This member of the US team effectively 
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acted as their resident ‘exit champion’ as she discouraged the team’s adoption 
of any radical ideas. 
 
In the UK, because they didn’t adhere to any form of stage-gate process, role 
polarity unnecessarily permeated the entire process.  In essence, the UK 
filtered their ideas purely on the passion exhibited by the originator of the ideas 
and were not able to make any type of market volume estimate.   
 
This case illustrates the importance of developing a scoring mechanism by 
which to evaluate new ideas within whatever context this is being done.  That 
neither team did this helps explain why the participants reported such 
frustration at the process (or lack of it) and at some of the ideas being carried 
forward. An elementary screening mechanism would have helped the teams 
identify an optimum balance between the desirability of some of their ideas (in 
terms of their revenue potential) against the degree of difficulty envisaged in 
bringing those ideas to fruition; in terms of probability of technical success, 
how long it might take and the reliance on external partners. 
 
8.4.7 Harnessing the Voice of the Consumer  
In this case study, there is no real dispute about the need for consumer input 
into the innovation process, the conflict arises over the level of such input; its 
timing and whether or not it is appropriate to have this marketing research 
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work carried out by scientists whose talents and experience might arguably be 
better deployed elsewhere.   
  
In the literature, the debate on the role of the voice of the consumer in the 
innovation process continues without definitive resolution with some arguing 
that consumers are limited in their capacity to develop ideas outside the 
current use context, and that they are consistently lacking in foresight (Hayes 
and Abernathy, 1980; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Martin, 1995). Proponents 
of this argument further believe that technology can advance at a much faster 
pace than some users comprehension of it and hence they will have difficulty 
in inputting any useful insights in technology driven markets (Moriarty and 
Kosnik, 1989; Lynn et al., 1996; Veryzer, 1998a; O’Connor and Veryzer, 
2001).  
 
However, some researchers assert that there is a group of users – specifically 
‘lead users’ – who can contribute product or category insights based on wants 
and needs they experience significantly earlier than other more mainstream 
users and are therefore able to anticipate early trends and possibly even 
emerging markets or market segments. Thus, some advocates believe that 
lead users can possibly be a source of ideas that might lead to radical 
innovation (von Hippel, 1986, 1989; Urban and von Hippel, 1988;  Herstatt and 
von Hippel, 1992; Lilien et al., 2002). 
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In ‘Democratizing Innovation’ (2006, p. 19), Von Hippel notes that the idea that 
new products and services are developed exclusively by manufacturers is 
deeply ingrained both in individuals’ experience and in academic writing.  He 
reflects that when individuals perceive some shortcoming in a product or 
service, they generally respond by wishing ‘they’ (the manufacturers) would ‘do 
something about it.’  Even the term ‘consumers’, he suggests implies a passive 
role of consumption only. Von Hippel (2006) notes that new product 
development is becoming increasingly user-centred where individual 
customers are exhibiting a growing tendency to innovate for themselves.  In 
his research, he cites markets, specifically fringe sports like surfboarding or 
some ICT projects, where the level of NPD attributable to consumer input can 
reach up to 40%. 
 
The NPD literature has seen a good deal of research about the need to involve 
customers in the process, from the earliest possible stage.  The voice of the 
consumer or customer needs to be integrated into the entire process in order 
to fully capture the value of their input (Cooper, 1999; Von Hippel, 1986; Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1995; Thomke, 2003).  Empirical studies have also found that 
many of the innovations developed entirely by users do have commercial 
appeal and prospects. As an example, Urban and Von Hippel (1988) found 
that an industrial software product concept developed by lead users had 
greater marketplace appeal than did concepts developed by standard 
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marketing research methods.  Holger et al. (2010) asserts that the collection of 
customer information is critical in the very early stage of NPD (Ottum and 
Moore 1997) because the level of uncertainty regarding customer 
requirements is high.  Some companies involve customers only at the end of 
the process, notably in services, and this approach has led to criticism (van 
Kleef, 2005).  Additionally, in the field of banking, Athanassopolou and Johne 
(2004) demonstrated that project teams who communicated with lead users 
throughout the process were more successful than those who only 
communicated with them at the end of the process. 
 
Schum and Lin (2007) suggest that as all innovation projects stem from some 
analysis of customer needs and wants and hence customer knowledge drives 
innovation in successful firms.  Implicit in their descriptor of market orientation 
is a commitment to consumer knowledge, understanding and communication 
from the very beginning of all innovation projects. 
 
In their proposal for a world class NPD process, based on the global PDMA 
survey data, they (Schum and Lin, 2007) suggest a method for ensuring that 
the voice of the consumer is ever-present in the process:  
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All these world best practices innovative companies make use of a cross-
functional team in new product development. This provides diverse viewpoints 
of customer needs, with a minimum of at least two employees from marketing 
and technical.  (p 1614) 
 
However, there is a subtle difference here insofar as the PDMA best practice 
guidelines are recommending using a proxy for the voice of the customer; they 
suggest that someone from marketing or sales can represent the customers’ 
viewpoint.  But many companies prefer to have a dialogue with the customer 
themselves rather than simply with their own customer-facing staff.  Cooper 
(2009) has written extensively on the subject of best practice in the area of 
NPD and notes: 
 
The quest for unique, superior products begins with a thorough understanding 
of the customer’s unmet and often unarticulated needs—through in-the-field, 
voice-of-customer work. This means that the entire team—technical, 
marketing, and operations people—interviews and interfaces with real 
customers/users, and learns their problems, needs, and challenges first-hand. 
This is quite different from relying on the salesperson or product manager to 
speak for the marketplace; such information is often filtered, biased, and 
incorrect. (Cooper, 2009, p. 11) 
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Advances in technology make it easier to harness the voice of the consumer.  
Füller (2010) cites the rise of the internet, user-generated content and social 
networking and the availability of wiki’s, terms such as crowd sourcing, co-
creation, user innovation, virtual customer integration, and open innovation 
have become popular. These terms describe a variety of useful roles 
consumers may play in the previously organisation-led world of new product 
development and innovation. Consumers are increasingly considered a 
valuable source of ideas for innovation. 
 
Overall, there are two main criticisms of the practice of engaging consumers in 
the innovation process.  First, it may make lead times longer as customer 
feedback has to be integrated into the process at each stage (Fang, 2008).  
Although, this criticism may be mitigated by the higher likelihood of an 
outcome which is aligned with customer wants and needs.  The second 
reflects the more profound concern that existing customers have a very limited 
view of the market and its likely future development.  Consequently, many 
ideas emanating from existing consumers are likely to revolve around 
incremental improvements often centred on price (they want it cheaper) and 
access (they want it available more easily).  In ‘The Innovator’s Dilemma”, 
Christensen (1997) suggested that technology can move at a faster pace than 
consumer preference and that, in many cases, consumers don’t really know 
what they want.  Hence, allowing consumers be the architects of new product 
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development can actually be counterproductive by reining in more radical 
ideas and favouring the more sustaining, incremental ones. 
 
In summary, there is some debate in the literature as to the benefits and the 
role of customer input in the development of (specifically) very new products. 
While von Hippel (1986, 2006) proposed that users are an important source of 
new product ideas, others have argued that being too close to customers or 
being ‘customer-led’ may prove limiting both for innovation and firm 
performance (Macdonald, 1995). These and other studies (Christensen, 1997; 
Ciccantelli and Magidson, 1993; Neale and Corkindale, 1998) form the basis of 
an on-going discussion in the literature about whether customers and users 
inhibit or enable very new or radical product ideas (Connor, 1999; Slater and 
Narver, 1998, 1999), and if customer input constrains original ideas and leads 
only to incremental new products.  For instance, Callahan and Lasry (2004) 
have demonstrated how the importance of customer input in new product 
development changes with product newness. 
 
The literature suggests that consumers are important in all types of innovation 
but their role is different (and usually less significant) in the development of 
radical innovation where technology may play a more dominant part than in 
incremental innovation, which is more likely to be consumer-led.   
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In the ISF case study, the US team engaged in consumer research to a very 
high degree.  They used focus groups to validate and optimise their own ideas 
and then took the best performing ideas and put them into volumetric testing.  
The high level of research equipped them with a winning presentation but it did 
attract some comments suggesting that their ideas were both incremental and 
predictable.  In contrast, the UK did not manage to arrange any significant 
piece of research in advance of the final presentation. Instead, they 
deliberately kept their scientists focusing on the science until the very last 
minute.  As a consequence, although they didn’t have all the market research 
data to back up their ideas, their ideas were described by a number of people 
on the SLT as more original and radical than the UK ones.  This outcome 
would appear to lend support to the prevailing wisdom in the literature 
suggesting that higher consumer involvement is more appropriate for 
incremental innovation than it is for disruptive projects (Christensen, 1997; 
Ciccantelli and Magidson, 1993). 
 
8.4.8 Using IT in the Early Phases of Innovation 
An additional difference in the teams’ approach was clear in their use of IT in 
the management of the project.  In the US, the team leader was a strong 
believer in using software systems to generate, upload, manage and even vote 
on ideas.  The team all subscribed to Think Tank (a software programme) 
which allowed them to load up ideas regardless of the time of day or 
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geographic location.  The software acted as a central repository for the ideas 
and allowed each team member see other ideas as they were loaded; allowing 
them to comment on them or add other ‘builds’ on the ideas if they so wished.  
They could also cluster ideas under certain broader typologies or platforms 
and analyse them by various dimensions.   The US team used this systems as 
a central part of their process and yet they did not develop or promote really 
radical innovations. 
 
The UK did not use any IT systems in managing either the individual ideas or 
the overall project.  Despite, having three team-members located at a separate 
site, the UK team leader did not subscribe to any specific software to facilitate 
the generation but, more especially, the sharing of ideas between his team 
members. 
 
The US team leader made extensive use of specialist innovation software but 
it was used merely to share ideas internally within his team.  It was not used to 
connect the team or the ideas to external third parties.  Ultimately, the team 
characterised as the incremental innovation team were far more reliant on IT 
than the radical innovation team.  It was the UK’s ideas, which were deemed to 
be more original, novel and radical, and hence one could, within the findings of 
this case study, question the value of the IT software in terms of its usefulness 
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in developing radical ideas for innovation certainly within team-based 
initiatives. 
 
8.4.9  Managing Networks in new product development 
The case highlights the significance of networks in three important and 
separate dimensions: internal networks (bridging ties); external networks (open 
innovation) and innovation champions. 
 
Many studies have shown the alliance networks in which firms are engaged 
can enhance firm learning, their acquisition of knowledge and innovation (e.g. 
Ahuja, 2000; Shan, Walker, and Kogut, 1994; Smith-Doerr et al., 1999; Soh, 
2003). Networks, including personal networks, are believed to enhance 
organisational innovation for two main reasons. First, involvement in 
disconnected networks increases creativity and innovation because they 
provide the people involved with timely access to diverse information and 
knowledge (Burt, 1992, 2004).  Secondly, networks have a positive impact on 
trust; they enhance social capital because such structures generate trust, 
reciprocity norms, and a shared identity, which increase cooperation and 
knowledge sharing (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998).  Further, networks imply a 
level of communication and communication has long been associated with 
superior performance in innovation ( Allen 1971, 1977).  Brown and Eisenhardt 
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(1995) suggest that both internal and external networks are connected with 
success in new product development: 
 
Communication among project team members and with outsiders stimulates 
the performance of development teams. Thus, the better those members are 
connected with each other and with key outsiders, the more successful the 
development process will be. (p. 354) 
 
The literature distinguishes two forms of knowledge network: (1) contact 
networks, through which firms source knowledge; and (2) alliance networks, 
through which firms collaborate to innovate. Networks in the form of the latter 
(alliance networks) usually describe formalised, purposeful collaboration and 
joint ventures, or some other 'contracted' relationships resulting in frequent and 
continuous interaction (Huggins and Johnston, 2010).  Specifically, in the area 
of discontinuous, radical innovation, Birkinshaw et al (2007) have developed a 
more detailed taxonomy (Figure 8.5) of the types of networks that firms can 
engage in to help access broader potential sources of innovation projects or 
simply ideas. 
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Figure 8.5: Examples of Networks for Discontinuous Innovation  
 
Source: Birkinshaw, Bessant and Delbridge, 2007. 
 
Having networks that extend outside the organisation is referred to as 
Boundary Spanning. Research on boundary spanning generally supports the 
considerable advantages associated with access to external sources of 
knowledge and information (Allen and Cohen, 1969; Allen, Tushman, and Lee, 
1979; Tushman and Scanlan, 1981; Chesbrough, 2004).  
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Specifically, it has been noted that boundary spanning plays an important role 
in driving innovation within; organisations (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), 
business units (Hansen, 1999; Tsai, 2001), teams (Ancona and Caldwell, 
1992; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001), and individuals (Burt, 2004; Perry-
Smith, 2006).  Similarly, other researchers have also shown that such 
networks reaching outside an organisation are positively correlated to 
individual (Cross and Cummings, 2003) or unit-level performance (Tsai, 2001).  
At a conceptual level, therefore, the advantages of boundary spanning are 
widely supported. Teece (1996) concludes that informal structures of the firm, 
as well as the network of external linkages that they possess, have a 
significant bearing on the strength as well as the kind of innovation activity they 
undertake.   
 
When boundary-spanning programmes are extended beyond the idea 
generation stage to more advanced collaborative projects, closer to 
exploitation or commercialisation, a number of complications are observed to 
occur.  These arise from the obvious difficulties associated with transferring, 
integrating, and leveraging the diverse inputs and differing perspectives 
available across organisational boundaries (Dougherty, 1992; Argote, 1999; 
Carlile, 2004).  However, these difficulties did not become manifest in this 
project as, with the UK team at least, they did not, in the course of this project,  
progress the ideas into or close to the activation or implementation phase. 
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In this case, the use of external networks played an important role in the 
development of the ideas of the UK team.  The team specifically sought 
external inputs, which provided information and connections for the team 
members.  Interestingly, in the case, this use of external networks was on a 
commercial basis, and was not in any meaningful sense, the result of previous 
exchanges between the parties.  This would suggest that the use of external 
networks can be a purposeful, targeted and short-term process based on 
economic exchange.  This is somewhat in contrast to the nature of innovation 
networks portrayed in the literature, where networks are often discussed with 
reference to the strength of the relationship between the contracting parties. 
 
8.4.10  Innovation Champions  
Boundary spanning is most often associated with external communication 
links, which are critical to enhancing innovations since they facilitate learning 
and they help secure necessary resources (Goes and Peirk, 1997) and for the 
successful uptake of ideas between and within organisations (Cziepel, 1975; 
Daft, 1978; Ghosal and Bartlett, 1987; Kimberly, 1978; Robertson and Wind, 
1983).  Indeed, Callahan and Salipante (1979) hold that ‘boundary spanning 
units are defined as any group or department whose primary responsibilities 
are to deal with parties outside the organisation, such as clients, suppliers, and 
research institutions.’   
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However, in this case, as the ISF team was a relatively autonomous group 
within the wider corporate framework, intra-firm boundary spanning was seen 
to be necessary (by the US team, at least) in order to promote their ideas and 
to try to secure future support for their development.   
 
One perspective (Youtie and Shapira, 2008) is that in an increasingly 
knowledge-based environment, high-performing organisations are those which 
have capacity (through their people in teams), not only to develop, acquire and 
use new ideas and knowledge, but, just as important, to advance, distribute 
and recombine this knowledge through the internal promotion of these new 
ideas.  Boundary spanning is a necessary but not sufficient precondition of this 
activity. 
 
Typically, NPD environments are characterised by high levels of both 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Mishra and Shah, 2009), therefore, an ability to 
collaborate effectively both internally and with external partners (Wheelwright 
and Clark, 1992; Swink, 2006) is central to any organisation’s success in the 
process of new product or service development.  Similarly, it is widely 
recognised that new product development is a highly interdependent process, 
and successful NPD requires firms to develop routines and practices to 
collaborate with internal cross-functional employee teams.    
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Case studies of product innovation success highlight internal championing as a 
critical means by which social and political pressures are applied to overcome 
management inertia and help new product ideas find traction within host 
organisations (e.g., Achilladelis et al., 1971; Schon, 1963; Tushman and 
Nadler, 1986).  Put simply: ‘‘A new idea either finds a champion or dies’’ 
(Schon, 1963, p. 84).   
 
In the organisational context, raw ideas are potentially very valuable but they 
are also very fragile and there is an increasing level of academic attention 
given to theoretical and empirical work on how to ensure the idea survives until 
appropriate market research can determine whether it should be progressed or 
abandoned (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995, Dougherty and Hardy, 1996, 
Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996 and Venkataraman et al., 1992).  In these 
studies, the role of a champion generally includes the following inventory of 
characteristics: active support for innovation, overcoming barriers, attracting 
resources and ensuring the project makes it to completion (Howell and 
Higgins, 1990).  These have all been shown in research to be vital for the 
success of any innovation project. (Chakrabati and Hauschildt, 1989; Howell 
and Higgins, 1990; Roberts and Fusfeld, 1981; Schon, 1963).  Glynn (1996) 
points to the existence of influential “innovation champions” who have the 
social, political or interpersonal knowledge necessary to accelerate the 
acceptance of innovative change. 
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Successful innovation depends, inter alia, on the individual and collective 
creativity and expertise of employees.  Moreover, innovation is increasingly 
characterised by an iterative process of people working together building on 
the creative ideas of one another (Coakes and Smith, 2007).  Howell (2005) 
states that ninety per cent of raw ideas never go beyond the originator’s desk 
because they fail to attract a champion (Stevens and Burley, 1997). Dedicated 
champions, Howell asserts, are pivotal to innovation success and thus ought to 
find organisational support for their work and be integrated into the mainstream 
of organisational activity i.e. a champion should not be equated with a 
maverick. 
 
In recognition of the importance of innovation champions, Howell et al., (2005) 
developed a three-factor model in which they identified facets of champion 
behaviour.  The key behaviours are: Expressing enthusiasm and confidence 
about the success of the innovation, 
Persisting under adversity, and 
Getting the right people involved. 
 
Barczak and Wilemon (2007) see being an innovation champion as an 
essential trait for an R&D team leader:  
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Team leaders need to develop, manage, and sustain the team’s relationship 
with senior management. Since disagreements about organisational issues 
create conflict and affect team members’ perspectives about a project, team 
leaders need to engage in activities aimed at promoting and generating 
support for the project. 
 
Earlier insights into champion behaviour were developed by Burgelman 
(1983). Champions articulated a convincing master strategy for the idea, and 
got support for it informally by “acting as scavengers, reaching for hidden or 
forgotten resources to demonstrate feasibility” (1983: 238). The next phase for 
them is establishing and maintaining contact with top management to keep 
them informed and enthusiastic about the project. Similarly, Venkataraman et 
al. (1992) observed that a new venture idea required a champion to exert 
social and political effort to galvanise internal support for the concept and 
settle conflicts between key stakeholders.  Coalition building is another key 
activity of champions as well as other cooperative influence tactics in order to 
gain organisational traction for the idea (e.g. Galbraith, 1982, Markham and 
Griffin, 1998 and Shane, 1994). 
 
While a lot of research on innovation champions attribute much of their positive 
influence to an inspiring, transformational style of leadership (Chakrabarti and 
Hauschildt, 1989; Smith et al., 1984; Schön, 1963).  Research has also shown 
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that the technical skill and reputation of the champion can be equally 
important.  Technical competence and analytical skills (Beatty and Gordon, 
1991) are important assets of an innovation champion. Such technical abilities 
can be instrumental when it comes to ensuring that the champion has the 
required and perceived authority within the organisation. Jensen and 
Jorgensen (2004) suggest that when organisation members regard the 
champion as one of the leading experts in the organisation in the area of 
current interest, the champion’s chances of breakthrough are considerably 
enhanced.  Analytical skills are also seen as important for innovations where 
budgeting, planning and control are central tasks and these are areas where 
the US team leader excelled. Overall, this implies that leadership and 
managerial skills of the champion are also influential especially when it comes 
to driving a significant innovation project in the organisation (Beatty and 
Gordon, 1991; Conger and Kanungo, 1987; Oberg, 1972).  
 
In summary,  
 
‘The success of a creative idea is above all a matter of political activities and 
strategies of the ideator. It pays attention to the notion that organisational 
creativity is an individual expression on the one hand and organisational 
commitment on the other’  (Bakker et al., 2006. p306).   
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Additionally, innovation teams not only form the engine and heart of the 
innovation process (Buijs, 2007), they are also essential for encouraging the 
organisation to accept and adopt the innovation result.  Thus, it is not enough 
for the innovation champion merely to facilitate their team mates in coming up 
with a potentially winning idea, he or she also has the difficult task of finding 
internal support to progress the idea through the innovation process within the 
wider organisation. 
 
Because the innovation process is a complex, non-linear activity, the role of a 
champion while widely considered essential for success, is nonetheless 
difficult to define.  Howell et al. (2005) have created taxonomy of champion 
behaviour that is aligned with prior case study findings and this could make it 
easier for organisations to facilitate the emergence of hitherto largely informal 
innovation champions.  In the ISF project, it could be argued that a key role of 
the team leaders was to act as innovation champions, coordinating the efforts 
of their own teams and facilitating external contacts and networks at the start 
of the project.   
 
In the ISF project, the US team leader was particularly adept at these 
champion behaviours.  Apart from expressing a lot of confidence in his team 
and their ideas, he made key senior people aware of the exact nature of the 
ideas that were circulating around his group and he anticipated any possible 
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objections that might arise.  By commissioning the specialist services he did 
(copywriting, illustration, qualitative focus groups and online volumetric 
testing), he managed to effectively ward off any possible future criticism that 
the ideas were too technical and had not been filtered through consumer 
research.  Specifically, he was very adept in both getting the right people 
involved and keeping the right people updated. 
 
In the case of the UK team, they decided not to attempt to influence senior 
management by exposing them to the ideas on which they were working.  On 
examination, this seems a naïve approach and one which was not appreciated 
by the SLT in general.  The UK team leader refers to his desire to ‘surprise’ the 
SLT with some sparkling ideas.  By deliberately not sensitising SLT members 
to what was coming from his team, Grist inadvertently engineered a situation 
where his ideas had to work much harder to gain traction with the judging 
panel. 
 
In this case, success wasn’t just judged upon the originality of the ideas or 
concepts but was considered to depend upon the organisation’s subsequent 
likelihood of adopting the team’s ideas. Hence, the US team leader acted as 
an exemplar of some of the characteristics commonly ascribed, in the 
literature, to innovation champions and his teams’ ideas had already been 
previewed to the influential judging panel.  Ideally, towards the end of the 
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project, the focus of the champion’s role might have (and had in the case of 
Coapman) switched to finding internal future sponsors and building a coalition 
of support for the ideas.  In the case of the US team, this role was discharged 
to a very high level while in the UK, it was largely ignored.  The failure to 
engage in the coalition building required to seed the ideas with the company 
pipeline is definitely one of the factors that caused the UK team to lose the 
competition. 
 
The case data adds some support to the literature’s view that innovation 
champions can have a powerful effect in getting influential support for ideas 
within the organisation.  The evidence from this case is, however, slightly 
equivocal, because it was the team whose ideas were incremental who 
exhibited championing behaviours and secured support for the ideas. It could 
be argued that the company already had an ability to assimilate and a 
tendency to promote incremental ideas and hence it is hard to attribute this 
support exclusively to the role of the innovation champion.  Nevertheless, the 
case endorses the view that ideas can travel far further in the organisation if 
they attract the attention of influential senior managers who can allocate time 
and resources to them. 
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8.4.11  The Role of the Team Leader in Innovation Projects 
Academic interest in the role of the team leader in R&D projects has been high 
and sustained for 30 years now.  And yet, despite this, a number of authors 
continue to assert that this is an area, which has hardly been touched in 
research.  Buijs (2007, p. 203) declares there to be a gap in the literature in the 
area of leadership of innovation teams which he notes ‘has hardly been 
discussed in the innovation literature.’  Mumford et al. (2002) note that this 
topic is ‘conspicuously absent’ in the literature.  Edmondson (2003) merely 
suggests that the leadership role in R&D has been down-played in the 
literature while Elkins and Keller (2003) point to ‘a lack of theory-based 
leadership studies’ in the R&D environment.  Nippa (2006) says: 
 
Comprehensive reviews of the broad research on critical success factors of 
managing product innovation in most cases do not emphasise leadership or 
leadership styles explicitly. (p2) 
 
However, since 1980, a number of studies have sought to investigate and 
characterise this role. The R&D team in any firm, which is responsible for most 
of the organisation’s product innovation, plays, probably, the crucial role in firm 
survival (Huang and Lin 2006). Finding effective methods with which to 
manage an R&D team so that it achieves a high level of innovation 
performance should be on top of the agenda of any business (Beheshti, 2004).  
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The literature on this topic is prolific, consistent and reasonably clear about the 
skills and priorities of R&D team leaders likely to deliver the highest level of 
performance from their teams.   
 
Many studies agree that the R&D team leader needs to be an exceptional 
individual, combining both soft and hard skills in equal measure.  Just as an 
innovation project has essentially two elements; invention and implementation 
(Amabile, 1988; Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Kanter, 1988; Klein and Sorra, 
1996); equally the R&D manager must have the skills to manage those two 
phases.  But each phase requires very different skills not just from the leader 
but from the team involved as well.   
 
Nippa (2006) points out that the characteristics required in the ultimate R&D 
leader are not easy to distinguish or describe; ‘the search for the perfect R&D 
leader, i.e. superior characteristics, seems either to be still in the starting-block 
or up a blind alley.’(p3) 
 
There is a dichotomy that is not fully resolved in the literature.  It is this; 
innovation work relies, in its early stage on an ability to work in the currency of 
creativity, novelty and ideas (Cardinal, 2001).  This requires creativity and risk-
taking and a high tolerance for ambiguity.  This mainly characterises the ‘R’ 
stage of conventional R&D.  To lead a project of this type demands that the 
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leader facilitate a creative process that has an element of uncertainty and 
chaos at its heart.  Many studies come to the conclusion that relationship-
orientated or transformational leadership styles are superior within the context 
of innovation generally (Bass, 1985; Jung, 2001; Sosik, Kahai, and Avolio, 
1998).  This seems intuitively right, that charismatic, open, inspiring leadership 
would be the approach that would encourage idea generation and 
development when success, in that phase of the project, depends on the 
generation of high quality ideas.   
 
But innovation, at least in its latter, implementation phase, also involves 
process-driven and routine tasks. A key question in this debate is whether one 
individual can really manage the entire, end-to-end; fluid to fixed; divergent to 
convergent; flexible to structured; open and experimental to closed, process of 
innovation.  Nippa (2006. p4) sums up the difficulty thus: 
 
The perfect R&D leader (note: on the supervisory level) – whether born or 
socialised – possesses an optimal mix of superior characteristics and qualities 
that enables him or her to be everybody’s darling and to achieve all objectives 
for the benefit of all stakeholders. (p 4) 
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NPD Project Leaders will not always be involved in the creative process 
themselves but research shows that they exert an enormous influence on the 
people who are directly involved.  To undertake creative work successfully, 
individuals must have certain abilities; expertise and creative skills such as 
general cognitive problem solving skills (Reiter-Palmon and Illies, 2004), and 
task motivation (Amabile, 1997). A supervisor or leader will exert a direct 
influence on their subordinates’ motivation to engage in creative problem 
solving; they will, equally, exert a considerable influence on the motivation of 
their team with regard to risk-taking.  Additionally, R&D leaders, either 
deliberately or unintentionally, will shape the work environment arising from 
various elements of the organisational structure, climate and culture, which 
they often have authority over (Nippa, 2006).  In short, they will control the 
conditions under which team-level creativity will either flourish or perish. 
 
Amabile and Khaire (2008) suggest that: ‘One doesn’t manage creativity; one 
manages for creativity.’ (p. 102) 
 
Dolan et al. (2003) also point out that, in innovation, it is especially necessary 
to develop a style of facilitating’ leadership to ensure that the right things 
happen.  They see the essential characteristics as being the capacity to 
inspire, to articulate a vision and to hold teams of creative individuals together 
and channel their work.  Amabile and Khaire (2008) agree and point out that 
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the leader’s job is to map out the stages of innovation and recognise the 
different skill sets, processes and perhaps even technologies that are 
necessary to support each phase.  Their ‘simple’ advice to people managing 
innovation and creativity; ‘Know where you are in the game.’  (p. 104) 
 
Awareness of the leadership traits and skills required for the team or project 
management level of R&D leadership has attracted considerable research 
attention. Consequently, the research canvas is very broad covering such 
elements as leader traits and characteristics (Barczak and Wilemon, 1989), 
leader position and power (Ancona and Cadwell, 1992), project climate 
(Harbone and Johne, 2003), leadership styles (Sarin and McDermott, 2003) 
and autonomy (Jassawalla and Sashittal, 2000). 
 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) confirm that the heart of the product-
development process and the focus of much research is the project team.  
 
‘Project team members are the people who actually do the work of product 
development. They are the people who transform vague ideas, concepts, and 
product specifications into the design of new products.’   
 
Hence the project or innovation team is the very engine of new product or 
service development. Barczak and Wilemon (2003) suggest: 
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Senior management needs to ensure that team leaders possess the three sets 
of critical skills identified by our research: interpersonal, project management 
and technical. As a first step, management needs to carefully consider whom 
they place into team leadership positions. (p. 476) 
 
Within the ISF project, in the US, another, separate issue emerged about an 
individual member of the team who rejected the corporate vision implicit in the 
ISF mandate.  This person was personally sceptical about the organisation’s 
appetite for radical innovation and she acted accordingly.  In the academic 
literature, the characteristics of their organisation largely affect followers' 
creativity (Siegel and Kaemmerer, 1978; Scott and Bruce, 1994; Amabile et al., 
1996). According to Scott and Bruce (1994), organisational climate is an 
important factor for creativity; employees' perceptions of the extent to which 
creativity is encouraged at the workplace, and the extent to which 
organisational resources are allocated to supporting creativity influence 
creative performance. An employee's perception of an innovative climate 
encourages risk taking, and the challenge to use creative approaches at work. 
This employee, clearly, did not perceive the organisational climate for creativity 
to be genuinely capable of accepting and progressing truly radical ideas and 
she acted accordingly in trying to block the adoption of the group of ideas 
outside the current footprint of the organisation. 
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Possibly the most important decision to be taken in such an innovation project 
is the selection of team leader.  The leader needs to be able to combine 
components of the archetypal transformational leader when inspiring team 
members with a compelling vision.  He also needs to possess solid technical 
skills to be able to judge the quality of the team’s work and to command the 
team’s respect as an expert in his field.  As an expert, the team leader must be 
able to forge useful networks both within and, especially, outside the 
organisation.  At a minimum, the team leader needs to be positively disposed 
and open to external collaboration even if she doesn’t personally possess the 
necessary contacts to make it possible.  Additionally, she should have a clear 
view of the direction and pace with which she wants her team to move.  This 
might involve creating sub-teams to combine skills and projects in order to 
meet the project objectives.  The leader also needs to use political acumen 
and experience in finding a path to take the team’s ideas forward within the 
organisation; a process, which invariably involves enrolling senior level 
champions to believe in and support the team’s ideas. 
 
The leader then needs to possess the transactional skills and style to make 
things happen and to channel the work towards an agreed output once the 
creativity has done its job. 
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In light of this, when reviewing the ISF case, while the approaches and 
activities of the two team leaders were very different from each other; they 
each had some elements to recommend them.  At a simplistic level, one can 
imagine that the perfect R&D team leader would be an optimal blend of the 
finest qualities of the two subjects in this study.  
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions & Contribution 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter has three objectives: first, to outline the contribution this study 
makes to the field of new product development and  innovation and to position 
this research in terms of its import to policy and practice, second, to discuss 
the limitations of the research and third, to make recommendations for future 
research. 
 
9.2 Research Question 
The objective of the study was to understand how R&D teams in large 
organisations generate and develop radical innovation ideas.  Despite an 
increased academic interest in NPD structures, the question of how firms 
should implement an effective NPD process design for radical innovation 
remains largely unanswered. Sundstrom and Zika-Viktorrson (2009) 
acknowledge that although innovation is being studied with ever increasing 
frequency and intensity, there have been many calls for a better understanding 
of how innovation really happens in organisations (Goffin and Mitchell, 2010; 
Grönlund et al., 2010).   Van de Ven and Poole (1990; p.313) hold that ‘an 
appreciation of the temporal sequence of activities in developing and 
implementing new ideas is fundamental to the management of innovation.’  
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The research question addressed in this study is as follows: how does 
innovation happen in a large, complex, global organisation? Specifically, within 
an R&D setting, how can a firm create a culture, a climate and a team that will 
deliver radical innovation ideas?  How are such ideas generated and how 
should they be tested and ranked, and how do organisations decide which 
ideas to pursue and which to abandon? How are, or should, teams be 
managed to deliver on a firm’s innovation objectives?   What  organisational 
factors might encourage innovation, as well as what factors might inhibit 
innovation?   
 
9.3 Findings 
It is widely acknowledged that in terms of new product (and service) 
development and their impact on both the industry and firm level; significant 
differences exist between radical and incremental innovations (Dosi, 1982; 
Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 2000). There is a plethora 
of classifications to define radical innovations (in particular) with some 
emphasising their impact on the technology; others stressing their disruption to 
the market; still others focusing on their novelty and more relating the 
radicalness to its impact on the parent organisation.  
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Based on an embedded twin-case study within the R&D division of GSK; 
following the processes and outcomes of two competing innovation or NPD 
teams a number of factors have been shown to be conducive to the 
development of radical innovation. 
 
The variation in outputs and outcomes for the teams; with one biased heavily 
towards radical ideas and the other veering almost exclusively towards 
incremental ideas was not envisaged a priori in the design of the ISF initiative. 
 It transpired that the team leaders chosen for both teams had vastly diverging 
views on how to accomplish the objectives and their individual leadership 
styles was one critical factor that influenced these outcomes. Neither approach 
was ideal and perhaps the perfect approach might have been somewhere in 
between the two described.  
 
Chapter Eight  provided a response to the research question which asked how 
does innovation unfold inside large, complex, organisations in the R&D setting; 
and, what factors might be conducive to the development of radical ideas for 
innovation and which organisational factors might frustrate radical innovation.  
Chapter Eight has reprised the key themes both from the perspective of the 
case itself and then from the standpoint of the literature. 
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Four factors within the process in the case study emerged as being central to 
the variation in outputs that characterised the teams: structures, processes, 
networks and leadership.  As part of the analysis, these factors were 
integrated into a framework (potentially) for application by managers who are 
charged with the responsibility of either setting up or managing innovation 
teams and projects within their organisations. 
 
Figure 9.1: Proposed Framework for Managing Innovation Teams & Projects 
 
9.4 Contributions 
As introductory context, it is important to note that this study is set within a 
natural experiment within a global firm.  The case study addresses the overall 
NPD process but the case data is specifically rooted in the heart of the fuzzy-
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front-end or the early stage of the innovation process.  Hence, the study’s 
contribution will be strongest in guiding managerial practice and scholarly 
research in the first phase (Idea Generation) of the innovation value chain 
(Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007). 
 
This study makes a number of contributions. Whetton (1999) notes that most 
scholars do not develop an original theory, rather they add something to an 
already existing theory.  In the case of this study, the key area, construct or 
concept being examined is the practice new product development within firms.  
A theory is defined as a collection of assertions or propositions that identify 
what variables are important and for what reasons.  It specifies how they are 
inter-related and why, and it identifies the specific conditions under which they 
should or should not be related (Campbell, 1990). Straw and Sutton (1995) 
asserted that theories generally answer questions of ‘why?’  This perspective 
was echoed by Christensen and Sundahl (2001; p 2) who concluded that; ‘A 
theory specifies what causes what, and why, and under what circumstances.’ 
 
In this study, as in a number of others (Leifer et al, 2001), a pragmatic 
approach has been taken to defining radical and incremental innovation; i.e. 
the former being innovation which, for the promoting company, requires both 
new technology and new marketing capabilities because it means entering 
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new markets or new market segments.  Thus, radical innovation represents an 
opportunity for firms that offer both higher risk and potentially higher reward.   
 
As Phillips et al (2006) confirmed, radical innovation is not a new concept, 
major upheavals in technology or markets have been happening since before 
the Industrial Revolution.  The issue they emphasise for managers is that the 
events or trends that trigger such upheavals; like the advance or adoption of 
new technology, the fragmenting of markets, the rising power of the consumer 
and regional instability in political and economic systems are all on the 
increase.  Hence, managers will be faced with a situation where radical 
innovation needs to be proactively planned for and facilitated to an 
unprecedented degree. 
 
The contributions of this research are as follows. First, it is argued that the 
method and context of the study is, in itself, a contribution to the literature on 
innovation. Specifically: 
 
- In terms of method, the study sought to connect the inputs to the 
innovation process to the outcomes that were developed within the 
project teams. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature on 
innovation management, which tends to treat these two aspects in a 
somehow separate way (Isari and Pontiggia, 2010). That is, researchers 
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often focuses either focus on how the process of innovation is organised 
in firms (innovation models) or, alternatively, on the results of the 
innovation processes and their characteristics (innovation outcomes).  
 
- The study is based on a revelatory case study. As noted in in Chapter 
Two, the majority of contributions to the leading journal on innovation 
are quantitative in nature, with case based research in the minority; with 
deductive theorising being the most prominent approach to research in 
organisations in general (Shepherd and Sutcliffe, 2011) and to 
innovation studies in particular. Thus, in its methodological approach, 
this study acts as a counterpoint to the prevailing orthodoxy of positivist 
research.  
 
- But, most importantly in this section, an aspect of context worth noting is 
that the design of the innovation initiative, which constitutes the case 
study, is unique in this organisation and certainly rare in any organisation. 
The ISF programme itself marked a cornerstone of the reorganisation of 
GSK’s R&D division. This ISF programme underlined the organisation’s 
commitment to innovation; its objective was to liven up the NPD pipeline 
by generating radical ideas. This project design lends itself to types of 
observation, comparison and analysis, which would be impossible with 
more conventional cases. This rare access into the real workings of an 
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innovation team and project operating at a very high level in one of the 
world’s biggest pharma companies, builds on previous pharma R&D case 
studies (Balsano et al., 2008; Bonabeau et al., 2008). Additionally, while 
ISF was an organisational experiment separate from and outside other 
innovation programmes being concurrently run by the company; it also 
had a second experiment nested within it.  This second experiment refers 
to the choice of the two team leaders; one a process expert and the other 
a scientist. 
 
 
Second, this study suggests a set of factors and a style of leadership that 
might be associated with radical innovation.  
 
Third, the study suggests that there is a differential potency associated with 
each variable connected with radical innovation, with the impact depending on 
the stage of the project along the innovation value chain (IVC). Many prior 
studies have treated the innovation process as a homogenous unit and have 
neglected to sub-divide it into its very separate component parts. Such a 
division is made in the literature around the stage-gate process but this is 
mainly to align mechanistic, to-do lists with each stage of the process. This 
research, on the other hand, is suggesting that the factors previously 
connected with radical innovation are of increasing or decreasing relevance to 
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managers depending on the phase of the IVC in which each specific 
innovation project is situated. 
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For example, the contribution of individual creativity to an overall radical 
innovation project depends on the stage at which the project is at, with 
arguably its strongest contribution coming at the idea-generation stage.  
Similarly, the contribution of strong project management capability is likely to 
have a beneficial effect throughout the project but this effect is likely to be 
greatest at the latter, implementation, diffusion stage of the project.   
 
By considering how stage of the innovation life cycle might influence the nature 
of the innovation process, the study contributes to the debate on the question 
of if, how and when the voice of the consumer (VOC) or customer should be 
included in the innovation process.  Extant literature suggests that it is unclear 
if the VOC is an advantage to an innovation team or whether it limits the 
variety and scope of ideas that are considered.  This study suggests that the 
inconclusive nature of this debate may reflect the failure by some of the extant 
research to differentiate between the stages of the innovation process and the 
nature of the innovation sought.  So, the case data suggests that during the 
earlier ideation phase when radical ideas are the desired outcome, it may be 
advantageous to delay the VOC input to the process. 
 
Fourth, extant literature also presents the innovation process in terms of a 
stage-gate process. This study suggests that when radical innovation is the 
quest for teams, the usefulness of stage-gate processes may be limited. These 
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mechanistic approaches to innovation can have the effect, if they are too 
rigidly applied, of stifling creativity and killing promising ideas too early.  
Moreover, stage-gates represent the phases of the process to be equivalent in 
length whereas the case data suggests that spending longer in the idea 
generation phase and involving more (internal and external) people in that part 
of the process is more likely to yield radical ideas for innovation. 
 
Fifth, this study addresses an important gap in the literature regarding the 
importance of leadership styles to the performance and outputs of innovation 
teams (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a; Barczak and Wilemon, 1992; 
McDonough and Barczak, 1991; McDonough and Griffin, 1997; Sarin and 
McDermott, 2003; Sarin and O’Connor, 2009). Prior literature has explored 
leadership in R&D and innovation but studies typically fail to distinguish 
between the type of leadership that is appropriate or required according to the 
phase of the innovation process. The case suggests that style of leadership is 
contingent on the stage of the innovation process. Specifically, the case 
suggests that loose and flexible leadership may be associated with radical 
innovation.  The converse also holds, with tight management being associated 
with incremental innovations. 
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Fourth, this study contributes to our understanding of the role of networks in 
innovation. Existing literature suggests that collaborating with organisational 
and individual networks contribute to a likelihood of success with radical 
innovation (Karkkainen and Ojanpera, 2006; Caswill and Wensley, 2007; 
Bahemia and Squire, 2010), while the closed innovation system is correlated 
with incremental innovation. More recently, Steiner (2009) suggests that 
collaborative creativity (i.e. tapping into external sources of ideas) is a 
prerequisite for the generation of ideas for innovation that aims at radical 
instead of incremental improvements of products, processes and services. 
Steiner (2009), in his call for ‘open creativity’, notes the particular contribution 
a networked, collaborative approach can make in the creative, idea-generation 
phase of innovation: ‘In a way, what “open creativity” is for creativity, 
Chesbrough’s “open innovation” is for innovation.’  (Steiner, 2009, p. 5). The 
association between external networks and radical innovation is evident in this 
case data.  The UK team, whose activities included external connections with 
experts, innovation intermediaries, universities and research institutes, 
developed a portfolio of radical ideas. The US team whose idea-generation 
activities were principally confined to desk research produced mainly 
incremental ideas. The data extends existing literature on the role of networks 
by suggesting that the recruitment of external partners to collaborate in 
innovation projects may in some cases be relatively easy and swift to effect. 
This suggests that it some regards it may be relatively straightforward for some 
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organisations to switch from a closed to an open innovation model of 
innovation. 
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9.5 Limitations of the Research 
The qualitative nature of this research, with its focus on a single organisation 
and twin case study, means that the findings cannot be confirmed by 
traditional, statistical measures of reliability. The nature of qualitative research 
generates outcomes that cannot be viewed as facts or objective truths; they 
are the result of an interaction between the research and the researched 
(Silverman, 2000).  Thus although these frameworks cannot be represented as 
complete theories in themselves, they do highlight issues of interest to those 
involved in the academic and practitioner community. 
 
A further limitation is that not only is this case study embedded within one 
organisation; it is also limited to one industry sector, the healthcare or 
pharmaceutical industry.  This industry is characterised by a significant 
investment in and focus on R&D to an extent that is unlikely to be matched in 
other industries that are not so research intensive. 
 
An element of bias may be inherent in this case study because of the fact that 
it represents insider research. The selection of an embedded case study 
design (in GSK) poses a particular challenge arising out of the researcher’s 
close involvement with the organisation.   Coghlan and Brannick (2005, p. 61) 
argue that insider-research facilitates ‘the knowledge, insight and 
understanding of organisational dynamics, but also the lived experience of 
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one’s own organisation.’  All of which are difficult to replicate with much 
legitimacy as an outsider with merely cursory familiarity of the context.   
 
Nevertheless, in the current research, it was a particularly important 
consideration and challenge to maintain objectivity and neutrality.  This was 
partly accomplished by relying on multiple informants; by including 
interviewees from different levels within the organisation as well as integrating 
extensive evidential support from documents and archives in order to support 
the study’s findings. 
 
Conventional definitions of innovation give equal weight to both invention and 
implementation (Bessant and Tidd, 2011). Hansen and Birkinshaw’s (2007) 
model extends this innovation definition into a three-stage journey; idea 
generation; idea conversion and idea diffusion.  This project revolved mainly 
around the invention or idea generation element with the implementation 
phase mainly devoted to building a coalition of future support to find 
champions to promote the ideas internally.  Hence, some of the elements 
found to be associated with the successful delivery of radical innovation are of 
limited relevance here as they apply more to the implementation or diffusion 
phase; a phase which played a more minor role in this instance. 
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These limitations suggest that the results have to be interpreted with a slight 
degree of caution. However, the chosen methodology in the current study 
contributed significantly to the trustworthiness of the results. Therefore, the 
results are interesting and significant for both researchers and managers.  
While the results are in no way generalisable, they are potentially transferable 
to organisations of similar scale and context to the one described. Thus, the 
value of the findings, in terms of their generality, results from their degree of 
credibility to those with an interest in the research area (Wyatt, 2001).   
 
9.6   Implications for Practice and Policy 
This research is of value to managers who participate in, use, commission or 
manage teams to deliver on NPD or innovation objectives as it indicates 
potential project or team-level factors that may facilitate or hamper the 
likelihood of innovation success. It identifies a range of contingencies, which 
potentially have a bearing on the appropriate calibration of the structure, 
processes, networks and leadership for innovation teams. In summary, it 
provides the following broad guidelines or recommendation to managers 
involved with or leading innovation projects: 
 
  
498 
 
Structure 
1) Choose the team carefully and ensure that participants have sufficient 
time to engage with the innovation programme by adjusting their 
workload and objectives according to their expected input to the project. 
2) Be mindful that the team will perform best when there are not too many 
members; 7 or 8 may be an ideal number. 
3) Ensure that the appropriate line managers have been briefed and that the 
necessary flexibility in reporting arrangements has been anticipated. 
4) Space to innovate: assign an appropriate creative space in which the 
team can meet and where they can store and interact with project 
material 
 
Processes 
5) Ideally, have access to a commercial expert in order to assist in the 
prioritisation of the ideas by using market data 
6) Develop an outline framework for prioritising the early-stage ideas which 
is flexible enough to allow for radical ideas but sensitive enough to be 
able to distinguish between potentially major and minor ideas 
7) Ensure that the entire team are aligned behind the objective and deal 
with any outlying opinions which may impede the team’s work 
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8) Plan for the appropriate integration of the voice of the customer in the 
project, while acknowledging that how this is done may differ with each 
type of idea 
9) Be judicious in the use of innovation IT and software, they may make 
managing the project easier, but they are unlikely to be the catalyst for 
radical ideas. 
 
Networks 
10)  Ensure the team is connected to all the relevant stakeholders and 
experts within the organisation so that they can leverage any tacit 
knowledge that may be available. 
11)  Connect the team with external networks of research institutes; 
universities; innovation intermediaries and consultants so that third party 
ideas are included in the ideation phase. 
12)  Begin to position the ideas with senior management and identify 
champions for them to facilitate their subsequent adoption into the 
pipeline after the innovation team has handed them over. 
 
Team Leader 
13)  Choose a team leader who has the necessary skills and experience to 
facilitate the process through the innovation value chain. 
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A further point; the ISF and this subsequent analysis of the project and its 
outcomes offer a rich learning opportunity for GSK. Specifically, it allows them 
the opportunity when considering similar initiatives to integrate the lessons 
learned from this project. The author has been invited to present these findings 
to the organisation in 2011. The framework proposed is merely a beginning; it 
needs testing and refinement.  It is hoped that GSK might adopt this model in 
future innovation programmes within the R&D group and this will allow the 
model to be tested. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, Ireland faces an innovation imperative; new 
product and service development is the central pillar of current (2010) 
government economic policy.  Apart from public service innovation over which 
it has some control, the government can only achieve its ambitions for 
innovation through enhancing the innovation capacity of indigenous Irish 
businesses. These insights and managerial recommendations will assist Irish 
companies to develop and manage their own innovation projects, possibly with 
a greater likelihood of success.  The Community Innovation Survey (CIS, 
2008) indicates that only 47% of firms in Ireland are ‘innovation active’ which 
means that the majority of Irish firms are not engaged in innovation or new 
product and service development.  One of the most often cited reasons for this 
absence of focus on innovation within Irish firms is ‘lack of knowledge or 
specialist training in innovation’. 
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Managerial guidelines and insight around the management of innovation, such 
as the issues raised and the frameworks proposed here are likely to be of 
considerable interest to Irish businesses as they look for practical methods to 
engage with new product and service development.   
 
9.7 Suggestions for Future Research 
While the research examined a single company in a single industry and this 
limits the generaliseability of these results, this study has provided in-depth 
insights that can be extended to future research.  For practitioners, it 
underlines the importance of linking structures, processes, networks and 
leadership in innovation projects and of maintaining feedback mechanisms that 
help adapt these elements over time. 
 
This study addresses a number of questions in the research on new product 
development.  It is, however, rooted upstream in the early phases of the 
process and its import is most pronounced at the first phase of the innovation 
value chain.  Hence, it suggests some questions for a research agenda that 
extend further along the value chain towards implementation.  Among these 
questions is what happens to the outputs of these experiments inside the 
organisation as they get handed off to other managers and teams and begin 
the next phase of their life in the NPD pipeline.  How are they assimilated into 
the organisation as they move closer to commercialisation.  Are there any 
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factors likely to provide them with a higher likelihood of success as they enter 
the commercial funnel? 
 
Within this experiment, one notable feature was that there was little evidence 
of the guiding hand of corporate strategy.  The project teams were merely 
asked for a quota of ideas across a number of different therapy areas as well 
as a few ideas outside the company’s current business footprint.  Future 
research might examine how strategy, including portfolio strategy might help to 
give such programmes strategic clarity and organisational connection. 
 
Further research would be helpful in establishing a correlation between the 
resources, including time, devoted to the early stage ideation and the eventual 
novelty of the innovation outcomes. It seems logical that there should be a 
positive connection between the amount of time devoted to the idea-
generation phase of innovation and the quality of the ideas emerging from it.  
However, this is possibly a curvilinear relationship, which reaches a point after 
which any additional time spend ideation may actually be counterproductive. 
 
Another area of future research surrounds organisational creativity.  This study 
illustrated a very high level of creativity from the UK team, which appeared to 
flourish under conditions of extremely loose management.  It is noted in the 
literature that innovation is generally thought to be a group activity while 
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invention is an individual act (Amabile 1998). In the UK team, there was a high 
level of invention and relatively little group activity. A useful area of future 
research might be to investigate the conditions most conducive to individual 
creativity in the context of innovation teams in particular. How individual 
creativity gets channelled into organisation and team level initiatives merits 
further attention. 
 
A key question, which was not explored in this study, is how firms make the 
transition back to operations once they have developed a radical innovation.  
Sometimes, existing business units within the firm will either be uninterested or 
inappropriate as the operating home for the new offering.  In these cases new 
SBU’s (strategic business units) may be created or, alternatively, the initiative 
can be spun-out to a third party for commercialisation.  Each of these 
possibilities has repercussions for the ultimate success of the venture and it 
would make an interesting research study to compare the various routes to 
operational commercialisation of truly radical innovations that emerge from 
large organisations. 
 
Another potential future research stream concerns the handling of the 
personnel involved in the development of a successful radical innovation 
project.  Inevitably, they will pass the baton to a business manager.  The 
receiving unit generally wants to assimilate the new product or service into 
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existing operations. Leifer et al, (2002) refer to this handover as the ‘transition 
gap’ and note that it is beset with difficulties.  They find that not only does 
successful transition require the active input of people from both sides of the 
gap, but it is often also necessary to have the process facilitated by people 
who are expert in managing these transitions.  Such tensions are likely to be 
most acute in radical innovations and some template for managing the 
transition would be beneficial to managers. 
 
This case study was investigating a firm in the healthcare business and this 
also restricts the generaliseability of the findings.  Future research could 
therefore examine the nature of innovation practices in industrial or technology 
firms to extend our understanding of those industries.  This would go some 
way in addressing whether the typology advanced here is relevant in a wider 
context. 
 
Future research efforts could also be applied to empirically testing this 
innovation framework 
 
9.8 Final Comment 
The subject of innovation is one of increasing importance at government level, 
at sector level, at industry level and at company and project level.  While 
decades of research have been able to show that innovation is no longer a 
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dark art, nor is it solely attributable to luck – it is still seen as something of a 
managerial black box whose secrets have yet to be fully revealed. 
 
Uncertainty plagues radical innovation projects.  The first, and often greatest, 
uncertainty is the technical one; can we make this? Will it do what we claim for 
it?  These are quickly followed by market uncertainties such as who will want 
to buy it and are there enough buyers to make it a worthwhile venture?  But 
equally frustrating, in the background are often resource and organisational 
uncertainties such as will the project be funded this year? Or how can we find 
more sponsors and champions to believe in this project?  Aligned to these 
uncertainties are issues around managing senior management expectations 
for radical projects and devising appropriate metrics for ideas that are 
genuinely novel. Paradoxically, all this uncertainty and risk makes radical 
projects the most exciting innovation initiatives to be involved in.  After all, if 
they are successful, the payoff is dramatic for the firm. This excitement was 
what attracted me to embark on my study.  The case study contained in this 
thesis, I believe, offers an interesting insight into how radical innovation can be 
encouraged inside large organisations.  Given the long gestation period 
involved in the NPD process in healthcare, often requiring clinical trials to 
demonstrate efficacy and safety, a number of the projects initiated within this 
project are still actively being developed by GSK. 
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